MLS context contains policy/libselinux changes
PATCH 1/1 MLS context contains policy/libselinux changes
Here is the policy changes needed for the context contains security
checking in PAM and cron.
Signature · 4 lines
James Antill - <[email protected]> setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_CONGESTION, ...); setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_DEFER_ACCEPT, ...); setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_FILTER, ...);
flask/access_vectors +1 -0
@@ -635,4 +635,5 @@ class context { translate + contains }
modules/system/userdomain.if +2 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ allow $1_t self:msg { send receive }; dontaudit $1_t self:socket create; + allow $1_t self:context contains; + allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr ioctl read getattr lock write append }; term_create_pty($1_t,$1_devpts_t)
mls +3 -0
@@ -597,4 +597,7 @@ mlsconstrain context translate (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mlstranslate )); +mlsconstrain context contains + ( h1 dom h2 ); + ') dnl end enable_mls
Quoted 3 lines · James Antill
Here is the policy changes needed for the context contains security
checking in PAM and cron.
er, where did this come from? I haven't seen any discussions about this and have no idea what its about (perhaps I've just totally missed it somehow though..)
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Quoted 8 lines · Joshua Brindle
Quoted 3 lines · James Antill
Here is the policy changes needed for the context contains security
checking in PAM and cron.er, where did this come from? I haven't seen any discussions about this and have no idea what its about (perhaps I've just totally missed it somehow though..)
The gory details were under the thread "MLS enforcing PTYs, sshd, and
newrole"
Signature · 1 line
James Antill <[email protected]>
Quoted 9 lines
From: James Antill [mailto:[email protected]]
Quoted 2 lines · Joshua Brindle
Quoted 1 line · James Antill
Here is the policy changes needed for the context
contains security
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 2 lines
checking in PAM and cron.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
er, where did this come from? I haven't seen any discussions about this and have no idea what its about (perhaps I've just
totally missed
Quoted 1 line
it somehow though..)
The gory details were under the thread "MLS enforcing PTYs,
sshd, and newrole"
Ah, well that explains it, that thread was way too long and had MLS in the subject.....
Any way I could get a summary/conclusion and description of the new permission?
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Quoted 18 lines · Joshua Brindle
Quoted 9 lines
From: James Antill [mailto:[email protected]]
Quoted 2 lines · Joshua Brindle
Quoted 1 line · James Antill
Here is the policy changes needed for the context
contains security
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 2 lines
checking in PAM and cron.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
er, where did this come from? I haven't seen any discussions about this and have no idea what its about (perhaps I've just
totally missed
Quoted 1 line
it somehow though..)
The gory details were under the thread "MLS enforcing PTYs,
sshd, and newrole"
Quoted 5 lines
Ah, well that explains it, that thread was way too long and had MLS in the subject.....
Any way I could get a summary/conclusion and description of the new permission?
If we allow users to enter a level at login time (or specify a level for a cron job), then we need to check that the Linux user was authorized for that level (based on seusers). As this gets into level comparisons, which are policy-specific, it requires a permission check to the security server. The check is applied between a context generated from the seusers entry for the user and the context modified with the user-specified level. The TE policy then authorizes it for the self relationship (since the types are the same in both contexts), and the MLS constraints ensure that the user-specified level is within the seusers-specified clearance. Same basic idea as the existing context translate permission used to similarly check the ability of the user to translate a given MLS level.
Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 2 lines · James Antill
Here is the policy changes needed for the context contains security
checking in PAM and cron.
Merged. Added require block to userdomain change since context is a userland object class and thus not automatically required by the gen_require() macro.
Signature · 9 lines
Chris PeBenito Tresys Technology, LLC (410) 290-1411 x150 -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.