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Driver for Microsoft USB Fingerprint Reader

DISCUSSION [email protected] 4 participants 4 messages Jul 6, 2006

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#0 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Alan Cox

The very cheap readers all appear to be fairly crude image scanners, and they even lack hardware encryption/perturbation so they are actually of very limited value.

I utterly fail to see why multiple, generally knowledgeable people are claiming that encryption in a fingerprint scanner is desirable.

As far as I can tell, the only thing you want is AUTHENTICATION - you want proof that you are getting a "live" scan taken from a user who's present, and not a replay of what was sent last week.

This is called "freshness" and is usually provided by including a random "nonce" (known in other contexts as "magic cookie") in the authenticated data.

That is,

1) Computer generates random nonce and sends to fingerprint reader as part of the "please scan" command.

2) Fingerprint reader scans the image, and hashes it along with the nonce.

3) Fingerprint reader sends the (unencrypted) scan back to the computer.

4) Fingerprint reader computes a digital signature of the hash computed in step 2, and sends it to the computer.

5) Computer verifies the signature, thereby proving that the reader read the fingerprint after receiving the nonce (or has been compromised internally).

To do it right, I'd have a per-reader signing key, signed by a vendor model key, signed by a top-level vendor public key that's widely published. These signatures and the public keys they sign can be stored in ROM.

Also note that, if using DSA, the raw fingerprint reader's data, hashed with the device private key and nonce, will make an excellent seed to generate the per-signature random nonce K. It is a security disaster if you make two signatures on different data with the same K, but by combining some secret information and all of the input used to generate the hash value, you guarantee that that will only happen if the data signed is the same, in which case it's harmless.

Put another way, given the hash H to sign and the private key X, you can let K = SHA(H,X). (You can also hash in other data, but H and X are available and sufficient.)

If you don't have the signature verification information, you can still use the device, you just can't be sure you aren't experiencing a replay attack.

Encryption is useless, as is authentication without a host-provided nonce or other means of guaranteeing freshness. You can just sniff and replay. I'm sure keyghost.com would be happy to sell you the necessary hardware.

Not that I expect "A-1 Computer Corporation" in Shenzhen to have a clue about these things, but you'd think that Microsoft would have one or two competent employees left on the payroll.

#1 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · [email protected] wrote:

I utterly fail to see why multiple, generally knowledgeable people are claiming that encryption in a fingerprint scanner is desirable.

As far as I can tell, the only thing you want is AUTHENTICATION - you want proof that you are getting a "live" scan taken from a user who's present, and not a replay of what was sent last week.

This is called "freshness" and is usually provided by including a random "nonce" (known in other contexts as "magic cookie") in the authenticated data.

The Digital Persona readers apparently use a challenge-response authentication scheme for the encryption. I think I know the challenge-sending and response-reading command structure but have not yet examined their effect on the encrypted fingerprint data.

Quoted 3 lines

Not that I expect "A-1 Computer Corporation" in Shenzhen to have a clue about these things, but you'd think that Microsoft would have one or two competent employees left on the payroll.

Now theres an interesting story in this area. The Microsoft fingerprint readers are based on Digital Persona devices, and actually they seem to be completely identical. But when comparing bus traffic for the DP devices vs the MS devices, the DP devices send encrypted fingerprint data and the MS devices send it as unencrypted 8-bit greyscale.

Anyway, further investigation shows a 1 bit difference in the firmware uploaded to each device, and I have confirmed that this bit turns encryption on and off.

IOW, MS's device are capable of encryption but they explicitly turned it off at the firmware level.

Daniel

#2 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]

Ar Iau, 2006-07-06 am 00:48 -0400, ysgrifennodd [email protected]:

Quoted 3 lines

As far as I can tell, the only thing you want is AUTHENTICATION - you want proof that you are getting a "live" scan taken from a user who's present, and not a replay of what was sent last week.

Read the papers on the subject. If I can get copies of the unencrypted data I can use those to make fake fingers.

A finger print is personal data, arguably sensitive personal data. That means there are lots of duties to store it securely. It is also very hard to revoke a fingerprint so theft of data is highly problematic as it will allow me to generate fake fingers. Theft of encrypted data might allow replay attacks on one PC. Big deal.

Alan

#3 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Alan Cox

Ar Iau, 2006-07-06 am 00:48 -0400, ysgrifennodd [email protected]:

Quoted 3 lines

As far as I can tell, the only thing you want is AUTHENTICATION - you want proof that you are getting a "live" scan taken from a user who's present, and not a replay of what was sent last week.

Quoted 8 lines

Read the papers on the subject. If I can get copies of the unencrypted data I can use those to make fake fingers.

A finger print is personal data, arguably sensitive personal data. That means there are lots of duties to store it securely. It is also very hard to revoke a fingerprint so theft of data is highly problematic as it will allow me to generate fake fingers. Theft of encrypted data might allow replay attacks on one PC. Big deal.

A fingerprint is a good identity token, but it's not a secret, nor is it really feasible to protect it (IE you leave them everywhere).

see:

http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9808.html#biometrics

The transmission channel for the data must be protected in some way to prevent replay attacks. challange response, radius style shared secret, one-time-key approach

The data itself needs to be cryptographically secured on the authenticating side because, otherwise you can game the identity system.

A- Alice subverts the machine containing the identity management system and uses bobs finger print data to fool the identity management system next time.

B - Substitution, alice replaces bobs fingerprint in the identity management system with her own, now alice is bob.

biometric data might be useful as an identy token, but if used as the sole source of authentication data it is pretty seriously lacking.

Quoted 7 lines

Alan

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