ima: Linux Security Module implementation
PATCH 1/1 ima: Linux Security Module implementation
This is the 3rd of 4 patches that constitute the IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA). This patch includes the main IMA functionality as a Linux Security Module.
This patch applies to the clean 2.6.12-rc4 test kernel.
Signed-off-by Reiner Sailer <[email protected]>
---
security/ima/ima.h +227 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation +* +* Authors: +* Reiner Sailer <[email protected]> +* +* Maintained by: TBD +* +* LSM IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture. +* +* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or +* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as +* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the +* License. +* +* File: ima.h +* defs +*/ +#ifndef __LINUX_IMA_H +#define __LINUX_IMA_H + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/security.h> + +#define ima_printk(level, format, arg...) \ + printk(level "ima (%s): " format ,__func__, ## arg) + +#define ima_error(format, arg...) \ + ima_printk(KERN_ERR, format, ## arg) + +#define ima_info(format, arg...) \ + ima_printk(KERN_INFO, format, ## arg) + +/* set during registering as lsm */ +extern unsigned char ima_terminating; + +#define IMA_MEASURE_MODULE_NAME "IMA" +#define IMA_MEASURE_PROC_NAME "ima" + +/* file systems we expect to change without +* our inode_permission hook being called (nfs, remote fs) */ +#define NFS_SUPER_MAGIC 0x6969 + +/* file systems we won't measure +(invalidate TPM PCR when executing one of these) */ +#define DEVFS_SUPER_MAGIC 0x1373 +#define PROC_SUPER_MAGIC 0x9fa0 +#define SYSFS_MAGIC 0x62656572 + +/* +* request structure fd: file descriptor +* label: sec label defined in user space or in kernel +* flags: store the hook that initiated measurement and more +*/ +#define FLAG_HOOK_MASK 0x0f +#define MMAP_MEASURE_FLAG 0x01 +#define MODULE_MEASURE_FLAG 0x02 +#define USER_MEASURE_FLAG 0x04 +struct measure_request { +int fd; +unsigned short label; +unsigned long flags; +}; + +#define MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE 512 +/* key = lowest two bytes of inode_number */ +#define HASH_KEY (inode_number) ((inode_number) % MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE) +#define SHA_KEY (sha_value) (((sha_value)[18] << 8 | (sha_value)[19]) % MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE) +typedef enum {CLEAN ,DIRTY ,CHANGED }ima_entry_flags ; + +/* security structure appended to inodes */ +#define IMA_MAGIC 0x9999 +struct ima_inode { +unsigned short magic; +atomic_t measure_count;/* # processes currently using this file in measure-mode */ +ima_entry_flags dirty; +char *file_name;/* points to measure entry->fileName */ +}; + +/* security structure appended to measured files*/ +struct ima_file { +unsigned short magic;/* identify our struct format */ +char is_measuring;/* identify fds that are "measuring" */ +}; + +/* get/store security state information; +* if stacking were to be implemented, this would be the place */ +#define ima_get_inode_security (inode) \ + ((struct ima_inode *) ((inode)->i_security)) + +#define ima_store_inode_security (inode,sec_struct) \ + ((inode)->i_security = (sec_struct)) + +#define ima_get_file_security (file) \ + ((struct ima_file *) ((file)->f_security)) + +#define ima_store_file_security (file, sec_struct) \ + ((file)->f_security = (sec_struct)) + +#define ENTRY_MAXFILENAME 50 +struct measure_entry { +struct measure_request mr;/* keep info from measure request if applies */ +unsigned long inodeNr; +dev_t devId; +ima_entry_flags dirty; +u8 digest[20 ];/* sha1 measurement hash */ +char fileName[51 ];/* max first 50 characters of name + \0 */ +unsigned long fsMagic;/* file system magic (distinuish local/remote files) */ +struct super_block *superBlock;/* super block link (for umount-dirty flagging) */ +}; + +struct sha_entry { +struct sha_entry *next; +u8 *digest; +struct measure_entry *m_entry; +}; + +struct queue_entry { +struct queue_entry *next; +struct queue_entry *later; +struct measure_entry *entry; +}; + +extern struct queue_entry *first_measurement;/* for printing */ +extern struct queue_entry *latest_measurement;/* for adding */ + +/* hash table to keep fast access to past measurements +* uses one global lock for now (read/write) */ +extern struct semaphore h_table_mutex; + +struct h_table { +atomic_t len; +atomic_t sysfs; +atomic_t cleanInodeHits;/* times we find an inode clean when measuring */ +atomic_t cleanTableHits;/* times we find a clean htable hit */ +atomic_t dirtyTableHits;/* times we find a dirty htable hit */ +atomic_t changedFiles;/* times we realize a dirty marked entry really changed */ +unsigned int max_htable_size; +u8 terminating; +struct queue_entry *queue[MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE ]; +atomic_t queueLen[MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE ]; +spinlock_t lock; +}; + +struct sha_table { +atomic_t len; +unsigned int max_htable_size; +u8 terminating; +struct sha_entry *queue[MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE ]; +atomic_t queueLen[MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE ]; +spinlock_t lock; +}; + +/* configuration options*/ +extern int ima_test_mode; +extern int skip_boot_aggregate; +extern int ram_bypass_protection; +extern int hd_sd_bypass_protection; +extern int kmem_bypass_protection; +extern int mem_bypass_protection; + +static inline void read_configs (void ) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TEST_MODE + ima_test_mode =1 ; +#else + ima_test_mode =0 ; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SKIP_BOOT_AGGREGATE + skip_boot_aggregate =1 ; +#else + skip_boot_aggregate =0 ; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_RAM_BYPASS_PROTECTION + ram_bypass_protection =1 ; +#else + ram_bypass_protection =0 ; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_HD_SD_BYPASS_PROTECTION + hd_sd_bypass_protection =1 ; +#else + hd_sd_bypass_protection =0 ; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KMEM_BYPASS_PROTECTION + kmem_bypass_protection =1 ; +#else + kmem_bypass_protection =0 ; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEM_BYPASS_PROTECTION + mem_bypass_protection =1 ; +#else + mem_bypass_protection =0 ; +#endif +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM +struct tpm_chip ; + +extern ssize_t tpm_transmit (struct tpm_chip *chip,const char *buf,size_t bufsiz); + +extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_lookup (int chip_num); +#else +struct tpm_chip { +char dummy; +}; + +static inline ssize_t tpm_transmit (struct tpm_chip *chip,const char *buf,size_t bufsiz) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_lookup (int chip_num) +{ +return NULL ; +} +#endif + +/* general prototypes */ +void invalidate_pcr (char *); + +#endif
security/ima/ima_init.c +161 -0
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security/ima/ima_lsmhooks.c +242 -0
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security/ima/ima_main.c +596 -0
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security/ima/ima_proc.c +444 -0
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security/ima/ima_queue.c +241 -0
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security/ima/ima_sysfs.c +150 -0
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security/ima/ima_tpm_glue.c +105 -0
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security/ima/INSTALL +124 -0
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security/ima/Kconfig +103 -0
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security/ima/Makefile +12 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +# +# Makefile for the TCG run-time Measurements +# +# Author: [email protected] +# adapted to 2.6 kernel + +ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE) += ima_init.o ima_sysfs.o ima_main.o ima_proc.o \ + ima_queue.o ima_lsmhooks.o ima_tpm_glue.o + +endif +
security/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ config SECURITY_SECLVL If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. source security/selinux/Kconfig +source security/ima/Kconfig endmenu
security/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux +subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE) += ima # if we don't select a security model, use the default capabilities ifneq ($(CONFIG_SECURITY),y)
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ endif obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o dummy.o # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly. obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE) += ima/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES) += commoncap.o capability.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG) += commoncap.o root_plug.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SECLVL) += seclvl.o