capabilites: allow the application of capability limits to usermode helpers
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 capabilites: allow the application of capability limits to usermode helpers
There is no way to limit the capabilities of usermodehelpers. This problem reared its head recently when someone complained that any user with cap_net_admin was able to load arbitrary kernel modules, even though the user didn't have cap_sys_module. The reason is because the actual load is done by a usermode helper and those always have the full cap set. This patch addes new sysctls which allow us to bound the permissions of usermode helpers.
/proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/bset/proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/inheritable
You must have CAP_SYS_MODULE to change these (changes are &= ONLY). When the kernel launches a usermodehelper it will do so with these as the bset and pI.
-v2: make globals static
create spinlock to protect globals
No-objection-from: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/kmod.h | 3 ++ kernel/kmod.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 6 +++ 3 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
include/linux/kmod.h +3 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@#include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/compiler.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> +#include <linux/sysctl.h> #define KMOD_PATH_LEN 256
@@ -109,6 +110,8 @@ call_usermodehelper(char *path, char **argv, char **envp, enum umh_wait wait) NULL, NULL, NULL); } +extern struct ctl_table usermodehelper_table[]; +extern void usermodehelper_init (void );extern int usermodehelper_disable (void );
kernel/kmod.c +99 -0
129 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/sysctl.c +6 -0
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@#include <linux/kprobes.h> #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h> #include <linux/oom.h> +#include <linux/kmod.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -610,6 +611,11 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .child = random_table, }, { + .procname = "usermodehelper", + .mode = 0555, + .child = usermodehelper_table, + }, + { .procname = "overflowuid", .data = &overflowuid, .maxlen = sizeof(int),
Eric,
Quoted 4 lines · Eric Paris
someone complained that any user with
cap_net_adminwas able to load arbitrary kernel modules, even though the user didn't havecap_sys_module. The reason is because the actual load is done by a usermode helper and those always have the full cap set.
AFAIU, your patch sets system-wide caps for _all_ usermode helpers, right? Then it does nothing with cap_net_admin's problem as it should restrict caps of specific helpers spawned from specific networking code, but not touching anything related to another helpers.
Quoted 8 lines
sysctls which allow us to bound the permissions of usermode helpers.
/proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/bset/proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/inheritableYou must have
CAP_SYS_MODULEto change these (changes are &= ONLY). When the kernel launches a usermodehelper it will do so with these as the bset and pI.
Thanks,
Signature · 1 line
Vasiliy
Quoted 8 lines · Vasiliy Kulikov
Eric,
Quoted 4 lines · Eric Paris
someone complained that any user with
cap_net_adminwas able to load arbitrary kernel modules, even though the user didn't havecap_sys_module. The reason is because the actual load is done by a usermode helper and those always have the full cap set.
Quoted 4 lines
AFAIU, your patch sets system-wide caps for _all_ usermode helpers, right? Then it does nothing with cap_net_admin's problem as it should restrict caps of specific helpers spawned from specific networking code, but not touching anything related to another helpers.
I'm actually solving 2 problems at once and it just so happens the the CAP_NET_ADMIN brew-ha-ha came up more recently. The original problem, and reason I wrote this patch, is because it's impossible on a modern Linux system to permanently and irrevocably drop capabilities system wide. You can get very close by dropping capabilities from the bset before init is launched which means everything launched by userspace can't have the dropped capabilities. But, khelper is still going to have the full set and thus usermodehelpers launched by the kernel will have the full set. This patch allows one to control usermode helpers. How one chooses to use that, is up to them.
-Eric
Quoted 14 lines · Eric Paris
There is no way to limit the capabilities of usermodehelpers. This problem reared its head recently when someone complained that any user with
cap_net_adminwas able to load arbitrary kernel modules, even though the user didn't havecap_sys_module. The reason is because the actual load is done by a usermode helper and those always have the full cap set. This patch addes new sysctls which allow us to bound the permissions of usermode helpers.
/proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/bset/proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/inheritableYou must have
CAP_SYS_MODULEto change these (changes are &= ONLY). When the kernel launches a usermodehelper it will do so with these as the bset and pI.
Quoted 5 lines
-v2: make globals static
create spinlock to protect globalsSigned-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>No-objection-from: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Quoted 9 lines · Eric Paris
There is no way to limit the capabilities of usermodehelpers. This problem reared its head recently when someone complained that any user with
cap_net_adminwas able to load arbitrary kernel modules, even though the user didn't havecap_sys_module. The reason is because the actual load is done by a usermode helper and those always have the full cap set. This patch addes new sysctls which allow us to bound the permissions of usermode helpers.
/proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/bset/proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/inheritable
Shouldn't these be documented somewhere? Documentation/ABI?
Quoted 1 line
You must have
CAP_SYS_MODULEto change these (changes are &= ONLY).
Why that permission? Just because 'modprobe' is usually run from this callback? Or some other reason?
Quoted 2 lines
When the kernel launches a usermodehelper it will do so with these as the bset and pI.
Shouldn't the caller of these functions be the ones dictating the capabilities it should be run with?
thanks,
greg k-h
Quoted 8 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 7 lines · Eric Paris
There is no way to limit the capabilities of usermodehelpers. This problem reared its head recently when someone complained that any user with
cap_net_adminwas able to load arbitrary kernel modules, even though the user didn't havecap_sys_module. The reason is because the actual load is done by a usermode helper and those always have the full cap set. This patch addes new sysctls which allow us to bound the permissions of usermode helpers.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
/proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/bset/proc/sys/kernel/usermodehelper/inheritableShouldn't these be documented somewhere?
Documentation/ABI?
Yes, they should. Will do.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
You must have
CAP_SYS_MODULEto change these (changes are &= ONLY).Why that permission? Just because 'modprobe' is usually run from this callback? Or some other reason?
I don't have a good answer for this. I was originally looking at this thinking about modprobe. Since it's a purely restrictive interface I probably don't need something quite so strong. I'm trying to decide what the implications are of usemode helpers being forced to run with reduced permissions. Andrew, do you have thoughts?
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
When the kernel launches a usermodehelper it will do so with these as the bset and pI.
Shouldn't the caller of these functions be the ones dictating the capabilities it should be run with?
Yes. And no. It depends what you mean. The caps of the 'caller' task are irrelevant. If I run ifconfig ipv6 I need CAP_NET_ADMIN but the upcall needs CAP_SYS_MODULE. If I plug in a USB drive there is no 'caller' task which makes sense.
Now if by 'caller' you mean 'call site' then yes, we could probably launch usermodehelpers with reduced privileged sets. We know in the code when we are asking to launch modprobe that we are going to need CAP_SYS_MODULE and don't need caps like CAP_SYS_RAWIO and CAP_MAC_ADMIN. We know when we upcall to hotplug we don't really need any priv, since it's another task that is going to do the real work. So yeah, there might be some value in another patch to address this....
But neither solves the problem of being able to eliminate capabilities from a machine globally. In olden times we had a global cap-bound but it was dropped in favor of an inheritance from init type mechanism. Since kthreads don't inherit from init we still end up with this patch.
Quoted 12 lines · Eric Paris
Quoted 5 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 2 lines
When the kernel launches a usermodehelper it will do so with these as the bset and pI.
Shouldn't the caller of these functions be the ones dictating the capabilities it should be run with?
Yes. And no. It depends what you mean. The caps of the 'caller' task are irrelevant. If I run ifconfig ipv6 I need
CAP_NET_ADMINbut the upcall needsCAP_SYS_MODULE. If I plug in a USB drive there is no 'caller' task which makes sense.
Quoted 7 lines
Now if by 'caller' you mean 'call site' then yes, we could probably launch usermodehelpers with reduced privileged sets. We know in the code when we are asking to launch modprobe that we are going to need
CAP_SYS_MODULEand don't need caps likeCAP_SYS_RAWIOandCAP_MAC_ADMIN. We know when we upcall to hotplug we don't really need any priv, since it's another task that is going to do the real work. So yeah, there might be some value in another patch to address this....
Yes, that is what I was referring to.
Quoted 4 lines
But neither solves the problem of being able to eliminate capabilities from a machine globally. In olden times we had a global cap-bound but it was dropped in favor of an inheritance from init type mechanism. Since kthreads don't inherit from init we still end up with this patch.
I'm not objecting to the patch, or the idea, just want to make sure it is correct.
thanks,
greg k-h
I'd prefer it if the invoker had both CAP_SETPCAP and CAP_SYS_MODULE in its pE set.
Also, have you considered an interface for setting the default values that is something like a "clone mine"? That is, cache the invoker's cap_inheritable, and cap_bound? (But not cap_permitted and cap_effective!) This would take care of atomicity and also allow for potentially including more state when folk find its logically necessary as the kernel evolves.
Cheers
Andrew
Quoted 35 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 12 lines · Eric Paris
Quoted 5 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 2 lines
When the kernel launches a usermodehelper it will do so with these as the bset and pI.
Shouldn't the caller of these functions be the ones dictating the capabilities it should be run with?
Yes. And no. It depends what you mean. The caps of the 'caller' task are irrelevant. If I run ifconfig ipv6 I need
CAP_NET_ADMINbut the upcall needsCAP_SYS_MODULE. If I plug in a USB drive there is no 'caller' task which makes sense.Quoted 7 lines
Now if by 'caller' you mean 'call site' then yes, we could probably launch usermodehelpers with reduced privileged sets. We know in the code when we are asking to launch modprobe that we are going to need
CAP_SYS_MODULEand don't need caps likeCAP_SYS_RAWIOandCAP_MAC_ADMIN. We know when we upcall to hotplug we don't really need any priv, since it's another task that is going to do the real work. So yeah, there might be some value in another patch to address this....Yes, that is what I was referring to.
Quoted 4 lines
But neither solves the problem of being able to eliminate capabilities from a machine globally. In olden times we had a global cap-bound but it was dropped in favor of an inheritance from init type mechanism. Since kthreads don't inherit from init we still end up with this patch.
I'm not objecting to the patch, or the idea, just want to make sure it is correct.
thanks,
greg k-h