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fs: call security_d_instantiate in d_obtain_alias

PATCH In review Josef Bacik 5 participants 12 messages Nov 17, 2010 – Nov 29, 2010

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 fs: call security_d_instantiate in d_obtain_alias

While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting -EACCESS for no apparent reason. Eric Paris and printk() helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denial

type=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied { 0x800000 } for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=file

Turns out this is because in d_obtain_alias if we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do the security_d_instantiate. With this patch I'm no longer seeing these errant -EACCESS return values. Thanks,

---
 fs/dcache.c |    1 +
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/dcache.c +1 -0
index 23702a9..890a59e 100644
@@ -1201,6 +1201,7 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)
 	spin_unlock(&tmp->d_lock);
 
 	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
+	security_d_instantiate(tmp, inode);
 	return tmp;
 
  out_iput:
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Josef Bacik

While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting -EACCESS for no apparent reason. Eric Paris and printk() helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denial

type=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied { 0x800000 } for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=file

Quoted 6 lines

Turns out this is because in d_obtain_alias if we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do the security_d_instantiate. With this patch I'm no longer seeing these errant -EACCESS return values. Thanks,

Adding a couple of people to the CC just to make sure they notice this patch.

-Eric

Quoted 16 lines
---
 fs/dcache.c |    1 +
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/dcache.c +1 -0
index 23702a9..890a59e 100644
@@ -1201,6 +1201,7 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)
 	spin_unlock(&tmp->d_lock);
 
 	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
+	security_d_instantiate(tmp, inode);
 	return tmp;
 
  out_iput:
#2 lore raw
In reply to Josef Bacik
Quoted 5 lines · Josef Bacik

While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting -EACCESS for no apparent reason. Eric Paris and printk() helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denial

Quoted 8 lines

type=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied { 0x800000 } for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=file

Turns out this is because in d_obtain_alias if we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do the security_d_instantiate. With this patch I'm no longer seeing these errant -EACCESS return values. Thanks,

Possibly dumb question: Is there still a small race here? Is it possible for another nfsd thread to find the new alias on the list while this thread is still:

Quoted 11 lines
---
 fs/dcache.c |    1 +
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/dcache.c +0 -0
index 23702a9..890a59e 100644

fs/dcache.c struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode) · line 1203

Quoted 3 lines
fs/dcache.c +0 -0
@@ -1201,6 +1201,7 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)
 	spin_unlock(&tmp->d_lock);
 
 	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);

... right here, so that that other nfsd thread still ends up trying to do something with a dentry that hasn't had security_d_instantiate called on it yet?

fs/dcache.c struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode) · line 1207

Quoted 5 lines
fs/dcache.c +1 -0
+	security_d_instantiate(tmp, inode);
 	return tmp;
 
  out_iput:

Or does something else prevent that?

--b.

#3 lore raw
Quoted 38 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Quoted 5 lines · Josef Bacik

While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting -EACCESS for no apparent reason. Eric Paris and printk() helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denial

Quoted 8 lines

type=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied { 0x800000 } for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=file

Turns out this is because in d_obtain_alias if we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do the security_d_instantiate. With this patch I'm no longer seeing these errant -EACCESS return values. Thanks,

Possibly dumb question: Is there still a small race here? Is it possible for another nfsd thread to find the new alias on the list while this thread is still:

Quoted 11 lines
---
 fs/dcache.c |    1 +
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/dcache.c +0 -0
index 23702a9..890a59e 100644

fs/dcache.c struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode) · line 1203

Quoted 3 lines
fs/dcache.c +0 -0
@@ -1201,6 +1201,7 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)
 	spin_unlock(&tmp->d_lock);
 
 	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);

... right here, so that that other nfsd thread still ends up trying to do something with a dentry that hasn't had security_d_instantiate called on it yet?

Quoted 8 lines

fs/dcache.c struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode) · line 1207

Quoted 5 lines
fs/dcache.c +1 -0
+	security_d_instantiate(tmp, inode);
 	return tmp;
 
  out_iput:

Or does something else prevent that?

That's a good question, I have no idea actually. Every other consumer of security_d_instantiate seems to hold the i_mutex of the parent directory inode, tho I'm not sure if that is appropriate for d_obtain_alias, maybe somebody else has an idea? Thanks,

Josef

#4 lore raw
Quoted 48 lines · Josef Bacik
Quoted 38 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Quoted 5 lines · Josef Bacik

While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting -EACCESS for no apparent reason. Eric Paris and printk() helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denial

Quoted 8 lines

type=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied { 0x800000 } for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=file

Turns out this is because in d_obtain_alias if we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do the security_d_instantiate. With this patch I'm no longer seeing these errant -EACCESS return values. Thanks,

Possibly dumb question: Is there still a small race here? Is it possible for another nfsd thread to find the new alias on the list while this thread is still:

Quoted 11 lines
---
 fs/dcache.c |    1 +
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/dcache.c +0 -0
index 23702a9..890a59e 100644

fs/dcache.c struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode) · line 1203

Quoted 3 lines
fs/dcache.c +0 -0
@@ -1201,6 +1201,7 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)
 	spin_unlock(&tmp->d_lock);
 
 	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);

... right here, so that that other nfsd thread still ends up trying to do something with a dentry that hasn't had security_d_instantiate called on it yet?

Quoted 8 lines

fs/dcache.c struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode) · line 1207

Quoted 5 lines
fs/dcache.c +1 -0
+	security_d_instantiate(tmp, inode);
 	return tmp;
 
  out_iput:

Or does something else prevent that?

Quoted 4 lines

That's a good question, I have no idea actually. Every other consumer of security_d_instantiate seems to hold the i_mutex of the parent directory inode, tho I'm not sure if that is appropriate for d_obtain_alias, maybe somebody else has an idea? Thanks,

Actually, I don't get it:

- Why is selinux using a *dentry* operation to initialize an *inode*?
- Are security hooks necessarily prepared to handle a disconnected dentry? (Which has no real parent, name an empty string, etc.)
- What use is the dentry to the security module in this case anyway?

--b.

#5 lore raw
Quoted 56 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Quoted 48 lines · Josef Bacik
Quoted 38 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Quoted 5 lines · Josef Bacik

While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting -EACCESS for no apparent reason. Eric Paris and printk() helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denial

Quoted 8 lines

type=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied { 0x800000 } for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=file

Turns out this is because in d_obtain_alias if we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do the security_d_instantiate. With this patch I'm no longer seeing these errant -EACCESS return values. Thanks,

Possibly dumb question: Is there still a small race here? Is it possible for another nfsd thread to find the new alias on the list while this thread is still:

Quoted 11 lines
---
 fs/dcache.c |    1 +
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/dcache.c +0 -0
index 23702a9..890a59e 100644

fs/dcache.c struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode) · line 1203

Quoted 3 lines
fs/dcache.c +0 -0
@@ -1201,6 +1201,7 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)
 	spin_unlock(&tmp->d_lock);
 
 	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);

... right here, so that that other nfsd thread still ends up trying to do something with a dentry that hasn't had security_d_instantiate called on it yet?

Quoted 8 lines

fs/dcache.c struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode) · line 1207

Quoted 5 lines
fs/dcache.c +1 -0
+	security_d_instantiate(tmp, inode);
 	return tmp;
 
  out_iput:

Or does something else prevent that?

Quoted 4 lines

That's a good question, I have no idea actually. Every other consumer of security_d_instantiate seems to hold the i_mutex of the parent directory inode, tho I'm not sure if that is appropriate for d_obtain_alias, maybe somebody else has an idea? Thanks,

Actually, I don't get it:

Quoted 7 lines

- Why is selinux using a *dentry* operation to initialize an *inode*?
- Are security hooks necessarily prepared to handle a disconnected dentry? (Which has no real parent, name an empty string, etc.)
- What use is the dentry to the security module in this case anyway?

I only know a bit from the SELinux world and can't speak at all for any other LSMs. SELinux however needs the dentry when an inode first enters core for a couple of reasons. (once the inode is in core it should have already been initialized and we skip all this)

If you have persistent xattr support we need the dentry since the xattr code requires a dentry. I have no idea why but that's what inode->i_op->getxattr() requires.

Then we come to procfs. In that filesystem we actually label based on the pathname. oh no did I say SELinux uses pathnames? yes, I did, but we only use the part of the pathname relative to the procfs root, so really it's a static identifier which is immutable.

Quoted 1 line

From what I can see SELinux doesn't really care about the dentry, we

don't care about IS_ROOT() or the name or any of that crap (in the non-procfs case). All we really about is that if something can find an inode and use it that security_d_instantiate() was called....

Calling security_d_instantiate() extra times is very low overhead and not harmful. the dirtiest (but easiest I guess) fix would be to add it into the out_iput path as well. I feel like there has to be an easier solution, I'm just not sure what it is...

-Eric

#6 lore raw
Quoted 84 lines · Eric Paris
Quoted 56 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Quoted 48 lines · Josef Bacik
Quoted 38 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Quoted 5 lines · Josef Bacik

While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting -EACCESS for no apparent reason. Eric Paris and printk() helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denial

Quoted 8 lines

type=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied { 0x800000 } for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=file

Turns out this is because in d_obtain_alias if we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do the security_d_instantiate. With this patch I'm no longer seeing these errant -EACCESS return values. Thanks,

Possibly dumb question: Is there still a small race here? Is it possible for another nfsd thread to find the new alias on the list while this thread is still:

Quoted 11 lines
---
 fs/dcache.c |    1 +
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/dcache.c +0 -0
index 23702a9..890a59e 100644

fs/dcache.c struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode) · line 1203

Quoted 3 lines
fs/dcache.c +0 -0
@@ -1201,6 +1201,7 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)
 	spin_unlock(&tmp->d_lock);
 
 	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);

... right here, so that that other nfsd thread still ends up trying to do something with a dentry that hasn't had security_d_instantiate called on it yet?

Quoted 8 lines

fs/dcache.c struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode) · line 1207

Quoted 5 lines
fs/dcache.c +1 -0
+	security_d_instantiate(tmp, inode);
 	return tmp;
 
  out_iput:

Or does something else prevent that?

Quoted 4 lines

That's a good question, I have no idea actually. Every other consumer of security_d_instantiate seems to hold the i_mutex of the parent directory inode, tho I'm not sure if that is appropriate for d_obtain_alias, maybe somebody else has an idea? Thanks,

Actually, I don't get it:

Quoted 7 lines

- Why is selinux using a *dentry* operation to initialize an *inode*?
- Are security hooks necessarily prepared to handle a disconnected dentry? (Which has no real parent, name an empty string, etc.)
- What use is the dentry to the security module in this case anyway?

I only know a bit from the SELinux world and can't speak at all for any other LSMs. SELinux however needs the dentry when an inode first enters core for a couple of reasons. (once the inode is in core it should have already been initialized and we skip all this)

If you have persistent xattr support we need the dentry since the xattr code requires a dentry. I have no idea why but that's what inode->i_op->getxattr() requires.

Then we come to procfs. In that filesystem we actually label based on the pathname. oh no did I say SELinux uses pathnames? yes, I did, but we only use the part of the pathname relative to the procfs root, so really it's a static identifier which is immutable.

From what I can see SELinux doesn't really care about the dentry, we don't care about IS_ROOT() or the name or any of that crap (in the non-procfs case). All we really about is that if something can find an inode and use it that security_d_instantiate() was called....

Quoted 5 lines

Calling security_d_instantiate() extra times is very low overhead and not harmful. the dirtiest (but easiest I guess) fix would be to add it into the out_iput path as well. I feel like there has to be an easier solution, I'm just not sure what it is...

So we're not worried about calling it multiple times, we're more worried about somebody finding the dentry before we have a chance to run security_d_instantiate. Would it be ok to call security_d_instantiate() right before we do all the actual instantiation work? That would solve this problem. Thanks,

Josef

#7 lore raw
In reply to Eric Paris

[snip]

Quoted 4 lines

If you have persistent xattr support we need the dentry since the xattr code requires a dentry. I have no idea why but that's what inode->i_op->getxattr() requires.

The original reason that the xattr operations take dentries is because of p9fs and CIFS. CIFS uses the name of the file to grab the extended attributes and so does p9fs. I had tried to remove this a while ago but couldn't find a way around that. When trying to find a solution I also got push back from Miklos (FUSE) as he views a filesystem being able to make xattr decisions based on the path name being a valid use-case.

Dave

#8 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · David Quigley

[snip]

Quoted 4 lines

If you have persistent xattr support we need the dentry since the xattr code requires a dentry. I have no idea why but that's what inode->i_op->getxattr() requires.

The original reason that the xattr operations take dentries is because of p9fs and CIFS. CIFS uses the name of the file to grab the extended attributes and so does p9fs. I had tried to remove this a while ago but couldn't find a way around that.

Both CIFS and FUSE are NFS-exportable, so both allow lookup by filehandle, so neither can count on getting a filename at this point.

So, out of curiosity, do we know what will happen when selinux asks one of them for an xattr on a DCACHE_DISCONNECTED dentry?

Quoted 4 lines

When trying to find a
solution I also got push back from Miklos (FUSE) as he views a filesystem being able to make xattr decisions based on the path name being a valid use-case.

So selinux may initialize an inode differently depending on which pathname it happened to be looked up under first?

Factoring the name into the xattr return sounds scary to me.

--b.

#9 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Quoted 9 lines · David Quigley

[snip]

Quoted 4 lines

If you have persistent xattr support we need the dentry since the xattr code requires a dentry. I have no idea why but that's what inode->i_op->getxattr() requires.

The original reason that the xattr operations take dentries is because of p9fs and CIFS. CIFS uses the name of the file to grab the extended attributes and so does p9fs. I had tried to remove this a while ago but couldn't find a way around that.

Quoted 6 lines

Both CIFS and FUSE are NFS-exportable, so both allow lookup by filehandle, so neither can count on getting a filename at this point.

So, out of curiosity, do we know what will happen when selinux asks one of them for an xattr on a DCACHE_DISCONNECTED dentry?

SELinux uses several methods to determine file labeling. In the policy filesystems such as xfs and the ext* series of filesystems are marked as fs_use_xattr. In this process the file label is pulled from the security.selinux xattr on disk. However CIFS and FUSE (and NFS but our Labeled NFS changes are trying to fix this) all have the filesystem marked as genfs. When mounting the filesystem the fs_type is looked at to determine its labeling type. Since its genfs we lookup what label was determined to be the default for that filesystem type. In NFS's current state all NFS mounts regardless of version get the uniform label of nfs_t for everything listed on an nfs mount point. We have a similar situation for cifs and fuse. So in this case SELinux should not be asking for the security.selinux xattr from these file systems. However if a getxattr call to the security.selinux xattr is made on these filesystems it will still work I might be wrong but my understanding is just the a dentry in the DCACHE_DISCONNECTED state is not negative but just isn't in the tree anymore. So looking at vfs_getxattr I had made some modifications a while back to it. Assuming we have permissions to access the file determined by xattr_permission and security_inode_getxattr we check to see if it is in the security namespace. If it is in the security namespace we call xattr_getsecurity which will attempt to get the security label from the inode first (security_inode_getsecurity). Because the convention is to call d_instantiate on inode create this should always work assuming an LSM is loaded. If it fails and we don't have an lsm loaded we fall back to checking the getxattr i_op and if that doesn't exist we fail with EOPNOTSUPP. That is what should happen on the getxattr call. I don't know if something is happening higher up that makes it so we never get to vfs_getxattr in the event that the dentry is in the DCACHE_DISCONNECTED state. If the DENTRY is disconnected though I'm not sure how getxattr from userspace would be able to have access to it except through a different name in the namespace.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines

When trying to find a
solution I also got push back from Miklos (FUSE) as he views a filesystem being able to make xattr decisions based on the path name being a valid use-case.

So selinux may initialize an inode differently depending on which pathname it happened to be looked up under first?

Factoring the name into the xattr return sounds scary to me.

The only current use of determining file label from path name is the situation that Eric Paris described with proc. I personally don't agree with miklos that the path to the xattr should make it return different information (unless im understanding him wrong). However the same thing is at work for CIFS as it exposes the windows alternate file streams which are accessed by adding the stream name to the end of the filename with a separator which I can't remember at the moment. If it was the situation that two fuse files shared the same inode and the security.selinux xattr was filled differently if it was accessed via /fuse/foo and /fuse/bar then yes the situation you described might happen. Normally this isn't a problem because file systems don't take the path into account so a hardlink to the same inode will still obtain the same security label. In reality the xattr is a piece of inode metadata and not a piece of dentry metadata.

Quoted 2 lines

--b.

#10 lore raw
Quoted 18 lines · Dave Quigley
Quoted 10 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Quoted 9 lines · David Quigley

[snip]

Quoted 4 lines

If you have persistent xattr support we need the dentry since the xattr code requires a dentry. I have no idea why but that's what inode->i_op->getxattr() requires.

The original reason that the xattr operations take dentries is because of p9fs and CIFS. CIFS uses the name of the file to grab the extended attributes and so does p9fs. I had tried to remove this a while ago but couldn't find a way around that.

Quoted 6 lines

Both CIFS and FUSE are NFS-exportable, so both allow lookup by filehandle, so neither can count on getting a filename at this point.

So, out of curiosity, do we know what will happen when selinux asks one of them for an xattr on a DCACHE_DISCONNECTED dentry?

Quoted 6 lines

SELinux uses several methods to determine file labeling. In the policy filesystems such as xfs and the ext* series of filesystems are marked as fs_use_xattr. In this process the file label is pulled from the security.selinux xattr on disk. However CIFS and FUSE (and NFS but our Labeled NFS changes are trying to fix this) all have the filesystem marked as genfs.

OK, fair enough. It seems a little fragile to me, but it sounds like that works....

Quoted 4 lines

When mounting the filesystem the fs_type
is looked at to determine its labeling type. Since its genfs we lookup what label was determined to be the default for that filesystem type. In NFS's current state all NFS mounts regardless of

Quoted 8 lines

version get the uniform label of nfs_t for everything listed on an nfs mount point. We have a similar situation for cifs and fuse. So in this case SELinux should not be asking for the security.selinux xattr from these file systems. However if a getxattr call to the security.selinux xattr is made on these filesystems it will still work I might be wrong but my understanding is just the a dentry in the DCACHE_DISCONNECTED state is not negative but just isn't in the tree anymore.

More like "yet" than "anymore"; we've looked up the inode by inode number (or something similar), not by name, so the dentry in this case ends up having a name "" and parent itself (like a root dentry).

--b.

Quoted 47 lines

So looking at vfs_getxattr I had made some
modifications a while back to it. Assuming we have permissions to access the file determined by xattr_permission and security_inode_getxattr we check to see if it is in the security namespace. If it is in the security namespace we call xattr_getsecurity which will attempt to get the security label from the inode first (security_inode_getsecurity). Because the convention is to call d_instantiate on inode create this should always work assuming an LSM is loaded. If it fails and we don't have an lsm loaded we fall back to checking the getxattr i_op and if that doesn't exist we fail with EOPNOTSUPP. That is what should happen on the getxattr call. I don't know if something is happening higher up that makes it so we never get to vfs_getxattr in the event that the dentry is in the DCACHE_DISCONNECTED state. If the DENTRY is disconnected though I'm not sure how getxattr from userspace would be able to have access to it except through a different name in the namespace.

Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines

When trying to find a
solution I also got push back from Miklos (FUSE) as he views a filesystem being able to make xattr decisions based on the path name being a valid use-case.

So selinux may initialize an inode differently depending on which pathname it happened to be looked up under first?

Factoring the name into the xattr return sounds scary to me.

The only current use of determining file label from path name is the situation that Eric Paris described with proc. I personally don't agree with miklos that the path to the xattr should make it return different information (unless im understanding him wrong). However the same thing is at work for CIFS as it exposes the windows alternate file streams which are accessed by adding the stream name to the end of the filename with a separator which I can't remember at the moment. If it was the situation that two fuse files shared the same inode and the security.selinux xattr was filled differently if it was accessed via /fuse/foo and /fuse/bar then yes the situation you described might happen. Normally this isn't a problem because file systems don't take the path into account so a hardlink to the same inode will still obtain the same security label. In reality the xattr is a piece of inode metadata and not a piece of dentry metadata.

Quoted 2 lines

--b.

#11 lore raw
In reply to Josef Bacik
Quoted 48 lines · Josef Bacik
Quoted 38 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Quoted 5 lines · Josef Bacik

While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting -EACCESS for no apparent reason. Eric Paris and printk() helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denial

Quoted 8 lines

type=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied { 0x800000 } for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=file

Turns out this is because in d_obtain_alias if we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do the security_d_instantiate. With this patch I'm no longer seeing these errant -EACCESS return values. Thanks,

Possibly dumb question: Is there still a small race here? Is it possible for another nfsd thread to find the new alias on the list while this thread is still:

Quoted 11 lines
---
 fs/dcache.c |    1 +
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/dcache.c +0 -0
index 23702a9..890a59e 100644

fs/dcache.c struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode) · line 1203

Quoted 3 lines
fs/dcache.c +0 -0
@@ -1201,6 +1201,7 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)
 	spin_unlock(&tmp->d_lock);
 
 	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);

... right here, so that that other nfsd thread still ends up trying to do something with a dentry that hasn't had security_d_instantiate called on it yet?

Quoted 8 lines

fs/dcache.c struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode) · line 1207

Quoted 5 lines
fs/dcache.c +1 -0
+	security_d_instantiate(tmp, inode);
 	return tmp;
 
  out_iput:

Or does something else prevent that?

Quoted 5 lines

That's a good question, I have no idea actually. Every other consumer of security_d_instantiate seems to hold the i_mutex of the parent directory inode, tho I'm not sure if that is appropriate for d_obtain_alias, maybe somebody else has an idea? Thanks,

I'd like some input from the SELinux guys on this, talking with Bruce we can't really figure out a good way to deal with this. If we're using the parent inode->i_mutex to guard the security initalization stuff we're screwed when it comes to this case, since we have no way to know who the parent is at this point in time. Any suggestions? Thanks,

Josef