make reading /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bould not require CAP_SYS_MODULE
RFC 1/1 make reading /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bould not require CAP_SYS_MODULE
Reading /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound requires CAP_SYS_MODULE. (see proc_dointvec_bset in kernel/sysctl.c)
sysctl appears to drive all over proc reading everything it can get it's hands on and is complaining when it is being denied access to read cap-bound. Clearly writing to cap-bound should be a sensitive operation but requiring CAP_SYS_MODULE to read cap-bound seems a bit to strong. I believe the information could with reasonable certainty be obtained by looking at a bunch of the output of /proc/pid/status which has very low security protection, so at best we are just getting a little obfuscation of information.
Currently SELinux policy has to 'dontaudit' capability checks for CAP_SYS_MODULE for things like sysctl which just want to read cap-bound. In doing so we also as a by product have to hide warnings of potential exploits such as if at some time that sysctl actually tried to load a module. I wondered if anyone would have a problem opening cap-bound up to read from anyone? Possibly with something like the patch below?
-Eric
kernel/sysctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/sysctl.c renamed from kernel/sysctl.c.cap.sys.module +1 -1
@@ -2020,7 +2020,7 @@ int proc_dointvec_bset(ctl_table *table, {int op; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_MODULE )) { +if (write && !capable (CAP_SYS_MODULE )) {return -EPERM ; }