kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users
Subsystems (7)
PATCH 1/1 kptr_restrict for hiding kernel pointers from unprivileged users
The below patch adds the %pK format specifier, the CONFIG_SECURITY_KPTR_RESTRICT configuration option, and the kptr_restrict sysctl.
The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers from unprivileged users, specifically via /proc interfaces. Its behavior depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl, whose default value depends on CONFIG_SECURITY_KPTR_RESTRICT. If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior occurs. If kptr_restrict is set to 1, if the current user (intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG (which is currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's. This was chosen over the default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects "(nil)".
---Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 14 ++++++++++++++
include/linux/kernel.h | 2 ++ kernel/sysctl.c | 9 +++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ security/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +14 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel: - hotplug - java-appletviewer [ binfmt_java, obsolete ] - java-interpreter [ binfmt_java, obsolete ] +- kptr_restrict - kstack_depth_to_print [ X86 only ] - l2cr [ PPC only ] - modprobe ==> Documentation/debugging-modules.txt
@@ -261,6 +262,19 @@ This flag controls the L2 cache of G3 processor boards. If ============================================================== +kptr_restrict: + +This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented from reading +kernel addresses via /proc and other interfaces. When kptr_restrict is set +to (0), there are no restrictions. When kptr_restrict is set to (1), kernel +pointers printed using the %pK format specifier will be replaced with 0's +unless the user has CAP_SYSLOG. + +The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_KPTR_RESTRICT sets the default +value of kptr_restrict. + +============================================================== + kstack_depth_to_print: (X86 only) Controls the number of words to print when dumping the raw
include/linux/kernel.h +2 -0
@@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ extern int sscanf(const char *, const char *, ...)extern int vsscanf (const char *,const char *,va_list ) __attribute__ ((format (scanf,2 ,0 ))); +extern int kptr_restrict;/* for sysctl */ +extern int get_option (char **str,int *pint);extern char *get_options (const char *str,int nints,int *ints);extern unsigned long long memparse (const char *ptr,char **retptr);
kernel/sysctl.c +9 -0
@@ -713,6 +713,15 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { },#endif { + .procname = "kptr_restrict", + .data = &kptr_restrict, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &one, + }, + { .procname = "ngroups_max", .data = &ngroups_max, .maxlen = sizeof (int),
lib/vsprintf.c +18 -0
@@ -936,6 +936,8 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr,return string (buf, end, uuid, spec); } +int kptr_restrict =CONFIG_SECURITY_KPTR_RESTRICT ; +/* * Show a '%p' thing. A kernel extension is that the '%p' is followed * by an extra set of alphanumeric characters that are extended format
@@ -979,6 +981,7 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr,* Implements a "recursive vsnprintf". * Do not use this feature without some mechanism to verify the * correctness of the format string and va_list arguments. +* - 'K' For a kernel pointer that should be hidden from unprivileged users * * Note: The difference between 'S' and 'F' is that on ia64 and ppc64 * function pointers are really function descriptors, which contain a
@@ -1035,6 +1038,21 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,return buf +vsnprintf (buf, end - buf, ((struct va_format *)ptr)->fmt, *(((struct va_format *)ptr)->va)); +case 'K' : +if (kptr_restrict) { +if (in_interrupt ()) +WARN (1 ,"%%pK used in interrupt context.\n" ); + +else if (capable (CAP_SYSLOG )) +break ; + +if (spec.field_width ==-1 ) { + spec.field_width =2 *sizeof (void *); + spec.flags |=ZEROPAD ; + } +return number (buf, end,0 , spec); + } +break ; } spec.flags |=SMALL ;if (spec.field_width ==-1 ) {
security/Kconfig +12 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,18 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config SECURITY_KPTR_RESTRICT + bool "Hide kernel pointers from unprivileged users" + default n + help + This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading kernel + addresses via various interfaces, e.g. /proc. + + If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced + unless the kptr_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + config SECURITY bool "Enable different security models" depends on SYSFS
Quoted 4 lines · Dan Rosenberg
The below patch adds the %pK format specifier, the
CONFIG_SECURITY_KPTR_RESTRICTconfiguration option, and thekptr_restrictsysctl.
Quoted 11 lines
The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers from unprivileged users, specifically via /proc interfaces. Its behavior depends on the
kptr_restrictsysctl, whose default value depends onCONFIG_SECURITY_KPTR_RESTRICT. Ifkptr_restrictis set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior occurs. Ifkptr_restrictis set to 1, if the current user (intended to be a reader viaseq_printf(), etc.) does not haveCAP_SYSLOG(which is currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's. This was chosen over the default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects "(nil)".
Thanks for not giving credits to people suggesting this idea to you (Thomas if I remember well), and not Ccing netdev where original discussion took place.
Quoted 8 lines
Signed-off-by Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>---
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt| 14 ++++++++++++++include/linux/kernel.h | 2 ++ kernel/sysctl.c | 9 +++++++++ lib/vsprintf.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ security/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
...
Quoted 22 lines
lib/vsprintf.c +3
-0@@ -936,6 +936,8 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr,return string (buf, end, uuid, spec); } +int kptr_restrict =CONFIG_SECURITY_KPTR_RESTRICT ; +/* * Show a '%p' thing. A kernel extension is that the '%p' is followed * by an extra set of alphanumeric characters that are extended format @@ -979,6 +981,7 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr,* Implements a "recursive vsnprintf". * Do not use this feature without some mechanism to verify the * correctness of the format string and va_list arguments. +* - 'K' For a kernel pointer that should be hidden from unprivileged users * * Note: The difference between 'S' and 'F' is that on ia64 and ppc64 * function pointers are really function descriptors, which contain a
lib/vsprintf.c char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, · line 1044
Quoted 7 lines
lib/vsprintf.c +4
-0@@ -1035,6 +1038,21 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,return buf +vsnprintf (buf, end - buf, ((struct va_format *)ptr)->fmt, *(((struct va_format *)ptr)->va)); +case 'K' : +if (kptr_restrict) { +if (in_interrupt ()) +WARN (1 ,"%%pK used in interrupt context.\n" );
So caller can not block BH ?
This seems wrong to me, please consider :
normal process context :
spin_lock_bh() ...
for (...)
{xxx}printf( ... "%pK" ...)spin_unlock_bh();
Quoted 38 lines
lib/vsprintf.c +11
-0+ +else if (capable (CAP_SYSLOG )) +break ; + +if (spec.field_width ==-1 ) { + spec.field_width =2 *sizeof (void *); + spec.flags |=ZEROPAD ; + } +return number (buf, end,0 , spec); + } +break ; } spec.flags |=SMALL ;if (spec.field_width ==-1 ) {security/Kconfig +12
-0@@ -51,6 +51,18 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config SECURITY_KPTR_RESTRICT + bool "Hide kernel pointers from unprivileged users" + default n + help + This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading kernel + addresses via various interfaces, e.g. /proc. + + If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced + unless the kptr_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + config SECURITY bool "Enable different security models" depends on SYSFS
Quoted 3 lines · Eric Dumazet
Thanks for not giving credits to people suggesting this idea to you (Thomas if I remember well), and not Ccing netdev where original discussion took place.
Yes, credits should be given to Thomas Graf
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg146606.html
Thanks
Quoted 6 lines
Thanks for not giving credits to people suggesting this idea to you (Thomas if I remember well), and not Ccing netdev where original discussion took place.
I am happy to credit Thomas, even though he is far from the first person to have suggested this approach to me. Thanks for the suggestion.
Quoted 5 lines
So caller can not block BH ?
This seems wrong to me, please consider :
Quoted 9 lines
normal process context :
spin_lock_bh()...for (...)
{xxx}printf( ... "%pK" ...)
spin_unlock_bh();
I will think about this and address it.
-Dan
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
So caller can not block BH ?
This seems wrong to me, please consider :
normal process context :
spin_lock_bh()...
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
for (...)
{xxx}printf( ... "%pK" ...)
spin_unlock_bh();I will think about this and address it.
Would you be happier if I omitted the in_interrupt() check entirely?
-Dan
Quoted 11 lines · Dan Rosenberg
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
So caller can not block BH ?
This seems wrong to me, please consider :
normal process context :
spin_lock_bh()...for (...)
{xxx}printf( ... "%pK" ...)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
spin_unlock_bh();I will think about this and address it.
Would you be happier if I omitted the
in_interrupt()check entirely?
Well, it seems difficult to make a check here, its a generic function that happens to be used from different contexts.
Even using in_irq() might be a problem.
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Quoted 6 lines
Well, it seems difficult to make a check here, its a generic function that happens to be used from different contexts.
Even using
in_irq()might be a problem.
I agree it seems difficult - my only goal was to prevent subsequent breakage with the capability check. Does anyone have any suggestions for a better approach here?
-Dan
Quoted 8 lines · Eric Dumazet
lib/vsprintf.c char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, · line 1044
Quoted 3 lines
lib/vsprintf.c +3
-0+if (kptr_restrict) { +if (in_interrupt ()) +WARN (1 ,"%%pK used in interrupt context.\n" );So caller can not block BH ?
This seems wrong to me, please consider :
Quoted 8 lines
normal process context :
spin_lock_bh()...for (...)
{xxx}printf( ... "%pK" ...)
spin_unlock_bh();
That's a bug in in_interrupt(), one I've been pointing out for a long while. Luckily we recently grew the infrastructure to deal with it.
If you write it as: if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) you'll not trigger for the above example.
Ideally in_serving_softirq() wouldn't exist and in_softirq() would do what in_server_softirq() does -- which would make it symmetric with the hardirq functions -- but nobody has found time to audit all in_softirq() users.