x86: kvm: fix information leak to userland
Subsystems (4)
PATCH v2 1/1 x86: kvm: fix information leak to userland
Structure kvm_ppc_pvinfo is copied to userland with pad field unitialized. Structure kvm_clock_data is copied to userland with flags and pad fields unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.
---
I cannot compile this driver, so it is not tested at all.
As it is not compilable, I've missed and typed wrong var name in v1, sorry.
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +2 -1
@@ -2896,6 +2896,7 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,case KVM_GET_DEBUGREGS : {struct kvm_debugregs dbgregs; +memset (&dbgregs,0 ,sizeof (dbgregs));kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs (vcpu, &dbgregs); r = -EFAULT ;
@@ -3481,11 +3482,11 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,struct kvm_clock_data user_ns;u64 now_ns; +memset (&user_ns,0 ,sizeof (user_ns));local_irq_disable (); now_ns =get_kernel_ns (); user_ns.clock = kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset + now_ns;local_irq_enable (); - user_ns.flags =0 ; r = -EFAULT ;if (copy_to_user (argp, &user_ns,sizeof (user_ns)))
Signature · 1 line
1.7.0.4
Quoted 4 lines · Vasiliy Kulikov
Structure
kvm_ppc_pvinfois copied to userland with pad field unitialized. Structurekvm_clock_datais copied to userland with flags and pad fields unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.
This description only partially matches your patch, please fix.
Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>---
I cannot compile this driver, so it is not tested at all.
Why? It should be compilable (provided you have a x86 toolchain).
Quoted 21 lines
As it is not compilable, I've missed and typed wrong var name in v1, sorry.
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1
-0@@ -2896,6 +2896,7 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,case KVM_GET_DEBUGREGS : {struct kvm_debugregs dbgregs; +memset (&dbgregs,0 ,sizeof (dbgregs));kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs (vcpu, &dbgregs); r = -EFAULT ;@@ -3481,11 +3482,11 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,struct kvm_clock_data user_ns;u64 now_ns;
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, · line 3492
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1
-1+memset (&user_ns,0 ,sizeof (user_ns));local_irq_disable (); now_ns =get_kernel_ns (); user_ns.clock = kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset + now_ns;local_irq_enable (); - user_ns.flags =0 ; r = -EFAULT ;if (copy_to_user (argp, &user_ns,sizeof (user_ns)))
I would rather clear the padding/reserved fields (in both cases). No need to double-initialize properly set fields.
There are more interfaces in KVM for obtaining data from the kernel via padded structures. Did you check them all (kvm_vcpu_events come to my mind)?
Nevertheless, looks like a worthwhile hardening of the KVM interfaces.
Thanks,
Jan
Quoted 7 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 4 lines · Vasiliy Kulikov
Structure
kvm_ppc_pvinfois copied to userland with pad field unitialized. Structurekvm_clock_datais copied to userland with flags and pad fields unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.This description only partially matches your patch, please fix.
What do you mean? Two structures are copied with some fields with old stack values. Smth valuable else?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>---
I cannot compile this driver, so it is not tested at all.Why? It should be compilable (provided you have a x86 toolchain).
Hmm, I can't say... Now it is compilable, but I precisely know that it failed with "no such header" or smth like this. Forget it.
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 29 lines
As it is not compilable, I've missed and typed wrong var name in v1, sorry.
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +2
-1@@ -2896,6 +2896,7 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *filp,case KVM_GET_DEBUGREGS : {struct kvm_debugregs dbgregs; +memset (&dbgregs,0 ,sizeof (dbgregs));kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs (vcpu, &dbgregs); r = -EFAULT ;@@ -3481,11 +3482,11 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,struct kvm_clock_data user_ns;u64 now_ns; +memset (&user_ns,0 ,sizeof (user_ns));local_irq_disable (); now_ns =get_kernel_ns (); user_ns.clock = kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset + now_ns;local_irq_enable (); - user_ns.flags =0 ;
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, · line 3492
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +0
-0r = -EFAULT ;if (copy_to_user (argp, &user_ns,sizeof (user_ns)))I would rather clear the padding/reserved fields (in both cases). No need to double-initialize properly set fields.
Maybe you're right, but from my point of view it's much safer to explicitly set it to zeroes and then maybe change some of the fields. Anybody like me who search for such bug will know that it is initialized at the copy_to_user() level. If somebody wants to add smth to this code might move field initalizing to new function; to explore this situation one should explore this function, etc.
E.g. I searched this bug with copy_to_user() copying struct without explicit copy_from_user() or memset().
Weaker argument: setting fields to zeroes logically related to copy_to_user() level, but not initialization as it is correct data unit with some unitialized not-used-yet field. On kernel level (without sending it to userspace) it is OK and even faster.
Quoted 2 lines
There are more interfaces in KVM for obtaining data from the kernel via padded structures. Did you check them all (
kvm_vcpu_eventscome to my mind)?
Not all of them yet, at least one place with kvm_vcpu_events is not initialized too. I'll send the patch today.
Thanks,
Signature · 1 line
Vasiliy
Quoted 11 lines · Vasiliy Kulikov
Quoted 7 lines · Jan Kiszka
Quoted 4 lines · Vasiliy Kulikov
Structure
kvm_ppc_pvinfois copied to userland with pad field unitialized. Structurekvm_clock_datais copied to userland with flags and pad fields unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.This description only partially matches your patch, please fix.
What do you mean? Two structures are copied with some fields with old stack values. Smth valuable else?
I mean you aren't touching ppc code in this patch, but you are fixing more than just the kvm_clock interface.
Jan
PATCH v2 1/1 x86: kvm: x86: fix information leak to userland
Structures kvm_vcpu_events, kvm_debugregs, kvm_pit_state2 and kvm_clock_data are copied to userland with some padding and reserved fields unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. We have to initialize them to zero.
In patch v1 Jan Kiszka suggested to fill reserved fields with zeros instead of memset'ting the whole struct. It makes sense as these fields are explicitly marked as padding. No more fields need zeroing.
---
Compile tesed only.
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 ++++++ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -0
@@ -2560,6 +2560,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, !kvm_exception_is_soft (vcpu->arch.exception.nr); events->exception.nr = vcpu->arch.exception.nr; events->exception.has_error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code; + events->exception.pad =0 ; events->exception.error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.error_code; events->interrupt.injected @@ -2573,12 +2574,14 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
events->nmi.injected = vcpu->arch.nmi_injected; events->nmi.pending = vcpu->arch.nmi_pending; events->nmi.masked = kvm_x86_ops->get_nmi_mask(vcpu);
+ events->nmi.pad = 0;
events->sipi_vector = vcpu->arch.sipi_vector;
events->flags = (KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NMI_PENDING
| KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SIPI_VECTOR | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SHADOW);
+ memset(&events->reserved, 0, sizeof(events->reserved));
}
static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
@@ -2623,6 +2626,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
dbgregs->dr6 = vcpu->arch.dr6;
dbgregs->dr7 = vcpu->arch.dr7;
dbgregs->flags = 0;
+ memset(&dbgregs->reserved, 0, sizeof(dbgregs->reserved));
}
static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
@@ -3106,6 +3110,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps)
sizeof(ps->channels));
ps->flags = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags; mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
+ memset(&ps->reserved, 0, sizeof(ps->reserved));
return r;
}
@@ -3486,6 +3491,7 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
user_ns.clock = kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset + now_ns; local_irq_enable();
user_ns.flags = 0;
+ memset(&user_ns.pad, 0, sizeof(user_ns.pad));
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &user_ns, sizeof(user_ns)))
Signature · 1 line
Vasiliy
Marcelo Tosatti
AppliedRe: [patch v2] x86: kvm: x86: fix information leak to userland
Quoted 9 lines · Vasiliy Kulikov
Structures
kvm_vcpu_events,kvm_debugregs,kvm_pit_state2andkvm_clock_dataare copied to userland with some padding and reserved fields unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. We have to initialize them to zero.In patch v1 Jan Kiszka suggested to fill reserved fields with zeros instead of memset'ting the whole struct. It makes sense as these fields are explicitly marked as padding. No more fields need zeroing.
Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>---
Compile tesed only.arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 ++++++ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
Applied, thanks.
Re: [patch v2] x86: kvm: x86: fix information leak to userland
In reply to Vasiliy KulikovQuoted 51 lines · Vasiliy Kulikov
Structures
kvm_vcpu_events,kvm_debugregs,kvm_pit_state2andkvm_clock_dataare copied to userland with some padding and reserved fields unitialized. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory. We have to initialize them to zero.In patch v1 Jan Kiszka suggested to fill reserved fields with zeros instead of memset'ting the whole struct. It makes sense as these fields are explicitly marked as padding. No more fields need zeroing.
Signed-off-by Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>---
Compile tesed only.
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c| 6 ++++++1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1
-0@@ -2560,6 +2560,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, !kvm_exception_is_soft (vcpu->arch.exception.nr); events->exception.nr = vcpu->arch.exception.nr; events->exception.has_error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code; + events->exception.pad =0 ; events->exception.error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.error_code; events->interrupt.injected > @@ -2573,12 +2574,14 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,events->nmi.injected = vcpu->arch.nmi_injected; events->nmi.pending = vcpu->arch.nmi_pending; events->nmi.masked = kvm_x86_ops->get_nmi_mask(vcpu);arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1
-0+ events->nmi.pad =0 ;events->sipi_vector = vcpu->arch.sipi_vector; events->flags = (KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NMI_PENDING | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SIPI_VECTOR | KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_SHADOW);arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1
-0+memset (&events->reserved,0 ,sizeof (events->reserved));}
static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(struct
kvm_vcpu*vcpu,arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1
-0@@ -2623,6 +2626,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, dbgregs->dr6 = vcpu->arch.dr6; dbgregs->dr7 = vcpu->arch.dr7; dbgregs->flags =0 ; +memset (&dbgregs->reserved,0 ,sizeof (dbgregs->reserved)); } static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps) · line 3113
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1
-0@@ -3106,6 +3110,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps) sizeof(ps->channels)); ps->flags = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags;mutex_unlock (&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock); +memset (&ps->reserved,0 ,sizeof (ps->reserved));
struct kvm_pit_state2 {
struct kvm_pit_channel_state channels[3];
__u32 flags;
__u32 reserved[9];
};So memset(&ps->reserved) would give you the a __u32 **, no? Same goes for all the other array sets in here. Or am I understanding some C logic wrong? :)
Alex
Quoted 17 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1
-0return r; }@@ -3486,6 +3491,7 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, user_ns.clock = kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset + now_ns;local_irq_enable (); user_ns.flags =0 ; +memset (&user_ns.pad,0 ,sizeof (user_ns.pad)); r = -EFAULT ;if (copy_to_user (argp, &user_ns,sizeof (user_ns)))Signature · 5 lines
Vasiliy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Re: [patch v2] x86: kvm: x86: fix information leak to userland
Quoted 8 lines · Alexander Graf
struct kvm_pit_state2 { struct kvm_pit_channel_state channels[3]; __u32 flags; __u32 reserved[9]; };So
memset(&ps->reserved)would give you the a__u32**, no? Same goes for all the other array sets in here. Or am I understanding some C logic wrong? :)
An address of an array is the array itself.
Signature · 1 line
error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function
Re: [patch v2] x86: kvm: x86: fix information leak to userland
Quoted 11 lines · Avi Kivity
Quoted 8 lines · Alexander Graf
struct kvm_pit_state2 { struct kvm_pit_channel_state channels[3]; __u32 flags; __u32 reserved[9]; };So
memset(&ps->reserved)would give you the a__u32**, no? Same goes for all the other array sets in here. Or am I understanding some C logic wrong? :)An address of an array is the array itself.
Ah, nice. So it's really a matter of taste then rather than functionality. Good to know :)
Alex
Re: [patch v2] x86: kvm: x86: fix information leak to userland
In reply to Alexander GrafAlexander,
Quoted 20 lines · Alexander Graf
Review static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps) · line 3113
Quoted 13 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0@@ -2623,6 +2626,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, dbgregs->dr6 = vcpu->arch.dr6; dbgregs->dr7 = vcpu->arch.dr7; dbgregs->flags = 0; + memset(&dbgregs->reserved, 0, sizeof(dbgregs->reserved)); } static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,@@ -3106,6 +3110,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps) sizeof(ps->channels)); ps->flags = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags; mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock); + memset(&ps->reserved, 0, sizeof(ps->reserved));struct kvm_pit_state2 { struct kvm_pit_channel_state channels[3]; __u32 flags; __u32 reserved[9]; };
Quoted 1 line
So
memset(&ps->reserved)would give you the a__u32**, no? Same goes for all the other array sets in here. Or am I understanding some C logic wrong? :)
No, the array name and an address of the array give the same address. I could use ps->reserved instead of &ps->reserved, but it is a question of coding style. I got opposite opinions on this question from different maintainers.
Another thing is that sizeof() of the array name and the pointer to the first array element differ. But I used sizeof(array) here, so it should be correct.
Thanks,
Signature · 2 lines
Vasiliy Kulikov http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
Re: [patch v2] x86: kvm: x86: fix information leak to userland
Quoted 25 lines · Vasiliy Kulikov
Alexander,
Quoted 20 lines · Alexander Graf
Review static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps) · line 3113
Quoted 13 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0@@ -2623,6 +2626,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, dbgregs->dr6 = vcpu->arch.dr6; dbgregs->dr7 = vcpu->arch.dr7; dbgregs->flags = 0; + memset(&dbgregs->reserved, 0, sizeof(dbgregs->reserved)); } static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,@@ -3106,6 +3110,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps) sizeof(ps->channels)); ps->flags = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags; mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock); + memset(&ps->reserved, 0, sizeof(ps->reserved));struct kvm_pit_state2 { struct kvm_pit_channel_state channels[3]; __u32 flags; __u32 reserved[9]; };Quoted 1 line
So
memset(&ps->reserved)would give you the a__u32**, no? Same goes for all the other array sets in here. Or am I understanding some C logic wrong? :)
Quoted 8 lines
No, the array name and an address of the array give the same address. I could use
ps->reservedinstead of&ps->reserved, but it is a question of coding style. I got opposite opinions on this question from different maintainers.Another thing is that
sizeof()of the array name and the pointer to the first array element differ. But I used sizeof(array) here, so it should be correct.
Yup, the sizeof looks fine. I was really only puzzled about the &array part. But if it's standardized to return the same as array, then that's great and I can call myself more educated now :)
Alex