EVM
Subsystems (6)
v4 cover EVM
Extended Verification Module(EVM) detects offline tampering of the security extended attributes (e.g. security.selinux, security.SMACK64, security.ima), which is the basis for LSM permission decisions and, with the IMA-appraisal patchset, integrity appraisal decisions. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method to detect offline tampering of the security extended attributes. The initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 across a set of security extended attributes, storing the HMAC as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. To verify the integrity of an extended attribute, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(), which re-calculates the HMAC and compares it with the version stored in 'security.evm'. Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures).
While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately (eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper:
http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf.
Much appreciation to Dave Hansen, Serge Hallyn, and Matt Helsley for reviewing the original patches.
Mimi Zohar
David Safford
Dmitry Kasatkin (2):
evm: add support for different security.evm data types
evm: crypto hash replaced by shash
Mimi Zohar (9):
integrity: move ima inode integrity data management
xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp
evm: re-release
ima: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
security: imbed evm calls in security hooks
evm: inode post removexattr
evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr
evm: inode_post_init
fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls
Documentation/ABI/testing/evm | 23 +++ fs/attr.c | 5 +- fs/ext2/xattr_security.c | 31 +++- fs/ext3/xattr_security.c | 30 +++- fs/ext4/xattr_security.c | 30 +++- fs/file_table.c | 2 +- fs/xattr.c | 63 +++++++- include/linux/evm.h | 82 +++++++++ include/linux/ima.h | 13 -- include/linux/integrity.h | 43 +++++ include/linux/xattr.h | 14 ++- security/Kconfig | 2 +- security/Makefile | 4 +- security/integrity/Kconfig | 7 + security/integrity/Makefile | 12 ++ security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 12 ++ security/integrity/evm/Makefile | 6 + security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 39 +++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 211 +++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 323 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 108 ++++++++++++ security/integrity/iint.c | 171 ++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 + security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 29 +--- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 7 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c | 169 ------------------ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 12 +- security/integrity/integrity.h | 38 ++++ security/security.c | 19 ++- 30 files changed, 1265 insertions(+), 243 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/evm create mode 100644 include/linux/evm.h create mode 100644 include/linux/integrity.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/integrity/Makefile create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/Makefile create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/iint.c delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/integrity.h
Signature · 1 line
1.7.3.4
PATCH v4 1/11 integrity: move ima inode integrity data management
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.
Changelog:
- Rebased on current ima_iint.c
- Define integrity_iint_store/lock as static
--- include/linux/ima.h | 13 --- include/linux/integrity.h | 30 +++++++ security/Kconfig | 2 +- security/Makefile | 4 +- security/integrity/Kconfig | 6 ++ security/integrity/Makefile | 10 ++ security/integrity/iint.c | 170 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 + security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 29 ++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 7 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c | 169 ------------------------------------ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 12 ++-- security/integrity/integrity.h | 37 ++++++++ security/security.c | 3 +- 15 files changed, 279 insertions(+), 216 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/integrity.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/integrity/Makefile create mode 100644 security/integrity/iint.c delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/integrity.h
include/linux/ima.h +0 -13
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ struct linux_binprm;#ifdef CONFIG_IMA extern int ima_bprm_check (struct linux_binprm *bprm); -extern int ima_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode); -extern void ima_inode_free (struct inode *inode);extern int ima_file_check (struct file *file,int mask);extern void ima_file_free (struct file *file);extern int ima_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long prot);
@@ -27,16 +25,6 @@ static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)return 0 ; } -static inline int ima_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode) -{ -return 0 ; -} - -static inline void ima_inode_free (struct inode *inode) -{ -return ; -} -static inline int ima_file_check (struct file *file,int mask) {return 0 ;
@@ -51,6 +39,5 @@ static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) {return 0 ; } -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_H */ #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
include/linux/integrity.h new file +30 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2009 IBM Corporation +* Author: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> +* +* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. +*/ + +#ifndef _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H +#define _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H + +#include <linux/fs.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY +extern int integrity_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode); +extern void integrity_inode_free (struct inode *inode); + +#else +static inline int integrity_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline void integrity_inode_free (struct inode *inode) +{ +return ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_H */ +#endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
security/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ source security/smack/Kconfig source security/tomoyo/Kconfig source security/apparmor/Kconfig -source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +source security/integrity/Kconfig choice prompt "Default security module"
security/Makefile +2 -2
@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o # Object integrity file lists -subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += integrity/ima -obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += integrity/ima/built-in.o +subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity +obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity/built-in.o
security/integrity/Kconfig new file +6 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +# +config INTEGRITY + def_bool y + depends on IMA + +source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
security/integrity/Makefile new file +10 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +# +# Makefile for caching inode integrity data (iint) +# + +obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o + +integrity-y := iint.o + +subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/built-in.o
security/integrity/iint.c new file +170 -0
170 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ config IMA bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)" depends on SECURITY + select INTEGRITY select SECURITYFS select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_HMAC
security/integrity/ima/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -6,4 +6,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ - ima_policy.o ima_iint.o ima_audit.o + ima_policy.o ima_audit.o
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +9 -20
@@ -24,11 +24,13 @@#include <linux/tpm.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include "../integrity.h" +enum ima_show_type {IMA_SHOW_BINARY ,IMA_SHOW_ASCII };enum tpm_pcrs {TPM_PCR0 =0 ,TPM_PCR8 =8 };/* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */ -#define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE 20 +#define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE#define IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX 255#define IMA_HASH_BITS 9
@@ -96,34 +98,21 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)return hash_long (*digest,IMA_HASH_BITS ); } -/* iint cache flags */ -#define IMA_MEASURED 0x01 - -/* integrity data associated with an inode */ -struct ima_iint_cache { -struct rb_node rb_node;/* rooted in ima_iint_tree */ -struct inode *inode;/* back pointer to inode in question */ -u64 version;/* track inode changes */ -unsigned char flags; -u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -struct mutex mutex;/* protects: version, flags, digest */ -}; -/* LIM API function definitions */ int ima_must_measure (struct inode *inode,int mask,int function); -int ima_collect_measurement (struct ima_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file); -void ima_store_measurement (struct ima_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file, +int ima_collect_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +struct file *file); +void ima_store_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file,const unsigned char *filename);int ima_store_template (struct ima_template_entry *entry,int violation,struct inode *inode); -void ima_template_show (struct seq_file *m,void *e, -enum ima_show_type show); +void ima_template_show (struct seq_file *m,void *e,enum ima_show_type show);/* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete * integrity data associated with an inode. */ -struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_insert (struct inode *inode); -struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find (struct inode *inode); +struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert (struct inode *inode); +struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find (struct inode *inode);/* IMA policy related functions */ enum ima_hooks {FILE_CHECK =1 ,FILE_MMAP ,BPRM_CHECK };
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +4 -3
@@ -126,7 +126,8 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, int function)* * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise */ -int ima_collect_measurement (struct ima_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file) +int ima_collect_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +struct file *file) {int result = -EEXIST ;
@@ -156,8 +157,8 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)* * Must be called with iint->mutex held. */ -void ima_store_measurement (struct ima_iint_cache *iint,struct file *file, -const unsigned char *filename) +void ima_store_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, +struct file *file,const unsigned char *filename) {const char *op ="add_template_measure" ;const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;
security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c deleted +0 -169
169 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +6 -6
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ out: "open_writers"); } -static void ima_check_last_writer (struct ima_iint_cache *iint, +static void ima_check_last_writer (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct inode *inode,struct file *file) {
@@ -105,12 +105,12 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache *iint,void ima_file_free (struct file *file) {struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; -struct ima_iint_cache *iint; +struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG (inode->i_mode))return ; - iint =ima_iint_find (inode); + iint =integrity_iint_find (inode);if (!iint)return ;
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, int mask, int function) {struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; -struct ima_iint_cache *iint; +struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;int rc =0 ;if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG (inode->i_mode))
@@ -131,9 +131,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,if (rc !=0 )return rc; retry: - iint =ima_iint_find (inode); + iint =integrity_iint_find (inode);if (!iint) { - rc =ima_inode_alloc (inode); + rc =integrity_inode_alloc (inode);if (!rc || rc == -EEXIST ) goto retry;return rc;
security/integrity/integrity.h new file +37 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2009-2010 IBM Corporation +* +* Authors: +* Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> +* +* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or +* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as +* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the +* License. +* +*/ + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/integrity.h> +#include <crypto/sha.h> + +#define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + +/* iint cache flags */ +#define IMA_MEASURED 0x01 + +/* integrity data associated with an inode */ +struct integrity_iint_cache { +struct rb_node rb_node;/* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */ +struct inode *inode;/* back pointer to inode in question */ +u64 version;/* track inode changes */ +unsigned char flags; +u8 digest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +struct mutex mutex;/* protects: version, flags, digest */ +}; + +/* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete +* integrity data associated with an inode. +*/ +struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_insert (struct inode *inode); +struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find (struct inode *inode);
security/security.c +2 -1
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@#include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/integrity.h> #include <linux/ima.h> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
@@ -330,7 +331,7 @@ int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)void security_inode_free (struct inode *inode) { -ima_inode_free (inode); +integrity_inode_free (inode); security_ops->inode_free_security (inode); }
Signature · 1 line
1.7.3.4
PATCH v4 2/11 xattr: define vfs_getxattr_alloc and vfs_xattr_cmp
In reply to Mimi Zoharvfs_getxattr_alloc() and vfs_xattr_cmp() are two new kernel xattr helper functions. vfs_getxattr_alloc() first allocates memory for the requested xattr and then retrieves it. vfs_xattr_cmp() compares a given value with the contents of an extended attribute.
--- fs/xattr.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/xattr.h | 5 +++- 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
fs/xattr.c +58 -0
@@ -159,6 +159,64 @@ out_noalloc: }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xattr_getsecurity); +/* +* vfs_getxattr_alloc - allocate memory, if necessary, before calling getxattr +* +* Allocate memory, if not already allocated, or re-allocate correct size, +* before retrieving the extended attribute. +* +* Returns the result of alloc, if failed, or the getxattr operation. +*/ +ssize_t +vfs_getxattr_alloc (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,char **xattr_value, +size_t xattr_size,gfp_t flags) +{ +struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; +char *value = *xattr_value; +int error; + + error =xattr_permission (inode, name,MAY_READ ); +if (error) +return error; + +if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + + error = inode->i_op->getxattr (dentry, name,NULL ,0 ); +if (error <0 ) +return error; + +if (!value || (error > xattr_size)) { + value =krealloc (*xattr_value, error +1 , flags); +if (!value) +return -ENOMEM ; +memset (value,0 , error +1 ); + } + + error = inode->i_op->getxattr (dentry, name, value, error); + *xattr_value = value; +return error; +} + +/* Compare an extended attribute value with the given value */ +int vfs_xattr_cmp (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name, +const char *value,size_t size,gfp_t flags) +{ +char *xattr_value =NULL ; +int rc; + + rc =vfs_getxattr_alloc (dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_value,0 , flags); +if (rc <0 ) +return rc; + +if ((rc != size) || (memcmp (xattr_value, value, rc) !=0 )) + rc = -EINVAL ; +else + rc =0 ; +kfree (xattr_value); +return rc; +} +ssize_t vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *value,size_t size) {
include/linux/xattr.h +4 -1
@@ -78,7 +78,10 @@ ssize_t generic_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *buffer,ssize_t generic_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *buffer,size_t buffer_size);int generic_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags);int generic_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name); - +ssize_t vfs_getxattr_alloc (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name, +char **xattr_value,size_t size,gfp_t flags); +int vfs_xattr_cmp (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name, +const char *value,size_t size,gfp_t flags);#endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _LINUX_XATTR_H */
Signature · 1 line
1.7.3.4
PATCH v4 3/11 evm: re-release
In reply to Mimi ZoharEVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures).
While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately (eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper:
http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf.
EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is available from http://linu-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.
Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks:evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three
calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr().
Changelog:
- locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex
- using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1 operation.
- replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised
- Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin
- Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/evm | 23 +++ include/linux/integrity.h | 7 + include/linux/xattr.h | 3 + security/integrity/Kconfig | 3 +- security/integrity/Makefile | 2 + security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 12 ++ security/integrity/evm/Makefile | 6 + security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 34 ++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 177 ++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 283 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 108 +++++++++++++ security/integrity/iint.c | 1 + security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 + 13 files changed, 659 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/evm create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/Makefile create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
Documentation/ABI/testing/evm new file +23 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +What: security/evm +Date: March 2011 +Contact: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> +Description: + EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) + against integrity attacks. The initial method maintains an + HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the + value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. + + EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it + with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. + The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until + EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully + loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM + can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but + returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM + should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done + in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part + of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and + loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to: + Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. (A sample dracut + patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables + EVM, is available from http://linu-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)
include/linux/integrity.h +7 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,13 @@#include <linux/fs.h> +enum integrity_status { +INTEGRITY_PASS =0 , +INTEGRITY_FAIL , +INTEGRITY_NOLABEL , +INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN , +}; +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY extern int integrity_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode);extern void integrity_inode_free (struct inode *inode);
include/linux/xattr.h +3 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@#define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1)/* Security namespace */ +#define XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX "evm" +#define XATTR_NAME_EVM XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX +#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
security/integrity/Kconfig +2 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ # config INTEGRITY def_bool y - depends on IMA + depends on IMA || EVM source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +source security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
security/integrity/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -8,3 +8,5 @@ integrity-y := iint.o subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/built-in.o +subdir-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm +obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/built-in.o
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig new file +12 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +config EVM + boolean "EVM support" + depends on SECURITY && KEYS && ENCRYPTED_KEYS + select CRYPTO_HMAC + select CRYPTO_MD5 + select CRYPTO_SHA1 + default n + help + EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against + integrity attacks. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
security/integrity/evm/Makefile new file +6 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +# +# Makefile for building the Extended Verification Module(EVM) +# +obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm.o + +evm-y := evm_main.o evm_crypto.o evm_secfs.o
security/integrity/evm/evm.h new file +34 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation +* +* Authors: +* Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> +* Kylene Hall <[email protected]> +* +* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify +* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +* the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. +* +* File: evm.h +* +*/ +#include <linux/security.h> +#include "../integrity.h" + +extern int evm_initialized; +extern char *evm_hmac; +extern int evm_hmac_size; + +/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */ +extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[]; + +extern int evm_init_key (void ); +extern int evm_update_evmxattr (struct dentry *dentry, +const char *req_xattr_name, +const char *req_xattr_value, +size_t req_xattr_value_len); +extern int evm_calc_hmac (struct dentry *dentry,const char *req_xattr_name, +const char *req_xattr_value, +size_t req_xattr_value_len,char *digest); +extern int evm_init_secfs (void ); +extern void evm_cleanup_secfs (void );
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c new file +177 -0
177 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c new file +283 -0
283 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c new file +108 -0
108 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/iint.c +1 -0
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo) iint->version =0 ; iint->flags =0UL ;mutex_init (&iint->mutex); + iint->hmac_status =INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN ; }static int __init integrity_iintcache_init (void )
security/integrity/integrity.h +1 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {unsigned char flags;u8 digest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ];struct mutex mutex;/* protects: version, flags, digest */ +enum integrity_status hmac_status; };/* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
Signature · 1 line
1.7.3.4
PATCH v4 4/11 evm: add support for different security.evm data types
In reply to Mimi ZoharFrom: Dmitry Kasatkin <[email protected]>
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity attacks. The current patchset maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security xattrs, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. We anticipate other methods for protecting the security extended attributes. This patch reserves the first byte of 'security.evm' as a place holder for the type of method.
--- include/linux/integrity.h | 6 ++++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 10 ++++++---- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/linux/integrity.h +6 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ enum integrity_status { INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN, }; +enum evm_ima_xattr_type { +IMA_XATTR_DIGEST =0x01 , +EVM_XATTR_HMAC , +EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG , +}; +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY extern int integrity_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode);extern void integrity_inode_free (struct inode *inode);
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +6 -4
@@ -138,14 +138,16 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; -u8 hmac[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +u8 hmac[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE +1 ];int rc =0 ; rc =evm_calc_hmac (dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, - xattr_value_len, hmac); -if (rc ==0 ) + xattr_value_len, hmac +1 ); +if (rc ==0 ) { + hmac[0 ] =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ; rc =__vfs_setxattr_noperm (dentry,XATTR_NAME_EVM , - hmac, evm_hmac_size,0 ); + hmac, evm_hmac_size +1 ,0 ); + }else if (rc == -ENODATA ) rc = inode->i_op->removexattr (dentry,XATTR_NAME_EVM );return rc;
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +3 -2
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,size_t xattr_value_len, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { - char hmac_val[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + char hmac_val[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE + 1];int rc;if (iint->hmac_status !=INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN )
@@ -60,10 +60,11 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,memset (hmac_val,0 ,sizeof hmac_val); rc =evm_calc_hmac (dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, - xattr_value_len, hmac_val); + xattr_value_len, hmac_val +1 );if (rc <0 )return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN ; + hmac_val[0 ] =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ; rc =vfs_xattr_cmp (dentry,XATTR_NAME_EVM , hmac_val,sizeof hmac_val,GFP_NOFS );if (rc <0 )
Signature · 1 line
1.7.3.4
PATCH v4 5/11 ima: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
In reply to Mimi ZoharIntegrity appraisal measures files on file_free and stores the file measurement as an xattr. Measure the file before releasing it.
--- fs/file_table.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
fs/file_table.c +1 -1
@@ -243,10 +243,10 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file)if (file->f_op && file->f_op->fasync) file->f_op->fasync (-1 , file,0 ); } +ima_file_free (file);if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release) file->f_op->release (inode, file);security_file_free (file); -ima_file_free (file);if (unlikely (S_ISCHR (inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev !=NULL && !(file->f_mode &FMODE_PATH ))) {cdev_put (inode->i_cdev);
Signature · 1 line
1.7.3.4
PATCH v4 6/11 security: imbed evm calls in security hooks
In reply to Mimi ZoharImbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr() protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode.
(Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.)
Changelog:
- Don't define evm_verifyxattr(), unless CONFIG_INTEGRITY is enabled.
- xattr_name is a 'const', value is 'void *'
--- include/linux/evm.h | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 1 + security/security.c | 16 +++++++++- 3 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/evm.h
include/linux/evm.h new file +56 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* +* evm.h +* +* Copyright (c) 2009 IBM Corporation +* Author: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> +*/ + +#ifndef _LINUX_EVM_H +#define _LINUX_EVM_H + +#include <linux/integrity.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_EVM +extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr (struct dentry *dentry, +const char *xattr_name, +void *xattr_value, +size_t xattr_value_len); +extern int evm_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name, +const void *value,size_t size); +extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, +const char *xattr_name, +const void *xattr_value, +size_t xattr_value_len); +extern int evm_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name); +#else +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY +static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr (struct dentry *dentry, +const char *xattr_name, +void *xattr_value, +size_t xattr_value_len) +{ +return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN ; +} +#endif + +static inline int evm_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name, +const void *value,size_t size) +{ +return 0 ; +} + +static inline void evm_inode_post_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, +const char *xattr_name, +const void *xattr_value, +size_t xattr_value_len) +{ +return ; +} + +static inline int evm_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, +const char *xattr_name) +{ +return 0 ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_EVM_H */ +#endif /* LINUX_EVM_H */
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +1 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include <linux/crypto.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> #include "evm.h" int evm_initialized;
security/security.c +14 -2
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> #include <linux/ima.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
@@ -545,9 +546,14 @@ int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)int security_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags) { +int ret; +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (dentry->d_inode)))return 0 ; -return security_ops->inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size, flags); + ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size, flags); +if (ret) +return ret; +return evm_inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size); } void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
@@ -556,6 +562,7 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (dentry->d_inode)))return ; security_ops->inode_post_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size, flags); +evm_inode_post_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size); }int security_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name)
@@ -574,9 +581,14 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name) { +int ret; +if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (dentry->d_inode)))return 0 ; -return security_ops->inode_removexattr (dentry, name); + ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr (dentry, name); +if (ret) +return ret; +return evm_inode_removexattr (dentry, name); }int security_inode_need_killpriv (struct dentry *dentry)
Signature · 1 line
1.7.3.4
PATCH v4 7/11 evm: inode post removexattr
In reply to Mimi ZoharWhen an EVM protected extended attribute is removed, update 'security.evm'.
--- fs/xattr.c | 5 ++++- include/linux/evm.h | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
fs/xattr.c +4 -1
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
@@ -294,8 +295,10 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) error = inode->i_op->removexattr (dentry, name);mutex_unlock (&inode->i_mutex); -if (!error) +if (!error) {fsnotify_xattr (dentry); +evm_inode_post_removexattr (dentry, name); + }return error; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (vfs_removexattr);
include/linux/evm.h +9 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);extern int evm_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name); +extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, +const char *xattr_name);#else #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -52,5 +54,12 @@ static inline int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, {return 0 ; } + +static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, +const char *xattr_name) +{ +return ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_EVM_H */ #endif /* LINUX_EVM_H */
Signature · 1 line
1.7.3.4
PATCH v4 8/11 evm: imbed evm_inode_post_setattr
In reply to Mimi ZoharChanging the inode's metadata may require the 'security.evm' extended attribute to be re-calculated and updated.
--- fs/attr.c | 5 ++++- include/linux/evm.h | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
fs/attr.c +4 -1
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/fcntl.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> /** * inode_change_ok - check if attribute changes to an inode are allowed
@@ -236,8 +237,10 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry, struct iattr * attr)if (ia_valid &ATTR_SIZE )up_write (&dentry->d_inode->i_alloc_sem); -if (!error) +if (!error) {fsnotify_change (dentry, ia_valid); +evm_inode_post_setattr (dentry, ia_valid); + }return error; }
include/linux/evm.h +6 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name, void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); +extern void evm_inode_post_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,int ia_valid);extern int evm_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size); extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -35,6 +36,11 @@ static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, }#endif +static inline void evm_inode_post_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,int ia_valid) +{ +return ; +} +static inline int evm_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size) {
Signature · 1 line
1.7.3.4
PATCH v4 9/11 evm: inode_post_init
In reply to Mimi ZoharInitialize 'security.evm' for new files. Reduce number of arguments by defining 'struct xattr'.
--- include/linux/evm.h | 11 ++++++++++ include/linux/xattr.h | 6 +++++ security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 3 ++ security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
include/linux/evm.h +11 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#define _LINUX_EVM_H#include <linux/integrity.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> #ifdef CONFIG_EVM extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -25,6 +26,9 @@ extern void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,extern int evm_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name);extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *xattr_name); +extern int evm_inode_post_init_security (struct inode *inode, +const struct xattr *new, +struct xattr *evm);#else #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -67,5 +71,12 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,return ; } +static inline int evm_inode_post_init_security (struct inode *inode, +const struct xattr *new, +struct xattr *evm) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_EVM_H */ #endif /* LINUX_EVM_H */
include/linux/xattr.h +6 -0
@@ -70,6 +70,12 @@ struct xattr_handler { size_t size, int flags, int handler_flags); }; +struct xattr { +char *name; +void *value; +size_t value_len; +}; +ssize_t xattr_getsecurity (struct inode *,const char *,void *,size_t );ssize_t vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *,const char *,void *,size_t );ssize_t vfs_listxattr (struct dentry *d,char *list,size_t size);
security/integrity/evm/evm.h +3 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@* File: evm.h * */ +#include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include "../integrity.h"
@@ -30,5 +31,7 @@ extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,extern int evm_calc_hmac (struct dentry *dentry,const char *req_xattr_name,const char *req_xattr_value,size_t req_xattr_value_len,char *digest); +extern int evm_init_hmac (struct inode *inode,const struct xattr *xattr, +char *hmac_val);extern int evm_init_secfs (void );extern void evm_cleanup_secfs (void );
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +20 -0
@@ -153,6 +153,26 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,return rc; } +int evm_init_hmac (struct inode *inode,const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, +char *hmac_val) +{ +struct hash_desc desc; +struct scatterlist sg[1 ]; +int error; + + error =init_desc (&desc); +if (error !=0 ) { +printk (KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n" ); +return error; + } + +sg_init_one (sg, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len); +crypto_hash_update (&desc, sg, lsm_xattr->value_len); +hmac_add_misc (&desc, inode, hmac_val); +crypto_free_hash (desc.tfm); +return 0 ; +} +/* * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC */
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +38 -0
@@ -98,6 +98,12 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name) found =1 ;break ; } +if (strncmp (req_xattr_name, + *xattrname +XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN , +strlen (req_xattr_name)) ==0 ) { + found =1 ; +break ; + } }return found; }
@@ -245,6 +251,38 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)return ; } +/* +* evm_inode_post_init_security - initializes security.evm +*/ +int evm_inode_post_init_security (struct inode *inode, +const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, +struct xattr *evm_xattr) +{ +u8 *hmac_val; +int rc; + +if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr (lsm_xattr->name)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + + hmac_val =kzalloc (evm_hmac_size +1 ,GFP_NOFS ); +if (!hmac_val) +return -ENOMEM ; + + hmac_val[0 ] =EVM_XATTR_HMAC ; + rc =evm_init_hmac (inode, lsm_xattr, hmac_val +1 ); +if (rc <0 ) + goto out; + + evm_xattr->value = hmac_val; + evm_xattr->value_len = evm_hmac_size +1 ; + evm_xattr->name =XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX ; +return 0 ; +out: +kfree (hmac_val); +return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (evm_inode_post_init_security); +static struct crypto_hash *tfm_hmac;/* preload crypto alg */ static int __init init_evm (void ) {
Signature · 1 line
1.7.3.4
PATCH v4 10/11 fs: add evm_inode_post_init calls
In reply to Mimi ZoharAfter creating the initial LSM security extended attribute, call evm_inode_post_init_security() to create the 'security.evm' extended attribute.
(Support for other fs still needed.)
--- fs/ext2/xattr_security.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- fs/ext3/xattr_security.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++------- fs/ext4/xattr_security.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
fs/ext2/xattr_security.c +24 -7
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/ext2_fs.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> #include "xattr.h" static size_t
@@ -51,21 +52,37 @@ ext2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr) {int err; -size_t len; -void *value; -char *name; +struct xattr lsm_xattr; +struct xattr evm_xattr; - err =security_inode_init_security (inode, dir, qstr, &name, &value, &len); + err =security_inode_init_security (inode, dir, qstr, &lsm_xattr.name, + &lsm_xattr.value, + &lsm_xattr.value_len);if (err) {if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP )return 0 ;return err; } err =ext2_xattr_set (inode,EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , - name, value, len,0 ); -kfree (name); -kfree (value); + lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value, + lsm_xattr.value_len,0 ); +if (err <0 ) + goto out; + + err =evm_inode_post_init_security (inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr); +if (err) + goto out; + err =ext2_xattr_set (inode,EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , + evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value, + evm_xattr.value_len,0 ); +kfree (evm_xattr.value); +out: +kfree (lsm_xattr.name); +kfree (lsm_xattr.value); +if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP ) +return 0 ;return err; + }const struct xattr_handler ext2_xattr_security_handler = {
fs/ext3/xattr_security.c +23 -7
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@#include <linux/ext3_jbd.h> #include <linux/ext3_fs.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> #include "xattr.h" static size_t
@@ -53,20 +54,35 @@ ext3_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr) {int err; -size_t len; -void *value; -char *name; +struct xattr lsm_xattr; +struct xattr evm_xattr; - err =security_inode_init_security (inode, dir, qstr, &name, &value, &len); + err =security_inode_init_security (inode, dir, qstr, &lsm_xattr.name, + &lsm_xattr.value, + &lsm_xattr.value_len);if (err) {if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP )return 0 ;return err; } err =ext3_xattr_set_handle (handle, inode,EXT3_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , - name, value, len,0 ); -kfree (name); -kfree (value); + lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value, + lsm_xattr.value_len,0 ); +if (err <0 ) + goto out; + + err =evm_inode_post_init_security (inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr); +if (err) + goto out; + err =ext3_xattr_set_handle (handle, inode,EXT3_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , + evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value, + evm_xattr.value_len,0 ); +kfree (evm_xattr.value); +out: +kfree (lsm_xattr.name); +kfree (lsm_xattr.value); +if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP ) +return 0 ;return err; }
fs/ext4/xattr_security.c +23 -7
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@#include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/evm.h> #include "ext4_jbd2.h" #include "ext4.h" #include "xattr.h"
@@ -53,20 +54,35 @@ ext4_init_security(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr) {int err; -size_t len; -void *value; -char *name; +struct xattr lsm_xattr; +struct xattr evm_xattr; - err =security_inode_init_security (inode, dir, qstr, &name, &value, &len); + err =security_inode_init_security (inode, dir, qstr, &lsm_xattr.name, + &lsm_xattr.value, + &lsm_xattr.value_len);if (err) {if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP )return 0 ;return err; } err =ext4_xattr_set_handle (handle, inode,EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , - name, value, len,0 ); -kfree (name); -kfree (value); + lsm_xattr.name, lsm_xattr.value, + lsm_xattr.value_len,0 ); +if (err <0 ) + goto out; + + err =evm_inode_post_init_security (inode, &lsm_xattr, &evm_xattr); +if (err) + goto out; + err =ext4_xattr_set_handle (handle, inode,EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , + evm_xattr.name, evm_xattr.value, + evm_xattr.value_len,0 ); +kfree (evm_xattr.value); +out: +kfree (lsm_xattr.name); +kfree (lsm_xattr.value); +if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP ) +return 0 ;return err; }
Signature · 1 line
1.7.3.4
PATCH v4 11/11 evm: crypto hash replaced by shash
In reply to Mimi ZoharFrom: Dmitry Kasatkin <[email protected]>
Using shash is more efficient, because the algorithm is allocated only once. Only the descriptor to store the hash state needs to be allocated for every operation.
--- security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 2 + security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 6 +- 3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
security/integrity/evm/evm.h +2 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ extern int evm_initialized;extern char *evm_hmac;extern int evm_hmac_size; +extern struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm; +/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */ extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +53 -41
164 lines not on this page · raw message
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +3 -3
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@#include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> #include <linux/evm.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> #include "evm.h" int evm_initialized;
@@ -283,12 +284,10 @@ out: }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (evm_inode_post_init_security); -static struct crypto_hash *tfm_hmac;/* preload crypto alg */ static int __init init_evm (void ) {int error; - tfm_hmac =crypto_alloc_hash (evm_hmac,0 ,CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC ); error =evm_init_secfs ();if (error <0 ) {printk (KERN_INFO "EVM: Error registering secfs\n" );
@@ -301,7 +300,8 @@ err: static void __exit cleanup_evm(void) {evm_cleanup_secfs (); -crypto_free_hash (tfm_hmac); +if (hmac_tfm) +crypto_free_shash (hmac_tfm); }/*
Signature · 1 line
1.7.3.4