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AES-NI: Add support to Intel AES-NI instructions for x86_64 platform

PATCH In review Huang Ying 2 participants 7 messages Jan 15, 2009 – Jan 16, 2009 1 message not in the archive

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Huang Ying

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PATCH 2/2 AES-NI: Add support to Intel AES-NI instructions for x86_64 platform

Intel AES-NI is a new set of Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) instructions that are going to be introduced in the next generation of Intel processor, as of 2009. These instructions enable fast and secure data encryption and decryption, using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), defined by FIPS Publication number 197. The architecture introduces six instructions that offer full hardware support for AES. Four of them support high performance data encryption and decryption, and the other two instructions support the AES key expansion procedure.

The white paper can be downloaded from:

http://softwarecommunity.intel.com/isn/downloads/intelavx/AES-Instructions-Set_WP.pdf

AES may be used in soft_irq context, but MMX/SSE context can not be touched safely in soft_irq context. So in_interrupt() is checked, if in IRQ or soft_irq context, the general x86_64 implementation are used instead.

ChangeLog:

v4:

- Pre-assemble AES-NI instructions, because they are not supported by old binutils.

v3:

- Use cryptd(%s) to delay a crypto request instead of work queue.

v2:

- Rename file name and function name to aesni_<xx>

- Move to arch/x86/crypto.

- ECB and CBC modes are implemented in parallel style to take advantage of pipelined hardware implementation.

- AES key scheduling algorithm is re-implemented with higher performance.

- ablkcipher asynchronous machanism is used to delay a crypto request to work queue context upon FPU state is using by other kernel context.

---
 arch/x86/crypto/Makefile           |    3 
 arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S  |  896 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c |  460 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h  |    1 
 crypto/Kconfig                     |   25 +
 5 files changed, 1385 insertions(+)
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c new file +460 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,460 @@
+/*
+ * Support for Intel AES-NI instructions. This file contains glue
+ * code, the real AES implementation is in intel-aes_asm.S.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, Intel Corp.
+ *    Author: Huang Ying <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/hardirq.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <asm/i387.h>
+#include <asm/aes.h>
+
+struct async_aes_ctx {
+	struct cryptd_ablkcipher *cryptd_tfm;
+};
+
+#define AESNI_ALIGN	16
+#define AES_BLOCK_MASK	(~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE-1))
+
+asmlinkage int aesni_set_key(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key,
+			     unsigned int key_len);
+asmlinkage void aesni_enc(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
+			  const u8 *in);
+asmlinkage void aesni_dec(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
+			  const u8 *in);
+asmlinkage void aesni_ecb_enc(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
+			      const u8 *in, unsigned int len);
+asmlinkage void aesni_ecb_dec(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
+			      const u8 *in, unsigned int len);
+asmlinkage void aesni_cbc_enc(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
+			      const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv);
+asmlinkage void aesni_cbc_dec(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
+			      const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv);
+
+static inline int kernel_fpu_using(void)
+{
+	if (in_interrupt() && !(read_cr0() & X86_CR0_TS))
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_ctx(void *raw_ctx)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)raw_ctx;
+	unsigned long align = AESNI_ALIGN;
+
+	if (align <= crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment())
+		align = 1;
+	return (struct crypto_aes_ctx *)ALIGN(addr, align);
+}
+
+static int aes_set_key_common(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, void *raw_ctx,
+			      const u8 *in_key, unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(raw_ctx);
+	u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
+	int err;
+
+	if (key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
+	    key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256) {
+		*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (kernel_fpu_using())
+		err = crypto_aes_expand_key(ctx, in_key, key_len);
+	else {
+		kernel_fpu_begin();
+		err = aesni_set_key(ctx, in_key, key_len);
+		kernel_fpu_end();
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+		       unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	return aes_set_key_common(tfm, crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), in_key, key_len);
+}
+
+static void aes_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm));
+
+	if (kernel_fpu_using())
+		crypto_aes_encrypt_x86(ctx, dst, src);
+	else {
+		kernel_fpu_begin();
+		aesni_enc(ctx, dst, src);
+		kernel_fpu_end();
+	}
+}
+
+static void aes_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm));
+
+	if (kernel_fpu_using())
+		crypto_aes_decrypt_x86(ctx, dst, src);
+	else {
+		kernel_fpu_begin();
+		aesni_dec(ctx, dst, src);
+		kernel_fpu_end();
+	}
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg aesni_alg = {
+	.cra_name		= "aes",
+	.cra_driver_name	= "aes-aesni",
+	.cra_priority		= 300,
+	.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx)+AESNI_ALIGN-1,
+	.cra_alignmask		= 0,
+	.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		= LIST_HEAD_INIT(aesni_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u	= {
+		.cipher	= {
+			.cia_min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+			.cia_max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+			.cia_setkey		= aes_set_key,
+			.cia_encrypt		= aes_encrypt,
+			.cia_decrypt		= aes_decrypt
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static int ecb_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+		       struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+		       unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm));
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+	int err;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
+
+	kernel_fpu_begin();
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
+		aesni_ecb_enc(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+			      nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK);
+		nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
+		err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
+	}
+	kernel_fpu_end();
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int ecb_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+		       struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+		       unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm));
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+	int err;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
+
+	kernel_fpu_begin();
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
+		aesni_ecb_dec(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+			      nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK);
+		nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
+		err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
+	}
+	kernel_fpu_end();
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg blk_ecb_alg = {
+	.cra_name		= "__ecb-aes-aesni",
+	.cra_driver_name	= "__driver-ecb-aes-aesni",
+	.cra_priority		= 0,
+	.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx)+AESNI_ALIGN-1,
+	.cra_alignmask		= 0,
+	.cra_type		= &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		= LIST_HEAD_INIT(blk_ecb_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u = {
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+			.setkey		= aes_set_key,
+			.encrypt	= ecb_encrypt,
+			.decrypt	= ecb_decrypt,
+		},
+	},
+};
+
+static int cbc_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+		       struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+		       unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm));
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+	int err;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
+
+	kernel_fpu_begin();
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
+		aesni_cbc_enc(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+			      nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK, walk.iv);
+		nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
+		err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
+	}
+	kernel_fpu_end();
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int cbc_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+		       struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+		       unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+	struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm));
+	struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+	int err;
+
+	blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+	err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
+
+	kernel_fpu_begin();
+	while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
+		aesni_cbc_dec(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+			      nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK, walk.iv);
+		nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
+		err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
+	}
+	kernel_fpu_end();
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg blk_cbc_alg = {
+	.cra_name		= "__cbc-aes-aesni",
+	.cra_driver_name	= "__driver-cbc-aes-aesni",
+	.cra_priority		= 0,
+	.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER,
+	.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx)+AESNI_ALIGN-1,
+	.cra_alignmask		= 0,
+	.cra_type		= &crypto_blkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		= LIST_HEAD_INIT(blk_cbc_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_u = {
+		.blkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+			.setkey		= aes_set_key,
+			.encrypt	= cbc_encrypt,
+			.decrypt	= cbc_decrypt,
+		},
+	},
+};
+
+static int ablk_set_key(struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+			unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct async_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return crypto_ablkcipher_setkey(&ctx->cryptd_tfm->base, key, key_len);
+}
+
+static int ablk_encrypt(struct ablkcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct async_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (kernel_fpu_using()) {
+		struct ablkcipher_request *cryptd_req =
+			ablkcipher_request_ctx(req);
+		memcpy(cryptd_req, req, sizeof(*req));
+		ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(cryptd_req, &ctx->cryptd_tfm->base);
+		return crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(cryptd_req);
+	} else {
+		struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+		desc.tfm = cryptd_ablkcipher_child(ctx->cryptd_tfm);
+		desc.info = req->info;
+		desc.flags = 0;
+		return crypto_blkcipher_crt(desc.tfm)->encrypt(
+			&desc, req->dst, req->src, req->nbytes);
+	}
+}
+
+static int ablk_decrypt(struct ablkcipher_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	struct async_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (kernel_fpu_using()) {
+		struct ablkcipher_request *cryptd_req =
+			ablkcipher_request_ctx(req);
+		memcpy(cryptd_req, req, sizeof(*req));
+		ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(cryptd_req, &ctx->cryptd_tfm->base);
+		return crypto_ablkcipher_decrypt(cryptd_req);
+	} else {
+		struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+		desc.tfm = cryptd_ablkcipher_child(ctx->cryptd_tfm);
+		desc.info = req->info;
+		desc.flags = 0;
+		return crypto_blkcipher_crt(desc.tfm)->decrypt(
+			&desc, req->dst, req->src, req->nbytes);
+	}
+}
+
+static void ablk_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct async_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	cryptd_free_ablkcipher(ctx->cryptd_tfm);
+}
+
+static void ablk_init_common(struct crypto_tfm *tfm,
+			     struct cryptd_ablkcipher *cryptd_tfm)
+{
+	struct async_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	ctx->cryptd_tfm = cryptd_tfm;
+	tfm->crt_ablkcipher.reqsize = sizeof(struct ablkcipher_request) +
+		crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(&cryptd_tfm->base);
+}
+
+static int ablk_ecb_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct cryptd_ablkcipher *cryptd_tfm;
+
+	cryptd_tfm = cryptd_alloc_ablkcipher("__driver-ecb-aes-aesni", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(cryptd_tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(cryptd_tfm);
+	ablk_init_common(tfm, cryptd_tfm);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ablk_ecb_alg = {
+	.cra_name		= "ecb(aes)",
+	.cra_driver_name	= "ecb-aes-aesni",
+	.cra_priority		= 400,
+	.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ABLKCIPHER|CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
+	.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct async_aes_ctx),
+	.cra_alignmask		= 0,
+	.cra_type		= &crypto_ablkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		= LIST_HEAD_INIT(ablk_ecb_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_init		= ablk_ecb_init,
+	.cra_exit		= ablk_exit,
+	.cra_u = {
+		.ablkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+			.setkey		= ablk_set_key,
+			.encrypt	= ablk_encrypt,
+			.decrypt	= ablk_decrypt,
+		},
+	},
+};
+
+static int ablk_cbc_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct cryptd_ablkcipher *cryptd_tfm;
+
+	cryptd_tfm = cryptd_alloc_ablkcipher("__driver-cbc-aes-aesni", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(cryptd_tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(cryptd_tfm);
+	ablk_init_common(tfm, cryptd_tfm);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct crypto_alg ablk_cbc_alg = {
+	.cra_name		= "cbc(aes)",
+	.cra_driver_name	= "cbc-aes-aesni",
+	.cra_priority		= 400,
+	.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ABLKCIPHER|CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC,
+	.cra_blocksize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct async_aes_ctx),
+	.cra_alignmask		= 0,
+	.cra_type		= &crypto_ablkcipher_type,
+	.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.cra_list		= LIST_HEAD_INIT(ablk_cbc_alg.cra_list),
+	.cra_init		= ablk_cbc_init,
+	.cra_exit		= ablk_exit,
+	.cra_u = {
+		.ablkcipher = {
+			.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+			.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+			.ivsize		= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.setkey		= ablk_set_key,
+			.encrypt	= ablk_encrypt,
+			.decrypt	= ablk_decrypt,
+		},
+	},
+};
+
+static int __init aesni_init(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (!cpu_has_aes) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "Intel AES-NI instructions are not detected.\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+	if ((err = crypto_register_alg(&aesni_alg)))
+		goto aes_err;
+	if ((err = crypto_register_alg(&blk_ecb_alg)))
+		goto blk_ecb_err;
+	if ((err = crypto_register_alg(&blk_cbc_alg)))
+		goto blk_cbc_err;
+	if ((err = crypto_register_alg(&ablk_ecb_alg)))
+		goto ablk_ecb_err;
+	if ((err = crypto_register_alg(&ablk_cbc_alg)))
+		goto ablk_cbc_err;
+
+	return err;
+
+ablk_cbc_err:
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&ablk_ecb_alg);
+ablk_ecb_err:
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&blk_cbc_alg);
+blk_cbc_err:
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&blk_ecb_alg);
+blk_ecb_err:
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&aesni_alg);
+aes_err:
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void __exit aesni_exit(void)
+{
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&ablk_cbc_alg);
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&ablk_ecb_alg);
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&blk_cbc_alg);
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&blk_ecb_alg);
+	crypto_unregister_alg(&aesni_alg);
+}
+
+module_init(aesni_init);
+module_exit(aesni_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Rijndael (AES) Cipher Algorithm, Intel AES-NI instructions optimized");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_ALIAS("aes");
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +1 -0
@@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ extern const char * const x86_power_flag
 #define cpu_has_xmm		boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM)
 #define cpu_has_xmm2		boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2)
 #define cpu_has_xmm3		boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM3)
+#define cpu_has_aes		boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AES)
 #define cpu_has_ht		boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HT)
 #define cpu_has_mp		boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MP)
 #define cpu_has_nx		boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX)
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S new file +896 -0

896 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/crypto/Makefile +3 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20_586) += sals
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_X86_64) += aes-x86_64.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64) += twofish-x86_64.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20_X86_64) += salsa20-x86_64.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_NI_INTEL) += aesni-intel.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32C_INTEL) += crc32c-intel.o
 
@@ -19,3 +20,5 @@ salsa20-i586-y := salsa20-i586-asm_32.o 
 aes-x86_64-y := aes-x86_64-asm_64.o aes_glue.o
 twofish-x86_64-y := twofish-x86_64-asm_64.o twofish_glue.o
 salsa20-x86_64-y := salsa20-x86_64-asm_64.o salsa20_glue.o
+
+aesni-intel-y := aesni-intel_asm.o aesni-intel_glue.o
crypto/Kconfig +25 -0
@@ -470,6 +470,31 @@ config CRYPTO_AES_X86_64
 
 	  See <http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/> for more information.
 
+config CRYPTO_AES_NI_INTEL
+	tristate "AES cipher algorithms (AES-NI)"
+	depends on (X86 || UML_X86) && 64BIT
+	select CRYPTO_AES_X86_64
+	select CRYPTO_CRYPTD
+	select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
+	help
+	  Use Intel AES-NI instructions for AES algorithm.
+
+	  AES cipher algorithms (FIPS-197). AES uses the Rijndael
+	  algorithm.
+
+	  Rijndael appears to be consistently a very good performer in
+	  both hardware and software across a wide range of computing
+	  environments regardless of its use in feedback or non-feedback
+	  modes. Its key setup time is excellent, and its key agility is
+	  good. Rijndael's very low memory requirements make it very well
+	  suited for restricted-space environments, in which it also
+	  demonstrates excellent performance. Rijndael's operations are
+	  among the easiest to defend against power and timing attacks.
+
+	  The AES specifies three key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 bits
+
+	  See <http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/> for more information.
+
 config CRYPTO_ANUBIS
 	tristate "Anubis cipher algorithm"
 	select CRYPTO_ALGAPI

A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]

author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 29 lines · roel kluin

Sorry to bother,

Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c new file +12 -0
+static int ecb_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
+                      struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
+                      unsigned int nbytes)
+{
+       struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm));
+       struct blkcipher_walk walk;
+       int err;
+
+       blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
+       err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
+
+       kernel_fpu_begin();

arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c line 160

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c new file +10 -0
+       while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
+               aesni_ecb_enc(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+                             nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK);
+               nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
+               err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
+       }
+       kernel_fpu_end();
+
+       return err;
+}

if blkcipher_walk_{virt,done} returns an error, don't we have to break out of the loop?
i.e.

Quoted 3 lines

while (!err && (nbytes = walk.nbytes))

(if that's erroneous, it occurs in other places as well)

It seems that it is a bug.

But it seems that the similar code in geode-aes.c and padlock-aes.c has same bug. I think we should fix them too.

Best Regards,
Huang Ying

maintainer
#3 lore raw
Quoted 18 lines · Huang Ying
Quoted 16 lines · roel kluin

arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c line 160

Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c new file +11 -0
+       kernel_fpu_begin();
+       while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
+               aesni_ecb_enc(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+                             nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK);
+               nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
+               err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
+       }
+       kernel_fpu_end();
+
+       return err;
+}

if blkcipher_walk_{virt,done} returns an error, don't we have to break out of the loop?
i.e.

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

while (!err && (nbytes = walk.nbytes))

(if that's erroneous, it occurs in other places as well)

That's not necessary because blkcipher_walk_done will ensure that walk.nbytes == 0 if there is an error.

Cheers,

Signature · 4 lines
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Email: Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <[email protected]>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
author
#4 lore raw
Quoted 19 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 18 lines · Huang Ying
Quoted 16 lines · roel kluin

arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c line 160

Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c new file +11 -0
+       kernel_fpu_begin();
+       while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
+               aesni_ecb_enc(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
+                             nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK);
+               nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
+               err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
+       }
+       kernel_fpu_end();
+
+       return err;
+}

if blkcipher_walk_{virt,done} returns an error, don't we have to break out of the loop?
i.e.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

while (!err && (nbytes = walk.nbytes))

(if that's erroneous, it occurs in other places as well)

That's not necessary because blkcipher_walk_done will ensure that walk.nbytes == 0 if there is an error.

But after checking blkcipher_walk_done() in 2.6.28, If input argument err != 0 and walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW != 0, when blkcipher_walk_done() return non-zero, walk->nbytes != 0. So I think it is a little fragile to use walk->nbytes == 0 indicate error.

int blkcipher_walk_done(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct blkcipher_walk *walk, int err)

{
        struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = desc->tfm;
        unsigned int nbytes = 0;

        if (likely(err >= 0)) {
                unsigned int n = walk->nbytes - err;

                if (likely(!(walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW)))
                        n = blkcipher_done_fast(walk, n);
                else if (WARN_ON(err)) {
                        err = -EINVAL;
                        goto err;
                } else
                        n = blkcipher_done_slow(tfm, walk, n);

                nbytes = walk->total - n;
                err = 0;
        }

        scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, nbytes);
        scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 1, nbytes);

        walk->total = nbytes;
        walk->nbytes = nbytes;

        if (nbytes) {
                crypto_yield(desc->flags);
                return blkcipher_walk_next(desc, walk);
        }

err:

        if (walk->iv != desc->info)
                memcpy(desc->info, walk->iv, crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm));
        if (walk->buffer != walk->page)
                kfree(walk->buffer);
        if (walk->page)
                free_page((unsigned long)walk->page);

        return err;
}

Best Regards,
Huang Ying

maintainer
#5 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Huang Ying

But after checking blkcipher_walk_done() in 2.6.28, If input argument err != 0 and walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW != 0, when blkcipher_walk_done() return non-zero, walk->nbytes != 0. So I think it is a little fragile to use walk->nbytes == 0 indicate error.

Right, that's a bug. Although this case shouldn't occur unless wer have a buggy algorithm (that's why it's a WARN_ON). But as we're handling it anyway, we should ensure that the result is sane.

crypt: blkcipher - Fix WARN_ON handling in walk_done

When we get left-over bits from a slow walk, it means that the underlying cipher has gone troppo. However, as we're handling that case we should ensure that the caller terminates the walk.

This patch does this by setting walk->nbytes to zero.

crypto/blkcipher.c +1 -1
index 4a7e65c..d70a41c 100644
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ int blkcipher_walk_done(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
 	scatterwalk_done(&walk->in, 0, nbytes);
 	scatterwalk_done(&walk->out, 1, nbytes);
 
+err:
 	walk->total = nbytes;
 	walk->nbytes = nbytes;
 
@@ -132,7 +133,6 @@ int blkcipher_walk_done(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
 		return blkcipher_walk_next(desc, walk);
 	}
 
-err:
 	if (walk->iv != desc->info)
 		memcpy(desc->info, walk->iv, crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm));
 	if (walk->buffer != walk->page)

Thanks,

Signature · 4 lines
Visit Openswan at http://www.openswan.org/
Email: Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <[email protected]>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
author
#6 lore raw
Quoted 13 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 5 lines · Huang Ying

But after checking blkcipher_walk_done() in 2.6.28, If input argument err != 0 and walk->flags & BLKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW != 0, when blkcipher_walk_done() return non-zero, walk->nbytes != 0. So I think it is a little fragile to use walk->nbytes == 0 indicate error.

Right, that's a bug. Although this case shouldn't occur unless wer have a buggy algorithm (that's why it's a WARN_ON). But as we're handling it anyway, we should ensure that the result is sane.

crypt: blkcipher - Fix WARN_ON handling in walk_done

Quoted 7 lines

When we get left-over bits from a slow walk, it means that the underlying cipher has gone troppo. However, as we're handling that case we should ensure that the caller terminates the walk.

This patch does this by setting walk->nbytes to zero.

I think Roel Kluin is the real reporter.

Best Regards,
Huang Ying

maintainer
#7 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Huang Ying

I think Roel Kluin is the real reporter.

OK I'll add him as well.

Thanks,

Signature · 4 lines
Visit Openswan at http://www.openswan.org/
Email: Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <[email protected]>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt