fs: call security_d_instantiate in d_obtain_alias V2
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 fs: call security_d_instantiate in d_obtain_alias V2
While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting -EACCESS for no apparent reason. Eric Paris and printk() helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denial
type=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied { 0x800000 } for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=file
Turns out this is because in d_obtain_alias if we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do the security_d_instantiate.
Usually we are protected from getting a hashed dentry that hasn't yet run security_d_instantiate() by the parent's i_mutex, but obviously this isn't an option there, so in order to deal with the case that a second thread comes in and finds our new dentry before we get to run security_d_instantiate(), we go ahead and call it if we find a dentry already. Eric assures me that this is ok as the code checks to see if the dentry has been initialized already so calling security_d_instantiate() against the same dentry multiple times is ok. With this patch I'm no longer getting errant -EACCESS values.
---V1->V2:
-added second security_d_instantiate() call
fs/dcache.c | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/dcache.c +3 -0
@@ -1201,9 +1201,12 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)spin_unlock (&tmp->d_lock);spin_unlock (&dcache_lock); +security_d_instantiate (tmp, inode);return tmp; out_iput: +if (res && !IS_ERR (res)) +security_d_instantiate (res, inode);iput (inode);return res; }
Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
Quoted 13 lines · Josef Bacik
While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting
-EACCESSfor no apparent reason. Eric Paris andprintk()helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denialtype=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied {
0x800000} for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=fileTurns out this is because in
d_obtain_aliasif we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do thesecurity_d_instantiate.
Quoted 8 lines
Usually we are protected from getting a hashed dentry that hasn't yet run
security_d_instantiate()by the parent'si_mutex, but obviously this isn't an option there, so in order to deal with the case that a second thread comes in and finds our new dentry before we get to runsecurity_d_instantiate(), we go ahead and call it if we find a dentry already. Eric assures me that this is ok as the code checks to see if the dentry has been initialized already so callingsecurity_d_instantiate()against the same dentry multiple times is ok. With this patch I'm no longer getting errant-EACCESSvalues.
Thanks, I can't see any reason that wouldn't work.
--b.
Quoted 29 lines
Signed-off-by Josef Bacik <[email protected]>---
V1->V2:(quoted diff) +0
-1-added second security_d_instantiate() call fs/dcache.c | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)fs/dcache.c +3
-0@@ -1201,9 +1201,12 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)spin_unlock (&tmp->d_lock);spin_unlock (&dcache_lock); +security_d_instantiate (tmp, inode);return tmp; out_iput: +if (res && !IS_ERR (res)) +security_d_instantiate (res, inode);iput (inode);return res; }Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
Quoted 23 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Quoted 13 lines · Josef Bacik
While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting
-EACCESSfor no apparent reason. Eric Paris andprintk()helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denialtype=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied {
0x800000} for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=fileTurns out this is because in
d_obtain_aliasif we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do thesecurity_d_instantiate.Quoted 8 lines
Usually we are protected from getting a hashed dentry that hasn't yet run
security_d_instantiate()by the parent'si_mutex, but obviously this isn't an option there, so in order to deal with the case that a second thread comes in and finds our new dentry before we get to runsecurity_d_instantiate(), we go ahead and call it if we find a dentry already. Eric assures me that this is ok as the code checks to see if the dentry has been initialized already so callingsecurity_d_instantiate()against the same dentry multiple times is ok. With this patch I'm no longer getting errant-EACCESSvalues.
Quoted 1 line
Thanks, I can't see any reason that wouldn't work.
(FWIW, I also ran my usual nfs regression tests with this applied. They don't exercise the problem you were seeing, but maybe it's at least some sort of sanity check.)
--b.
Quoted 36 lines
--b.
Quoted 29 lines
Signed-off-by Josef Bacik <[email protected]>---
V1->V2:(quoted diff) +0
-1-added second security_d_instantiate() call fs/dcache.c | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)fs/dcache.c +3
-0@@ -1201,9 +1201,12 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)spin_unlock (&tmp->d_lock);spin_unlock (&dcache_lock); +security_d_instantiate (tmp, inode);return tmp; out_iput: +if (res && !IS_ERR (res)) +security_d_instantiate (res, inode);iput (inode);return res; }Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1--
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Quoted 24 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Quoted 23 lines · J. Bruce Fields
Quoted 21 lines · Josef Bacik
While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting
-EACCESSfor no apparent reason. Eric Paris andprintk()helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denialtype=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied {
0x800000} for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=fileTurns out this is because in
d_obtain_aliasif we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do thesecurity_d_instantiate.Usually we are protected from getting a hashed dentry that hasn't yet run
security_d_instantiate()by the parent'si_mutex, but obviously this isn't an option there, so in order to deal with the case that a second thread comes in and finds our new dentry before we get to runsecurity_d_instantiate(), we go ahead and call it if we find a dentry already. Eric assures me that this is ok as the code checks to see if the dentry has been initialized already so callingsecurity_d_instantiate()against the same dentry multiple times is ok. With this patch I'm no longer getting errant-EACCESSvalues.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Thanks, I can't see any reason that wouldn't work.
(FWIW, I also ran my usual nfs regression tests with this applied. They don't exercise the problem you were seeing, but maybe it's at least some sort of sanity check.)
Oh I should have mentioned the testing I gave it. With BTRFS I could regularly reproduce this by doing the following
SERVER
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/btrfs
btrfs subvol create /mnt/btrfs/foo
cp mutt.tar.gz /mnt/btrfs/foo
CLIENT
mount server:/mnt/btrfs /mnt/test
cd /mnt/test/foo
tar xzvf mutt.tar.gz
cd mutt
ls
SERVER
echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
CLIENT
ls
and bam I'd get -EACCESS every time. I did this a bunch of times to make sure it didn't happen anymore plus variations of the above. Thanks,
Josef
Quoted 50 lines · Josef Bacik
While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting
-EACCESSfor no apparent reason. Eric Paris andprintk()helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denialtype=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied {
0x800000} for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=fileTurns out this is because in
d_obtain_aliasif we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do thesecurity_d_instantiate.Usually we are protected from getting a hashed dentry that hasn't yet run
security_d_instantiate()by the parent'si_mutex, but obviously this isn't an option there, so in order to deal with the case that a second thread comes in and finds our new dentry before we get to runsecurity_d_instantiate(), we go ahead and call it if we find a dentry already. Eric assures me that this is ok as the code checks to see if the dentry has been initialized already so callingsecurity_d_instantiate()against the same dentry multiple times is ok. With this patch I'm no longer getting errant-EACCESSvalues.Signed-off-by Josef Bacik <[email protected]>---
V1->V2:(quoted diff) +0
-1-added second security_d_instantiate() call fs/dcache.c | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)fs/dcache.c +3
-0@@ -1201,9 +1201,12 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)spin_unlock (&tmp->d_lock);spin_unlock (&dcache_lock); +security_d_instantiate (tmp, inode);return tmp; out_iput: +if (res && !IS_ERR (res)) +security_d_instantiate (res, inode);iput (inode);return res; }Signature · 1 line
1.6.6.1
Hey Al,
I forgot to cc you directly, is this ok with you, and if it is would you mind picking it up? Thanks,
Josef
Quoted 22 lines · Josef Bacik
While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting
-EACCESSfor no apparent reason. Eric Paris andprintk()helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denialtype=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied {
0x800000} for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=fileTurns out this is because in
d_obtain_aliasif we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do thesecurity_d_instantiate.Usually we are protected from getting a hashed dentry that hasn't yet run
security_d_instantiate()by the parent'si_mutex, but obviously this isn't an option there, so in order to deal with the case that a second thread comes in and finds our new dentry before we get to runsecurity_d_instantiate(), we go ahead and call it if we find a dentry already. Eric assures me that this is ok as the code checks to see if the dentry has been initialized already so callingsecurity_d_instantiate()against the same dentry multiple times is ok. With this patch I'm no longer getting errant-EACCESSvalues.
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Thanks, this fixes xfsdump too, see also:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=662344
Bug 662344 - broken SELinux AVCs on XFS partition when running xfsdump
(xfsdump uses the open by handle library from xfsprogs)
-Eric
Quoted 24 lines
---
V1->V2:(quoted diff) +0
-1-added second security_d_instantiate() call fs/dcache.c | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)fs/dcache.c +3
-0@@ -1201,9 +1201,12 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)spin_unlock (&tmp->d_lock);spin_unlock (&dcache_lock); +security_d_instantiate (tmp, inode);return tmp; out_iput: +if (res && !IS_ERR (res)) +security_d_instantiate (res, inode);iput (inode);return res; }
Quoted 22 lines · Josef Bacik
While trying to track down some NFS problems with BTRFS, I kept noticing I was getting
-EACCESSfor no apparent reason. Eric Paris andprintk()helped me figure out that it was SELinux that was giving me grief, with the following denialtype=AVC msg=audit(1290013638.413:95): avc: denied {
0x800000} for pid=1772 comm="nfsd" name="" dev=sda1 ino=256 scontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=fileTurns out this is because in
d_obtain_aliasif we can't find an alias we create one and do all the normal instantiation stuff, but we don't do thesecurity_d_instantiate.Usually we are protected from getting a hashed dentry that hasn't yet run
security_d_instantiate()by the parent'si_mutex, but obviously this isn't an option there, so in order to deal with the case that a second thread comes in and finds our new dentry before we get to runsecurity_d_instantiate(), we go ahead and call it if we find a dentry already. Eric assures me that this is ok as the code checks to see if the dentry has been initialized already so callingsecurity_d_instantiate()against the same dentry multiple times is ok. With this patch I'm no longer getting errant-EACCESSvalues.
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
Al, any chance we can push this along?
-Eric
Quoted 24 lines
---
V1->V2:(quoted diff) +0
-1-added second security_d_instantiate() call fs/dcache.c | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)fs/dcache.c +3
-0@@ -1201,9 +1201,12 @@ struct dentry *d_obtain_alias(struct inode *inode)spin_unlock (&tmp->d_lock);spin_unlock (&dcache_lock); +security_d_instantiate (tmp, inode);return tmp; out_iput: +if (res && !IS_ERR (res)) +security_d_instantiate (res, inode);iput (inode);return res; }