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Access Control Lists for tmpfs and /dev/pts

RFC PATCH In review Andreas Gruenbacher 3 participants 7 messages Feb 2, 2005 – Aug 4, 2005

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#0 lore raw

cover Access Control Lists for tmpfs and /dev/pts

Here is a set of three patches which implement some general infrastructure and on top of that, acls for tmpfs and /dev/pts files. We may want to factor out some of the current ext2 and ext3 acl code and use the generic layer instead. Comments welcome.

Regards,
--
Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
SUSE Labs, SUSE LINUX PRODUCTS GMBH

#1 lore raw

RFC PATCH 1/3 Generic infrastructure for acls

Add some infrastructure for access control lists on in-memory filesystems such as tmpfs and devpts. We can probably also use this code from ext2 and ext3, but this hasn't been started, yet.

fs/Kconfig +4 -0
Index: linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm2/fs/Kconfig
===================================================================
@@ -1809,6 +1809,10 @@ config AFS_FSCACHE
 config RXRPC
 	tristate
 
+config GENERIC_ACL
+	bool
+	select FS_POSIX_ACL
+
 endmenu
 
 menu "Partition Types"
fs/Makefile +1 -0
Index: linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm2/fs/Makefile
===================================================================
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BINFMT_FLAT)	+= binfmt_flat
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_FS_MBCACHE)	+= mbcache.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL)	+= posix_acl.o xattr_acl.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_ACL)	+= generic_acl.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NFS_ACL_SUPPORT)	+= nfsacl.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_QUOTA)		+= dquot.o
include/linux/generic_acl.h new file +30 -0
Index: linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm2/include/linux/generic_acl.h
===================================================================
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * fs/generic_acl.c
+ *
+ * (C) 2005 Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This file is released under the GPL.
+ */
+
+#ifndef GENERIC_ACL_H
+#define GENERIC_ACL_H
+
+#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
+#include <linux/xattr_acl.h>
+
+struct generic_acl_operations {
+	struct posix_acl *(*getacl)(struct inode *, int);
+	void (*setacl)(struct inode *, int, struct posix_acl *);
+};
+
+size_t generic_acl_list(struct inode *, struct generic_acl_operations *, int,
+			char *, size_t);
+int generic_acl_get(struct inode *, struct generic_acl_operations *, int,
+		    void *, size_t);
+int generic_acl_set(struct inode *, struct generic_acl_operations *, int,
+		    const void *, size_t);
+int generic_acl_init(struct inode *, struct inode *,
+		     struct generic_acl_operations *);
+int generic_acl_chmod(struct inode *, struct generic_acl_operations *);
+
+#endif
fs/generic_acl.c new file +172 -0

172 lines not on this page · raw message

--
Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
SUSE Labs, SUSE LINUX PRODUCTS GMBH

#2 lore raw

RFC PATCH 2/3 Access Control Lists for tmpfs

In reply to Andreas Gruenbacher

Add access control lists for tmpfs. There is more code in tmpfs itself than in the generic acl layer, but at least the acl handling complexities are hidden from the filesystem.

mm/shmem.c +25 -0
Index: linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm2/mm/shmem.c
===================================================================
@@ -1617,6 +1617,8 @@ static int shmem_statfs(struct super_blo
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void shmem_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode);
+
 /*
  * File creation. Allocate an inode, and we're done..
  */
@@ -1627,6 +1629,11 @@ shmem_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct de
 	int error = -ENOSPC;
 
 	if (inode) {
+		error = shmem_acl_init(inode, dir);
+		if (error) {
+			shmem_destroy_inode(inode);
+			return error;
+		}
 		if (dir->i_mode & S_ISGID) {
 			inode->i_gid = dir->i_gid;
 			if (S_ISDIR(mode))
@@ -1993,6 +2000,9 @@ static int shmem_fill_super(struct super
 		sbinfo->free_inodes = inodes;
 	}
 	sb->s_xattr = shmem_xattr_handlers;
+#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
+	sb->s_flags |= MS_POSIXACL;
+#endif
 #else
 	sb->s_flags |= MS_NOUSER;
 #endif
@@ -2037,6 +2047,7 @@ static void shmem_destroy_inode(struct i
 		/* only struct inode is valid if it's an inline symlink */
 		mpol_free_shared_policy(&SHMEM_I(inode)->policy);
 	}
+	shmem_acl_destroy_inode(inode);
 	kmem_cache_free(shmem_inode_cachep, SHMEM_I(inode));
 }
 
@@ -2047,6 +2058,10 @@ static void init_once(void *foo, kmem_ca
 	if ((flags & (SLAB_CTOR_VERIFY|SLAB_CTOR_CONSTRUCTOR)) ==
 	    SLAB_CTOR_CONSTRUCTOR) {
 		inode_init_once(&p->vfs_inode);
+#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
+		p->i_acl = NULL;
+		p->i_default_acl = NULL;
+#endif
 	}
 }
 
@@ -2095,6 +2110,8 @@ static struct inode_operations shmem_ino
 	.listxattr      = generic_listxattr,
 	.removexattr    = generic_removexattr,
 #endif
+	.setattr	= shmem_setattr,
+	.permission	= shmem_permission,
 };
 
 static struct inode_operations shmem_dir_inode_operations = {
@@ -2114,6 +2131,8 @@ static struct inode_operations shmem_dir
 	.listxattr      = generic_listxattr,
 	.removexattr    = generic_removexattr,
 #endif
+	.setattr	= shmem_setattr,
+	.permission	= shmem_permission,
 #endif
 };
 
@@ -2124,6 +2143,8 @@ static struct inode_operations shmem_spe
 	.listxattr	= generic_listxattr,
 	.removexattr	= generic_removexattr,
 #endif
+	.setattr	= shmem_setattr,
+	.permission	= shmem_permission,
 };
 
 static struct super_operations shmem_ops = {
@@ -2182,6 +2203,10 @@ static struct xattr_handler shmem_xattr_
 #ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR
 
 static struct xattr_handler *shmem_xattr_handlers[] = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
+	&shmem_xattr_acl_access_handler,
+	&shmem_xattr_acl_default_handler,
+#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_SECURITY
 	&shmem_xattr_security_handler,
 #endif
include/linux/shmem_fs.h +25 -0
Index: linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm2/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
===================================================================
@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@ struct shmem_inode_info {
 	swp_entry_t		i_direct[SHMEM_NR_DIRECT]; /* first blocks */
 	struct list_head	swaplist;	/* chain of maybes on swap */
 	struct inode		vfs_inode;
+#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
+	struct posix_acl	*i_acl;
+	struct posix_acl	*i_default_acl;
+#endif
 };
 
 struct shmem_sb_info {
@@ -34,4 +38,25 @@ static inline struct shmem_inode_info *S
 	return container_of(inode, struct shmem_inode_info, vfs_inode);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
+int shmem_setattr(struct dentry *, struct iattr *);
+int shmem_permission(struct inode *, int, struct nameidata *);
+int shmem_acl_init(struct inode *, struct inode *);
+void shmem_acl_destroy_inode(struct inode *);
+
+extern struct xattr_handler shmem_xattr_acl_access_handler;
+extern struct xattr_handler shmem_xattr_acl_default_handler;
+#else
+#define shmem_setattr NULL
+#define shmem_permission NULL
+
+static inline int shmem_acl_init(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+void shmem_acl_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+}
+#endif  /* CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL */
+
 #endif
fs/Kconfig +13 -0
Index: linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm2/fs/Kconfig
===================================================================
@@ -884,6 +884,19 @@ config TMPFS_XATTR
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
+	bool "tmpfs POSIX Access Control Lists"
+	depends on TMPFS_XATTR
+	select GENERIC_ACL
+	help
+	  POSIX Access Control Lists (ACLs) support permissions for users and
+	  groups beyond the owner/group/world scheme.
+
+	  To learn more about Access Control Lists, visit the POSIX ACLs for
+	  Linux website <http://acl.bestbits.at/>.
+
+	  If you don't know what Access Control Lists are, say N.
+
 config TMPFS_SECURITY
 	bool "tmpfs Security Labels"
 	depends on TMPFS_XATTR
mm/shmem_acl.c new file +178 -0

178 lines not on this page · raw message

mm/Makefile +1 -0
Index: linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm2/mm/Makefile
===================================================================
@@ -17,4 +17,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_HUGETLBFS)	+= hugetlb.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA) 	+= mempolicy.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SHMEM) += shmem.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TINY_SHMEM) += tiny-shmem.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL) += shmem_acl.o
 

--
Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
SUSE Labs, SUSE LINUX PRODUCTS GMBH

#3 lore raw

RFC PATCH 3/3 Access Control Lists for /dev/pts

In reply to Andreas Gruenbacher

/dev/pts is somewhat special: there are no directories, and so we don't need default acls.

fs/devpts/inode.c +39 -0
Index: linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm2/fs/devpts/inode.c
===================================================================
@@ -19,15 +19,43 @@
 #include <linux/tty.h>
 #include <linux/devpts_fs.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/generic_acl.h>
 
 #define DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC 0x1cd1
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEVPTS_POSIX_ACL
+static struct inode *
+devpts_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct devpts_inode_info *ei;
+	ei = kmalloc(sizeof(*ei), SLAB_KERNEL);
+	if (!ei)
+		return NULL;
+	inode_init_once(&ei->vfs_inode);
+	ei->i_acl = NULL;
+	return &ei->vfs_inode;
+}
+
+static void
+devpts_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct devpts_inode_info *ei = DEVPTS_I(inode);
+	if (ei->i_acl)
+		posix_acl_release(ei->i_acl);
+	kfree(ei);
+}
+#endif  /* CONFIG_DEVPTS_POSIX_ACL */
+
 extern struct xattr_handler devpts_xattr_security_handler;
+extern struct xattr_handler devpts_xattr_acl_access_handler;
 
 static struct xattr_handler *devpts_xattr_handlers[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEVPTS_FS_SECURITY
 	&devpts_xattr_security_handler,
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEVPTS_POSIX_ACL
+	&devpts_xattr_acl_access_handler,
+#endif
 	NULL
 };
 
@@ -38,6 +66,10 @@ static struct inode_operations devpts_fi
 	.listxattr	= generic_listxattr,
 	.removexattr	= generic_removexattr,
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEVPTS_POSIX_ACL
+	.setattr	= devpts_setattr,
+	.permission	= devpts_permission,
+#endif
 };
 
 static struct vfsmount *devpts_mnt;
@@ -89,6 +121,10 @@ static int devpts_remount(struct super_b
 }
 
 static struct super_operations devpts_sops = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEVPTS_POSIX_ACL
+	.alloc_inode    = devpts_alloc_inode,
+	.destroy_inode	= devpts_destroy_inode,
+#endif
 	.statfs		= simple_statfs,
 	.remount_fs	= devpts_remount,
 };
@@ -117,6 +153,9 @@ devpts_fill_super(struct super_block *s,
 	inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
 	inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
 	inode->i_nlink = 2;
+#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
+	s->s_flags |= MS_POSIXACL;
+#endif
 
 	devpts_root = s->s_root = d_alloc_root(inode);
 	if (s->s_root)
fs/devpts/Makefile +1 -0
Index: linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm2/fs/devpts/Makefile
===================================================================
@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX98_PTYS)		+= devpts.o
 
 devpts-$(CONFIG_UNIX98_PTYS)		:= inode.o
 devpts-$(CONFIG_DEVPTS_FS_SECURITY)	+= xattr_security.o
+devpts-$(CONFIG_DEVPTS_POSIX_ACL)	+= acl.o
include/linux/devpts_fs.h +17 -0
Index: linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm2/include/linux/devpts_fs.h
===================================================================
@@ -17,6 +17,23 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNIX98_PTYS
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEVPTS_POSIX_ACL
+struct devpts_inode_info {
+	struct posix_acl	*i_acl;
+	struct inode		vfs_inode;
+};
+
+static inline struct devpts_inode_info *DEVPTS_I(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return container_of(inode, struct devpts_inode_info, vfs_inode);
+}
+
+/* acl.c */
+int devpts_setattr(struct dentry *, struct iattr *);
+int devpts_permission(struct inode *, int, struct nameidata *);
+#endif  /* CONFIG_DEVPTS_POSIX_ACL */
+
+/* inode.c */
 int devpts_pty_new(struct tty_struct *tty);      /* mknod in devpts */
 struct tty_struct *devpts_get_tty(int number);	 /* get tty structure */
 void devpts_pty_kill(int number);		 /* unlink */
fs/Kconfig +13 -0
Index: linux-2.6.11-rc2-mm2/fs/Kconfig
===================================================================
@@ -850,6 +850,19 @@ config DEVPTS_FS_XATTR
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config DEVPTS_POSIX_ACL
+	bool "/dev/pts POSIX Access Control Lists"
+	depends on DEVPTS_FS_XATTR
+	select GENERIC_ACL
+	help
+	  POSIX Access Control Lists (ACLs) support permissions for users and
+	  groups beyond the owner/group/world scheme.
+
+	  To learn more about Access Control Lists, visit the POSIX ACLs for
+	  Linux website <http://acl.bestbits.at/>.
+
+	  If you don't know what Access Control Lists are, say N.
+
 config DEVPTS_FS_SECURITY
 	bool "/dev/pts Security Labels"
 	depends on DEVPTS_FS_XATTR
fs/devpts/acl.c new file +112 -0

112 lines not on this page · raw message

--
Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
SUSE Labs, SUSE LINUX PRODUCTS GMBH

#4 lore raw
In reply to Andreas Gruenbacher
Quoted 2 lines · Andreas Gruenbacher

Here is a set of three patches which implement some general infrastructure and on top of that, acls for tmpfs and /dev/pts files.

Why would you want ACLs on /dev/pts?

#5 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 2 lines · Andreas Gruenbacher

Here is a set of three patches which implement some general infrastructure and on top of that, acls for tmpfs and /dev/pts files.

Why would you want ACLs on /dev/pts?

That's actually a good question. The patch allows to give several people access to the same terminal, which sometimes comes in handy with tools like screen (at least in its current version), and that's what the patch originally was meant for. I've just talked this over this with one of the maintainers though, and there are probably better ways than handling this at the file permission level, like passing open file descriptors between processes. So unless somebody comes up with a convincing application, that patch probably should stay out.

Cheers,

Signature · 2 lines
Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
SUSE Labs, SUSE LINUX GMBH
#6 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Andreas Gruenbacher
Quoted 5 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 2 lines · Andreas Gruenbacher

Here is a set of three patches which implement some general infrastructure and on top of that, acls for tmpfs and /dev/pts files.

Why would you want ACLs on /dev/pts?

Quoted 8 lines

That's actually a good question. The patch allows to give several people access to the same terminal, which sometimes comes in handy with tools like screen (at least in its current version), and that's what the patch originally was meant for. I've just talked this over this with one of the maintainers though, and there are probably better ways than handling this at the file permission level, like passing open file descriptors between processes. So unless somebody comes up with a convincing application, that patch probably should stay out.

Aside from the above reason, I believe the mechanism behind the write command should also be considered. The notifications generated by write can currently be enabled and disabled only through an "all-on" or "all-off" mechanism - it doesn't leave room for user- or group-specific permissions because it's based on the mode of the TTY special file.

ACL support in devpts would allow much more fine-grained control of who is allowed and who is denied access to writing messages on your terminal. This would come in very handy and I personally believe it should be possible to have such control.

Sorry for the random post and thanks for considering this reason, Catalin Patulea

Quoted 6 lines

Cheers,
--
Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
SUSE Labs, SUSE LINUX GMBH

Quoted 7 lines

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