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PATCH In review Mimi Zohar 8 participants 41 messages Apr 21, 2010 – Jun 4, 2010

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Mimi Zohar

author
#0 lore raw

cover EVM

Extended Verification Module(EVM) detects offline tampering of the security extended attributes (e.g. security.selinux, security.SMACK64, security.ima), which is the basis for LSM permission decisions and, with this set of patches, integrity appraisal decisions. To detect offline tampering of the extended attributes, EVM maintains an HMAC-sha1 across a set of security extended attributes, storing the HMAC as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. To verify the integrity of an extended attribute, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(), which re-calculates the HMAC and compares it with the version stored in 'security.evm'.

IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list, containing the hashes of all executables, mmaped execute files, and files open for read by root (assuming the default measurement policy). The measurement list, with other information, can be used to assert the integrity of the running system to a third party. The "ima: integrity appraisal extension" patch extends IMA with local measurement appraisal. The extension stores and maintains the file integrity measurement as an extended attribute 'security.ima', which EVM can be configured to protect.

DAC/MAC protect the integrity of a running system. An offline attack can bypass these protection mechanisms by mounting the disk under a different operating system and modifying the file data/metadata. If the disk is subsequently remounted under the EVM + DAC/MAC + IMA protected OS, then the hash of the file data won't match the hash stored in the IMA xattr, or the TPM-calculated HMAC of the file's metadata won't be valid. Therefore, IMA + MAC + EVM can protect system integrity online and detect offline tampering.

This patch set applies to the security-testing/next tree. They prereq remove-kref-set.patch (https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/86079,
linux-next commit 8e47f1004).

Much appreciation to Dave Hansen, Serge Hallyn, and Matt Helsley for reviewing the patches.

Mimi

Mimi Zohar (14):
integrity: move ima inode integrity data management
security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h
xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp
evm: re-release
ima: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
security: imbed evm calls in security hooks
evm: inode post removexattr
evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr
evm: inode_post_init
fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls
ima: integrity appraisal extension
ima: appraise default rules
ima: inode post_setattr
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr and ima_inode_removexattr

author
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/14 integrity: move ima inode integrity data management

Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity layer in order to share the integrity data area among the different integrity models.

include/linux/ima.h +0 -12
index 975837e..4dce900 100644
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ struct linux_binprm;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA
 extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-extern int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
-extern void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
 extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
 extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
 extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
@@ -28,16 +26,6 @@ static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
-{
-	return;
-}
-
 static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	return 0;
include/linux/integrity.h new file +28 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..276081f
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H
+#define _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
+extern int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
+extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
+
+#else
+static inline int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_H */
+#endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
security/Kconfig +1 -1
index 226b955..4f00287 100644
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
 source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
 
-source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+source security/integrity/Kconfig
 
 choice
 	prompt "Default security module"
security/Makefile +2 -2
index da20a19..9269caa 100644
@@ -22,5 +22,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
 
 # Object integrity file lists
-subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= integrity/ima
-obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= integrity/ima/built-in.o
+subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY)		+= integrity
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY)			+= integrity/built-in.o
security/integrity/Kconfig new file +6 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2704691
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#
+config INTEGRITY
+	def_bool y
+	depends on IMA
+
+source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
security/integrity/Makefile new file +10 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6eddd61
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#
+# Makefile for caching inode integrity data (iint)
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o
+
+integrity-y := iint.o
+
+subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima/built-in.o
security/integrity/iint.c new file +150 -0

150 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +1 -0
index 3d7846d..dc60e40 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config IMA
 	bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
 	depends on ACPI
 	depends on SECURITY
+	select INTEGRITY
 	select SECURITYFS
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
security/integrity/ima/Makefile +1 -1
index 787c4cb..5690c02 100644
@@ -6,4 +6,4 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
-	 ima_policy.o ima_iint.o ima_audit.o
+	 ima_policy.o ima_audit.o
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +10 -24
index 16d100d..a58ac9f 100644
@@ -24,11 +24,13 @@
 #include <linux/tpm.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 
+#include "../integrity.h"
+
 enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
 enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
 
 /* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */
-#define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE		20
+#define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE		SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
 #define IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX	255
 
 #define IMA_HASH_BITS 9
@@ -94,38 +96,22 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
 	return hash_long(*digest, IMA_HASH_BITS);
 }
 
-/* iint cache flags */
-#define IMA_MEASURED		1
-
-/* integrity data associated with an inode */
-struct ima_iint_cache {
-	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
-	unsigned long flags;
-	u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	struct mutex mutex;	/* protects: version, flags, digest */
-	long readcount;		/* measured files readcount */
-	long writecount;	/* measured files writecount */
-	long opencount;		/* opens reference count */
-	struct kref refcount;	/* ima_iint_cache reference count */
-	struct rcu_head rcu;
-};
-
 /* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
+int ima_must_measure(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
 		     int mask, int function);
-int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
-void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			    struct file *file);
+void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 		       struct inode *inode);
-void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e,
-		       enum ima_show_type show);
+void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show);
 
 /* radix tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
  * integrity data associated with an inode.
  */
-struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
-struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_get(struct inode *inode);
+struct integrity_iint_cache *ima_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
+struct integrity_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_get(struct inode *inode);
 void iint_free(struct kref *kref);
 void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu);
 
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +5 -4
index 2a5e0bc..bb307fb 100644
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ err_out:
  * For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy, or other
  * error, return an error code.
 */
-int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
+int ima_must_measure(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
 		     int mask, int function)
 {
 	int must_measure;
@@ -132,7 +132,8 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
  *
  * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
  */
-int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
+int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			    struct file *file)
 {
 	int result = -EEXIST;
 
@@ -162,8 +163,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
  *
  * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
  */
-void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-			   const unsigned char *filename)
+void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			   struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename)
 {
 	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
 	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c deleted +0 -145

145 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +11 -10
index 983037f..7eeb76e 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
  */
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
@@ -96,7 +97,7 @@ out:
  */
 enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS };
 static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error,
-				 struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 				 struct inode *inode,
 				 const unsigned char *filename)
 {
@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error,
 /*
  * Update the counts given an fmode_t
  */
-static void ima_inc_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, fmode_t mode)
+static void ima_inc_counts(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, fmode_t mode)
 {
 	BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&iint->mutex));
 
@@ -144,12 +145,12 @@ void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
 	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
-	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 	int rc;
 
 	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return;
-	iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
+	iint = integrity_iint_find_get(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return;
 	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
@@ -172,8 +173,8 @@ out:
 /*
  * Decrement ima counts
  */
-static void ima_dec_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
-			   struct file *file)
+static void ima_dec_counts(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			   struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	mode_t mode = file->f_mode;
 	BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&iint->mutex));
@@ -210,11 +211,11 @@ static void ima_dec_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
 void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
-	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 
 	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return;
-	iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
+	iint = integrity_iint_find_get(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return;
 
@@ -228,12 +229,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			       int mask, int function)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
-	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
 	int rc;
 
 	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
-	iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
+	iint = integrity_iint_find_get(inode);
 	if (!iint)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
security/integrity/integrity.h new file +42 -0

42 lines not on this page · raw message

security/security.c +3 -2
index 8585019..e42a78e 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 
 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
@@ -339,7 +340,7 @@ int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
 	ret =  security_ops->inode_alloc_security(inode);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
-	ret = ima_inode_alloc(inode);
+	ret = integrity_inode_alloc(inode);
 	if (ret)
 		security_inode_free(inode);
 	return ret;
@@ -347,7 +348,7 @@ int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
 
 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	ima_inode_free(inode);
+	integrity_inode_free(inode);
 	security_ops->inode_free_security(inode);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
author
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/14 security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h

In reply to Mimi Zohar

Make the security extended attributes names global.

include/linux/capability.h +0 -3
index 39e5ff5..90012b9 100644
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
 } __user *cap_user_data_t;
 
 
-#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
-#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
-
 #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK	0xFF000000
 #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT	24
 #define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK	~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
include/linux/xattr.h +10 -0
index fb9b7e6..d079bec 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,16 @@
 #define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user."
 #define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1)
 
+/* Security namespace */
+#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
+#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
+
+#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64"
+#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX
+
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
+#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
+
 struct inode;
 struct dentry;
 
security/selinux/hooks.c +0 -3
index ebee467..1973abe 100644
@@ -87,9 +87,6 @@
 #include "netlabel.h"
 #include "audit.h"
 
-#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
-#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
-
 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
 
 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
security/smack/smack.h +0 -2
index c6e9aca..9c773e3 100644
@@ -126,10 +126,8 @@ struct smack_known {
 /*
  * xattr names
  */
-#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX	"SMACK64"
 #define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN	"SMACK64IPIN"
 #define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT	"SMACK64IPOUT"
-#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX
 #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN
 #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
 
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
author
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/14 xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp

In reply to Mimi Zohar

vfs_getxattr_alloc() and vfs_xattr_cmp() are two new kernel xattr helper functions. vfs_getxattr_alloc() first allocates memory for the requested xattr and then retrieves it. vfs_xattr_cmp() compares a given value with the contents of an extended attribute.

fs/xattr.c +58 -0
index 46f87e8..341ad71 100644
@@ -159,6 +159,64 @@ out_noalloc:
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xattr_getsecurity);
 
+/*
+ * vfs_getxattr_alloc - allocate memory, if necessary, before calling getxattr
+ *
+ * Allocate memory, if not already allocated, or re-allocate correct size,
+ * before retrieving the extended attribute.
+ *
+ * Returns the result of alloc, if failed, or the getxattr operation.
+ */
+ssize_t
+vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, char **xattr_value,
+		   size_t xattr_size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	char *value = *xattr_value;
+	int error;
+
+	error = xattr_permission(inode, name, MAY_READ);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, name, NULL, 0);
+	if (error < 0)
+		return error;
+
+	if (!value || (error > xattr_size)) {
+		value = krealloc(*xattr_value, error + 1, flags);
+		if (!value)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		memset(value, 0, error + 1);
+	}
+
+	error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, name, value, error);
+	*xattr_value = value;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/* Compare an extended attribute value with the given value */
+int vfs_xattr_cmp(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+		  const char *value, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	char *xattr_value = NULL;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_value, 0, flags);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	if ((rc != size) || (memcmp(xattr_value, value, rc) != 0))
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+	else
+		rc = 0;
+	kfree(xattr_value);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 ssize_t
 vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
include/linux/xattr.h +4 -1
index d079bec..8698de3 100644
@@ -68,7 +68,10 @@ ssize_t generic_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *buffer,
 ssize_t generic_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
 int generic_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 int generic_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
-
+ssize_t vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+			   char **xattr_value, size_t size, gfp_t flags);
+int vfs_xattr_cmp(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+		  const char *value, size_t size, gfp_t flags);
 #endif  /*  __KERNEL__  */
 
 #endif	/* _LINUX_XATTR_H */
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
Acked-by on v1 3/14
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 03/14] xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp

Quoted 6 lines · Mimi Zohar

vfs_getxattr_alloc() and vfs_xattr_cmp() are two new kernel xattr helper functions. vfs_getxattr_alloc() first allocates memory for the requested xattr and then retrieves it. vfs_xattr_cmp() compares a given value with the contents of an extended attribute.

(Heh, *thought* I had a hole to point to, but nope, looks good)

thanks,
-serge

Quoted 93 lines
fs/xattr.c +58 -0
index 46f87e8..341ad71 100644
@@ -159,6 +159,64 @@ out_noalloc:
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xattr_getsecurity);
 
+/*
+ * vfs_getxattr_alloc - allocate memory, if necessary, before calling getxattr
+ *
+ * Allocate memory, if not already allocated, or re-allocate correct size,
+ * before retrieving the extended attribute.
+ *
+ * Returns the result of alloc, if failed, or the getxattr operation.
+ */
+ssize_t
+vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, char **xattr_value,
+		   size_t xattr_size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	char *value = *xattr_value;
+	int error;
+
+	error = xattr_permission(inode, name, MAY_READ);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, name, NULL, 0);
+	if (error < 0)
+		return error;
+
+	if (!value || (error > xattr_size)) {
+		value = krealloc(*xattr_value, error + 1, flags);
+		if (!value)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		memset(value, 0, error + 1);
+	}
+
+	error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, name, value, error);
+	*xattr_value = value;
+	return error;
+}
+
+/* Compare an extended attribute value with the given value */
+int vfs_xattr_cmp(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+		  const char *value, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	char *xattr_value = NULL;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_value, 0, flags);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	if ((rc != size) || (memcmp(xattr_value, value, rc) != 0))
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+	else
+		rc = 0;
+	kfree(xattr_value);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 ssize_t
 vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 {
include/linux/xattr.h +4 -1
index d079bec..8698de3 100644
@@ -68,7 +68,10 @@ ssize_t generic_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *buffer,
 ssize_t generic_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
 int generic_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 int generic_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
-
+ssize_t vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+			   char **xattr_value, size_t size, gfp_t flags);
+int vfs_xattr_cmp(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+		  const char *value, size_t size, gfp_t flags);
 #endif  /*  __KERNEL__  */
 
 #endif	/* _LINUX_XATTR_H */
Signature · 6 lines
1.6.6.1

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author
#5 lore raw

PATCH 4/14 evm: re-release

In reply to Mimi Zohar

EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against integrity attacks. It maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. EVM has gone through a number of iterations, initially as an LSM module, subsequently as a LIM integrity provider, and now, when co-located with a security_ hook, embedded directly in the security_ hook, similar to IMA.

This is the first part of a local file integrity verification system. While this part does authenticate the selected extended attributes, and cryptographically bind them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. The set of protected security extended attributes is configured at compile.

EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with the kernel master key for the HMAC operation. The kernel master key is securely loaded onto the root's keyring, typically by 'loadkernkey', which either uses the TPM sealed secret key, if available, or a password requested from the console. To signal EVM, that the key has been loaded onto the keyring, 'echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm'. This is normally done in the initrd, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. (Refer to http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)

EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks, evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr.

To initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks.

To verify the integrity of an extended attribute, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr().

include/linux/integrity.h +7 -0
index 276081f..fa9c199 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H
 #define _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H
 
+enum integrity_status {
+	INTEGRITY_PASS = 0,
+	INTEGRITY_FAIL,
+	INTEGRITY_NOLABEL,
+	INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN,
+};
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
 extern int integrity_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
 extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
include/linux/xattr.h +3 -0
index 8698de3..d1afa51 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
 #define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1)
 
 /* Security namespace */
+#define XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX "evm"
+#define XATTR_NAME_EVM XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX
+
 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
 
security/integrity/Kconfig +2 -1
index 2704691..4bf00ac 100644
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #
 config INTEGRITY
 	def_bool y
-	depends on IMA
+	depends on IMA || EVM
 
 source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+source security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
security/integrity/Makefile +2 -0
index 6eddd61..0ae44ae 100644
@@ -8,3 +8,5 @@ integrity-y := iint.o
 
 subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima/built-in.o
+subdir-$(CONFIG_EVM)			+= evm
+obj-$(CONFIG_EVM)			+= evm/built-in.o
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig new file +13 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a546f7
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+config EVM
+	boolean "EVM support"
+	depends on SECURITY && KEYS
+	select CRYPTO_HMAC
+	select CRYPTO_MD5
+	select CRYPTO_SHA1
+	default n
+	help
+	  A configurable set of security extended attributes are HMAC
+	  protected against modification using the TPM's kernel root key,
+	  if configured, or with a pass-phrase.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
security/integrity/evm/Makefile new file +7 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3d38273
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#
+# Makefile for building the Extended Verification Module(EVM)
+#
+obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm.o
+
+evm-y := evm_main.o evm_crypto.o evm_secfs.o
+
security/integrity/evm/evm.h new file +35 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b6f7b2
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
+ * Kylene Hall <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * File: evm.h
+ *
+ */
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include "../integrity.h"
+
+extern int evm_initialized;
+extern char *evm_hmac;
+extern int evm_hmac_size;
+
+/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
+extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
+
+extern int evm_init_tpmkernkey(void);
+extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+			       const char *req_xattr_name,
+			       const char *req_xattr_value,
+			       size_t req_xattr_value_len,
+			       struct integrity_iint_cache *iint);
+extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+			 const char *req_xattr_value,
+			 size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
+extern int evm_init_secfs(void);
+extern void evm_cleanup_secfs(void);
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c new file +179 -0

179 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c new file +296 -0

296 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c new file +108 -0

108 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/iint.c +2 -0
index e2bdd8f..66013f2 100644
@@ -133,9 +133,11 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
 	iint->version = 0;
 	iint->flags = 0UL;
 	mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
+	mutex_init(&iint->evm_mutex);
 	iint->readcount = 0;
 	iint->writecount = 0;
 	iint->opencount = 0;
+	iint->hmac_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	kref_init(&iint->refcount);
 }
 
security/integrity/integrity.h +3 -0
index f1013c9..c83e475 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
 	long opencount;		/* opens reference count */
 	struct kref refcount;	/* ima_iint_cache reference count */
 	struct rcu_head rcu;
+	struct mutex evm_mutex;	/* protects: hmac_status, hmac */
+	enum integrity_status hmac_status;
+	u8 hmac[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 };
 
 /* radix tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
Acked-by on v1 4/14
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 04/14] evm: re-release

Quoted 26 lines · Mimi Zohar

EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against integrity attacks. It maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. EVM has gone through a number of iterations, initially as an LSM module, subsequently as a LIM integrity provider, and now, when co-located with a security_ hook, embedded directly in the security_ hook, similar to IMA.

This is the first part of a local file integrity verification system. While this part does authenticate the selected extended attributes, and cryptographically bind them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. The set of protected security extended attributes is configured at compile.

EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with the kernel master key for the HMAC operation. The kernel master key is securely loaded onto the root's keyring, typically by 'loadkernkey', which either uses the TPM sealed secret key, if available, or a password requested from the console. To signal EVM, that the key has been loaded onto the keyring, 'echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm'. This is normally done in the initrd, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. (Refer to http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)

EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks, evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr.

Quoted 8 lines

To initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks.

To verify the integrity of an extended attribute, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr().

thanks,
-serge

#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 04/14] evm: re-release

In reply to Mimi Zohar
Quoted 13 lines · Mimi Zohar

EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against integrity attacks. It maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. EVM has gone through a number of iterations, initially as an LSM module, subsequently as a LIM integrity provider, and now, when co-located with a security_ hook, embedded directly in the security_ hook, similar to IMA.

This is the first part of a local file integrity verification system. While this part does authenticate the selected extended attributes, and cryptographically bind them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. The set of protected security extended attributes is configured at compile.

Quoted 8 lines

EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with the kernel master key for the HMAC operation. The kernel master key is securely loaded onto the root's keyring, typically by 'loadkernkey', which either uses the TPM sealed secret key, if available, or a password requested from the console. To signal EVM, that the key has been loaded onto the keyring, 'echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm'. This is normally done in the initrd, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. (Refer to http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)

I don't remember this dependency on the kernel key system in prior incarnations of EVM. Can you explain the rationale for using it, and the implications?

Signature · 2 lines
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
author
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 04/14] evm: re-release

Quoted 23 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 13 lines · Mimi Zohar

EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against integrity attacks. It maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. EVM has gone through a number of iterations, initially as an LSM module, subsequently as a LIM integrity provider, and now, when co-located with a security_ hook, embedded directly in the security_ hook, similar to IMA.

This is the first part of a local file integrity verification system. While this part does authenticate the selected extended attributes, and cryptographically bind them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. The set of protected security extended attributes is configured at compile.

Quoted 8 lines

EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with the kernel master key for the HMAC operation. The kernel master key is securely loaded onto the root's keyring, typically by 'loadkernkey', which either uses the TPM sealed secret key, if available, or a password requested from the console. To signal EVM, that the key has been loaded onto the keyring, 'echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm'. This is normally done in the initrd, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. (Refer to http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)

Quoted 3 lines

I don't remember this dependency on the kernel key system in prior incarnations of EVM. Can you explain the rationale for using it, and the implications?

This changed very early on, so that people without a TPM could 'play' with it.

Mimi

#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 04/14] evm: re-release

Quoted 24 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 23 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 21 lines · Mimi Zohar

EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against integrity attacks. It maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. EVM has gone through a number of iterations, initially as an LSM module, subsequently as a LIM integrity provider, and now, when co-located with a security_ hook, embedded directly in the security_ hook, similar to IMA.

This is the first part of a local file integrity verification system. While this part does authenticate the selected extended attributes, and cryptographically bind them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. The set of protected security extended attributes is configured at compile.

EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with the kernel master key for the HMAC operation. The kernel master key is securely loaded onto the root's keyring, typically by 'loadkernkey', which either uses the TPM sealed secret key, if available, or a password requested from the console. To signal EVM, that the key has been loaded onto the keyring, 'echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm'. This is normally done in the initrd, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. (Refer to http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

I don't remember this dependency on the kernel key system in prior incarnations of EVM. Can you explain the rationale for using it, and the implications?

This changed very early on, so that people without a TPM could 'play' with it.

The last time EVM was posted to lsm list (2005, AFAICS) prior to this year's round, David Safford said:
"Since the kernel master key is unsealed by the hardware TPM only as a result of a valid trusted boot, and the key is never visible outside the kernel, the EVM HMAC attribute cannot be forged in an offline attack."

So that seemed to be an important property to you at the time. I understand providing alternatives for TPM-less systems, but that doesn't necessarily mean changing the properties on systems with TPMs.

Signature · 2 lines
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 04/14] evm: re-release

Quoted 25 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 11 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 10 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 8 lines · Mimi Zohar

EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with the kernel master key for the HMAC operation. The kernel master key is securely loaded onto the root's keyring, typically by 'loadkernkey', which either uses the TPM sealed secret key, if available, or a password requested from the console. To signal EVM, that the key has been loaded onto the keyring, 'echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm'. This is normally done in the initrd, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. (Refer to http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

I don't remember this dependency on the kernel key system in prior incarnations of EVM. Can you explain the rationale for using it, and the implications?

This changed very early on, so that people without a TPM could 'play' with it.

The last time EVM was posted to lsm list (2005, AFAICS) prior to this year's round, David Safford said:
"Since the kernel master key is unsealed by the hardware TPM only as a result of a valid trusted boot, and the key is never visible outside the kernel, the EVM HMAC attribute cannot be forged in an offline attack."

Quoted 4 lines

So that seemed to be an important property to you at the time. I understand providing alternatives for TPM-less systems, but that doesn't necessarily mean changing the properties on systems with TPMs.

In it's earliest form we did have an extension to the tpm device driver to do the unseal, keeping the resultant key entirely in the kernel. When IMA and EVM were compiled in, and all initialization was done within the initrd (which was measured by grub), we thought that doing the unseal while in the initrd init script which was still single threaded, was safe enough. (EVM does zero out the key on the ring after it copies it, so that it is not visible after the boot). One of our thoughts was to have a common interface for loading the key, independent of whether it came from a passphrase or TPM.

If you think this is undesirable for TPM based systems, we could certainly add a securityfs file to evm, through which the init script could load the encrypted blob. Then evm could have the TPM unseal it without the key ever being visible outside kernel memory. Alternately we could simply redefine the contents of the ring evm_key to be the encrypted blob, and add a line to evm's initialization to unseal the blob, if there is a tpm.

dave

author
#11 lore raw

PATCH 5/14 ima: move ima_file_free before releasing the file

In reply to Mimi Zohar

Integrity appraisal measures files on file_free and stores the file measurement as an xattr. Measure the file before releasing it.

fs/file_table.c +1 -1
index 32d12b7..fac3e43 100644
@@ -250,10 +250,10 @@ void __fput(struct file *file)
 		if (file->f_op && file->f_op->fasync)
 			file->f_op->fasync(-1, file, 0);
 	}
+	ima_file_free(file);
 	if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release)
 		file->f_op->release(inode, file);
 	security_file_free(file);
-	ima_file_free(file);
 	if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL))
 		cdev_put(inode->i_cdev);
 	fops_put(file->f_op);
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
author
#12 lore raw

PATCH 6/14 security: imbed evm calls in security hooks

In reply to Mimi Zohar

Imbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr() protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode.

(Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.)

include/linux/evm.h new file +54 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a30beb
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+ * evm.h
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2009 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_EVM_H
+#define _LINUX_EVM_H
+
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM
+extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+					     char *xattr_name,
+					     char *xattr_value,
+					     size_t xattr_value_len);
+extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+			      const void *value, size_t size);
+extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				    const char *xattr_name,
+				    const void *xattr_value,
+				    size_t xattr_value_len);
+extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
+#else
+static enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+					     char *xattr_name,
+					     char *xattr_value,
+					     size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				     const void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+					   const char *xattr_name,
+					   const void *xattr_value,
+					   size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
+static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+					const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_EVM_H */
+#endif /* LINUX_EVM_H */
security/security.c +14 -2
index e42a78e..6b1e50e 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/integrity.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
 
 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
 static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
@@ -549,9 +550,14 @@ int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
 int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 			    const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
+	int ret;
+
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	return evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
 }
 
 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
@@ -560,6 +566,7 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
 		return;
 	security_ops->inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
 }
 
 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
@@ -578,9 +585,14 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 
 int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
+	int ret;
+
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+	ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	return evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 }
 
 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
author
#13 lore raw

PATCH 7/14 evm: inode post removexattr

In reply to Mimi Zohar

When an EVM protected extended attribute is removed, update 'security.evm'.

fs/xattr.c +4 -1
index 341ad71..9372e77 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
@@ -294,8 +295,10 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	error = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, name);
 	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
-	if (!error)
+	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
+		evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
+	}
 	return error;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_removexattr);
include/linux/evm.h +9 -0
index 1a30beb..93edadd 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 				    const void *xattr_value,
 				    size_t xattr_value_len);
 extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
+extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+				       const char *xattr_name);
 #else
 static enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 					     char *xattr_name,
@@ -50,5 +52,12 @@ static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+					      const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_EVM_H */
 #endif /* LINUX_EVM_H */
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
author
#14 lore raw

PATCH 8/14 evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr

In reply to Mimi Zohar

Changing the inode's metadata may require the 'security.evm' extended attribute to be re-calculated and updated.

fs/attr.c +4 -1
index 0815e93..5d9ff4e 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/fcntl.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
 
 /* Taken over from the old code... */
 
@@ -218,8 +219,10 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr)
 	if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
 		up_write(&dentry->d_inode->i_alloc_sem);
 
-	if (!error)
+	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
+		evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
+	}
 
 	return error;
 }
include/linux/evm.h +6 -0
index 93edadd..8626263 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 					     char *xattr_name,
 					     char *xattr_value,
 					     size_t xattr_value_len);
+extern void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid);
 extern int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 			      const void *value, size_t size);
 extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -33,6 +34,11 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
 
+static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
 static inline int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 				     const void *value, size_t size)
 {
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
author
#15 lore raw

PATCH 9/14 evm: inode_post_init

In reply to Mimi Zohar

Initialize 'security.evm' for new files. Reduce number of arguments by defining 'struct xattr'.

include/linux/evm.h +11 -0
index 8626263..3602bd1 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #define _LINUX_EVM_H
 
 #include <linux/integrity.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_EVM
 extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -25,6 +26,9 @@ extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
 extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 				       const char *xattr_name);
+extern int evm_inode_post_init_security(struct inode *inode,
+					const struct xattr *new,
+					struct xattr *evm);
 #else
 static enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 					     char *xattr_name,
@@ -65,5 +69,12 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return;
 }
 
+static inline int evm_inode_post_init_security(struct inode *inode,
+					       const struct xattr *new,
+					       struct xattr *evm)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_EVM_H */
 #endif /* LINUX_EVM_H */
include/linux/xattr.h +6 -0
index d1afa51..e90377e 100644
@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ struct xattr_handler {
 		   size_t size, int flags, int handler_flags);
 };
 
+struct xattr {
+	char *name;
+	void *value;
+	size_t value_len;
+};
+
 ssize_t xattr_getsecurity(struct inode *, const char *, void *, size_t);
 ssize_t vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *, const char *, void *, size_t);
 ssize_t vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *d, char *list, size_t size);
security/integrity/evm/evm.h +3 -0
index 0b6f7b2..a4b6907 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
  * File: evm.h
  *
  */
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include "../integrity.h"
 
@@ -31,5 +32,7 @@ extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
 			 const char *req_xattr_value,
 			 size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
+extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, struct xattr *xattr,
+			 char *hmac_val);
 extern int evm_init_secfs(void);
 extern void evm_cleanup_secfs(void);
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +19 -0
index 4f1be71..5fe322d 100644
@@ -150,6 +150,25 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, struct xattr *lsm_xattr, char *hmac_val)
+{
+	struct hash_desc desc;
+	struct scatterlist sg[1];
+	int error;
+
+	error = init_desc(&desc);
+	if (error != 0) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n");
+		return error;
+	}
+
+	sg_init_one(sg, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
+	crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, lsm_xattr->value_len);
+	hmac_add_misc(&desc, inode, hmac_val);
+	crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC
  */
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +36 -0
index 59dc148..acc5176 100644
@@ -96,6 +96,12 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
 			found = 1;
 			break;
 		}
+		if (strncmp(req_xattr_name,
+			    *xattrname + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
+			    strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
 	}
 	return found;
 }
@@ -256,6 +262,36 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 	return;
 }
 
+/*
+ * evm_inode_post_init_security - initializes security.evm
+ */
+int evm_inode_post_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
+				 struct xattr *evm_xattr)
+{
+	u8 *hmac_val;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	hmac_val = kzalloc(MAX_DIGEST_SIZE, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!hmac_val)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, hmac_val);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	evm_xattr->value = hmac_val;
+	evm_xattr->value_len = evm_hmac_size;
+	evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX;
+	return 0;
+out:
+	kfree(hmac_val);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_post_init_security);
+
 static struct crypto_hash *tfm_hmac;	/* preload crypto alg */
 static int __init init_evm(void)
 {
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
author
#16 lore raw

PATCH 10/14 fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls

In reply to Mimi Zohar

After creating the initial LSM security extended attribute, call evm_inode_post_init_security() to create the 'security.evm' extended attribute.

(Support for other fs still needed.)

fs/ext2/xattr_security.c +24 -7
index c815584..3987a1b 100644
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
 #include "xattr.h"
 
 static size_t
@@ -49,21 +50,37 @@ int
 ext2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
 {
 	int err;
-	size_t len;
-	void *value;
-	char *name;
+	struct xattr lsm_xattr;
+	struct xattr evm_xattr;
 
-	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &name, &value, &len);
+	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &lsm_xattr.name,
+					   &lsm_xattr.value,
+					   &lsm_xattr.value_len);
 	if (err) {
 		if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			return 0;
 		return err;
 	}
 	err = ext2_xattr_set(inode, EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
-			     name, value, len, 0);
-	kfree(name);
-	kfree(value);
+			     lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value,
+			     lsm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+	if (err < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = evm_inode_post_init_security(inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+	err = ext2_xattr_set(inode, EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
+			     evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value,
+			     evm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+	kfree(evm_xattr.value);
+out:
+	kfree(lsm_xattr.name);
+	kfree(lsm_xattr.value);
+	if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+		return 0;
 	return err;
+
 }
 
 struct xattr_handler ext2_xattr_security_handler = {
fs/ext3/xattr_security.c +23 -7
index 4743487..eba57a9 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/ext3_jbd.h>
 #include <linux/ext3_fs.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
 #include "xattr.h"
 
 static size_t
@@ -51,20 +52,35 @@ int
 ext3_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
 {
 	int err;
-	size_t len;
-	void *value;
-	char *name;
+	struct xattr lsm_xattr;
+	struct xattr evm_xattr;
 
-	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &name, &value, &len);
+	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &lsm_xattr.name,
+					   &lsm_xattr.value,
+					   &lsm_xattr.value_len);
 	if (err) {
 		if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			return 0;
 		return err;
 	}
 	err = ext3_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, EXT3_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
-				    name, value, len, 0);
-	kfree(name);
-	kfree(value);
+				    lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value,
+				    lsm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+	if (err < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = evm_inode_post_init_security(inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+	err = ext3_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, EXT3_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
+				    evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value,
+				    evm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+	kfree(evm_xattr.value);
+out:
+	kfree(lsm_xattr.name);
+	kfree(lsm_xattr.value);
+	if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+		return 0;
 	return err;
 }
 
fs/ext4/xattr_security.c +23 -7
index 983c253..d8ecbee 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
 #include "ext4_jbd2.h"
 #include "ext4.h"
 #include "xattr.h"
@@ -51,20 +52,35 @@ int
 ext4_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir)
 {
 	int err;
-	size_t len;
-	void *value;
-	char *name;
+	struct xattr lsm_xattr;
+	struct xattr evm_xattr;
 
-	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &name, &value, &len);
+	err = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &lsm_xattr.name,
+					   &lsm_xattr.value,
+					   &lsm_xattr.value_len);
 	if (err) {
 		if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 			return 0;
 		return err;
 	}
 	err = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
-				    name, value, len, 0);
-	kfree(name);
-	kfree(value);
+				    lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value,
+				    lsm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+	if (err < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = evm_inode_post_init_security(inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+	err = ext4_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
+				    evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value,
+				    evm_xattr.value_len, 0);
+	kfree(evm_xattr.value);
+out:
+	kfree(lsm_xattr.name);
+	kfree(lsm_xattr.value);
+	if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+		return 0;
 	return err;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
author
#17 lore raw

PATCH 11/14 ima: integrity appraisal extension

In reply to Mimi Zohar

This patch adds local measurement integrity appraisal to IMA. (Taken from the original EVM postings.) New is the creation and maintainance of an extended attribute 'security.ima' containing the file hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by EVM, if enabled and configured.

Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify the security.ima xattr integrity and, assuming success, compares the xattr hash value with the collected file measurement.

Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +4 -0
index 23f95ea..26eecc9 100644
@@ -962,6 +962,10 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file
 	ihash_entries=	[KNL]
 			Set number of hash buckets for inode cache.
 
+	ima_appraise=	[IMA] appraise integrity measurements
+			Format: { "off" | "enforce" | "log" | "fix" }
+			default: "enforce"
+
 	ima_audit=	[IMA]
 			Format: { "0" | "1" }
 			0 -- integrity auditing messages. (Default)
include/linux/xattr.h +3 -0
index e90377e..4f6608f 100644
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
 #define XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX "evm"
 #define XATTR_NAME_EVM XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX
 
+#define XATTR_IMA_SUFFIX "ima"
+#define XATTR_NAME_IMA XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_IMA_SUFFIX
+
 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
 
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +3 -0
index acc5176..278e0de 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
 	XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+	XATTR_NAME_IMA,
+#endif
 	XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
 	NULL
 };
security/integrity/iint.c +1 -0
index 66013f2..b182ce5 100644
@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
 	iint->readcount = 0;
 	iint->writecount = 0;
 	iint->opencount = 0;
+	iint->hash_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	iint->hmac_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 	kref_init(&iint->refcount);
 }
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +14 -0
index dc60e40..39abced 100644
@@ -55,3 +55,17 @@ config IMA_LSM_RULES
 	default y
 	help
 	  Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE
+	bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
+	depends on IMA
+	default n
+	help
+	  This option enables local measurement integrity appraisal.
+	  To protect extended attributes from offline attack, enable
+	  and configure EVM.
+
+	  For more information on integrity appraisal refer to:
+	  <http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
security/integrity/ima/Makefile +2 -0
index 5690c02..bd31516 100644
@@ -7,3 +7,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
 	 ima_policy.o ima_audit.o
+
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +39 -3

69 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +39 -15

102 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c new file +140 -0

140 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +64 -12

151 lines not on this page · raw message

security/integrity/integrity.h +6 -1
index c83e475..3a9b3de 100644
@@ -18,13 +18,18 @@
 #define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
 
 /* iint cache flags */
-#define IMA_MEASURED		1
+#define IMA_MEASURE		1
+#define IMA_MEASURED		2
+#define IMA_APPRAISE		4
+#define IMA_APPRAISED		8
+#define IMA_COLLECTED		16
 
 /* integrity data associated with an inode */
 struct integrity_iint_cache {
 	u64 version;		/* track inode changes */
 	unsigned long flags;
 	u8 digest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	enum integrity_status hash_status;
 	struct mutex mutex;	/* protects: version, flags, digest */
 	long readcount;		/* measured files readcount */
 	long writecount;	/* measured files writecount */
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
author
#18 lore raw

PATCH 12/14 ima: appraise default rules

In reply to Mimi Zohar

Unlike the IMA measurement policy, the appraise policy can not be dependent on runtime process information, such as the task uid, as the 'security.ima' xattr is written on file close and must be updated each time the file changes, regardless of the current task uid. The appraise default policy appraises all files owned by root.

security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -0
index aabd615..7cc028d 100644
@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu);
 enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK, POST_SETATTR };
 
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
+int ima_match_appraise_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func,
+			      int mask);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy(void);
 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +13 -1
index 0afb1b4..ad8e0ac 100644
@@ -28,7 +28,19 @@ __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup);
 int ima_must_appraise(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
 		      enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
 {
-	return 0;
+	int must_appraise, rc = 0;
+
+	if (!ima_appraise || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
+		return 0;
+	else if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
+		return 0;
+
+	must_appraise = ima_match_appraise_policy(inode, func, mask);
+	if (must_appraise) {
+		iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISE;
+		rc = 1;
+	}
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static void ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +59 -2

122 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
author
#19 lore raw

PATCH 13/14 ima: inode post_setattr

In reply to Mimi Zohar

Changing an inode's metadata may result in our not needing to appraise the file. In such cases, we must remove 'security.ima'.

fs/attr.c +2 -0
index 5d9ff4e..9038baf 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/fcntl.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 /* Taken over from the old code... */
 
@@ -221,6 +222,7 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr)
 
 	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_change(dentry, ia_valid);
+		ima_inode_post_setattr(dentry);
 		evm_inode_post_setattr(dentry, ia_valid);
 	}
 
include/linux/ima.h +6 -0
index 4dce900..ce82e29 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
 extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
 extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
 extern void ima_counts_get(struct file *file);
+extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry);
 
 #else
 static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -46,5 +47,10 @@ static inline void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
 	return;
 }
 
+static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_H */
 #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
author
#20 lore raw

PATCH 14/14 ima: add ima_inode_setxattr and ima_inode_removexattr

In reply to Mimi Zohar

Based on xattr_permission comments, the restriction to modify 'security' xattr is left up to the underlying fs or lsm. Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'.

include/linux/ima.h +13 -0
index ce82e29..3307420 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
 extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
 extern void ima_counts_get(struct file *file);
 extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry);
+extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+		       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);
+extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name);
 
 #else
 static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -52,5 +55,15 @@ static inline void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return;
 }
 
+int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+		       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_H */
 #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +26 -0
index 635a3be..e5a52a6 100644
@@ -370,6 +370,32 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return;
 }
 
+/*
+ * ima_protect_xattr - protect 'security.ima'
+ *
+ * Ensure that not just anyone can modify or remove 'security.ima'.
+ */
+int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+		      const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	if ((strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
+	    && !capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
+		       const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
+{
+	return ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
+				 xattr_value_len);
+}
+
+int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
+{
+	return ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
+}
+
 static int __init init_ima(void)
 {
 	int error;
security/security.c +6 -0
index 6b1e50e..9345731 100644
@@ -557,6 +557,9 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
+	ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 	return evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
 }
 
@@ -592,6 +595,9 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
+	ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 	return evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
#21 lore raw
In reply to Mimi Zohar
Quoted 11 lines · On Wed, 21 Apr 2010 17:49:40 -0400 Mimi Zohar wrote:

Extended Verification Module(EVM) detects offline tampering of the security extended attributes (e.g. security.selinux, security.SMACK64, security.ima), which is the basis for LSM permission decisions and, with this set of patches, integrity appraisal decisions. To detect offline tampering of the extended attributes, EVM maintains an HMAC-sha1 across a set of security extended attributes, storing the HMAC as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. To verify the integrity of an extended attribute, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(), which re-calculates the HMAC and compares it with the version stored in 'security.evm'.

...

Quoted 6 lines

Much appreciation to Dave Hansen, Serge Hallyn, and Matt Helsley for reviewing the patches.

Mimi

Quoted 16 lines

Mimi Zohar (14):
integrity: move ima inode integrity data management
security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h
xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp
evm: re-release
ima: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
security: imbed evm calls in security hooks
evm: inode post removexattr
evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr
evm: inode_post_init
fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls
ima: integrity appraisal extension
ima: appraise default rules
ima: inode post_setattr
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr and ima_inode_removexattr
--

A summary diffstat would be good to see in patch 00/14.

Lacking that, at least each individual patch should have a diffstat summary in it. Please read Documentation/SubmittingPatches.

---
~Randy

author
#22 lore raw
Quoted 37 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 11 lines · On Wed, 21 Apr 2010 17:49:40 -0400 Mimi Zohar wrote:

Extended Verification Module(EVM) detects offline tampering of the security extended attributes (e.g. security.selinux, security.SMACK64, security.ima), which is the basis for LSM permission decisions and, with this set of patches, integrity appraisal decisions. To detect offline tampering of the extended attributes, EVM maintains an HMAC-sha1 across a set of security extended attributes, storing the HMAC as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. To verify the integrity of an extended attribute, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(), which re-calculates the HMAC and compares it with the version stored in 'security.evm'.

...

Quoted 6 lines

Much appreciation to Dave Hansen, Serge Hallyn, and Matt Helsley for reviewing the patches.

Mimi

Quoted 16 lines

Mimi Zohar (14):
integrity: move ima inode integrity data management
security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h
xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp
evm: re-release
ima: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
security: imbed evm calls in security hooks
evm: inode post removexattr
evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr
evm: inode_post_init
fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls
ima: integrity appraisal extension
ima: appraise default rules
ima: inode post_setattr
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr and ima_inode_removexattr
--

Quoted 7 lines

A summary diffstat would be good to see in patch 00/14.

Lacking that, at least each individual patch should have a diffstat summary in it. Please read Documentation/SubmittingPatches.

---
~Randy

Only two minor changes from the RFC posting:

0011-ima-integrity-appraisal-extension.patch adds a missing ima_fix_xattr() call.

security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +6 -1
Index: security-testing-2.6/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
===================================================================
@@ -92,8 +92,13 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(struct inte
 				ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
 			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
 					    filename, op, cause, 1, 0);
-		} else
+		} else {
 			status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+
+			if ((status == INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)
+			    && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX))
+				ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint);
+		}
 		iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISED;
 	} else {
 		if (status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL)

0012-ima-appraise-default-rules.patch replaces audit_log_format() calls with ima_log_string(), introduced in Eric's patches.

Mimi

#23 lore raw
Quoted 43 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 42 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 11 lines · On Wed, 21 Apr 2010 17:49:40 -0400 Mimi Zohar wrote:

Extended Verification Module(EVM) detects offline tampering of the security extended attributes (e.g. security.selinux, security.SMACK64, security.ima), which is the basis for LSM permission decisions and, with this set of patches, integrity appraisal decisions. To detect offline tampering of the extended attributes, EVM maintains an HMAC-sha1 across a set of security extended attributes, storing the HMAC as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. To verify the integrity of an extended attribute, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(), which re-calculates the HMAC and compares it with the version stored in 'security.evm'.

...

Quoted 6 lines

Much appreciation to Dave Hansen, Serge Hallyn, and Matt Helsley for reviewing the patches.

Mimi

Quoted 16 lines

Mimi Zohar (14):
integrity: move ima inode integrity data management
security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h
xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp
evm: re-release
ima: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
security: imbed evm calls in security hooks
evm: inode post removexattr
evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr
evm: inode_post_init
fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls
ima: integrity appraisal extension
ima: appraise default rules
ima: inode post_setattr
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr and ima_inode_removexattr
--

A summary diffstat would be good to see in patch 00/14.

Lacking that, at least each individual patch should have a diffstat summary in it. Please read Documentation/SubmittingPatches.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

---
~Randy

Only two minor changes from the RFC posting:

0011-ima-integrity-appraisal-extension.patch adds a missing ima_fix_xattr() call.

diffstat summary example, from a series of 35 filesystem patches:

 Documentation/filesystems/union-mounts.txt |  708 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 Documentation/filesystems/vfs.txt          |   16 +-
 fs/Kconfig                                 |   13 +
 fs/Makefile                                |    1 +
 fs/autofs4/autofs_i.h                      |    1 +
 fs/autofs4/init.c                          |   11 +-
 fs/autofs4/root.c                          |    6 +
 fs/compat.c                                |    9 +
 fs/dcache.c                                |   35 +-
 fs/ext2/dir.c                              |  248 +++++++-
 fs/ext2/ext2.h                             |    4 +
 fs/ext2/inode.c                            |   11 +-
 fs/ext2/namei.c                            |   89 +++-
 fs/ext2/super.c                            |    6 +
 fs/jffs2/dir.c                             |  104 ++++-
 fs/jffs2/fs.c                              |    4 +
 fs/jffs2/super.c                           |    2 +-
 fs/libfs.c                                 |   21 +-
 fs/namei.c                                 |  793 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
 fs/namespace.c                             |  146 +++++-
 fs/nfsd/nfs3xdr.c                          |    5 +
 fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c                          |    5 +
 fs/nfsd/nfsxdr.c                           |    4 +
 fs/open.c                                  |  116 +++-
 fs/readdir.c                               |   18 +
 fs/super.c                                 |   23 +
 fs/union.c                                 |  881 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/utimes.c                                |   13 +-
 include/linux/dcache.h                     |   40 ++
 include/linux/ext2_fs.h                    |    5 +
 include/linux/fs.h                         |   16 +
 include/linux/jffs2.h                      |    8 +
 include/linux/mount.h                      |    7 +-
 include/linux/namei.h                      |    2 +
 include/linux/union.h                      |   77 +++
 mm/shmem.c                                 |  195 ++++++-
 36 files changed, 3483 insertions(+), 160 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/filesystems/union-mounts.txt
 create mode 100644 fs/union.c
 create mode 100644 include/linux/union.h

This summarizes which files are changed and how much, so that interested people can know if they want to review the patches.

Signature · 1 line
~Randy
author
#24 lore raw
Quoted 39 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 38 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 37 lines · Randy Dunlap
Quoted 11 lines · On Wed, 21 Apr 2010 17:49:40 -0400 Mimi Zohar wrote:

Extended Verification Module(EVM) detects offline tampering of the security extended attributes (e.g. security.selinux, security.SMACK64, security.ima), which is the basis for LSM permission decisions and, with this set of patches, integrity appraisal decisions. To detect offline tampering of the extended attributes, EVM maintains an HMAC-sha1 across a set of security extended attributes, storing the HMAC as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. To verify the integrity of an extended attribute, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(), which re-calculates the HMAC and compares it with the version stored in 'security.evm'.

...

Quoted 22 lines

Much appreciation to Dave Hansen, Serge Hallyn, and Matt Helsley for reviewing the patches.

Mimi

Mimi Zohar (14):
integrity: move ima inode integrity data management
security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h
xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp
evm: re-release
ima: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
security: imbed evm calls in security hooks
evm: inode post removexattr
evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr
evm: inode_post_init
fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls
ima: integrity appraisal extension
ima: appraise default rules
ima: inode post_setattr
ima: add ima_inode_setxattr and ima_inode_removexattr
--

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines

A summary diffstat would be good to see in patch 00/14.

Lacking that, at least each individual patch should have a diffstat summary in it. Please read Documentation/SubmittingPatches.

---
~Randy

Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +

 fs/attr.c                             |    7 +-
 fs/ext2/xattr_security.c              |   31 +++-
 fs/ext3/xattr_security.c              |   30 +++-
 fs/ext4/xattr_security.c              |   30 +++-
 fs/file_table.c                       |    2 +-
 fs/xattr.c                            |   63 ++++++-
 include/linux/capability.h            |    3 -
 include/linux/evm.h                   |   80 ++++++++
 include/linux/ima.h                   |   27 ++-
 include/linux/integrity.h             |   35 ++++
 include/linux/xattr.h                 |   27 +++-
 security/Kconfig                      |    2 +-
 security/Makefile                     |    4 +-
 security/integrity/Kconfig            |    7 +
 security/integrity/Makefile           |   12 ++
 security/integrity/evm/Kconfig        |   13 ++
 security/integrity/evm/Makefile       |    7 +
 security/integrity/evm/evm.h          |   38 ++++
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c   |  198 +++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c     |  335 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c    |  108 +++++++++++
 security/integrity/iint.c             |  153 +++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig        |   15 ++
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile       |    4 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |   76 +++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |   61 +++++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  152 +++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c     |  145 --------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |  123 ++++++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   |   61 ++++++-
 security/integrity/integrity.h        |   50 +++++
 security/security.c                   |   27 +++-
 security/selinux/hooks.c              |    3 -
 security/smack/smack.h                |    2 -
 35 files changed, 1671 insertions(+), 264 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/evm.h
 create mode 100644 include/linux/integrity.h
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/Makefile
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm.h
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/iint.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
 delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/integrity.h

Mimi

maintainer
#25 lore raw
In reply to Mimi Zohar
Quoted 2 lines · Mimi Zohar

Much appreciation to Dave Hansen, Serge Hallyn, and Matt Helsley for reviewing the patches.

We're not seeing much comment on this code beyond the folk above. It might help to cc fsdevel.

Also, I raised some issues:

I'd also be interested to know what kind of user demand there is for EVM -- are there any specific instances of user requirements which are met by it? Do any distros plan to enable and support it?

and does this code meet the requirements of potential users such as Meego ?

- James

Signature · 2 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>
#26 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · James Morris
Quoted 2 lines · Mimi Zohar

Much appreciation to Dave Hansen, Serge Hallyn, and Matt Helsley for reviewing the patches.

We're not seeing much comment on this code beyond the folk above.  It might help to cc fsdevel.

Quoted 7 lines

Also, I raised some issues:

 I'd also be interested to know what kind of user demand there is for EVM -- are there any specific instances of user requirements which are met by it?  Do any distros plan to enable and support it?

and does this code meet the requirements of potential users such as Meego ?

EVM is based on EA while Aegis does not use EA as far as I can understand from the documentation available. Can we make EVM independent of EA? Even the MAC mechanism is very different then existing LSM based mechanisms.

Signature · 1 line
Shaz
author
#28 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Shaz
Quoted 4 lines

EVM is based on EA while Aegis does not use EA as far as I can understand from the documentation available. Can we make EVM independent of EA? Even the MAC mechanism is very different then existing LSM based mechanisms.

Have a look at the following:

http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008010.pdf
http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008007.pdf
http://lwn.net/Articles/372937/

SELinux, Smack, Capabilities, and IMA all use extended attributes. The purpose of EVM is to detect offline tampering of these security extended attributes.

The IMA integrity appraisal extension extends IMA with local measurement appraisal. The extension stores and maintains the file integrity measurement as an extended attribute 'security.ima', which EVM can be configured to protect. Instead of storing the hash measurement as an extended attribute, the file hashes could be loaded in kernel memory, as long as the appraise policy is appropriately constrained.

Mimi

#29 lore raw
Quoted 17 lines · ext Mimi Zohar
Quoted 11 lines · Shaz
Quoted 5 lines

EVM is based on EA while Aegis does not use EA as far as I can understand from the documentation available. Can we make EVM independent of EA? Even the MAC mechanism is very different then existing LSM based mechanisms.

Have a look at the following:

http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008010.pdf
http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008007.pdf
http://lwn.net/Articles/372937/

SELinux, Smack, Capabilities, and IMA all use extended attributes. The purpose of EVM is to detect offline tampering of these security extended attributes.

Quoted 8 lines

The IMA integrity appraisal extension extends IMA with local measurement appraisal. The extension stores and maintains the file integrity measurement as an extended attribute 'security.ima', which EVM can be configured to protect. Instead of storing the hash measurement as an extended attribute, the file hashes could be loaded in kernel memory, as long as the appraise policy is appropriately constrained.

Hi,

Maemo integrity protection solution was based on old DigSig project which was used to verify
integrity of executables. Signed integrity measurement was embedded to the ELF header.
When we started to develop it EVM was not available.

And we decided to use a file to keep hashes and other info.

Our goals were
1. Protect also certain data files.
digsig worked only with ELF files.

2. Be mobile friendly
It seems faster to verify signature of one file with hashes instead of checking signature of every EA.

3. Persistant to offline attacks
EA can be delete. If not all files has EA then it is not possible to detect removal

4. Do not use EA.
IIRC it was some problems with EA on our system and we could not use them..

EVM looks very interesting and I would like also to review the code and understand the architecture.
We consider possibility to use EVM if it is going to be in the kernel.

- Dmitry Kasatkin
Maemo/MeeGo security team

Quoted 8 lines

Mimi

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

#30 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 9 lines · ext Mimi Zohar
Quoted 7 lines · Shaz
Quoted 5 lines

EVM is based on EA while Aegis does not use EA as far as I can understand from the documentation available. Can we make EVM independent of EA? Even the MAC mechanism is very different then existing LSM based mechanisms.

Have a look at the following:

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008010.pdf
http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008007.pdf
http://lwn.net/Articles/372937/

SELinux, Smack, Capabilities, and IMA all use extended attributes. The purpose of EVM is to detect offline tampering of these security extended attributes.

MeeGo/Maemo security framework does not use LSM because Maemo/MeeGo security framework only focuses at process level MAC and for that they use Dazuko as Nokia research report mentions.

By the way MeeGo 1.0 has no security at the moment so one cannot be sure if they are going according to their research or what. They are also not opening the internals of their security framework. Not sure why if the whole thing is open and Linux Foundation is backing it up.

Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 8 lines

The IMA integrity appraisal extension extends IMA with local measurement appraisal. The extension stores and maintains the file integrity measurement as an extended attribute 'security.ima', which EVM can be configured to protect.  Instead of storing the hash measurement as an extended attribute, the file hashes could be loaded in kernel memory, as long as the appraise policy is appropriately constrained.

Hi,

Maemo integrity protection solution was based on old DigSig project which was used to verify
integrity of executables. Signed integrity measurement was embedded to the ELF header.
When we started to develop it EVM was not available.

And we decided to use a file to keep hashes and other info.

Quoted 7 lines

Our goals were
1. Protect also certain data files.
digsig worked only with ELF files.

2. Be mobile friendly
It seems faster to verify signature of one file with hashes instead of checking signature of every EA.

Here Mimi can explain better because I am of the same opinion as yours if you mean that all signatures lie in one file and you check it from there. Anyways some sort of policy can reduce checking every EA ... I guess.

Quoted 3 lines

3. Persistant to offline attacks
EA can be delete. If not all files has EA then it is not possible to detect removal

Availability of EA on all file systems needs some effort but it's not a big deal. I have even seen patches for yaffs2.

Quoted 2 lines

4. Do not use EA.
IIRC it was some problems with EA on our system and we could not use them..

This is a bad excuse :)

Quoted 3 lines

EVM looks very interesting and I would like also to review the code and understand the architecture.
We consider possibility to use EVM if it is going to be in the kernel.

Please do have a look because we need these features too but in a light weight manner. We are trying to make available similar functionality for OpenMoko based software stacks.

Signature · 1 line
Shaz
#31 lore raw
Quoted 26 lines · ext Shaz
Quoted 19 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 16 lines · ext Mimi Zohar
Quoted 13 lines · Shaz
Quoted 6 lines

EVM is based on EA while Aegis does not use EA as far as I can understand from the documentation available. Can we make EVM independent of EA? Even the MAC mechanism is very different then existing LSM based mechanisms.

Have a look at the following:

http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008010.pdf
http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008007.pdf
http://lwn.net/Articles/372937/

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

SELinux, Smack, Capabilities, and IMA all use extended attributes. The purpose of EVM is to detect offline tampering of these security extended attributes.

Quoted 10 lines

MeeGo/Maemo security framework does not use LSM because Maemo/MeeGo security framework only focuses at process level MAC and for that they use Dazuko as Nokia research report mentions.

By the way MeeGo 1.0 has no security at the moment so one cannot be sure if they are going according to their research or what. They are also not opening the internals of their security framework. Not sure why if the whole thing is open and Linux Foundation is backing it up.

Maemo/MeeGo does not do exactly what is written in that research report. It has been done in parallel to our work.
And we do use LSM.

We go approval from company layers to open source the work. We will see what to do next.

Quoted 33 lines
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 9 lines

The IMA integrity appraisal extension extends IMA with local measurement appraisal. The extension stores and maintains the file integrity measurement as an extended attribute 'security.ima', which EVM can be configured to protect. Instead of storing the hash measurement as an extended attribute, the file hashes could be loaded in kernel memory, as long as the appraise policy is appropriately constrained.

Hi,

Maemo integrity protection solution was based on old DigSig project which was used to verify
integrity of executables. Signed integrity measurement was embedded to the ELF header.
When we started to develop it EVM was not available.

And we decided to use a file to keep hashes and other info.

Quoted 8 lines

Our goals were
1. Protect also certain data files.
digsig worked only with ELF files.

2. Be mobile friendly
It seems faster to verify signature of one file with hashes instead of checking signature of every EA.

Here Mimi can explain better because I am of the same opinion as yours if you mean that all signatures lie in one file and you check it from there. Anyways some sort of policy can reduce checking every EA ... I guess.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

3. Persistant to offline attacks
EA can be delete. If not all files has EA then it is not possible to detect removal

Availability of EA on all file systems needs some effort but it's not a big deal. I have even seen patches for yaffs2.

The issue was removal.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

4. Do not use EA.
IIRC it was some problems with EA on our system and we could not use them..

This is a bad excuse :)

Yes. not so convincing...

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines

EVM looks very interesting and I would like also to review the code and understand the architecture.
We consider possibility to use EVM if it is going to be in the kernel.

Please do have a look because we need these features too but in a light weight manner. We are trying to make available similar functionality for OpenMoko based software stacks.

#32 lore raw
Quoted 38 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 26 lines · ext Shaz
Quoted 19 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 16 lines · ext Mimi Zohar
Quoted 13 lines · Shaz
Quoted 6 lines

EVM is based on EA while Aegis does not use EA as far as I can understand from the documentation available. Can we make EVM independent of EA? Even the MAC mechanism is very different then existing LSM based mechanisms.

Have a look at the following:

http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008010.pdf
http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008007.pdf
http://lwn.net/Articles/372937/

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

SELinux, Smack, Capabilities, and IMA all use extended attributes. The purpose of EVM is to detect offline tampering of these security extended attributes.

Quoted 10 lines

MeeGo/Maemo security framework does not use LSM because Maemo/MeeGo security framework only focuses at process level MAC and for that they use Dazuko as Nokia research report mentions.

By the way MeeGo 1.0 has no security at the moment so one cannot be sure if they are going according to their research or what. They are also not opening the internals of their security framework. Not sure why if the whole thing is open and Linux Foundation is backing it up.

Quoted 3 lines

Maemo/MeeGo does not do exactly what is written in that research report. It has been done in parallel to our work.
And we do use LSM.

Elina was the first author of the report and she is the person who has presented whatever is available from Maemo project regarding security. Therefore it is very odd that your work is in parallel to the report!

Quoted 2 lines

We go approval from company layers to open source the work. We will see what to do next.

I cannot understand what the Linux Foundation will have to say about this?

Quoted 37 lines
Quoted 37 lines
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 9 lines

The IMA integrity appraisal extension extends IMA with local measurement appraisal. The extension stores and maintains the file integrity measurement as an extended attribute 'security.ima', which EVM can be configured to protect.  Instead of storing the hash measurement as an extended attribute, the file hashes could be loaded in kernel memory, as long as the appraise policy is appropriately constrained.

Hi,

Maemo integrity protection solution was based on old DigSig project which was used to verify
integrity of executables. Signed integrity measurement was embedded to the ELF header.
When we started to develop it EVM was not available.

And we decided to use a file to keep hashes and other info.

Quoted 8 lines

Our goals were
1. Protect also certain data files.
digsig worked only with ELF files.

2. Be mobile friendly
It seems faster to verify signature of one file with hashes instead of checking signature of every EA.

Here Mimi can explain better because I am of the same opinion as yours if you mean that all signatures lie in one file and you check it from there. Anyways some sort of policy can reduce checking every EA ... I guess.

Quoted 4 lines

3. Persistant to offline attacks
EA can be delete. If not all files has EA then it is not possible to detect removal

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Availability of EA on all file systems needs some effort but it's not a big deal. I have even seen patches for yaffs2.

The issue was removal.

EA is a filesystem functionality and if the attributes get deleted or tampered than EVM will report is as un-trusted. I haven't done practical work on EVM yet but this is how it should be. Mimi can clarify this.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

4. Do not use EA.
IIRC it was some problems with EA on our system and we could not use them..

This is a bad excuse :)

Yes. not so convincing...

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

EVM looks very interesting and I would like also to review the code and understand the architecture.

It is very odd that you guys are unaware of what is opensource since a decade!

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

We consider possibility to use EVM if it is going to be in the kernel.

Please do have a look because we need these features too but in a light weight manner. We are trying to make available similar functionality for OpenMoko based software stacks.

Signature · 1 line
Shaz
#33 lore raw
Quoted 47 lines · ext Shaz
Quoted 44 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 42 lines · ext Shaz
Quoted 22 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 19 lines · ext Mimi Zohar
Quoted 15 lines · Shaz
Quoted 7 lines

EVM is based on EA while Aegis does not use EA as far as I can understand from the documentation available. Can we make EVM independent of EA? Even the MAC mechanism is very different then existing LSM based mechanisms.

Have a look at the following:

http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008010.pdf
http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008007.pdf
http://lwn.net/Articles/372937/

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines

SELinux, Smack, Capabilities, and IMA all use extended attributes. The purpose of EVM is to detect offline tampering of these security extended attributes.

MeeGo/Maemo security framework does not use LSM because Maemo/MeeGo security framework only focuses at process level MAC and for that they use Dazuko as Nokia research report mentions.

By the way MeeGo 1.0 has no security at the moment so one cannot be sure if they are going according to their research or what. They are also not opening the internals of their security framework. Not sure why if the whole thing is open and Linux Foundation is backing it up.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Maemo/MeeGo does not do exactly what is written in that research report. It has been done in parallel to our work.
And we do use LSM.

Elina was the first author of the report and she is the person who has presented whatever is available from Maemo project regarding security. Therefore it is very odd that your work is in parallel to the report!

Elena was not working for Maemo at that time.
They had own objectives in their research.
Then after moving to Maemo she was assigned to present maemo stuff. But I guess we never said that we follow that research work. Yeah.. might look confusing but that is how it went.

- Dmitry

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We go approval from company layers to open source the work. We will see what to do next.

I cannot understand what the Linux Foundation will have to say about this?

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The IMA integrity appraisal extension extends IMA with local measurement appraisal. The extension stores and maintains the file integrity measurement as an extended attribute 'security.ima', which EVM can be configured to protect. Instead of storing the hash measurement as an extended attribute, the file hashes could be loaded in kernel memory, as long as the appraise policy is appropriately constrained.

Hi,

Maemo integrity protection solution was based on old DigSig project which was used to verify
integrity of executables. Signed integrity measurement was embedded to the ELF header.
When we started to develop it EVM was not available.

And we decided to use a file to keep hashes and other info.

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Our goals were
1. Protect also certain data files.
digsig worked only with ELF files.

2. Be mobile friendly
It seems faster to verify signature of one file with hashes instead of checking signature of every EA.

Here Mimi can explain better because I am of the same opinion as yours if you mean that all signatures lie in one file and you check it from there. Anyways some sort of policy can reduce checking every EA ... I guess.

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3. Persistant to offline attacks
EA can be delete. If not all files has EA then it is not possible to detect removal

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Availability of EA on all file systems needs some effort but it's not a big deal. I have even seen patches for yaffs2.

The issue was removal.

EA is a filesystem functionality and if the attributes get deleted or tampered than EVM will report is as un-trusted. I haven't done practical work on EVM yet but this is how it should be. Mimi can clarify this.

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4. Do not use EA.
IIRC it was some problems with EA on our system and we could not use them..

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This is a bad excuse :)

Yes. not so convincing...

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EVM looks very interesting and I would like also to review the code and understand the architecture.

It is very odd that you guys are unaware of what is opensource since a decade!

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We consider possibility to use EVM if it is going to be in the kernel.

Please do have a look because we need these features too but in a light weight manner. We are trying to make available similar functionality for OpenMoko based software stacks.

author
#34 lore raw
In reply to Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 37 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 26 lines · ext Shaz
Quoted 19 lines · Dmitry Kasatkin
Quoted 16 lines · ext Mimi Zohar
Quoted 13 lines · Shaz
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EVM is based on EA while Aegis does not use EA as far as I can understand from the documentation available. Can we make EVM independent of EA? Even the MAC mechanism is very different then existing LSM based mechanisms.

Have a look at the following:

http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008010.pdf
http://research.nokia.com/files/NRCTR2008007.pdf
http://lwn.net/Articles/372937/

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SELinux, Smack, Capabilities, and IMA all use extended attributes. The purpose of EVM is to detect offline tampering of these security extended attributes.

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MeeGo/Maemo security framework does not use LSM because Maemo/MeeGo security framework only focuses at process level MAC and for that they use Dazuko as Nokia research report mentions.

By the way MeeGo 1.0 has no security at the moment so one cannot be sure if they are going according to their research or what. They are also not opening the internals of their security framework. Not sure why if the whole thing is open and Linux Foundation is backing it up.

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Maemo/MeeGo does not do exactly what is written in that research report. It has been done in parallel to our work.
And we do use LSM.

We go approval from company layers to open source the work. We will see what to do next.

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The IMA integrity appraisal extension extends IMA with local measurement appraisal. The extension stores and maintains the file integrity measurement as an extended attribute 'security.ima', which EVM can be configured to protect. Instead of storing the hash measurement as an extended attribute, the file hashes could be loaded in kernel memory, as long as the appraise policy is appropriately constrained.

Hi,

Maemo integrity protection solution was based on old DigSig project which was used to verify
integrity of executables. Signed integrity measurement was embedded to the ELF header.
When we started to develop it EVM was not available.

And we decided to use a file to keep hashes and other info.

Quoted 8 lines

Our goals were
1. Protect also certain data files.
digsig worked only with ELF files.

2. Be mobile friendly
It seems faster to verify signature of one file with hashes instead of checking signature of every EA.

Here Mimi can explain better because I am of the same opinion as yours if you mean that all signatures lie in one file and you check it from there. Anyways some sort of policy can reduce checking every EA ... I guess.

Yes, verifying one file containing the hashes would be faster than verifying individual hashes stored as extended attributes (xattrs), but this does not take into account that files on a running system are being modified or added. On a small form factor, the number of files is limited, but would this scale well? In addition, what protects that one file containing all the hashes from being modified? So, if you limit the types of files to those that don't change, and the number of file hashes, then using a single file would be faster.

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3. Persistant to offline attacks
EA can be delete. If not all files has EA then it is not possible to detect removal

Availability of EA on all file systems needs some effort but it's not a big deal. I have even seen patches for yaffs2.

The issue was removal.

Yes, exactly. The original EVM required that all files be labeled. Anything unlabeled was untrusted. The current implementation is based upon policy with the default policy being to only appraise all files owned by root.

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4. Do not use EA.
IIRC it was some problems with EA on our system and we could not use them..

This is a bad excuse :)

Yes. not so convincing...

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EVM looks very interesting and I would like also to review the code and understand the architecture.
We consider possibility to use EVM if it is going to be in the kernel.

Am looking forward to your questions/comments.

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Please do have a look because we need these features too but in a light weight manner. We are trying to make available similar functionality for OpenMoko based software stacks.

Glad to hear it.

Mimi

#35 lore raw
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Yes, verifying one file containing the hashes would be faster than verifying individual hashes stored as extended attributes (xattrs), but this does not take into account that files on a running system are being modified or added. On a small form factor, the number of files is limited, but would this scale well? In addition, what protects that one file containing all the hashes from being modified?  So, if you limit

How about sealing to protect this file?

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the types of files to those that don't change, and the number of file hashes, then using a single file would be faster.

Signature · 1 line
Shaz
author
#36 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Shaz
Quoted 6 lines

Yes, verifying one file containing the hashes would be faster than verifying individual hashes stored as extended attributes (xattrs), but this does not take into account that files on a running system are being modified or added. On a small form factor, the number of files is limited, but would this scale well? In addition, what protects that one file containing all the hashes from being modified? So, if you limit

How about sealing to protect this file?

Was just indicating that the file needs to be protected. So, yes sealing the file, based on PCRs, would work in a trusted boot environment.

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the types of files to those that don't change, and the number of file hashes, then using a single file would be faster.

Mimi

#37 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 3 lines · Shaz
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Yes, verifying one file containing the hashes would be faster than verifying individual hashes stored as extended attributes (xattrs), but this does not take into account that files on a running system are being

What if the sensitive files (binary or data) are compared with IMA measurements after trusted boot or at anytime a stakeholder wants to? The comparisons made with IMA will be the sha1 (or ....) of the files stored in that one verification file. The stakeholder's key determines which measurements can be compared by her (privacy protection and confidentiality). Better use this key for an equivalence mechanism for the factor of performance. The stakeholder's key as an identity can help to make remote attestation more sensible as well. And here you will be moving towards TCG MPWG standards .....

Combine this with SELinux or some RBAC mechanism and hopefully you will get something closer to what MeeGo is trying to achieve. Consider a trusted package manager with a registry sort of functionality for files and it's owners and users and you've got a complete solution.

The worst part is that achieving performance is tough, while space is not a serious issue.

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modified or added. On a small form factor, the number of files is limited, but would this scale well? In addition, what protects that one file containing all the hashes from being modified?  So, if you limit

Signature · 1 line
Shaz
maintainer
#38 lore raw
In reply to Mimi Zohar
Quoted 3 lines · Mimi Zohar

SELinux, Smack, Capabilities, and IMA all use extended attributes. The purpose of EVM is to detect offline tampering of these security extended attributes.

One issue mentioned to me off-list is that if EVM is only protecting against offline attacks, why not just encrypt the entire volume ?

This would provide confidentiality and integrity protection for all data and metadata, rather than just integrity for xattr metadata.

- James

Signature · 2 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>
#39 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · James Morris
Quoted 3 lines · Mimi Zohar

SELinux, Smack, Capabilities, and IMA all use extended attributes. The purpose of EVM is to detect offline tampering of these security extended attributes.

One issue mentioned to me off-list is that if EVM is only protecting against offline attacks, why not just encrypt the entire volume ?

Are you sure that EVM protects against offline attacks only?

Why and why not encrypt the whole volume?

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This would provide confidentiality and integrity protection for all data and metadata, rather than just integrity for xattr metadata.

Signature · 1 line
Shaz
#40 lore raw
In reply to James Morris
Quoted 11 lines · James Morris
Quoted 3 lines · Mimi Zohar

SELinux, Smack, Capabilities, and IMA all use extended attributes. The purpose of EVM is to detect offline tampering of these security extended attributes.

One issue mentioned to me off-list is that if EVM is only protecting against offline attacks, why not just encrypt the entire volume ?

This would provide confidentiality and integrity protection for all data and metadata, rather than just integrity for xattr metadata.

Software whole disk encryption is slower, and doesn't really provide integrity protection. While there are encryption modes, such as IAPM (Integrity Aware Parallelizable Mode) which can provide both confidentially and integrity guarantees, they are hard to use for random access devices. An example attack is replaying previously valid encrypted blocks, to revert to a previous version with a known vulnerabiity. With EVM, these attacks can be defeated efficiently with directory level binding. (This is on our TODO list).

With encryption in the hard disk, the performance is less of an issue, but the integrity problem is still there. Plus, most systems don't have the encrypting drives, and need a software solution.

dave