xfrm: SHA-256/384/512 HMAC support for IPsec
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 xfrm: SHA-256/384/512 HMAC support for IPsec
RFC4868 defines the use of SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 in HMAC using 128, 192 and 256 bits truncation. This patch replaces the outdated SHA256 algorithm with 96 bits truncation by the 128 bit variant and adds the SHA384/512 algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <[email protected]>
---
Replacing the 96 bit truncation SHA256 algorithm might be problematic, but it is obsolete in IPsec and I don't see a way to register two different truncation lengths in XFRM.
net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c 2008-06-05 14:39:31.000000000 +0200 renamed from net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c 2008-06-05 14:01:01.000000000 +0200 +37 -1
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ .uinfo = { .auth = { - .icv_truncbits = 96, + .icv_truncbits = 128, .icv_fullbits = 256, } },
@@ -200,6 +200,42 @@ } }, { + .name = "hmac(sha384)", + .compat = "sha384", + + .uinfo = { + .auth = { + .icv_truncbits = 192, + .icv_fullbits = 384, + } + }, + + .desc = { + .sadb_alg_id = SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384HMAC, + .sadb_alg_ivlen = 0, + .sadb_alg_minbits = 384, + .sadb_alg_maxbits = 384 + } +}, +{ + .name = "hmac(sha512)", + .compat = "sha512", + + .uinfo = { + .auth = { + .icv_truncbits = 256, + .icv_fullbits = 512, + } + }, + + .desc = { + .sadb_alg_id = SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512HMAC, + .sadb_alg_ivlen = 0, + .sadb_alg_minbits = 512, + .sadb_alg_maxbits = 512 + } +}, +{ .name = "hmac(rmd160)", .compat = "rmd160",
Quoted 11 lines · Martin Willi
RFC4868 defines the use of SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 in HMAC using 128, 192 and 256 bits truncation. This patch replaces the outdated SHA256 algorithm with 96 bits truncation by the 128 bit variant and adds the SHA384/512 algorithms.
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <[email protected]>
---
Replacing the 96 bit truncation SHA256 algorithm might be problematic, but it is obsolete in IPsec and I don't see a way to register two different truncation lengths in XFRM.
You could register a new SADB algorithm id in pfkeyv2.h and add a new entry to the aalg_list analogous to how GCM is doing that in the aead_list.
Adrian
Quoted 54 lines
net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c 2008-06-05 14:39:31.000000000 +0200 renamed from net/xfrm/xfrm_algo.c 2008-06-05 14:01:01.000000000 +0200 +37
-1@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ .uinfo = { .auth = { - .icv_truncbits = 96, + .icv_truncbits = 128, .icv_fullbits = 256, } },@@ -200,6 +200,42 @@ } }, { + .name = "hmac(sha384)", + .compat = "sha384", + + .uinfo = { + .auth = { + .icv_truncbits = 192, + .icv_fullbits = 384, + } + }, + + .desc = { + .sadb_alg_id = SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384HMAC, + .sadb_alg_ivlen = 0, + .sadb_alg_minbits = 384, + .sadb_alg_maxbits = 384 + } +}, +{ + .name = "hmac(sha512)", + .compat = "sha512", + + .uinfo = { + .auth = { + .icv_truncbits = 256, + .icv_fullbits = 512, + } + }, + + .desc = { + .sadb_alg_id = SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512HMAC, + .sadb_alg_ivlen = 0, + .sadb_alg_minbits = 512, + .sadb_alg_maxbits = 512 + } +}, +{ .name = "hmac(rmd160)", .compat = "rmd160",
Quoted 5 lines
You could register a new SADB algorithm id in
pfkeyv2.hand add a new entry to theaalg_listanalogous to how GCM is doing that in theaead_list.Adrian
We could do that, but SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256HMAC (5) actually refers to 128 bit truncation. 96 bit truncation is a leftover of draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00 and has been replaced by 128 bit truncation in draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-01.
draft-kelly-ipsec-ciph-sha2 and the resulting RFC4868 define 128 bit truncation for SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256HMAC (5), so 96 bit truncation is really obsolete. We could define a new PF_KEY algorithm for 96 bit truncation, but it is not really usable as it is not standardized.
Martin
Quoted 10 lines · Martin Willi
Quoted 4 lines
You could register a new SADB algorithm id in
pfkeyv2.hand add a new entry to theaalg_listanalogous to how GCM is doing that in theaead_list.Adrian
We could do that, but SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256HMAC (5) actually refers to 128 bit truncation. 96 bit truncation is a leftover of draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-00 and has been replaced by 128 bit truncation in draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-sha-256-01.
Quoted 4 lines
draft-kelly-ipsec-ciph-sha2 and the resulting RFC4868 define 128 bit truncation for SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256HMAC (5), so 96 bit truncation is really obsolete. We could define a new
PF_KEYalgorithm for 96 bit truncation, but it is not really usable as it is not standardized.
I agree that 96bit truncation is obsolete and 128 bit should be used. However people might be using the current implementation and this patch could cause trouble for them. The question is if anybody really depends on the current behavior.
Adrian
Herbert Xu
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Adrian-Ken Rüegsegger
I agree that 96bit truncation is obsolete and 128 bit should be used. However people might be using the current implementation and this patch could cause trouble for them. The question is if anybody really depends on the current behavior.
I think the way we're currently representing the truncation length is not ideal. We should move over to the way it's done for AEAD algorithms, i.e., let user-space supply us with the truncation length. That way the problem lies with them :) More importantly, this would allows us to support multiple truncation lengths.
Cheers,
Signature · 4 lines
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Email: Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <[email protected]>
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