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SELinux policy regarding LD_LIBRARY_PATH

DISCUSSION Aaron Sowry 3 participants 6 messages Aug 4, 2011 SELinux security module

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#0 lore raw

Hi,

It appears that with SELinux enabled, the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable is not inherited by user processes forked by a root process. This is on RHEL6.

What is the general SELinux policy regarding LD_LIBRARY_PATH? Is there any way to change this behaviour? I couldn't find any documentation regarding this.

Thanks,
Aaron

#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Aaron Sowry

It appears that with SELinux enabled, the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable is not inherited by user processes forked by a root process. This is on RHEL6.

What is the general SELinux policy regarding LD_LIBRARY_PATH? Is there any way to change this behaviour? I couldn't find any documentation regarding this.

If the fork results in a type transition (say from sysadm_t to mozilla_t), then the environment is cleaned up (see glibc's AT_SECURE setting).

If you do not want the environment to be cleared, allow noatsecure, like so:

allow sysadm_t mozilla_t:process noatsecure;

Wkr,
Sven Vermeulen

PS Aaron sorry for double post, reply-to went to you instead of mailinglist.

#2 lore raw

Sven, Spencer,

Quoted 6 lines

If the fork results in a type transition (say from sysadm_t to mozilla_t), then the environment is cleaned up (see glibc's AT_SECURE setting).

If you do not want the environment to be cleared, allow noatsecure, like so:

allow sysadm_t mozilla_t:process noatsecure;

Thanks for the pointers. I will take a look and let you know if I have any further questions.

Regards,
Aaron

#3 lore raw
In reply to Aaron Sowry
Quoted 9 lines · Aaron Sowry

Hi,

It appears that with SELinux enabled, the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable is not inherited by user processes forked by a root process. This is on RHEL6.

What is the general SELinux policy regarding LD_LIBRARY_PATH? Is there any way to change this behaviour? I couldn't find any documentation regarding this.

I see that Sven has answered your question, but wanted to clarify one
point: this behavior happens on execve, not on fork, and only if the process security context changes (whether an automatic transition or explicit request by the caller via setexeccon prior to execve).

However, the behavior you are seeing might not be related to SELinux, as Linux also enables AT_SECURE if the uid or gid changes across execve (to be precise, if the effective identity is not equal to the real identity after the credential change, as this was the legacy logic from libc).

Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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#4 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines

However, the behavior you are seeing might not be related to SELinux, as Linux also enables AT_SECURE if the uid or gid changes across execve (to be precise, if the effective identity is not equal to the real identity after the credential change, as this was the legacy logic from libc).

So if I understand correctly, SELinux expands on AT_SECURE to sanitize environment variables across context changes instead of just setgid/setuid. Makes sense; you live and learn.

In this case I believe it was SELinux performing the sanitization as disabling it solved the problem, but this is helpful to know.

/Aaron

#5 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Aaron Sowry
Quoted 4 lines

However, the behavior you are seeing might not be related to SELinux, as Linux also enables AT_SECURE if the uid or gid changes across execve (to be precise, if the effective identity is not equal to the real identity after the credential change, as this was the legacy logic from libc).

So if I understand correctly, SELinux expands on AT_SECURE to sanitize environment variables across context changes instead of just setgid/setuid. Makes sense; you live and learn.

In this case I believe it was SELinux performing the sanitization as disabling it solved the problem, but this is helpful to know.

Just to clarify, we introduced AT_SECURE for SELinux. Prior to SELinux, userspace directly used AT_EUID/AT_UID and AT_EGID/AT_GID to decide whether to sanitize the environment. When we wanted a similar mechanism for SELinux, Roland McGrath suggested that we create an AT_SECURE flag that could be set by the kernel whenever a security-relevant change has taken place, and then rework userspace to use that flag when present. Thus we have a more general mechanism today that can be used for setuid/setgid, capability changes, SELinux security context transitions, or any other security module.

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Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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