slim: fix security issue with the task_post_setuid hook
PATCH 1/1 slim: fix security issue with the task_post_setuid hook
Much thanks to Stephen Smalley for finding this security hole opened by not calling the dummy_ops function in the task_post_setuid hook of the SLIM LSM. This patch fixes that as well as resolves an existing issue where we should have been handling all LSM_SETID types.
Signed-off-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Kylene Hall <[email protected]>
--- security/slim/slm_main.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
security/slim/slm_main.c +42 -35
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@#include "slim.h" +extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops; +unsigned int slm_debug =SLM_BASE ;#define XATTR_NAME "security.slim.level"
@@ -1196,43 +1199,48 @@ static int slm_task_post_setuid(uid_t ol uid_t old_suid, int flags) {struct slm_tsec_data *cur_tsec = current->security; +int rc; -if (cur_tsec && flags ==LSM_SETID_ID ) { -/*set process to USER level integrity for everything but root */ -dprintk (SLM_VERBOSE ,"ruid %d euid %d suid %d " -"cur: uid %d euid %d suid %d\n" , +/*set process to USER level integrity for everything but root */ +dprintk (SLM_VERBOSE ,"ruid %d euid %d suid %d " +"cur: uid %d euid %d suid %d " +"permitted %x effective %x\n" , old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, - current->uid, current->euid, current->suid); -spin_lock (&cur_tsec->lock); -if ((cur_tsec->iac_r == cur_tsec->iac_wx) - && (cur_tsec->iac_r ==SLM_IAC_UNTRUSTED )) { -dprintk (SLM_INTEGRITY , -"Integrity: pid %d iac_r %d " -" iac_wx %d remains UNTRUSTED\n" , - current->pid, cur_tsec->iac_r, - cur_tsec->iac_wx); - }else if (current->suid !=0 ) { -dprintk (SLM_INTEGRITY ,"setting: pid %d iac_r %d " -" iac_wx %d to USER\n" , - current->pid, cur_tsec->iac_r, - cur_tsec->iac_wx); - cur_tsec->iac_r =SLM_IAC_USER ; - cur_tsec->iac_wx =SLM_IAC_USER ; - }else if ((current->uid ==0 ) && (old_ruid !=0 )) { -dprintk (SLM_INTEGRITY ,"setting: pid %d iac_r %d " -" iac_wx %d to SYSTEM\n" , - current->pid, cur_tsec->iac_r, - cur_tsec->iac_wx); - cur_tsec->iac_r =SLM_IAC_SYSTEM ; - cur_tsec->iac_wx =SLM_IAC_SYSTEM ; - }else -dprintk (SLM_INTEGRITY ,"%s: pid %d iac_r %d " -" iac_wx %d \n" , __FUNCTION__, - current->pid, cur_tsec->iac_r, - cur_tsec->iac_wx); -spin_unlock (&cur_tsec->lock); - } -return 0 ; + current->uid, current->euid, current->suid, + current->cap_permitted, current->cap_effective); + rc = dummy_security_ops.task_post_setuid (old_ruid, old_euid, + old_suid, flags); +spin_lock (&cur_tsec->lock); +if ((cur_tsec->iac_r == cur_tsec->iac_wx) + && (cur_tsec->iac_r ==SLM_IAC_UNTRUSTED )) { +dprintk (SLM_INTEGRITY , +"Integrity: pid %d iac_r %d " +" iac_wx %d remains UNTRUSTED\n" , + current->pid, cur_tsec->iac_r, + cur_tsec->iac_wx); + current->cap_permitted =0 ; + current->cap_effective =0 ; + }else if (current->suid !=0 ) { +dprintk (SLM_INTEGRITY ,"setting: pid %d iac_r %d " +" iac_wx %d to USER\n" , + current->pid, cur_tsec->iac_r, + cur_tsec->iac_wx); + cur_tsec->iac_r =SLM_IAC_USER ; + cur_tsec->iac_wx =SLM_IAC_USER ; + }else if ((current->uid ==0 ) && (old_ruid !=0 )) { +dprintk (SLM_INTEGRITY ,"setting: pid %d iac_r %d " +" iac_wx %d to SYSTEM\n" , + current->pid, cur_tsec->iac_r, + cur_tsec->iac_wx); + cur_tsec->iac_r =SLM_IAC_SYSTEM ; + cur_tsec->iac_wx =SLM_IAC_SYSTEM ; + }else +dprintk (SLM_INTEGRITY ,"%s: pid %d iac_r %d " +" iac_wx %d \n" , __FUNCTION__, + current->pid, cur_tsec->iac_r, + cur_tsec->iac_wx); +spin_unlock (&cur_tsec->lock); +return rc; } static inline int slm_setprocattr(struct task_struct *tsk,