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: Allow HVM guests to use entire address space

PATCH In review Gianni Tedesco 2 participants 3 messages Nov 10, 2010

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 : Allow HVM guests to use entire address space

HVM guests are allowed to use the entire virtual address space for whatever they want, without any Xen hole. __addr_ok() is therefore always true for such guests.

xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h +3 -1
diff -r 7188d1e4b0e1 xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ void free_compat_arg_xlat(unsigned int c
  * non-canonical address (and thus fault) before ever reaching VIRT_START.
  */
 #define __addr_ok(addr) \
-    (((unsigned long)(addr) < (1UL<<48)) || \
+    (is_hvm_vcpu(current) || \
+     ((unsigned long)(addr) < (1UL<<48)) || \
      ((unsigned long)(addr) >= HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END))
 
 #define access_ok(addr, size) \
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ void free_compat_arg_xlat(unsigned int c
     (access_ok(addr, (count)*(size)))
 
 #define __compat_addr_ok(d, addr) \
+    (is_hvm_vcpu(current) || \
     ((unsigned long)(addr) < HYPERVISOR_COMPAT_VIRT_START(d))
 
 #define __compat_access_ok(d, addr, size) \
#1 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Gianni Tedesco

HVM guests are allowed to use the entire virtual address space for whatever they want, without any Xen hole. __addr_ok() is therefore always true for such guests.

This one got nacked and the bug was instead fixed by xen-unstable:21456 aka xen-4.0-testing:21169. So we don't need this patch, thank you. ;-)

-- Keir

Quoted 30 lines

diff -r 7188d1e4b0e1 xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h

xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h Wed Nov 10 13:34:52 2010 +0000 renamed from xen/include/asm-x86/x86_64/uaccess.h Tue Nov 09 12:00:05 2010 +0000 +3 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ void free_compat_arg_xlat(unsigned int c
  * non-canonical address (and thus fault) before ever reaching VIRT_START.
  */
 #define __addr_ok(addr) \
-    (((unsigned long)(addr) < (1UL<<48)) || \
+    (is_hvm_vcpu(current) || \
+     ((unsigned long)(addr) < (1UL<<48)) || \
      ((unsigned long)(addr) >= HYPERVISOR_VIRT_END))
 
 #define access_ok(addr, size) \
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ void free_compat_arg_xlat(unsigned int c
     (access_ok(addr, (count)*(size)))
 
 #define __compat_addr_ok(d, addr) \
+    (is_hvm_vcpu(current) || \
     ((unsigned long)(addr) < HYPERVISOR_COMPAT_VIRT_START(d))
 
 #define __compat_access_ok(d, addr, size) \

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#2 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Keir Fraser
Quoted 3 lines · Gianni Tedesco

HVM guests are allowed to use the entire virtual address space for whatever they want, without any Xen hole. __addr_ok() is therefore always true for such guests.

This one got nacked and the bug was instead fixed by xen-unstable:21456 aka xen-4.0-testing:21169. So we don't need this patch, thank you. ;-)

-- Keir

Aha, good to know, I will make appropriate changes our end.

Gianni