Make LIST_POISON less deadly (v3)
PATCH 1/1 Make LIST_POISON less deadly (v3)
The list macros use LIST_POISON1 and LIST_POISON2 as undereferencable pointers in order to trap erronous use of freed list_heads. Unfortunately userspace can arrange for those pointers to actually be dereferencable, potentially turning an oops to an expolit.
To avoid this allow architectures (currently x86_64 only) to override the default values for these pointers with truly-undereferncable values. This is easy on x86_64 as the virtual address space is large and contains unmapped ranges.
---
Changes since v1:
- add CONFIG_ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE instead of new header <asm/poison.h>
Changes since v2:
- switched the range from an uncanonical address to a canonical unmapped address, since uncannonical addresses generate #GP instead of #PF, losing the faulting address.
arch/x86/Kconfig | 5 +++++ include/linux/poison.h | 10 ++++++++-- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +5 -0
@@ -1021,6 +1021,11 @@ config ARCH_MEMORY_PROBE def_bool X86_64 depends on MEMORY_HOTPLUG +config ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE + hex + default 0 if X86_32 + default 0xffffc10000000000 if X86_64 + source "mm/Kconfig" config HIGHPTE
include/linux/poison.h +8 -2
@@ -1,14 +1,20 @@#ifndef _LINUX_POISON_H#define _LINUX_POISON_H +#ifdef CONFIG_ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE +#define POISON_POINTER_DELTA CONFIG_ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE +#else +#define POISON_POINTER_DELTA 0L +#endif +/********** include/linux/list.h **********/ /* * These are non-NULL pointers that will result in page faults * under normal circumstances, used to verify that nobody uses * non-initialized list entries. */ -#define LIST_POISON1 ((void *) 0x00100100) -#define LIST_POISON2 ((void *) 0x00200200) +#define LIST_POISON1 ((void *) 0x00100100 + POISON_POINTER_DELTA) +#define LIST_POISON2 ((void *) 0x00200200 + POISON_POINTER_DELTA)/********** include/linux/timer.h **********/ /*
Signature · 1 line
1.5.5.1
Quoted 9 lines · Avi Kivity
The list macros use
LIST_POISON1andLIST_POISON2as undereferencable pointers in order to trap erronous use of freedlist_heads. Unfortunately userspace can arrange for those pointers to actually be dereferencable, potentially turning an oops to an expolit.To avoid this allow architectures (currently
x86_64only) to override the default values for these pointers with truly-undereferncable values. This is easy onx86_64as the virtual address space is large and contains unmapped ranges.
looks good - thanks Avi - i've added your patch to the -tip tree. I have opened a separate topic for it: tip/safe-poison-pointers. (because it affects other architectures as well)
Ingo
arch/x86/Kconfig config ARCH_MEMORY_PROBE · line 1027
Quoted 5 lines · Avi Kivity
arch/x86/Kconfig +4
-0+config ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE + hex + default 0 if X86_32 + default 0xffffc10000000000 if X86_64
Don't make it exactly 0xffffc10000000000 but 0xffffc10000000000 + 0x1000000 or so, otherwise list_entry() users which subtract offsets would still end up in user space and there might be actually something in there by default.
-Andi
Quoted 9 lines · Andi Kleen
arch/x86/Kconfig config ARCH_MEMORY_PROBE · line 1027
Quoted 6 lines · Avi Kivity
arch/x86/Kconfig +4
-0+config ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE + hex + default 0 if X86_32 + default 0xffffc10000000000 if X86_64
Quoted 5 lines
Don't make it exactly
0xffffc10000000000but0xffffc10000000000+0x1000000or so, otherwiselist_entry()users which subtract offsets would still end up in user space and there might be actually something in there by default.
The poison code adds a large offset (>1MB) so we're safe here.
Signature · 1 line
error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function