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Fix cr0.wp=0 emulation

PATCH In review Avi Kivity 2 participants 5 messages May 27, 2010

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Avi Kivity

author
#0 lore raw

cover Fix cr0.wp=0 emulation

Xiao didn't find the nice cr0.wp=0 trick because it wasn't there, removed accidentally by b70ccb0b3fd. Restore the trick and document it.

Avi Kivity (3):
KVM: MMU: Allow spte.w=1 for gpte.w=0 and cr0.wp=0 only in shadow
mode
KVM: MMU: Remove user access when allowing kernel access to gpte.w=0
page
KVM: MMU: Document cr0.wp emulation

 Documentation/kvm/mmu.txt |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c        |    6 +++++-
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
author
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 KVM: MMU: Allow spte.w=1 for gpte.w=0 and cr0.wp=0 only in shadow mode

When tdp is enabled, the guest's cr0.wp shouldn't have any effect on spte permissions.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c |    3 ++-
 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c +2 -1
index 136e160..39dd8d3 100644
@@ -1881,7 +1881,8 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
 	spte |= (u64)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
 
 	if ((pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK)
-	    || (write_fault && !is_write_protection(vcpu) && !user_fault)) {
+	    || (!tdp_enabled && write_fault && !is_write_protection(vcpu)
+		&& !user_fault)) {
 
 		if (level > PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL &&
 		    has_wrprotected_page(vcpu->kvm, gfn, level)) {
Signature · 1 line
1.7.1
author
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 KVM: MMU: Remove user access when allowing kernel access to gpte.w=0 page

In reply to Avi Kivity

If cr0.wp=0, we have to allow the guest kernel access to a page with pte.w=0. We do that by setting spte.w=1, since the host cr0.wp must remain set so the host can write protect pages. Once we allow write access, we must remove user access otherwise we mistakenly allow the user to write the page.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c |    3 +++
 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c +3 -0
index 39dd8d3..56f8c3c 100644
@@ -1894,6 +1894,9 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
 
 		spte |= PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
 
+		if (!tdp_enabled && !(pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK))
+			spte &= ~PT_USER_MASK;
+
 		/*
 		 * Optimization: for pte sync, if spte was writable the hash
 		 * lookup is unnecessary (and expensive). Write protection
Signature · 1 line
1.7.1
Reviewed-by on v1 2/3
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/3] KVM: MMU: Remove user access when allowing kernel access to gpte.w=0 page

Quoted 5 lines · Avi Kivity

If cr0.wp=0, we have to allow the guest kernel access to a page with pte.w=0. We do that by setting spte.w=1, since the host cr0.wp must remain set so the host can write protect pages. Once we allow write access, we must remove user access otherwise we mistakenly allow the user to write the page.

Yeah, it's really a nice way :-)

Quoted 19 lines
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c |    3 +++
 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c +3 -0
index 39dd8d3..56f8c3c 100644
@@ -1894,6 +1894,9 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
 
 		spte |= PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
 
+		if (!tdp_enabled && !(pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK))
+			spte &= ~PT_USER_MASK;
+
 		/*
 		 * Optimization: for pte sync, if spte was writable the hash
 		 * lookup is unnecessary (and expensive). Write protection
author
#4 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 KVM: MMU: Document cr0.wp emulation

In reply to Avi Kivity
---
 Documentation/kvm/mmu.txt |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
Documentation/kvm/mmu.txt +18 -0
index 2201dcb..6528ad9 100644
@@ -298,6 +298,24 @@ Host translation updates:
   - look up affected sptes through reverse map
   - drop (or update) translations
 
+Emulating cr0.wp
+================
+
+If tdp is not enabled, the host must keep cr0.wp=1 so page write protection
+works for the guest kernel, not guest guest userspace.  When the guest
+cr0.wp=1, this does not present a problem.  However when the guest cr0.wp=0,
+we cannot map the permissions for gpte.u=1, gpte.w=0 to any spte.
+
+We handle this my mapping the permissions to two possible gptes, depending
+on fault type:
+
+- kernel write fault: spte.u=0, spte.w=1 (allows full kernel access,
+  disallows user access)
+- read fault: spte.u=1, spte.w=0 (allows full read access, disallows kernel
+  write access)
+
+(user write faults generate a #PF)
+
 Further reading
 ===============
 
Signature · 1 line
1.7.1