OpenBSD Networking-related randomization port
Subsystems (8)
PATCH 1/1 OpenBSD Networking-related randomization port
Hi,
Attached you can find a split up patch ported from grSecurity [1], as Linus commented that he wouldn't get a whole-sale patch, I was working on it and also studying what features of grSecurity can be implemented without a development or maintenance overhead, aka less-invasive implementations.
It adds support for advanced networking-related randomization, in concrete it adds support for TCP ISNs randomization, RPC XIDs randomization, IP IDs randomization and finally a sub-key under the Cryptographic options menu for Linux PRNG [2] enhancements (useful now and also for future patch submissions), which currently has an only-one option for poll sizes increasing (x2).
As it's impact is minimal (in performance and development/maintenance terms), I recommend to merge it, as it gives a basic prevention for the so-called system fingerprinting (which is used most by "kids" to know how old and insecure could be a target system, many time used as the first, even only-one, data to decide if attack or not the target host) among other things.
There's only a missing feature that is present on grSecurity, the sources ports randomization which seems achieved now by some changes that can be checked out in the Linux BKBits repository:
http://linux.bkbits.net:8080/linux-2.6/diffs/net/ipv4/[email protected]?nav=index.html|src/|src/net|src/net/ipv4|hist/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
(net/ipv4/[email protected])
I'm not sure of the effectiveness of that changes, but I just prefer to keep it as most simple as possible.If there are thoughts on reverting to the old schema, and using obsd_rand.c code instead, just drop me a line and I will modify the patch.
I've uploaded the patches and obsd_rand.c source to:
http://cvs.tuxedo-es.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/obsd-netrand/
References:
[1]: http://www.grsecurity.net
[2]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudorandom_number_generator
Cheers,
Signature · 2 lines
Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro <[email protected]> [1024D/6F2B2DEC] & [2048g/9AE91A22][http://tuxedo-es.org]
crypto/Kconfig +20 -0
@@ -4,6 +4,26 @@ menu "Cryptographic options" +config RANDOM + bool "Random Numbers Generator enhancements" + help + By enabling this option, you will be able to select + a few enhancements for the Linux Random Numbers Generator + (./drivers/char/random.{h,c}). + + If unsure: say Y. + +config RANDOM_INCREASED_POOLSIZES + bool "Larger entropy pools" + depends on RANDOM + help + If you say Y here, the entropy pools used for many features of Linux + will be doubled in size. It is recommended that you say Y + here. Saying Y here has a similar effect as modifying + /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize. + + If unsure: say Y. + config CRYPTO bool "Cryptographic API" help
drivers/char/random.c +10 -0
@@ -255,10 +255,20 @@/* * Configuration information +* If "increased pool sizes" option is enabled, +* then poll size default values get increased x2. */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_INCREASED_POOLSIZES +#define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 1024 +#define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 256 +#define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 512 +#else #define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 512#define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 128#define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 256 +#endif +#define USE_SHA /*
include/linux/random.h +6 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@#ifdef __KERNEL__ +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_SECURITY +extern unsigned long obsd_get_random_long (void ); +extern __u16 ip_randomid (void ); +extern __u32 ip_randomisn (void ); +#endif +extern void rand_initialize_irq (int irq); extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +18 -4
@@ -539,10 +539,14 @@static inline __u32 tcp_v4_init_sequence (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) { +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDISN +return ip_randomisn (); +#else return secure_tcp_sequence_number (skb->nh.iph->daddr, skb->nh.iph->saddr, skb->h.th->dest, skb->h.th->source); +#endif }/* called with local bh disabled */
@@ -833,14 +837,21 @@tcp_v4_setup_caps (sk, &rt->u.dst); tp->ext2_header_len = rt->u.dst.header_len; -if (!tp->write_seq) +if (!tp->write_seq) { +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDISN + tp->write_seq =ip_randomisn (); +#else tp->write_seq =secure_tcp_sequence_number (inet->saddr, inet->daddr, inet->sport, usin->sin_port); - +#endif + } +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDID + inet->id =htons (ip_randomid ()); +#else inet->id = tp->write_seq ^ jiffies; - +#endif err =tcp_connect (sk); rt =NULL ;if (err)
@@ -1579,8 +1590,11 @@if (newinet->opt) newtp->ext_header_len = newinet->opt->optlen; newtp->ext2_header_len = dst->header_len; +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDID + newinet->id =htons (ip_randomid ()); +#else newinet->id = newtp->write_seq ^ jiffies; - +#endif tcp_sync_mss (newsk,dst_pmtu (dst)); newtp->advmss =dst_metric (dst,RTAX_ADVMSS );tcp_initialize_rcv_mss (newsk);
net/ipv4/udp.c +1 -0
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@#include <linux/inet.h> #include <linux/ipv6.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> +#include <linux/random.h> #include <net/snmp.h> #include <net/tcp.h> #include <net/protocol.h>
net/Kconfig +53 -0
59 lines not on this page · raw message
net/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ tmp-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) := compat.o obj-$(CONFIG_NET) += $(tmp-y) +obj-$(CONFIG_NET_SECURITY) += obsd_rand.o # LLC has to be linked before the files in net/802/ obj-$(CONFIG_LLC) += llc/
net/obsd_rand.c +269 -0
269 lines not on this page · raw message
net/sunrpc/xprt.c +4 -0
@@ -1342,7 +1342,11 @@*/ static inline u32 xprt_alloc_xid (struct rpc_xprt *xprt) { +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RANDRPC +return (u32 )obsd_get_random_long (); +#else return xprt->xid++; +#endif }static inline void xprt_init_xid (struct rpc_xprt *xprt)
Quoted 8 lines · Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
...
As it's impact is minimal (in performance and development/maintenance terms), I recommend to merge it, as it gives a basic prevention for the so-called system fingerprinting (which is used most by "kids" to know how old and insecure could be a target system, many time used as the first, even only-one, data to decide if attack or not the target host) among other things.
...
"basic prevention"?
I hardly see how this patch makes OS fingerprinting by e.g. Nmap impossible.
cu
Adrian
Signature · 4 lines
"Is there not promise of rain?" Ling Tan asked suddenly out
of the darkness. There had been need of rain for many days.
"Only a promise," Lao Er said.
Pearl S. Buck - Dragon SeedQuoted 10 lines · Adrian Bunk
Quoted 8 lines · Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
...
As it's impact is minimal (in performance and development/maintenance terms), I recommend to merge it, as it gives a basic prevention for the so-called system fingerprinting (which is used most by "kids" to know how old and insecure could be a target system, many time used as the first, even only-one, data to decide if attack or not the target host) among other things.
...
Quoted 3 lines
"basic prevention"?
I hardly see how this patch makes OS fingerprinting by e.g. Nmap impossible.
That's an example, as you can find at the grsecurity handbook [1]:
"The default Linux TCP/IP-stack has some properties that make it more vulnerable to prediction-based hacks. By randomizing several items, predicting the behaviour will be a lot more difficult."
"Randomized IP IDs hinders OS fingerprinting and will keep your machine from being a bounce for an untraceable portscan."
References:
[1]: http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/hardened/grsecurity.xml
Cheers,
PS: Thanks for CC'ing me, I forgot to mention that I'm not subscribed to the list, I just read the archives and reply by getting the original mbox-formatted messages.
Signature · 2 lines
Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro <[email protected]> [1024D/6F2B2DEC] & [2048g/9AE91A22][http://tuxedo-es.org]
Quoted 15 lines · On Fri, 28 Jan 2005 18:47:55 +0100 Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro…
Quoted 10 lines · Adrian Bunk
Quoted 8 lines · Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
...
As it's impact is minimal (in performance and development/maintenance terms), I recommend to merge it, as it gives a basic prevention for the so-called system fingerprinting (which is used most by "kids" to know how old and insecure could be a target system, many time used as the first, even only-one, data to decide if attack or not the target host) among other things.
...Quoted 3 lines
"basic prevention"?
I hardly see how this patch makes OS fingerprinting by e.g. Nmap impossible.
Quoted 5 lines
That's an example, as you can find at the grsecurity handbook [1]:
"The default Linux TCP/IP-stack has some properties that make it more vulnerable to prediction-based hacks. By randomizing several items, predicting the behaviour will be a lot more difficult."
No it just changes the fingerprint table. "Hmm, this looks like a newer generation system, must be OpenBSD or Linux".
Quoted 5 lines
"Randomized IP IDs hinders OS fingerprinting and will keep your machine from being a bounce for an untraceable portscan."
References:
[1]: http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/hardened/grsecurity.xml
This is a very transitory effect, it works only because your machine is then different from the typical Linux machine; therefore the scanner will go on to the next obvious ones. But if this gets incorporated widely then the rarity factor goes away and this defense becomes useless.
Signature · 1 line
Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Quoted 4 lines · Stephen Hemminger
This is a very transitory effect, it works only because your machine is then different from the typical Linux machine; therefore the scanner will go on to the next obvious ones. But if this gets incorporated widely then the rarity factor goes away and this defense becomes useless.
I would prefer to say that such "rarity factor" comes directly from the "rarity factor" given by the PRNG.
So, we should take "rarity factor" as the PRNG seed entropy and not as a predictable value (not in a reasonable time manner, which is the goal of most crypto-related developments, to make as much difficult as possible to cause an information leak, and if such leak happens, ensure that the information is no longer needed, private, confidential, critical, whateverelse) (AFAIK).
So, there's no point at that claim.
Cheers,
Signature · 2 lines
Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro <[email protected]> [1024D/6F2B2DEC] & [2048g/9AE91A22][http://tuxedo-es.org]
Quoted 15 lines · Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
Quoted 10 lines · Adrian Bunk
Quoted 8 lines · Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
...
As it's impact is minimal (in performance and development/maintenance terms), I recommend to merge it, as it gives a basic prevention for the so-called system fingerprinting (which is used most by "kids" to know how old and insecure could be a target system, many time used as the first, even only-one, data to decide if attack or not the target host) among other things.
...Quoted 3 lines
"basic prevention"?
I hardly see how this patch makes OS fingerprinting by e.g. Nmap impossible.
Quoted 5 lines
That's an example, as you can find at the grsecurity handbook [1]:
...
"Randomized IP IDs hinders OS fingerprinting and will keep your machine from being a bounce for an untraceable portscan."
...
The OS detection in Nmap [1], which is AFAIK the most popular port scanner today works by e.g. checking the answer of an ACK to a closed port.
I do still not understand how your patch has any impact on these issues.
Quoted 2 lines
Cheers,
...
cu
Adrian
[1] http://www.insecure.org/nmap/nmap-fingerprinting-article.html
Signature · 4 lines
"Is there not promise of rain?" Ling Tan asked suddenly out
of the darkness. There had been need of rain for many days.
"Only a promise," Lao Er said.
Pearl S. Buck - Dragon SeedQuoted 26 lines
Attached you can find a split up patch ported from grSecurity [1], as Linus commented that he wouldn't get a whole-sale patch, I was working on it and also studying what features of grSecurity can be implemented without a development or maintenance overhead, aka less-invasive implementations.
It adds support for advanced networking-related randomization, in concrete it adds support for TCP ISNs randomization, RPC XIDs randomization, IP IDs randomization and finally a sub-key under the Cryptographic options menu for Linux PRNG [2] enhancements (useful now and also for future patch submissions), which currently has an only-one option for poll sizes increasing (x2).
As it's impact is minimal (in performance and development/maintenance terms), I recommend to merge it, as it gives a basic prevention for the so-called system fingerprinting (which is used most by "kids" to know how old and insecure could be a target system, many time used as the first, even only-one, data to decide if attack or not the target host) among other things.
There's only a missing feature that is present on grSecurity, the sources ports randomization which seems achieved now by some changes that can be checked out in the Linux BKBits repository:
http://linux.bkbits.net:8080/linux-2.6/diffs/net/ipv4/[email protected]?nav=index.html|src/|src/net|src/net/ipv4|hist/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
(net/ipv4/[email protected])
Quoted 4 lines
I'm not sure of the effectiveness of that changes, but I just prefer to keep it as most simple as possible.If there are thoughts on reverting to the old schema, and using
obsd_rand.ccode instead, just drop me a line and I will modify the patch.
Okay, but:
* Need to give better explanation of why this is required, existing randomization code in network is compromise between performance and security. So you need to quantify the performance impact of this, and the security threat reduction.
* Why are the OpenBSD random functions better? because they have more security coolness factor?
* It is hard to have two levels of security based on config options. Think of a distro vendor, do they ship the fast or the secure system??
As always:
* Send networking stuff to [email protected]
* Please split up patches.
Quoted 31 lines · Stephen Hemminger
Quoted 26 lines
Attached you can find a split up patch ported from grSecurity [1], as Linus commented that he wouldn't get a whole-sale patch, I was working on it and also studying what features of grSecurity can be implemented without a development or maintenance overhead, aka less-invasive implementations.
It adds support for advanced networking-related randomization, in concrete it adds support for TCP ISNs randomization, RPC XIDs randomization, IP IDs randomization and finally a sub-key under the Cryptographic options menu for Linux PRNG [2] enhancements (useful now and also for future patch submissions), which currently has an only-one option for poll sizes increasing (x2).
As it's impact is minimal (in performance and development/maintenance terms), I recommend to merge it, as it gives a basic prevention for the so-called system fingerprinting (which is used most by "kids" to know how old and insecure could be a target system, many time used as the first, even only-one, data to decide if attack or not the target host) among other things.
There's only a missing feature that is present on grSecurity, the sources ports randomization which seems achieved now by some changes that can be checked out in the Linux BKBits repository:
http://linux.bkbits.net:8080/linux-2.6/diffs/net/ipv4/[email protected]?nav=index.html|src/|src/net|src/net/ipv4|hist/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
(net/ipv4/[email protected])Quoted 4 lines
I'm not sure of the effectiveness of that changes, but I just prefer to keep it as most simple as possible.If there are thoughts on reverting to the old schema, and using
obsd_rand.ccode instead, just drop me a line and I will modify the patch.
Quoted 5 lines
Okay, but:
* Need to give better explanation of why this is required, existing randomization code in network is compromise between performance and security. So you need to quantify the performance impact of this, and the security threat reduction.
Performance impact is none AFAIK.
I've explained them in an early reply to Adrian [1].
Quoted 2 lines
* Why are the OpenBSD random functions better? because they have more security coolness factor?
I'm not an OpenBSD user, and no intention to being a one.
I just recognize that the functions do the same job better, as explained in the Kconfig diffs.
Quoted 5 lines
* It is hard to have two levels of security based on config options. Think of a distro vendor, do they ship the fast or the secure system??
As always:
* Send networking stuff to [email protected]
Added to CC list.
Quoted 1 line
* Please split up patches.
If you talk about removing the pool sizes increasing, then i will do it, but i would like to know if this has any chances to get merged.
[1]: http://lkml.org/lkml/2005/1/28/139
Cheers,
Signature · 2 lines
Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro <[email protected]> [1024D/6F2B2DEC] & [2048g/9AE91A22][http://tuxedo-es.org]
On Fri, 28 Jan 2005 19:31:50 +0100
L
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Okay, but:
* Need to give better explanation of why this is required, existing randomization code in network is compromise between performance and security. So you need to quantify the performance impact of this, and the security threat reduction.Performance impact is none AFAIK.
I've explained them in an early reply to Adrian [1].
When I did the port randomization patch the benchmark that was most impacted was LMBENCH. The biggest change was in the communications latency results.
If you want, you can sign up for a free access to OSDL test machines and use STP to run lmbench and easily get before/after results.
1. Go to osdl.org and get associate account http://osdl.org/join_form
2. Submit patch to Patch Lifecycle Manager http://osdl.org/plm-cgi/plm
3. Choose test to run Scalable Test Platform (STP)
http://osdl.org/lab_activities/kernel_testing/stp/
Signature · 1 line
Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines · Stephen Hemminger
On Fri, 28 Jan 2005 19:31:50 +0100
When I did the port randomization patch the benchmark that was most impacted was LMBENCH. The biggest change was in the communications latency results.If you want, you can sign up for a free access to OSDL test machines and use STP to run lmbench and easily get before/after results.
Quoted 6 lines
1. Go to osdl.org and get associate account http://osdl.org/join_form
2. Submit patch to Patch Lifecycle Manager http://osdl.org/plm-cgi/plm
3. Choose test to run Scalable Test Platform (STP)
http://osdl.org/lab_activities/kernel_testing/stp/
OK, many thanks.
Haven't noticed that (maybe 'cos I'm new in kernel hacking ;) )
I will submit there the new patch ASAP.
Cheers,
Signature · 2 lines
Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro <[email protected]> [1024D/6F2B2DEC] & [2048g/9AE91A22][http://tuxedo-es.org]
Hi,
Attached the new patch following Arjan's recommendations. I'm sorry about not making it "inlined", but my mail agent messes up the diffs if I do so.
Still waiting for the OSDL STP tests results, they will take a while to finish.
Cheers,
Signature · 2 lines
Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro <[email protected]> [1024D/6F2B2DEC] & [2048g/9AE91A22][http://tuxedo-es.org]
include/linux/random.h +6 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@#ifdef __KERNEL__ +/* OpenBSD Networking-related randomization functions - [email protected] */ +extern unsigned long obsd_get_random_long (void ); +extern __u16 ip_randomid (void ); +extern __u32 ip_randomisn (void ); + +extern void rand_initialize_irq (int irq); extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +9 -14
@@ -539,10 +539,8 @@static inline __u32 tcp_v4_init_sequence (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) { -return secure_tcp_sequence_number (skb->nh.iph->daddr, - skb->nh.iph->saddr, - skb->h.th->dest, - skb->h.th->source); + +return ip_randomisn (); }/* called with local bh disabled */
@@ -833,14 +831,11 @@tcp_v4_setup_caps (sk, &rt->u.dst); tp->ext2_header_len = rt->u.dst.header_len; -if (!tp->write_seq) - tp->write_seq =secure_tcp_sequence_number (inet->saddr, - inet->daddr, - inet->sport, - usin->sin_port); - - inet->id = tp->write_seq ^ jiffies; - +if (!tp->write_seq) { + tp->write_seq =ip_randomisn (); + } + + inet->id =htons (ip_randomid ()); err =tcp_connect (sk); rt =NULL ;if (err)
@@ -1579,8 +1574,8 @@if (newinet->opt) newtp->ext_header_len = newinet->opt->optlen; newtp->ext2_header_len = dst->header_len; - newinet->id = newtp->write_seq ^ jiffies; - + newinet->id =htons (ip_randomid ()); +tcp_sync_mss (newsk,dst_pmtu (dst)); newtp->advmss =dst_metric (dst,RTAX_ADVMSS );tcp_initialize_rcv_mss (newsk);
net/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ tmp-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) := compat.o obj-$(CONFIG_NET) += $(tmp-y) +obj-y += obsd_rand.o # LLC has to be linked before the files in net/802/ obj-$(CONFIG_LLC) += llc/
net/obsd_rand.c +269 -0
269 lines not on this page · raw message
net/sunrpc/xprt.c +3 -1
@@ -1342,7 +1342,9 @@*/ static inline u32 xprt_alloc_xid (struct rpc_xprt *xprt) { -return xprt->xid++; +/* Return randomized xprt->xid instead of prt->xid++ */ +return (u32 )obsd_get_random_long (); + }static inline void xprt_init_xid (struct rpc_xprt *xprt)
David S. Miller
maintainerQuoted 1 line · On Fri, 28 Jan 2005 21:34:52 +0100 Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro…
Attached the new patch following Arjan's recommendations.
No SMP protection on the SBOX, better look into that. The locking you'll likely need to add will make this routine serialize many networking operations which is one thing we've been trying to avoid.
Quoted 10 lines · On Fri, 28 Jan 2005 12:45:17 -0800 "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>…
Quoted 1 line · On Fri, 28 Jan 2005 21:34:52 +0100 Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro…
Attached the new patch following Arjan's recommendations.
No SMP protection on the SBOX, better look into that. The locking you'll likely need to add will make this routine serialize many networking operations which is one thing we've been trying to avoid.
per-cpu would be the way to go here.
Signature · 1 line
Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
David S. Miller
maintainerQuoted 1 line · On Fri, 28 Jan 2005 13:34:08 -0800 Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>…
per-cpu would be the way to go here.
Does the sbox get somehow seeded from use to use?
If not, then yes that's the thing to do.
Quoted 8 lines · Stephen Hemminger
Quoted 5 lines · On Fri, 28 Jan 2005 12:45:17 -0800 "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>…
Quoted 1 line · On Fri, 28 Jan 2005 21:34:52 +0100 Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro…
Attached the new patch following Arjan's recommendations.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
No SMP protection on the SBOX, better look into that. The locking you'll likely need to add will make this routine serialize many networking operations which is one thing we've been trying to avoid.
per-cpu would be the way to go here.
I don't think so no - just doing per cpu counters you risk nearby duplicates, which can cause even easier data corruption (e.g. during ip fragment reassembly - it is already very weak and making it weaker is probably not a good idea)
If you want SMP performance for ipids you can resurrect the old "cookie jar" approach I used in 2.4 time frame to get rid of inetpeers. The idea was that you have global state, and each CPU would regenerate some numbers from the state, then store them in a private "jar" and use them use, then look at the global state with locking again etc.
This can be tuned on how big the jar is - the bigger the smaller the sequence space (risky for 16bit ipids), but the better the scalability.
But before doing anything like this I would recommend that someone skilled in cryptography evaluates the security of these functions carefully and see if it actually has any advantages. I remember that Andrey S. broke
some of the "cool" "secure" openbsd IDs easily some years ago.
At least for ipids I'm utterly sceptical. 16bits are just hopeless.
-Andi
Quoted 9 lines · Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
Hi,
Attached the new patch following Arjan's recommendations. I'm sorry about not making it "inlined", but my mail agent messes up the diffs if I do so.
Still waiting for the OSDL STP tests results, they will take a while to finish.Cheers,
lots better already! Some more comments (now that the patch got a lot easier to read :)
static inline __u32 tcp_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, structsk_buff *skb)
{
- return secure_tcp_sequence_number(skb->nh.iph->daddr,
- skb->nh.iph->saddr, - skb->h.th->dest, - skb->h.th->source);
+
+ return ip_randomisn();
}
is there a reason for the weird indentation?
+ if (!tp->write_seq) {
+ tp->write_seq = ip_randomisn();
+ }
spare { } pare that's not needed, also looks like one tab too many
as for obsd_get_random_long().. would it be possible to use the get_random_int() function from the patches I posted the other day? They use the existing random.c infrastructure instead of making a copy...
I still don't understand why you need a obsd_rand.c and can't use the normal random.c
static inline u32 xprt_alloc_xid(struct rpc_xprt *xprt) {
- return xprt->xid++; + /* Return randomized xprt->xid instead of prt->xid++ */ + return (u32) obsd_get_random_long();
+
}
that cast looks quite redundant...
Quoted 3 lines · Arjan van de Ven
as for
obsd_get_random_long().. would it be possible to use theget_random_int()function from the patches I posted the other day? They use the existingrandom.cinfrastructure instead of making a copy...
As seen at
http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/arjan/execshield/00-randomize-A0 you can suppose that there's no point to use that, we can easily maintain the functions at obsd_rand.c so we wouldn't need to add more maintenance overhead, I hope you can understand why I want it like that and not depending on random.c in more than the function exports (which make it even more independent as we don't need to use our proper header and add each proper include entry in the modified files, as most of them use or have already random.h included).
Attached you can find the new patch with the indentation fixes.
The tests on the patch are the following ones:
http://www.osdl.org/plm-cgi/plm?module=patch_info&patch_id=4136
(above one shows that there are no SMP-related issues)
http://khack.osdl.org/stp/300417
http://khack.osdl.org/stp/300420
Cheers and thanks for the information,
Signature · 2 lines
Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro <[email protected]> [1024D/6F2B2DEC] & [2048g/9AE91A22][http://tuxedo-es.org]
include/linux/random.h +6 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@#ifdef __KERNEL__ +/* OpenBSD Networking-related randomization functions - [email protected] */ +extern unsigned long obsd_get_random_long (void ); +extern __u16 ip_randomid (void ); +extern __u32 ip_randomisn (void ); + +extern void rand_initialize_irq (int irq); extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +13 -20
@@ -539,10 +539,7 @@static inline __u32 tcp_v4_init_sequence (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) { -return secure_tcp_sequence_number (skb->nh.iph->daddr, - skb->nh.iph->saddr, - skb->h.th->dest, - skb->h.th->source); +return ip_randomisn (); }/* called with local bh disabled */
@@ -834,13 +830,9 @@ tp->ext2_header_len = rt->u.dst.header_len;if (!tp->write_seq) - tp->write_seq =secure_tcp_sequence_number (inet->saddr, - inet->daddr, - inet->sport, - usin->sin_port); - - inet->id = tp->write_seq ^ jiffies; + tp->write_seq =ip_randomisn (); + inet->id =htons (ip_randomid ()); err =tcp_connect (sk); rt =NULL ;if (err)
@@ -1566,20 +1555,20 @@ newsk->sk_dst_cache = dst;tcp_v4_setup_caps (newsk, dst); - newtp =tcp_sk (newsk); - newinet =inet_sk (newsk); - newinet->daddr = req->af.v4_req.rmt_addr; - newinet->rcv_saddr = req->af.v4_req.loc_addr; - newinet->saddr = req->af.v4_req.loc_addr; - newinet->opt = req->af.v4_req.opt; - req->af.v4_req.opt =NULL ; - newinet->mc_index =tcp_v4_iif (skb); - newinet->mc_ttl = skb->nh.iph->ttl; + newtp =tcp_sk (newsk); + newinet =inet_sk (newsk); + newinet->daddr = req->af.v4_req.rmt_addr; + newinet->rcv_saddr = req->af.v4_req.loc_addr; + newinet->saddr = req->af.v4_req.loc_addr; + newinet->opt = req->af.v4_req.opt; + req->af.v4_req.opt =NULL ; + newinet->mc_index =tcp_v4_iif (skb); + newinet->mc_ttl = skb->nh.iph->ttl; newtp->ext_header_len =0 ;if (newinet->opt) newtp->ext_header_len = newinet->opt->optlen; newtp->ext2_header_len = dst->header_len; - newinet->id = newtp->write_seq ^ jiffies; + newinet->id =htons (ip_randomid ());tcp_sync_mss (newsk,dst_pmtu (dst)); newtp->advmss =dst_metric (dst,RTAX_ADVMSS );
net/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ tmp-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) := compat.o obj-$(CONFIG_NET) += $(tmp-y) +obj-y += obsd_rand.o # LLC has to be linked before the files in net/802/ obj-$(CONFIG_LLC) += llc/
net/obsd_rand.c +269 -0
269 lines not on this page · raw message
net/sunrpc/xprt.c +1 -1
@@ -1342,7 +1342,7 @@*/ static inline u32 xprt_alloc_xid (struct rpc_xprt *xprt) { -return xprt->xid++; +return (u32 )obsd_get_random_long (); }static inline void xprt_init_xid (struct rpc_xprt *xprt)
Quoted 7 lines · Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
Quoted 3 lines · Arjan van de Ven
as for
obsd_get_random_long().. would it be possible to use theget_random_int()function from the patches I posted the other day? They use the existingrandom.cinfrastructure instead of making a copy...As seen at
http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/arjan/execshield/00-randomize-A0 you can suppose that there's
I actually meant
http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/arjan/randomize/02-
randomize-infrastructure
which I posted for inclusion in the main kernel 2 or 3 days ago. That's nice and stand alone to get a random value; we should be able to share that.
Quoted 7 lines · Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
Quoted 3 lines · Arjan van de Ven
as for
obsd_get_random_long().. would it be possible to use theget_random_int()function from the patches I posted the other day? They use the existingrandom.cinfrastructure instead of making a copy...As seen at
the functions atobsd_rand.cso we wouldn't need to add more maintenance overhead, I hope you can understand why I want it like that
I actually DON'T understand that.
What you say kinda sorta makes sense if you're an external patch. But if you are inside the kernel (that was the goal of this patch, right?) then the argument is actually entirely the wrong way around...
Quoted 6 lines · Arjan van de Ven
as for
obsd_get_random_long().. would it be possible to use theget_random_int()function from the patches I posted the other day? They use the existingrandom.cinfrastructure instead of making a copy...I still don't understand why you need a
obsd_rand.cand can't use the normalrandom.c
Note that obsd_rand.c started off life as a BSD-licensed file - I was told that was a show-stopper when I submitted basically the same patch a while back.
So re-working it to use get_random_int() would be a good idea, I think....
Quoted 6 lines · On Sat, Jan 29, 2005 at 04:15:43AM -0500, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 4 lines · Arjan van de Ven
as for
obsd_get_random_long().. would it be possible to use theget_random_int()function from the patches I posted the other day? They use the existingrandom.cinfrastructure instead of making a copy...
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I still don't understand why you need a
obsd_rand.cand can't use the normalrandom.cNote that
obsd_rand.cstarted off life as a BSD-licensed file - I was told that was a show-stopper when I submitted basically the same patch a while back.
...
At least the three clause BSD license is GPL compatible.
cu
Adrian
Signature · 4 lines
"Is there not promise of rain?" Ling Tan asked suddenly out
of the darkness. There had been need of rain for many days.
"Only a promise," Lao Er said.
Pearl S. Buck - Dragon SeedQuoted 7 lines · Adrian Bunk
Quoted 6 lines · On Sat, Jan 29, 2005 at 04:15:43AM -0500, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 4 lines · Arjan van de Ven
as for
obsd_get_random_long().. would it be possible to use theget_random_int()function from the patches I posted the other day? They use the existingrandom.cinfrastructure instead of making a copy...
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I still don't understand why you need a
obsd_rand.cand can't use the normalrandom.cNote that
obsd_rand.cstarted off life as a BSD-licensed file - I was told that was a show-stopper when I submitted basically the same patch a while back.
...At least the three clause BSD license is GPL compatible.
Yes, AFAIK :)
I will try to follow Arjan's recommendations on using his functions instead of obsd ones, even if I think it should be alone in the current file.
Also I will split up the patch.
I will do it as soon as I get time for it, I need first to work out a cleaner vsec (no more code in headers and such) and also a sys_chroot() hook that I requested yesterday on the bugzilla, among the SELinux 2.4 backport which needs several fixes due to last 2.6 bk-commits reports.
Thanks for the comments,
Cheers.
Signature · 2 lines
Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro <[email protected]> [1024D/6F2B2DEC] & [2048g/9AE91A22][http://tuxedo-es.org]
Quoted 7 lines · Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
Quoted 1 line
At least the three clause BSD license is GPL compatible.
Yes, AFAIK :)
I will try to follow Arjan's recommendations on using his functions instead of obsd ones, even if I think it should be alone in the current file. Also I will split up the patch.
could you please also react to this feedback:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=110698371131630&w=2
to quote a couple of key points from that very detailed security analysis:
" I'm not sure how the OpenBSD code is better in any way. (Notice that
it uses the same "half_md4_transform" as Linux; you just added another copy.) Is there a design note on how the design was chosen? "
that mail also includes a much smaller patch to random.c.
( Obviously the more fundamental questions have to be solved prior solving code-level problems, patch splitup and patch ordering - often one ends up having a much smaller patch to work with, by thinking more about the fundamentals. )
Ingo
Quoted 10 lines
could you please also react to this feedback:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=110698371131630&w=2
to quote a couple of key points from that very detailed security analysis:
" I'm not sure how the OpenBSD code is better in any way. (Notice that
it uses the same "half_md4_transform" as Linux; you just added another copy.) Is there a design note on how the design was chosen? "
Just note that, in addition to the security aspects, there are also a whole set of multiprocessor issues. OpenBSD added SMP support in June 2004, and it looks like this code dates back to before that. It might be worth looking at what OpenBSD does now.
Note that I have NOT looked at the patch other than the TCP ISN generation. However, given the condition of the ISN code, I am inclined to take a "guilty until proven innocent" view of the rest of it. Don't merge it until someone has really grokked it, not just kibitzed about code style issues.
(The homebrew 15-bit block cipher in this code does show how much the world needs a small block cipher for some of these applications.)
Quoted 3 lines · [email protected] writes:
(The homebrew 15-bit block cipher in this code does show how much the world needs a small block cipher for some of these applications.)
Doesn't TEA fill this niche? It's certainly used for this in the Linux kernel, e.g. in reiserfs (although I have my doubts it is really useful there)
-Andi
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines · [email protected] writes:
(The homebrew 15-bit block cipher in this code does show how much the world needs a small block cipher for some of these applications.)
Doesn't TEA fill this niche? It's certainly used for this in the Linux kernel, e.g. in reiserfs (although I have my doubts it is really useful there)
Sorry; ambiguous parsing. I meant "(small block) cipher", not "small (block cipher)". TEA is intended for the latter niche. What I meant was a cipher that could encrypt blocks smaller than 64 bits.
It's easy to make a smaller hash by just thowing bits away, but a block cipher is a permutation, and has to be invertible.
For example, if I take a k-bit counter and encrypt it with a k-bit block cipher, the output is guaranteed not to repeat in less than 2^k steps, but the value after a given value is hard to predict.
There is a well-known technique for reducing the block size of a cipher by a small factor, such as from a power of 2 to a prime number slightly lower. That is:
unsignedencrypt_mod_n(unsigned x, unsigned n)
{
assert(x < n);
do {
x = encrypt(x);
} while (x >= n);
return x;
}It takes a bit of thinking to realize why this creates an bijection from [0..n-1] -> [0..n-1], but it's kind of a neat "aha!" when it does.
Remember, encrypt() is a bijection from [0..N-1] -> [0..N-1] for some N >= n. Typically N = 2^k for some k.
However, this technique requires N/n calls to encrypt(). I.e. n calls to encrypt_mod_n() will cause N calls to encrypt().
It's generally considered practical up to N/n = 2, so we can encrypt modulo any modulus n if we have encrypt() functions for any N = 2^k a power of 2. I.e. a k-bit block cipher.
For example, suppose we want to encrypt 7-digit North American telephone numbers. These are of the form NXX-XXXX, where N is a digit other than 0 or 1, and X is any digit. there are 8e6 possibilities. Using this scheme and a 23-bit block cipher, we can encrypt them to different valid 7-digit telephone numbers.
Likewise, 10-digit number with area codes, +1 NXX NXX-XXXX (but not starting with N11) are also possible. There are 792 area codes and 8e6 numbers for a total of 7776000000 < 2^33 combinations.
This sort of thing is very useful for adding encryption to protocols and file formats not designed for it.
However, the standard literature is notably lacking in block ciphers in funny block sizes. There was one AES submission (The Hasty Pudding Cipher, http://www.cs.arizona.edu/~rcs/hpc/) that supported variable block sizes, but it was eliminated fairly early.
To start with, consider very small blocks: 1, 2 or 3 bits. There are only two possible things encrypt() can do with a 1-bit value:
either invert it or leave it alone.
There are 4! = 24 possible 2-bit encryption operations. Ideally, the key should specify them all with equal probability, but 24 does not evenly divide the (power of 2 sized) keyspace. It is interesting to look at how iniformly the possibilities are covered.
It's fun to consider a Feistel network, dividing the plaintext into 1-bit L and R values, and alternating L ^= f(R), R ^= f(L) for (not nexessarily invertible) round functions f. Since there are only 4 possible 1-bit functions (1, 0, x and !x), you can consider each round to have an independent 2-bit round subkey and see how the cipher's uniformity develops as you increase the number of rounds and the key length to go with it.
There are 8! = 40320 3-bit encryption operations. Again, all should be covered uniformly. An odd number of bits makes a Feistel design more challenging. But if you don't allow odd numbers of bits, you have to push the shrinking technique it to N/n = 4, which starts to get unpleasant.
linux> It's easy to make a smaller hash by just thowing bits away, linux> but a block cipher is a permutation, and has to be linux> invertible.
linux> For example, if I take a k-bit counter and encrypt it with linux> a k-bit block cipher, the output is guaranteed not to linux> repeat in less than 2^k steps, but the value after a given linux> value is hard to predict.
Huh? What if my cipher consists of XOR-ing with a k-bit pattern? That's a permutation on the set of k-bit blocks but it happens to decompose as a product of (non-overlapping) swaps.
In general for more realistic block ciphers like DES it seems extremely unlikely that the cipher has only a single orbit when viewed as a permutation. I would expect a real block cipher to behave more like a random permutation, which means that the expected number of orbits for a k-bit cipher should be about ln(2^k) or roughly .7 * k.
- R.
linux> It's easy to make a smaller hash by just thowing bits away, linux> but a block cipher is a permutation, and has to be linux> invertible.
linux> For example, if I take a k-bit counter and encrypt it with linux> a k-bit block cipher, the output is guaranteed not to linux> repeat in less than 2^k steps, but the value after a given linux> value is hard to predict.
Quoted 9 lines
Huh? What if my cipher consists of XOR-ing with a k-bit pattern? That's a permutation on the set of k-bit blocks but it happens to decompose as a product of (non-overlapping) swaps.
In general for more realistic block ciphers like DES it seems extremely unlikely that the cipher has only a single orbit when viewed as a permutation. I would expect a real block cipher to behave more like a random permutation, which means that the expected number of orbits for a k-bit cipher should be about ln(2^k) or roughly .7 * k.
I think you misunderstand; your comments don't seem to make sense unless I assume you're imagining output feedback mode:
x[0] = encrypt(IV)
x[1] = encrypt(x[0])
x[2] = encrypt(x[1])
etc.
Obviously, this pattern will repeat after some unpredictable interval. (However, owing to the invertibility of encryption, looping can be easily detected by noticing that x[i] = IV.)
But I was talking about counter mode:
x[0] = encrypt(0)
x[1] = encrypt(1)
x[2] = encrypt(2)
etc.
It should be obvious that this will not repeat until the counter overflows k bits and you try to compute encrypt(2^k) = encrypt(0).
One easy way to generate unpredictable 16-bit port numbers that don't repeat too fast is:
highbit = 0;
for (;;) {
generate_random_encryption_key(key);
for (i = 0; i < 20000; i++)
use(highbit | encrypt15(i, key));
highbit ^= 0x8000;
}Note that this does NOT use all 32K values before switching to another key; if that were the case, an attacker who kept a big bitmap of reviously seen values could preduct the last few values based on knowing what hadn't been seen already.
Of course, you can always wrap a layer of Knuth's Algorithm B (randomization by shuffling) around anything:
#include "basic_rng.h"
#define SHUFFLE_SIZE 32 /* Power of 2 is more efficient */
struct better_rng_state {
struct basic_rng_state basic;
unsigned y;
unsigned z[SHUFFLE_SIZE];
};voidbetter_rng_seed(struct better_rng_state *state, unsigned seed)
{
unsigned i;
basic_rng_seed(&state->basic, seed);
for (i = 0; i < SHUFFLE_SIZE; i++)
state->z[i] = basic_rng(&state->basic);
state->y = basic_rng(&state->basic) % SHUFFLE_SIZE;
}unsignedbetter_rng(struct better_rng_state *state)
{
unsigned x = state->z[state->y];
state->y = (state->z = basic_rng(&state->basic)) % SHUFFLE_SIZE;
return x;
}(You can reduce code size by reducing modulo SHUFFLE_SIZE when you use state->y rather than when storing into it, but I have done it the other way to make clear exactly how much "effective" state is stored. You can also just initialize state->y to a fixed value.)
*Sigh*. This thread is heading into the weeds.
I have things I should be doing instead, but since nobody seems to actually be looking at what the patch *does*, I guess I'll have to dig into it a bit more...
Yes, licensing issues need to be resolved before a patch can go in. Yes, code style standards needs to be kept up.
And yes, SMP-locking issues need to be looked at.
(And yes, ipv6 needs to be looked at, too!)
But before getting sidetracked into the fine details, could folks please take a step back from the trees and look at the forest?
Several people have asked (especially when the first patch came out), but I haven't seen any answers to the Big Questions:
1) Does this patch improve Linux's networking behaviour in any way?
2) Are the techniques in this patch a good way to achieve those improvements?
Let's look at the various parts of the change:
- Increases the default random pool size.
Opinion: whatever. No real cost, except memory. Increases the maximum amount that can be read from /dev/random without blocking. Note that this is already adjustable at run time, so the question is why put it in the kernel config.
If you want this, I'd suggest instead an option under CONFIG_EMBEDDED to shrink the pools and possibly get rid of the run-time changing code, then you could increase the default with less concern.
- Changes the TCP ISN generation algorithm.
I have't seen any good side to this. The current algorithm can be used for OS fingerprinting based on starting two TCP connections from different sources (ports or IPs) and noticing that the ISNs only differ in the low 24 bits, but is that a serious issue? If it is, there are better ways to deal with it that still preserve the valuable timer property.
I point out that the entire reason for the cryptographically marginal half_md4_transform oprtation was that a full MD5 was a very noticeable performance bottleneck; the hash was only justified by the significant real-world attacks. obsd_get_random uses two calls to half_md4_transform. Which is the same cost as a full MD4 call. Frankly, they could just change half_md4_transform to return 64 bits instead of 32 and make do with one call.
- Changes to the IP ID generation algorithm.
All it actually does is change the way the initial inet->id is initialized for the inet_opt structure associated with the TCP socket. And if you look at ip_output.c:ip_push_pending_frames(), you'll see that, if DF is set (as is usual for a TCP connection), iph->id (the actual IP header ID) is set to htons(inet->id++). So it's still an incrementing sequence.
This is in fact (see the comment in ip.h:ip_select_ident()) a workaround for a Microsoft VJ compression bug. The fix was added in 2.4.4 (via DaveM's zerocopy-beta-3 patch); before that, Linux 2.4 sent a constant zero as the IP ID of DF packets. See discussion at
http://www.postel.org/pipermail/end2end-interest/2001-May/thread.html http://tcp-impl.lerc.nasa.gov/tcp-impl/list/archive/2378.html I'm not finding the diagnosis of the problem. I saw one report at http://oss.sgi.com/projects/netdev/archive/2001-01/msg00006.html and Dave Miller is pretty much on top of it when he posts http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-kernel&m=98275316400452&w=2
but I haven't found the actual debugging leading to the conclusion.
This also led to some discussion of the OpenBSD IP ID algorithm that I haven't fully waded through at
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-net/2003/11/
If the packet is fragmentable (the only time the IP ID is really needed by the receiver), it's done by route.c:__ip_select_ident(). Wherein the system uses inet_getid to assign p->ip_id_count++ based on the route cache's struct inet_peer *p.
(If the route cache is OOM, the system falls back on random IP ID assignment.)
This latter technique nicely prevents the sort of stealth port scanning that was mentioned earlier in this thread, and prevents a person at address A from guessing the IP ID range I'm using to talk to address B. So note that the boast about "Randomized IP IDs" in the grsecurity description at
http://www.gentoo.org/proj/en/hardened/grsecurity.xml
is, as far as I can tell from a quick look at the code, simply false.
As for the algorithm itself, it's described at
http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/full_papers/deraadt/deraadt_html/node18.html
but it's not obvious to me that it'd be hard to cryptanalyze given a stream of consecutive IDs. You need to recover:
- The n value for each inter-ID gap,
- The LCRNG state ru_a, ru_x, ru_b,
- The 15-bit XOR masks ru_seed and ru_seed2, and
- The discrete log generator ru_j (ru_g = 2^ru_j mod RU_N). Which is actually just a multiplier (mod RU_N-1 = 32748) on the input to the pmod() operation.
So the IP ID generation can be summarized as:
ru_x = (ru_a * ru_x + ru_b) % 31104; /* Repeated 1..4 times */ exp = ((ru_x ^ ru_seed2) + ru_j) % 32748; return ru_seed ^ pmod(2, exp, 32749);
Now, if you can guess ru_seed, then the pmod() operation is simply a bijection that can be looked up in a table, and then it's just a matter of untangling a slightly elaborated LCRNG.
- Changes the sun RPC XID allocation algorithm.
Note that each connection is already initialized with a secure random number; the only change is whether the IDs used are simply incrementing from there or randomized each time one is needed.
First of all and very importantly, obsd_get_random_long() does indeed generate a *random* number, which could be the *same* number as the last one. This could be VERY BAD for RPC XIDs, which have to be unique so the client can match the reply with the request. Note that Theo de Raadt knows better than do do that:
http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/full_papers/deraadt/deraadt_html/node18.html
Looking at the OpenBSD code at
http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/sys/nfs/
you can see that the NFS code in nfs_subs.c:nfsm_rpchead() generates a random starting xid and increments it by a random number 1..255 each time. The more general RPC code in krpc_subr.c:krpc_call() generates a fully random XID, constrained only to differ from the previous one. This is because the call is synchronous and does not permit more than one outstanding request at a time.
Anyway, if you wanted to do this, you'd have to add some checking to ensure that a request with that ID isn't already on the rq_list. Also, there appear to be some retransmit issues that mitigate against recycling them too fast (which is why OpenBSD forbids adjacent duplicates), but I haven't studied that in detail.
So in summary:
- Random pool: Few security issues, but on the other hand, why bother? It's run-time tunable already.
- TCP ISN: Proposed patch increases chance of TPC ISN reuse by breaking timer-based design specified in TCP RFC. It doesn't appear to have any more cryptographic security.
- IP ID: Doesn't change the uses where it matters (DF flag clear). Doesn't change the fact that the IDs are still consecutive. What's the freaking point? And all that modular exponentiation that OpenBSD does is a pretty dubious security improvement.
- RPC XID: Broken; don't use. And what's wrong with incrementing from a random start? If an attacker can see your requests, he can generate a fake reply no matter what algorithm you use, and if he can't, then the random start is all you need to limit his chances. The only thing a fully random sequence prevents against is that if an attacker can somehow tell when they've succeeded, an incrementing sequence lets them spoof furter replies easily. You could apply a first level of protection by incrementing them by a random odd number rather than 1, but even then, why bother?
And, of ocurse, all of this has performance implications. Linux is justifiably proud of keeping down performance bloat by not wasting cycles on fast paths if it can possibly be helped. If we *do* find something to improve, we should look at the goals and design the fastest way possible to achieve that. It's not at all clear that the current code patch is the right implementation even if it *did* do something useful.
Before worrying about the small stuff, could we take a good look at the Big Stuff?
I like to try to be polite to people contributing patches. It's a lot of work and I don't want to dishearten someone just starting. I'd like to be polite and encouraging when rejecting patches.
But everyone is so busy ignoring the elephant in the kitchen that I shall have to forego politeness and shout a little.
It doesn't matter what the license is or whether it's against the Linus tree or -mm or how the functions are names.
********************************************** ************************************************ ***** ***** **** THIS PATCH DOESN'T FREAKING WORK!!!! **** ***** ***** ************************************************ **********************************************
Ignoring all the *implementation* brokenness, it breaks the network protocols, doesn't do what it claims to do, and what it tries to do isn't of any benefit over the existing code. It's not resting, it's not stunned, and it's not pining for the fjords. It just plain doesn't work.
If there are any claimed benefits that you want, the first thing to do is throw it away, go back to square one, and come up with an algorithm that actually achieves that benefit.
I keep hearing people boast about how the many eyes reviewing open source code improves the code quality and makes it harder to insert back doors into the system. If something this bad can get this many comments without anyone pointing out the emperor's clothing arrangements, the situation is pretty pitiful.
There *are* things in OpenBSD, like randomized port assignment (as opposed to the linear scan in tcp_v4_get_port()) that would be worth emulating. Maybe worry about that first?
Quoted 4 lines · El mié, 02-02-2005 a las 17:17 +0000, [email protected] escribió:
There *are* things in OpenBSD, like randomized port assignment (as opposed to the linear scan in
tcp_v4_get_port()) that would be worth emulating. Maybe worry about that first?
Completely agreed with you, I was just trying to help with split up patches, but, as your analysis shows, it's more a weak implementation than a real security improvement.
All I can say, just ignore the patch.I will work on other (worthy) issues that are in a bigger need.
Maybe I would work something out on randomized source ports, as soon as I get time for it.
Note also that Brad fixed obsd_rand.c code this week, I've added him to the CC list because there are things that may concern grSecurity he should be able to comment further on it and discuss whatever concerns *his* work (which is, BTW, a good thing (tm) to have in mind even if he didn't send split up patches for each feature, which I really don't know).
I've just ported it out of grsecurity.
Thanks for your meaningful comments,
Cheers.
Signature · 2 lines
Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro <[email protected]> [1024D/6F2B2DEC] & [2048g/9AE91A22][http://tuxedo-es.org]
Quoted 5 lines · On Wed, 02 Feb 2005 18:38:37 +0100 Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro…
Quoted 4 lines · El mié, 02-02-2005 a las 17:17 +0000, [email protected] escribió:
There *are* things in OpenBSD, like randomized port assignment (as opposed to the linear scan in
tcp_v4_get_port()) that would be worth emulating. Maybe worry about that first?
Recent 2.6 does a more advanced form of port randomization already using address hash at connect time. tcp_v4_get_port is only used for the case of applications that explicitly bind to port zero to find a free port.
So the sequence:
socket(); connect();
will assign a random port in a manner similar to sequence number creation
The sequence:
socket(); bind(); connect();
assigns a simple linear increasing port value. It could be randomized, but most applications don't bother binding, so the first case is sufficient.
Signature · 1 line
Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Quoted 4 lines · Stephen Hemminger
Recent 2.6 does a more advanced form of port randomization already using address hash at connect time.
tcp_v4_get_portis only used for the case of applications that explicitly bind to port zero to find a free port.
Is any such randomisation done or planned for UDP?
--L
Quoted 7 lines · Adrian Bunk
Quoted 3 lines · On Sat, Jan 29, 2005 at 04:15:43AM -0500, [email protected] wrote:
Note that
obsd_rand.cstarted off life as a BSD-licensed file - I was told that was a show-stopper when I submitted basically the same patch a while back.
...At least the three clause BSD license is GPL compatible.
The copy of obsd_rand.c I have hass the problematic 4-clause version. It looks to me like we'd need to get Michael Shalayeff, Theodore T'so, and Niels Provos to all agree to re-license under the 3-clause variant. Using Arjan's code is most likely the better approach...
Quoted 7 lines · El lun, 31-01-2005 a las 14:42 -0500, [email protected] escribió:
Quoted 6 lines · Adrian Bunk
Quoted 3 lines · On Sat, Jan 29, 2005 at 04:15:43AM -0500, [email protected] wrote:
Note that
obsd_rand.cstarted off life as a BSD-licensed file - I was told that was a show-stopper when I submitted basically the same patch a while back.
...
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
At least the three clause BSD license is GPL compatible.
The copy of
obsd_rand.cI have hass the problematic 4-clause version. It looks to me like we'd need to get Michael Shalayeff, Theodore T'so, and Niels Provos to all agree to re-license under the 3-clause variant. Using Arjan's code is most likely the better approach...
Then we would in that way ;)
Arjan, I will give it a further look, is there anything you want to comment about it before I start?
I will re-code it to put the helper functions in random.c.
Thanks in advance,
Cheers.
Signature · 2 lines
Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro <[email protected]> [1024D/6F2B2DEC] & [2048g/9AE91A22][http://tuxedo-es.org]
Quoted 4 lines · Lorenzo Hern?ndez Garc?a-Hierro
Arjan, I will give it a further look, is there anything you want to comment about it before I start?
I will re-code it to put the helper functions in
random.c.
Do it against -mm, please, there are something like 30 patches against random.c there already. And please cc: me on any changes there.
Signature · 1 line
Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time.
Quoted 6 lines · Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
Attached you can find a split up patch ported from grSecurity [1], as Linus commented that he wouldn't get a whole-sale patch, I was working on it and also studying what features of grSecurity can be implemented without a development or maintenance overhead, aka less-invasive implementations.
I can see why Linus isn't too excited about this patch:
o Increased entropy pool sizes are independent. Should be a seperate patch.
o Huge numbers of #ifdef's in the code are Plain Wrong(tm).
o Replacing current randomization functions with new ones without lengthy explanation doesn't make me happy.
Also, if the patch was inline instead of an attachment, I could easily quote it while commenting.
Not sure whether there are useful things in the patch, but in the current form I wouldn't want to take it. And usually I'm less picky than Linus.
Jörn
Signature · 2 lines
Eighty percent of success is showing up. -- Woody Allen
Quoted 7 lines · Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
Hi,
Attached you can find a split up patch ported from grSecurity [1], as Linus commented that he wouldn't get a whole-sale patch, I was working on it and also studying what features of grSecurity can be implemented without a development or maintenance overhead, aka less-invasive implementations.
why did you make it a config option? This is the kind of thing that is either good or isn't... at which point you can get rid of a lot of, if not all the ugly ifdefs the patch adds.
Also, why does it need to enhance the random driver this much, the random driver already has a facility to provide pseudorandom numbers good enough for networking use (eg the PRNG rekeys often enough with real entropy that brute forcing it shouldn't be possible).
If you can fix those 2 things the patch will look a lot cleaner and has a lot higher chance to be merged.
Quoted 11 lines · Arjan van de Ven
Quoted 7 lines · Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
Hi,
Attached you can find a split up patch ported from grSecurity [1], as Linus commented that he wouldn't get a whole-sale patch, I was working on it and also studying what features of grSecurity can be implemented without a development or maintenance overhead, aka less-invasive implementations.
Quoted 3 lines
why did you make it a config option? This is the kind of thing that is either good or isn't... at which point you can get rid of a lot of, if not all the ugly ifdefs the patch adds.
I will remove the ifdef's, I've made it just from the usability POV, users may want the standard "randomization" schema, dunno. Anyway, I will remove those ifdef's and make it enabled-by-default.
Quoted 4 lines
Also, why does it need to enhance the random driver this much, the random driver already has a facility to provide pseudorandom numbers good enough for networking use (eg the PRNG rekeys often enough with real entropy that brute forcing it shouldn't be possible).
I will also remove the pool sizes increasing diffs from the patch.
Quoted 2 lines
If you can fix those 2 things the patch will look a lot cleaner and has a lot higher chance to be merged.
Sure, many thanks for pointing out that clearly. It will take a few minutes and then re-send the patch.
Cheers,
Signature · 2 lines
Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro <[email protected]> [1024D/6F2B2DEC] & [2048g/9AE91A22][http://tuxedo-es.org]
Quoted 13 lines · Arjan van de Ven
Quoted 7 lines · Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro
Hi,
Attached you can find a split up patch ported from grSecurity [1], as Linus commented that he wouldn't get a whole-sale patch, I was working on it and also studying what features of grSecurity can be implemented without a development or maintenance overhead, aka less-invasive implementations.
Quoted 3 lines
why did you make it a config option? This is the kind of thing that is either good or isn't... at which point you can get rid of a lot of, if not all the ugly ifdefs the patch adds.
If there is a performance hit (there is), it's not bad to have it be an option, since some people will choose to go fast ("damn the torpedos, full speed ahead). Your point on ifdefs *may* be able to be addressed somewhat by putting them in macros, or similar tricks. But some are going to be visible even so, and you're right, they are distracting.
Quoted 5 lines
Also, why does it need to enhance the random driver this much, the random driver already has a facility to provide pseudorandom numbers good enough for networking use (eg the PRNG rekeys often enough with real entropy that brute forcing it shouldn't be possible).
I'm curious about this one as well, unless there's some proof that the output is "better" by actual analysis, why change? And that's better in terms of realized security, not by some change in the 5th insignificant digit of a statistical measure.
In general I do like to have the option of more security as a tradeoff, even if it is more than is generally needed.
Signature · 3 lines
-bill davidsen ([email protected]) "The secret to procrastination is to put things off until the last possible moment - but no longer" -me
* Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro:
Quoted 6 lines
As it's impact is minimal (in performance and development/maintenance terms), I recommend to merge it, as it gives a basic prevention for the so-called system fingerprinting (which is used most by "kids" to know how old and insecure could be a target system, many time used as the first, even only-one, data to decide if attack or not the target host) among other things.
The most important result of such a patch is source port randomization for DNS queries to resolvers. This gives you a few more bits (DNS itself has just a 16 bit "unique" ID, which isn't too hard to brute-force these days, unfortunately).
Lorenzo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Hern=E1ndez_?=
Quoted 5 lines · =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Garc=EDa-Hierro?= <[email protected]> said:
Attached you can find a split up patch ported from grSecurity [1], as Linus commented that he wouldn't get a whole-sale patch, I was working on it and also studying what features of grSecurity can be implemented without a development or maintenance overhead, aka less-invasive implementations.
OK.
Quoted 2 lines
It adds support for advanced networking-related randomization, in concrete it adds support for TCP ISNs randomization,
1.
Quoted 2 lines
RPC XIDs
randomization,
2.
Quoted 1 line
IP IDs randomization
3.
Quoted 2 lines
and finally a sub-key under the
Cryptographic options menu for Linux PRNG [2] enhancements
4. (useful now
Quoted 2 lines
and also for future patch submissions), which currently has an only-one option for poll sizes increasing (x2).
5 (it seems).
Needs way more splitting?
Quoted 6 lines
As it's impact is minimal (in performance and development/maintenance terms), I recommend to merge it, as it gives a basic prevention for the so-called system fingerprinting (which is used most by "kids" to know how old and insecure could be a target system, many time used as the first, even only-one, data to decide if attack or not the target host) among other things.
How does it prevent fingerprinting?
And a huge, compressed patch attached.
Signature · 4 lines
Dr. Horst H. von Brand User #22616 counter.li.org Departamento de Informatica Fono: +56 32 654431 Universidad Tecnica Federico Santa Maria +56 32 654239 Casilla 110-V, Valparaiso, Chile Fax: +56 32 797513