efi: fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 efi: fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs
There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an efi variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct efi_variable in efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:
CPU0: CPU1:efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize = 1024;
efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize)
down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)
efivar_attr_read() // same efi var
var->DataSize = 1024;
efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize)
down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)
virt_efi_get_variable()
// returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but
// var->DataSize is set to a real
// var size more than 1024 bytes
up(&efivars_lock)
virt_efi_get_variable()
// called with var->DataSize set
// to a real var size, returns
// successfully and overwrites
// a 1024-bytes kernel buffer
up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an efi variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \
cat /sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size & ) ; done
Fix this by protecting struct efi_variable access by efivars_lock by using efivar_entry_iter_begin()/efivar_entry_iter_end(). Brush up and unify efivar_entry_[gs]et() and __efivar_entry_[gs]et() for this. This looks simpler than introducing a separate lock for every struct efi_variable.
Also fix the same race in efivar_store_raw() and efivar_show_raw(). The call in efi_pstore_read_func() is protected like this already.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 47 ++++++++++++-------- include/linux/efi.h | 2 + 4 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +1 -1
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int efi_pstore_scan_sysfs_exit(struct efivar_entry *pos,* * @record: pstore record to pass to callback * -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * */
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +57 -15
153 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +30 -17
93 lines not on this page · raw message
include/linux/efi.h +2 -0
@@ -1414,6 +1414,8 @@ int __efivar_entry_get(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 *attributes, unsigned long *size, void *data);int efivar_entry_get (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 *attributes,unsigned long *size,void *data); +int __efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes, +unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head);int efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes,unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head); int efivar_entry_set_get_size(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 40 lines · Vladis Dronov
There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an efi variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct
efi_variablein efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:CPU0: CPU1:
efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize= 1024;
efivar_entry_get(...&var->DataSize)down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) efivar_attr_read() // same efi var var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but // var->DataSize is set to a real // var size more than 1024 bytes up(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // called with var->DataSize set // to a real var size, returns // successfully and overwrites // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an efi variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \
cat/sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size& ) ; doneFix this by protecting struct
efi_variableaccess byefivars_lockby using efivar_entry_iter_begin()/efivar_entry_iter_end(). Brush up and unify efivar_entry_[gs]et() and __efivar_entry_[gs]et() for this. This looks simpler than introducing a separate lock for every structefi_variable.
Quoted 5 lines
Also fix the same race in
efivar_store_raw()andefivar_show_raw(). The call inefi_pstore_read_func()is protected like this already.Signed-off-by Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Wouldn't it be easier to pass a var_data_size stack variable into efivar_entry_get(), and only update the value in 'var' if it is <= 1024?
Quoted 305 lines
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 47 ++++++++++++-------- include/linux/efi.h | 2 + 4 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +1
-1@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int efi_pstore_scan_sysfs_exit(struct efivar_entry *pos,* * @record: pstore record to pass to callback * -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * */ drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +57
-15@@ -88,9 +88,15 @@ efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + }if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE ) str +=sprintf (str,"EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE\n" );@@ -109,6 +115,8 @@ efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) "EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\n");if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE ) str +=sprintf (str,"EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE\n" ); + +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return str - buf; }@@ -121,11 +129,19 @@ efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + } str +=sprintf (str,"0x%lx\n" , var->DataSize); + +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return str - buf; }@@ -137,11 +153,19 @@ efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + }memcpy (buf, var->Data, var->DataSize); + +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return var->DataSize; }@@ -197,13 +221,21 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count)efi_guid_t vendor;u32 attributes;u8 *data; -int err; +int err =0 ; + +if (!entry || !buf) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ;if (in_compat_syscall ()) {struct compat_efi_variable *compat; -if (count !=sizeof (*compat)) -return -EINVAL ; +if (count !=sizeof (*compat)) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } compat = (struct compat_efi_variable *)buf; attributes = compat->Attributes;@@ -214,12 +246,14 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) err =sanity_check (var, name, vendor, size, attributes, data);if (err) -return err; + goto out;copy_out_compat (&entry->var, compat); }else { -if (count !=sizeof (struct efi_variable )) -return -EINVAL ; +if (count !=sizeof (struct efi_variable )) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } new_var = (struct efi_variable *)buf;@@ -231,18 +265,20 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) err =sanity_check (var, name, vendor, size, attributes, data);if (err) -return err; + goto out;memcpy (&entry->var, new_var, count); } - err =efivar_entry_set (entry, attributes, size, data,NULL ); + err =__efivar_entry_set (entry, attributes, size, data,NULL );if (err) {printk (KERN_WARNING "efivars: set_variable() failed: status=%d\n" , err); -return -EIO ; + err = -EIO ; } -return count; +out: +efivar_entry_iter_end (); +return err ?: count; } static ssize_t@@ -255,10 +291,15 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + }if (in_compat_syscall ()) { compat = (struct compat_efi_variable *)buf;@@ -276,6 +317,7 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)memcpy (buf, var, size); } +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return size; }drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +30
-17@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ int efivar_entry_delete(struct efivar_entry *entry)EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (efivar_entry_delete);/** -* efivar_entry_set - call set_variable() +* __efivar_entry_set - call set_variable() * @entry: entry containing the EFI variable to write * @attributes: variable attributes * @size: size of @data buffer @@ -655,8 +655,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_delete);* Returns 0 on success, -EINTR if we can't grab the semaphore, * -EEXIST if a lookup is performed and the entry already exists on * the list, or a converted EFI status code if set_variable() fails. +* +* The caller MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() and +* efivar_entry_iter_end() before and after the invocation of this +* function, respectively. */ -int efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes, +int __efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes,unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head) {const struct efivar_operations *ops;@@ -664,9 +668,6 @@ int efivar_entry_set(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes,efi_char16_t *name = entry->var.VariableName;efi_guid_t vendor = entry->var.VendorGuid; -if (down_interruptible (&efivars_lock)) -return -EINTR ; -if (!__efivars) {up (&efivars_lock);return -EINVAL ;@@ -682,10 +683,28 @@ int efivar_entry_set(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes, status = ops->set_variable (name, &vendor, attributes, size, data); -up (&efivars_lock); -return efi_status_to_err (status); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__efivar_entry_set); +/** +* efivar_entry_set - call set_variable() +* +* This function takes efivars_lock and calls __efivar_entry_set() +*/ +int efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes, +unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head) +{ +int ret; + +if (down_interruptible (&efivars_lock)) +return -EINTR ; + + ret =__efivar_entry_set (entry, attributes, size, data, head); + +up (&efivars_lock); + +return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (efivar_entry_set);@@ -914,22 +933,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__efivar_entry_get);int efivar_entry_get (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 *attributes,unsigned long *size,void *data) { -efi_status_t status; +int ret;if (down_interruptible (&efivars_lock))return -EINTR ; -if (!__efivars) { -up (&efivars_lock); -return -EINVAL ; - } + ret =__efivar_entry_get (entry, attributes, size, data); - status = __efivars->ops->get_variable (entry->var.VariableName, - &entry->var.VendorGuid, - attributes, size, data);up (&efivars_lock); -return efi_status_to_err (status); +return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (efivar_entry_get);@@ -1071,7 +1084,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_iter_end);* entry on the list. It is safe for @func to remove entries in the * list via efivar_entry_delete(). * -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * * It is possible to begin iteration from an arbitrary entry within include/linux/efi.h +2
-1@@ -1414,6 +1414,8 @@ int __efivar_entry_get(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 *attributes, unsigned long *size, void *data);int efivar_entry_get (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 *attributes,unsigned long *size,void *data); +int __efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes, +unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head);int efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes,unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head); int efivar_entry_set_get_size(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes, --2.20.1
Hello, Ard, all,
----- Original Message -----
Quoted 50 lines
From: "Ard Biesheuvel" <[email protected]>
To: "Vladis Dronov" <[email protected]>
Cc: "linux-efi" <[email protected]>, "Linux Kernel Mailing List" <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, March 3, 2020 10:15:41 AM
Subject: Re: [PATCH] efi: fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfsQuoted 43 lines · Vladis Dronov
There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an efi variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct
efi_variablein efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:CPU0: CPU1:
efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize= 1024;
efivar_entry_get(...&var->DataSize)down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) efivar_attr_read() // same efi var var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but // var->DataSize is set to a real // var size more than 1024 bytes up(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // called with var->DataSize set // to a real var size, returns // successfully and overwrites // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an efi variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \
cat/sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size& ) ; doneFix this by protecting struct
efi_variableaccess byefivars_lockby using efivar_entry_iter_begin()/efivar_entry_iter_end(). Brush up and unify efivar_entry_[gs]et() and __efivar_entry_[gs]et() for this. This looks simpler than introducing a separate lock for every structefi_variable.Also fix the same race in
efivar_store_raw()andefivar_show_raw(). The call inefi_pstore_read_func()is protected like this already.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>Wouldn't it be easier to pass a
var_data_sizestack variable intoefivar_entry_get(), and only update the value in 'var' if it is <= 1024?
I was thinking about this approach, but this way we still do not protect var from a concurrent access. For example, efivar_data_read() can race with itself:
// reading var size 5efivar_data_read()
efivar_entry_get()
// reading the same var
efivar_data_read()
var->DataSize = 1024;
efivar_entry_get() // var->DataSize is SUDDENLY 1024
memcpy(buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);
return var->DataSize;
Also efivar read functions still can race with the write function efivar_store_raw(). Surely, the race window is much smaller but it is there. I strongly believe we need to protect all data accesses here with a lock.
May be not in a way I suggest, may be by a per-var mutex, but I believe this is overcomplication.
Quoted 326 lines
Quoted 326 lines
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 47 ++++++++++++-------- include/linux/efi.h | 2 + 4 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +1
-1@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int efi_pstore_scan_sysfs_exit(structefivar_entry *pos, * * @record: pstore record to pass to callback * - * You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and + * You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. **/
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +7
-1@@ -88,9 +88,15 @@ efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + }if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE )str += sprintf(str, "EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE\n");drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +11
-1@@ -109,6 +115,8 @@ efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) "EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\n");if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE ) str +=sprintf (str,"EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE\n" ); + +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return str - buf; }@@ -121,11 +129,19 @@ efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + } str +=sprintf (str,"0x%lx\n" , var->DataSize); + +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return str - buf;}
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +9
-1@@ -137,11 +153,19 @@ efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + }memcpy (buf, var->Data, var->DataSize); + +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return var->DataSize;}
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +11
-3@@ -197,13 +221,21 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) efi_guid_t vendor;u32 attributes;u8 *data; -int err; +int err =0 ; + +if (!entry || !buf) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ;if (in_compat_syscall ()) {struct compat_efi_variable *compat; -if (count !=sizeof (*compat)) -return -EINVAL ; +if (count !=sizeof (*compat)) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } compat = (struct compat_efi_variable *)buf;attributes = compat->Attributes;drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +5
-3@@ -214,12 +246,14 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) err =sanity_check (var, name, vendor, size, attributes, data);if (err) -return err; + goto out;copy_out_compat (&entry->var, compat); }else { -if (count !=sizeof (struct efi_variable )) -return -EINVAL ; +if (count !=sizeof (struct efi_variable )) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + }new_var = (struct efi_variable *)buf;drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +6
-4@@ -231,18 +265,20 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) err =sanity_check (var, name, vendor, size, attributes, data);if (err) -return err; + goto out;memcpy (&entry->var, new_var, count); } - err =efivar_entry_set (entry, attributes, size, data,NULL ); + err =__efivar_entry_set (entry, attributes, size, data,NULL );if (err) {printk (KERN_WARNING "efivars: set_variable() failed: status=%d\n", err); -return -EIO ; + err = -EIO ; } -return count; +out: +efivar_entry_iter_end (); +return err ?: count;}
static
ssize_tdrivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +7
-2@@ -255,10 +291,15 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + }if (in_compat_syscall ()) {compat = (struct compat_efi_variable *)buf;drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +1
-0@@ -276,6 +317,7 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)memcpy (buf, var, size); } +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return size; }drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +6
-2@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ int efivar_entry_delete(struct efivar_entry *entry)EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (efivar_entry_delete);/** -* efivar_entry_set - call set_variable() +* __efivar_entry_set - call set_variable() * @entry: entry containing the EFI variable to write * @attributes: variable attributes * @size: size of @data buffer @@ -655,8 +655,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_delete);* Returns 0 on success, -EINTR if we can't grab the semaphore, * -EEXIST if a lookup is performed and the entry already exists on * the list, or a converted EFI status code if set_variable() fails. +* +* The caller MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() and +* efivar_entry_iter_end() before and after the invocation of this +* function, respectively. */ -int efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes, +int __efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes,unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head) {const struct efivar_operations *ops;drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +0
-3@@ -664,9 +668,6 @@ int efivar_entry_set(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes, efi_char16_t *name = entry->var.VariableName;efi_guid_t vendor = entry->var.VendorGuid; -if (down_interruptible (&efivars_lock)) -return -EINTR ; -if (!__efivars) {up (&efivars_lock);return -EINVAL;drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +20
-2@@ -682,10 +683,28 @@ int efivar_entry_set(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes, status = ops->set_variable (name, &vendor, attributes, size, data); -up (&efivars_lock); -return efi_status_to_err (status); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__efivar_entry_set); +/** +* efivar_entry_set - call set_variable() +* +* This function takes efivars_lock and calls __efivar_entry_set() +*/ +int efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes, +unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head) +{ +int ret; + +if (down_interruptible (&efivars_lock)) +return -EINTR ; + + ret =__efivar_entry_set (entry, attributes, size, data, head); + +up (&efivars_lock); + +return ret; }
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_set);drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +4
-10@@ -914,22 +933,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__efivar_entry_get);int efivar_entry_get (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 *attributes,unsigned long *size,void *data) { -efi_status_t status; +int ret;if (down_interruptible (&efivars_lock))return -EINTR ; -if (!__efivars) { -up (&efivars_lock); -return -EINVAL ; - } + ret =__efivar_entry_get (entry, attributes, size, data); - status = __efivars->ops->get_variable (entry->var.VariableName, - &entry->var.VendorGuid, - attributes, size, data);up (&efivars_lock); -return efi_status_to_err (status); +return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (efivar_entry_get);@@ -1071,7 +1084,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_iter_end);* entry on the list. It is safe for @func to remove entries in the * list via efivar_entry_delete(). * -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * * It is possible to begin iteration from an arbitrary entry within include/linux/efi.h +2
-0@@ -1414,6 +1414,8 @@ int __efivar_entry_get(struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 *attributes, unsigned long *size, void *data);int efivar_entry_get (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 *attributes,unsigned long *size,void *data); +int __efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes, +unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head); int efivar_entry_set(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes,unsigned long size, void *data, struct
list_head*head);
int efivar_entry_set_get_size(structefivar_entry*entry, u32 attributes,
--
2.20.1
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 69 lines · Vladis Dronov
Hello, Ard, all,
----- Original Message -----
Quoted 50 lines
From: "Ard Biesheuvel" <[email protected]>
To: "Vladis Dronov" <[email protected]>
Cc: "linux-efi" <[email protected]>, "Linux Kernel Mailing List" <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, March 3, 2020 10:15:41 AM
Subject: Re: [PATCH] efi: fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfsQuoted 43 lines · Vladis Dronov
There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an efi variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct
efi_variablein efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:CPU0: CPU1:
efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize= 1024;
efivar_entry_get(...&var->DataSize)down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) efivar_attr_read() // same efi var var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but // var->DataSize is set to a real // var size more than 1024 bytes up(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // called with var->DataSize set // to a real var size, returns // successfully and overwrites // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an efi variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \
cat/sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size& ) ; doneFix this by protecting struct
efi_variableaccess byefivars_lockby using efivar_entry_iter_begin()/efivar_entry_iter_end(). Brush up and unify efivar_entry_[gs]et() and __efivar_entry_[gs]et() for this. This looks simpler than introducing a separate lock for every structefi_variable.Also fix the same race in
efivar_store_raw()andefivar_show_raw(). The call inefi_pstore_read_func()is protected like this already.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>Wouldn't it be easier to pass a
var_data_sizestack variable intoefivar_entry_get(), and only update the value in 'var' if it is <= 1024?I was thinking about this approach, but this way we still do not protect var from a concurrent access. For example,
efivar_data_read()can race with itself:// reading var size 5
efivar_data_read()
efivar_entry_get()
Quoted 6 lines
// reading the same var efivar_data_read() var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get()//
var->DataSizeis SUDDENLY 1024
memcpy(buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);
I'd assume that the memcpy() is not executed if var_data_size > 1024, and var->DataSize is not assigned in that case either.
Quoted 336 lines
return
var->DataSize;Also efivar read functions still can race with the write function
efivar_store_raw(). Surely, the race window is much smaller but it is there. I strongly believe we need to protect all data accesses here with a lock.May be not in a way I suggest, may be by a per-var mutex, but I believe this is overcomplication.
Quoted 326 lines
Quoted 326 lines
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 47 ++++++++++++-------- include/linux/efi.h | 2 + 4 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +1
-1@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int efi_pstore_scan_sysfs_exit(structefivar_entry *pos, * * @record: pstore record to pass to callback * - * You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and + * You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. **/
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +7
-1@@ -88,9 +88,15 @@ efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + }if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE )str += sprintf(str, "EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE\n");drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +11
-1@@ -109,6 +115,8 @@ efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) "EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\n");if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE ) str +=sprintf (str,"EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE\n" ); + +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return str - buf; }@@ -121,11 +129,19 @@ efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + } str +=sprintf (str,"0x%lx\n" , var->DataSize); + +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return str - buf;}
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +9
-1@@ -137,11 +153,19 @@ efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + }memcpy (buf, var->Data, var->DataSize); + +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return var->DataSize;}
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +11
-3@@ -197,13 +221,21 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) efi_guid_t vendor;u32 attributes;u8 *data; -int err; +int err =0 ; + +if (!entry || !buf) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ;if (in_compat_syscall ()) {struct compat_efi_variable *compat; -if (count !=sizeof (*compat)) -return -EINVAL ; +if (count !=sizeof (*compat)) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } compat = (struct compat_efi_variable *)buf;attributes = compat->Attributes;drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +5
-3@@ -214,12 +246,14 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) err =sanity_check (var, name, vendor, size, attributes, data);if (err) -return err; + goto out;copy_out_compat (&entry->var, compat); }else { -if (count !=sizeof (struct efi_variable )) -return -EINVAL ; +if (count !=sizeof (struct efi_variable )) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + }new_var = (struct efi_variable *)buf;drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +6
-4@@ -231,18 +265,20 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) err =sanity_check (var, name, vendor, size, attributes, data);if (err) -return err; + goto out;memcpy (&entry->var, new_var, count); } - err =efivar_entry_set (entry, attributes, size, data,NULL ); + err =__efivar_entry_set (entry, attributes, size, data,NULL );if (err) {printk (KERN_WARNING "efivars: set_variable() failed: status=%d\n", err); -return -EIO ; + err = -EIO ; } -return count; +out: +efivar_entry_iter_end (); +return err ?: count;}
static
ssize_tdrivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +7
-2@@ -255,10 +291,15 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + }if (in_compat_syscall ()) {compat = (struct compat_efi_variable *)buf;drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +1
-0@@ -276,6 +317,7 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)memcpy (buf, var, size); } +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return size; }drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +6
-2@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ int efivar_entry_delete(struct efivar_entry *entry)EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (efivar_entry_delete);/** -* efivar_entry_set - call set_variable() +* __efivar_entry_set - call set_variable() * @entry: entry containing the EFI variable to write * @attributes: variable attributes * @size: size of @data buffer @@ -655,8 +655,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_delete);* Returns 0 on success, -EINTR if we can't grab the semaphore, * -EEXIST if a lookup is performed and the entry already exists on * the list, or a converted EFI status code if set_variable() fails. +* +* The caller MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() and +* efivar_entry_iter_end() before and after the invocation of this +* function, respectively. */ -int efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes, +int __efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes,unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head) {const struct efivar_operations *ops;drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +0
-3@@ -664,9 +668,6 @@ int efivar_entry_set(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes, efi_char16_t *name = entry->var.VariableName;efi_guid_t vendor = entry->var.VendorGuid; -if (down_interruptible (&efivars_lock)) -return -EINTR ; -if (!__efivars) {up (&efivars_lock);return -EINVAL;drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +20
-2@@ -682,10 +683,28 @@ int efivar_entry_set(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes, status = ops->set_variable (name, &vendor, attributes, size, data); -up (&efivars_lock); -return efi_status_to_err (status); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__efivar_entry_set); +/** +* efivar_entry_set - call set_variable() +* +* This function takes efivars_lock and calls __efivar_entry_set() +*/ +int efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes, +unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head) +{ +int ret; + +if (down_interruptible (&efivars_lock)) +return -EINTR ; + + ret =__efivar_entry_set (entry, attributes, size, data, head); + +up (&efivars_lock); + +return ret; }
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_set);drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +4
-10@@ -914,22 +933,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__efivar_entry_get);int efivar_entry_get (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 *attributes,unsigned long *size,void *data) { -efi_status_t status; +int ret;if (down_interruptible (&efivars_lock))return -EINTR ; -if (!__efivars) { -up (&efivars_lock); -return -EINVAL ; - } + ret =__efivar_entry_get (entry, attributes, size, data); - status = __efivars->ops->get_variable (entry->var.VariableName, - &entry->var.VendorGuid, - attributes, size, data);up (&efivars_lock); -return efi_status_to_err (status); +return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (efivar_entry_get);@@ -1071,7 +1084,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_iter_end);* entry on the list. It is safe for @func to remove entries in the * list via efivar_entry_delete(). * -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * * It is possible to begin iteration from an arbitrary entry within include/linux/efi.h +2
-0@@ -1414,6 +1414,8 @@ int __efivar_entry_get(struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 *attributes, unsigned long *size, void *data);int efivar_entry_get (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 *attributes,unsigned long *size,void *data); +int __efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes, +unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head); int efivar_entry_set(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes,unsigned long size, void *data, struct
list_head*head);
int efivar_entry_set_get_size(structefivar_entry*entry, u32 attributes,
--
2.20.1
Hello, Ard, all,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Wouldn't it be easier to pass a
var_data_sizestack variable intoefivar_entry_get(), and only update the value in 'var' if it is <= 1024?I was thinking about this approach, but this way we still do not protect var from a concurrent access. For example,
efivar_data_read()can race with itself:
Oh, indeed, this race is not possible the way you sugget with a var_data_size stack variable. Unfortunately, AFAIU, the read/write race stays:
Quoted 3 lines
... efivar read functions still can race with the write function
efivar_store_raw(). Surely, the race window is much smaller but it is there. I strongly believe we need to protect all data accesses here with a lock.
Best regards,
Vladis Dronov | Red Hat, Inc. | The Core Kernel | Senior Software Engineer
Hi all,
Quoted 7 lines · Vladis Dronov
Hello, Ard, all,
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Wouldn't it be easier to pass a
var_data_sizestack variable intoefivar_entry_get(), and only update the value in 'var' if it is <= 1024?
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I was thinking about this approach, but this way we still do not protect var from a concurrent access. For example,
efivar_data_read()can race with itself:Oh, indeed, this race is not possible the way you sugget with a
var_data_sizestack variable. Unfortunately, AFAIU, the read/write race stays:Quoted 3 lines
... efivar read functions still can race with the write function
efivar_store_raw(). Surely, the race window is much smaller but it is there. I strongly believe we need to protect all data accesses here with a lock.
Looks that kernel uses EFI protocol to query variable everytime, then why should kernel keeps a copy of variable data size, data and attributes in memory? It makes sense to keep VariableName and VendorGuid, but why data?
The efi_variable can be used to interactive with userland. But we do not need to keep a data copy in efi_variable with efivar_entry. e.g. The efivarfs_file_read() allocates a buffer for reading variable instead of using efi_variable->Data.
Regards
Joey Lee
Hello, Ard,
Quoted 3 lines
Wouldn't it be easier to pass a
var_data_sizestack variable intoefivar_entry_get(), and only update the value in 'var' if it is <= 1024?
I have prepared a v2 patch with an approach you suggest and will send it out shortly. It indeed simpler and fixes only the overflow bug mentioned.
Could you, please, review it and if you like it, probably, accept it? In case I've implemented your idea incorrectly, could you, please, correct me?
Best regards,
Vladis Dronov | Red Hat, Inc. | The Core Kernel | Senior Software Engineer
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 7 lines · Vladis Dronov
Hello, Ard,
Quoted 3 lines
Wouldn't it be easier to pass a
var_data_sizestack variable intoefivar_entry_get(), and only update the value in 'var' if it is <= 1024?
Quoted 7 lines
I have prepared a v2 patch with an approach you suggest and will send it out shortly. It indeed simpler and fixes only the overflow bug mentioned.
Could you, please, review it and if you like it, probably, accept it? In case I've implemented your idea incorrectly, could you, please, correct me?
Absolutely! Thanks for taking the time to fix these bugs, your contributions are most welcome (and apologies if my responses suggested otherwise)
PATCH v2 1/1 efi: fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThere is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an efi variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct efi_variable in efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:
CPU0: CPU1:efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize = 1024;
efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize)
down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)
efivar_attr_read() // same efi var
var->DataSize = 1024;
efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize)
down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)
virt_efi_get_variable()
// returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but
// var->DataSize is set to a real
// var size more than 1024 bytes
up(&efivars_lock)
virt_efi_get_variable()
// called with var->DataSize set
// to a real var size, returns
// successfully and overwrites
// a 1024-bytes kernel buffer
up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an efi variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \
cat /sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size & ) ; done
Fix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it does not get overwritten. Also add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw().
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +1 -1
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int efi_pstore_scan_sysfs_exit(struct efivar_entry *pos,* * @record: pstore record to pass to callback * -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * */
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +23 -9
@@ -83,13 +83,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE )
@@ -116,13 +119,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ; str +=sprintf (str,"0x%lx\n" , var->DataSize);
@@ -133,12 +139,15 @@ static ssize_t efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data); +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;memcpy (buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);
@@ -199,6 +208,9 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count)u8 *data;int err; +if (!entry || !buf) +return -EINVAL ; +if (in_compat_syscall ()) {struct compat_efi_variable *compat;
@@ -250,14 +262,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) {struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;struct compat_efi_variable *compat; +unsigned long datasize =sizeof (var->Data);size_t size; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;if (in_compat_syscall ()) {
drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +1 -1
@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_iter_end);* entry on the list. It is safe for @func to remove entries in the * list via efivar_entry_delete(). * -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * * It is possible to begin iteration from an arbitrary entry within
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 51 lines · Vladis Dronov
There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an efi variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct
efi_variablein efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:CPU0: CPU1:
efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize= 1024;
efivar_entry_get(...&var->DataSize)down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) efivar_attr_read() // same efi var var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but // var->DataSize is set to a real // var size more than 1024 bytes up(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // called with var->DataSize set // to a real var size, returns // successfully and overwrites // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an efi variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \
cat/sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size& ) ; doneFix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it does not get overwritten. Also add a sanity check to
efivar_store_raw().Signed-off-by Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +0
-0
drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c static int efi_pstore_scan_sysfs_exit(struct efivar_entry *pos, · line 167
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +1
-1@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int efi_pstore_scan_sysfs_exit(struct efivar_entry *pos,* * @record: pstore record to pass to callback * -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * */
This hunk can be dropped now, I guess
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +1
-0@@ -83,13 +83,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c static ssize_t · line 94
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +3
-2char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size;
For my understanding, could you explain why we do the assignment here? Does var->DataSize matter in this case? Can it deviate from 1024?
Quoted 42 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +11
-4+if (ret)return -EIO ;if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE )@@ -116,13 +119,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ; str +=sprintf (str,"0x%lx\n" , var->DataSize);@@ -133,12 +139,15 @@ static ssize_t efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data); +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;memcpy (buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) · line 213
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +3
-0@@ -199,6 +208,9 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count)u8 *data;int err; +if (!entry || !buf) +return -EINVAL ; +
So what are we sanity checking here? When might this occur? Does it need to be in the same patch?
Quoted 28 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +5
-3if (in_compat_syscall ()) {struct compat_efi_variable *compat;@@ -250,14 +262,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) {struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;struct compat_efi_variable *compat; +unsigned long datasize =sizeof (var->Data);size_t size; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;if (in_compat_syscall ()) {drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +0
-0
drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_iter_end); · line 1077
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +1
-1@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_iter_end);* entry on the list. It is safe for @func to remove entries in the * list via efivar_entry_delete(). * -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * * It is possible to begin iteration from an arbitrary entry within
We can drop this.
Quoted 3 lines
--
2.20.1
Hello, Ard, Joye, all,
----- Original Message -----
Quoted 7 lines
From: "Ard Biesheuvel" <[email protected]>
To: "Vladis Dronov" <[email protected]>
Cc: "linux-efi" <[email protected]>, "joeyli" <[email protected]>, "Linux Kernel Mailing List" <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 4:57:16 PM
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] efi: fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs
Quoted 41 lines
Quoted 40 lines · Vladis Dronov
There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an efi variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct
efi_variablein efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:CPU0: CPU1:
efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize= 1024;
efivar_entry_get(...&var->DataSize)down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) efivar_attr_read() // same efi var var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but // var->DataSize is set to a real // var size more than 1024 bytes up(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // called with var->DataSize set // to a real var size, returns // successfully and overwrites // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an efi variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \
cat/sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size& ) ; doneFix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it does not get overwritten. Also add a sanity check to
efivar_store_raw().Signed-off-by Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
AFAIU, you can modify suggested patches, could you please, add a link here so further reader has a reference (I forgot to do it myself):
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +0
-0@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int efi_pstore_scan_sysfs_exit(structefivar_entry *pos, * * @record: pstore record to pass to callback
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +1
-1* -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * */
This hunk can be dropped now, I guess
I surely do not have much experience in writing upstream patches. But I saw people doing small fixes like this one, say, commit 589b7289 ("While we are here, the previous line has some trailing whitespace; clean that up as well"). This is a small mistype and I just wanted to fix it and did not wanted to allocate a whole commit for that. I believe a bigger commit is an acceptable place to fix mistypes.
AFAIU, a maintainer can modify suggested patches, so please, feel free to drop this hunk, if you feel this is a right thing.
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 16 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +2
-0@@ -83,13 +83,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ;
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c static ssize_t · line 94
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +2
-2- var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size;For my understanding, could you explain why we do the assignment here? Does
var->DataSizematter in this case? Can it deviate from 1024?
Yes, the other code expects var->DataSize to be set to a real size of a var after efivar_entry_get() call. For example, efivar_show_raw():
compat->DataSize = var->DataSize;
and efivar_data_read():
memcpy(buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);
return var->DataSize;Yes, we can change the code to use size here, but this will make struct efi_variable *var inconsistent (name, guid, data, attr set properly, but not size). It feels so incorrect to leave this struct inconsistent. I'm not sure that code which calls efivar_{attr,size,data}_read()/efivar_show_raw() is not using this struct's ->DataSize field later.
Quoted 48 lines
Quoted 48 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +1
-0+if (ret)return -EIO ;if (var->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE)drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +5
-2@@ -116,13 +119,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;str += sprintf(str, "0x%lx\n", var->DataSize);drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +5
-2@@ -133,12 +139,15 @@ static ssize_t efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data); +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;memcpy(buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +0
-0@@ -199,6 +208,9 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) u8 *data;int err;
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) · line 213
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +3
-0+if (!entry || !buf) +return -EINVAL ; +So what are we sanity checking here? When might this occur? Does it need to be in the same patch?
efivar_{attr,size,data}_read()/efivar_show_raw() has this check, I believe it is reasonable to add it here too. In case entry or buf happen to be NULL it will lead to a NULL-deref later:
compat = (struct compat_efi_variable *)buf;
memcpy(compat->VariableName, var->VariableName, EFI_VAR_NAME_LEN);I see this as more-or-less related and too small for a whole separate commit. Please, feel free to drop this hunk, if you believe this is not correct. Would you like me to send a separate patch adding the check above in this case?
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 24 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +5
-3if (in_compat_syscall ()) {struct compat_efi_variable *compat;@@ -250,14 +262,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) {struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;struct compat_efi_variable *compat; +unsigned long datasize =sizeof (var->Data);size_t size; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 6 lines
if (in_compat_syscall()) {drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +0
-0drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_iter_end); · line 1077
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +1
-1@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_iter_end);* entry on the list. It is safe for @func to remove entries in the * list via efivar_entry_delete(). * -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * * It is possible to begin iteration from an arbitrary entry within We can drop this.
Quoted 2 lines
--
2.20.1
Best regards,
Vladis Dronov | Red Hat, Inc. | The Core Kernel | Senior Software Engineer
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 82 lines · Vladis Dronov
Hello, Ard, Joye, all,
----- Original Message -----
Quoted 7 lines
From: "Ard Biesheuvel" <[email protected]>
To: "Vladis Dronov" <[email protected]>
Cc: "linux-efi" <[email protected]>, "joeyli" <[email protected]>, "Linux Kernel Mailing List" <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 4:57:16 PM
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] efi: fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfsQuoted 41 lines
Quoted 40 lines · Vladis Dronov
There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an efi variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct
efi_variablein efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:CPU0: CPU1:
efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize= 1024;
efivar_entry_get(...&var->DataSize)down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) efivar_attr_read() // same efi var var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but // var->DataSize is set to a real // var size more than 1024 bytes up(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // called with var->DataSize set // to a real var size, returns // successfully and overwrites // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an efi variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \
cat/sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size& ) ; doneFix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it does not get overwritten. Also add a sanity check to
efivar_store_raw().Signed-off-by Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>AFAIU, you can modify suggested patches, could you please, add a link here so further reader has a reference (I forgot to do it myself):
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +0
-0@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int efi_pstore_scan_sysfs_exit(structefivar_entry *pos, * * @record: pstore record to pass to callbackQuoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +1
-1* -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * */
This hunk can be dropped now, I guess
Quoted 9 lines
I surely do not have much experience in writing upstream patches. But I saw people doing small fixes like this one, say, commit
589b7289("While we are here, the previous line has some trailing whitespace; clean that up as well"). This is a small mistype and I just wanted to fix it and did not wanted to allocate a whole commit for that. I believe a bigger commit is an acceptable place to fix mistypes.AFAIU, a maintainer can modify suggested patches, so please, feel free to drop this hunk, if you feel this is a right thing.
I am not going to perform surgery on your patches. Please drop this hunk (and the one at the end) in the next version.
Quoted 32 lines
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 16 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +2
-0@@ -83,13 +83,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ;Quoted 8 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c static ssize_t · line 94
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +2
-2- var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size;For my understanding, could you explain why we do the assignment here? Does
var->DataSizematter in this case? Can it deviate from 1024?Yes, the other code expects
var->DataSizeto be set to a real size of a var afterefivar_entry_get()call. For example,efivar_show_raw():compat->DataSize = var->DataSize;and
efivar_data_read():
Quoted 9 lines
memcpy(buf, var->Data, var->DataSize); return var->DataSize;Yes, we can change the code to use size here, but this will make struct
efi_variable*var inconsistent (name, guid, data, attr set properly, but not size). It feels so incorrect to leave this struct inconsistent. I'm not sure that code which calls efivar_{attr,size,data}_read()/efivar_show_raw() is not using this struct's ->DataSize field later.
OK, that makes sense.
Quoted 59 lines
Quoted 48 lines
Quoted 48 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +1
-0+if (ret)return -EIO ;if (var->Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE)drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +5
-2@@ -116,13 +119,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;str += sprintf(str, "0x%lx\n", var->DataSize);drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +5
-2@@ -133,12 +139,15 @@ static ssize_t efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data); +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;memcpy(buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +0
-0@@ -199,6 +208,9 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) u8 *data;int err;Quoted 6 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) · line 213
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +3
-0+if (!entry || !buf) +return -EINVAL ; +So what are we sanity checking here? When might this occur? Does it need to be in the same patch?
efivar_{attr,size,data}_read()/efivar_show_raw() has this check, I believe it is reasonable to add it here too. In case entry or buf happen to be NULL it will lead to a NULL-deref later:
Quoted 7 lines
compat = (struct compat_efi_variable *)buf; memcpy(compat->VariableName, var->VariableName, EFI_VAR_NAME_LEN);I see this as more-or-less related and too small for a whole separate commit. Please, feel free to drop this hunk, if you believe this is not correct. Would you like me to send a separate patch adding the check above in this case?
Yes, please. Make it a two-piece series with a cover letter.
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 24 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +5
-3if (in_compat_syscall ()) {struct compat_efi_variable *compat;@@ -250,14 +262,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) {struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;struct compat_efi_variable *compat; +unsigned long datasize =sizeof (var->Data);size_t size; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
if (in_compat_syscall()) {drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +0
-0@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_iter_end);* entry on the list. It is safe for @func to remove entries in the * list via efivar_entry_delete(). Quoted 8 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_iter_end); · line 1077
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +1
-1* -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * * It is possible to begin iteration from an arbitrary entry within We can drop this.
... or make it a 3 piece series if you *really* want to clean up the whitespace :-)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
--
2.20.1Best regards,
Vladis Dronov | Red Hat, Inc. | The Core Kernel | Senior Software Engineer
Hi Vladis,
Quoted 52 lines · Vladis Dronov
There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an efi variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct
efi_variablein efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:CPU0: CPU1:
efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize= 1024;
efivar_entry_get(...&var->DataSize)down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) efivar_attr_read() // same efi var var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but // var->DataSize is set to a real // var size more than 1024 bytes up(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // called with var->DataSize set // to a real var size, returns // successfully and overwrites // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an efi variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \
cat/sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size& ) ; doneFix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it does not get overwritten. Also add a sanity check to
efivar_store_raw().Signed-off-by Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +0
-0@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int efi_pstore_scan_sysfs_exit(struct efivar_entry *pos,* * @record: pstore record to pass to callback
[...snip]
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +1
-0@@ -250,14 +262,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) {struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;struct compat_efi_variable *compat; +unsigned long datasize =sizeof (var->Data);size_t size;
drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) · line 273
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +3
-3+int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size;
The size is indeterminate here. I think that it should uses datasize?
var->DataSize = datasize;
drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) · line 277
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +1
-0+if (ret)return -EIO ;if (in_compat_syscall ()) {
Regards
Joey Lee
Hello, Joey, all,
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) · line 273
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +2
-3- var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size;The size is indeterminate here. I think that it should uses datasize?
var->DataSize = datasize;
Indeed, my mistake. Thank you much! I will fix it in the v3 patchset I'm currently composing.
Best regards,
Vladis Dronov | Red Hat, Inc. | The Core Kernel | Senior Software Engineer
v3 cover efi: fix a race and add a sanity check
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThere is a race and a buffer overflow while reading an efi variable and the first patch fixes it. The second patch adds a sanity check to efivar_store_raw(). And the third one just fixes mistypes in comments.
Vladis Dronov (3):
efi: fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs
efi: add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw()
efi: fix a mistype in comments mentioning efivar_entry_iter_begin()
drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
PATCH v3 1/3 efi: fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs
There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an efi variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct efi_variable in efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:
CPU0: CPU1:efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize = 1024;
efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize)
down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)
efivar_attr_read() // same efi var
var->DataSize = 1024;
efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize)
down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)
virt_efi_get_variable()
// returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but
// var->DataSize is set to a real
// var size more than 1024 bytes
up(&efivars_lock)
virt_efi_get_variable()
// called with var->DataSize set
// to a real var size, returns
// successfully and overwrites
// a 1024-bytes kernel buffer
up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an efi variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \
cat /sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size & ) ; done
Fix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it does not get overwritten.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +20 -9
@@ -83,13 +83,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE )
@@ -116,13 +119,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ; str +=sprintf (str,"0x%lx\n" , var->DataSize);
@@ -133,12 +139,15 @@ static ssize_t efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data); +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;memcpy (buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);
@@ -250,14 +259,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) {struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;struct compat_efi_variable *compat; +unsigned long datasize =sizeof (var->Data);size_t size; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data); + var->DataSize = datasize; +if (ret)return -EIO ;if (in_compat_syscall ()) {
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 32 lines · Vladis Dronov
There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an efi variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct
efi_variablein efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:CPU0: CPU1:
efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize= 1024;
efivar_entry_get(...&var->DataSize)down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) efivar_attr_read() // same efi var var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but // var->DataSize is set to a real // var size more than 1024 bytes up(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // called with var->DataSize set // to a real var size, returns // successfully and overwrites // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an efi variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
Quoted 8 lines
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \
cat/sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size& ) ; doneFix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it does not get overwritten.
For the future, please don't add these links. This one points to the old version of the patch, not to this one. It will be added by the tooling once the patch gets picked up.
Quoted 88 lines
Signed-off-by Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>--- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +20
-10@@ -83,13 +83,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE )@@ -116,13 +119,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ; str +=sprintf (str,"0x%lx\n" , var->DataSize);@@ -133,12 +139,15 @@ static ssize_t efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data); +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;memcpy (buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);@@ -250,14 +259,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) {struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;struct compat_efi_variable *compat; +unsigned long datasize =sizeof (var->Data);size_t size; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data); + var->DataSize = datasize; +if (ret)return -EIO ;if (in_compat_syscall ()) { --2.20.1
Hello, Ard!
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Link:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-efi/[email protected]/T/#uFor the future, please don't add these links. This one points to the old version of the patch, not to this one. It will be added by the tooling once the patch gets picked up.
Aha. I was under an impression Links: are added manually by authors. My intention here was to point at the root message of the whole discussion, not at the patch.
Anyway, thank you for the review and for bearing with me!
Best regards,
Vladis Dronov | Red Hat, Inc. | The Core Kernel | Senior Software Engineer
[tip: efi/urgent] efi: Fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs
In reply to Vladis DronovThe following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 286d3250c9d6437340203fb64938bea344729a0e Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/286d3250c9d6437340203fb64938bea344729a0e Author: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Sun, 08 Mar 2020 09:08:54 +01:00 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Sun, 08 Mar 2020 09:56:34 +01:00
efi: Fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs
There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an EFI variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct efi_variable in efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:
CPU0: CPU1:efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize = 1024;
efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize)
down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)
efivar_attr_read() // same EFI var
var->DataSize = 1024;
efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize)
down_interruptible(&efivars_lock)
virt_efi_get_variable()
// returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but
// var->DataSize is set to a real
// var size more than 1024 bytes
up(&efivars_lock)
virt_efi_get_variable()
// called with var->DataSize set
// to a real var size, returns
// successfully and overwrites
// a 1024-bytes kernel buffer
up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an EFI variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \ cat /sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size & ) ; done
Fix this by using a local variable for a var's data buffer size so it does not get overwritten.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +20 -9
@@ -83,13 +83,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE )
@@ -116,13 +119,16 @@ static ssize_t efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data);char *str = buf; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ; str +=sprintf (str,"0x%lx\n" , var->DataSize);
@@ -133,12 +139,15 @@ static ssize_t efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) { struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var; +unsigned long size =sizeof (var->Data); +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &size, var->Data); + var->DataSize = size; +if (ret)return -EIO ;memcpy (buf, var->Data, var->DataSize);
@@ -250,14 +259,16 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) {struct efi_variable *var = &entry->var;struct compat_efi_variable *compat; +unsigned long datasize =sizeof (var->Data);size_t size; +int ret;if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; - var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) + ret =efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &datasize, var->Data); + var->DataSize = datasize; +if (ret)return -EIO ;if (in_compat_syscall ()) {
PATCH v3 2/3 efi: add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw()
In reply to Vladis DronovAdd a sanity check to efivar_store_raw() the same way efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and efivar_show_raw() have it.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +3 -0
@@ -208,6 +208,9 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count)u8 *data;int err; +if (!entry || !buf) +return -EINVAL ; +if (in_compat_syscall ()) {struct compat_efi_variable *compat;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
[tip: efi/urgent] efi: Add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw()
The following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the efi/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: d6c066fda90d578aacdf19771a027ed484a79825 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/d6c066fda90d578aacdf19771a027ed484a79825 Author: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Sun, 08 Mar 2020 09:08:55 +01:00 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Sun, 08 Mar 2020 09:56:48 +01:00
efi: Add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw()
Add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw() the same way efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and efivar_show_raw() have it.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +3 -0
@@ -208,6 +208,9 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count)u8 *data;int err; +if (!entry || !buf) +return -EINVAL ; +if (in_compat_syscall ()) {struct compat_efi_variable *compat;
Sasha Levin
maintainerRe: [tip: efi/urgent] efi: Add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw()
Hi
[This is an automated email]
This commit has been processed because it contains a -stable tag. The stable tag indicates that it's relevant for the following trees: all
The bot has tested the following trees: v5.5.8, v5.4.24, v4.19.108, v4.14.172, v4.9.215, v4.4.215.
v5.5.8: Build OK!
v5.4.24: Build OK!
v4.19.108: Failed to apply! Possible dependencies:
98f76206b335 ("compat: Cleanup in_compat_syscall() callers")v4.14.172: Failed to apply! Possible dependencies:
98f76206b335 ("compat: Cleanup in_compat_syscall() callers")
ea2ce8f3514e ("time: Fix get_timespec64() for y2038 safe compat interfaces")v4.9.215: Failed to apply! Possible dependencies:
31ea70e0308b ("posix-timers: Move the do_schedule_next_timer declaration")
96fe3b072f13 ("posix-timers: Rename do_schedule_next_timer")
98f76206b335 ("compat: Cleanup in_compat_syscall() callers")
d5b7ffbfbdac ("time: introduce {get,put}_itimerspec64")
ea2ce8f3514e ("time: Fix get_timespec64() for y2038 safe compat interfaces")
f59dd9c886ac ("time: add get_timespec64 and put_timespec64")v4.4.215: Failed to apply! Possible dependencies:
2bf8c4762659 ("net/xfrm_user: use in_compat_syscall to deny compat syscalls") 31ea70e0308b ("posix-timers: Move the do_schedule_next_timer declaration") 4f01ed221e2e ("drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c: use in_compat_syscall() to check for compat callers") 96fe3b072f13 ("posix-timers: Rename do_schedule_next_timer")
98f76206b335 ("compat: Cleanup in_compat_syscall() callers")
bc2c53e5f1a2 ("time: add missing implementation for timespec64_add_safe()") d5b7ffbfbdac ("time: introduce {get,put}_itimerspec64")
ea2ce8f3514e ("time: Fix get_timespec64() for y2038 safe compat interfaces") f59dd9c886ac ("time: add get_timespec64 and put_timespec64")
NOTE: The patch will not be queued to stable trees until it is upstream.
How should we proceed with this patch?
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks Sasha
Re: [tip: efi/urgent] efi: Add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw()
Hello,
----- Original Message -----
Quoted 50 lines
From: "Sasha Levin" <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [tip: efi/urgent] efi: Add a sanity check toefivar_store_raw()Hi
[This is an automated email]
This commit has been processed because it contains a -stable tag. The stable tag indicates that it's relevant for the following trees: all
The bot has tested the following trees: v5.5.8, v5.4.24, v4.19.108, v4.14.172, v4.9.215, v4.4.215.
v5.5.8: Build OK!
v5.4.24: Build OK!
v4.19.108: Failed to apply! Possible dependencies:98f76206b335 ("compat: Cleanup in_compat_syscall() callers")v4.14.172: Failed to apply! Possible dependencies:
98f76206b335 ("compat: Cleanup in_compat_syscall() callers") ea2ce8f3514e ("time: Fix get_timespec64() for y2038 safe compat interfaces")v4.9.215: Failed to apply! Possible dependencies:
31ea70e0308b ("posix-timers: Move the do_schedule_next_timer declaration") 96fe3b072f13 ("posix-timers: Rename do_schedule_next_timer") 98f76206b335 ("compat: Cleanup in_compat_syscall() callers") d5b7ffbfbdac ("time: introduce {get,put}_itimerspec64") ea2ce8f3514e ("time: Fix get_timespec64() for y2038 safe compat interfaces") f59dd9c886ac ("time: add get_timespec64 and put_timespec64")v4.4.215: Failed to apply! Possible dependencies:
2bf8c4762659("net/xfrm_user: usein_compat_syscallto deny compat syscalls")
31ea70e0308b("posix-timers: Move thedo_schedule_next_timerdeclaration")
4f01ed221e2e("drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c: usein_compat_syscall()to check for compat callers")
96fe3b072f13("posix-timers: Renamedo_schedule_next_timer")98f76206b335("compat: Cleanupin_compat_syscall()callers")bc2c53e5f1a2("time: add missing implementation fortimespec64_add_safe()")
d5b7ffbfbdac("time: introduce {get,put}_itimerspec64")ea2ce8f3514e("time: Fixget_timespec64()for y2038 safe compat interfaces")
f59dd9c886ac("time: addget_timespec64andput_timespec64")
Quoted 3 lines
NOTE: The patch will not be queued to stable trees until it is upstream.
How should we proceed with this patch?
I believe I can try to backport this patch for the failed-to-apply branches.
I will do the same for "[tip: efi/urgent] efi: Fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs" (from the same patchset) which may fail to be applied too.
Best regards,
Vladis Dronov | Red Hat, Inc. | The Core Kernel | Senior Software Engineer
Quoted 4 lines
--
Thanks
Sasha
Re: [tip: efi/urgent] efi: Add a sanity check to efivar_store_raw()
In reply to Sasha LevinBackported:
https://lore.kernel.org/stable/[email protected]/T/#u
Best regards,
Vladis Dronov | Red Hat, Inc. | The Core Kernel | Senior Software Engineer
PATCH v3 3/3 efi: fix a mistype in comments mentioning efivar_entry_iter_begin()
In reply to Vladis Dronov--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +1 -1
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int efi_pstore_scan_sysfs_exit(struct efivar_entry *pos,* * @record: pstore record to pass to callback * -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * */
drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +1 -1
@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_iter_end);* entry on the list. It is safe for @func to remove entries in the * list via efivar_entry_delete(). * -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * * It is possible to begin iteration from an arbitrary entry within
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 0/3] efi: fix a race and add a sanity check
In reply to Vladis DronovQuoted 11 lines · Vladis Dronov
There is a race and a buffer overflow while reading an efi variable and the first patch fixes it. The second patch adds a sanity check to
efivar_store_raw(). And the third one just fixes mistypes in comments.Vladis Dronov (3):
efi: fix a race and a buffer overflow while reading efivars via sysfs
efi: add a sanity check toefivar_store_raw()
efi: fix a mistype in comments mentioningefivar_entry_iter_begin()
Queued in efi/next
Thanks!
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
Hi Vladis,
Quoted 39 lines · Vladis Dronov
There is a race and a buffer overflow corrupting a kernel memory while reading an efi variable with a size more than 1024 bytes via the older sysfs method. This happens because accessing struct
efi_variablein efivar_{attr,size,data}_read() and friends is not protected from a concurrent access leading to a kernel memory corruption and, at best, to a crash. The race scenario is the following:CPU0: CPU1:
efivar_attr_read()
var->DataSize= 1024;
efivar_entry_get(...&var->DataSize)down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) efivar_attr_read() // same efi var var->DataSize = 1024; efivar_entry_get(... &var->DataSize) down_interruptible(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL but // var->DataSize is set to a real // var size more than 1024 bytes up(&efivars_lock) virt_efi_get_variable() // called with var->DataSize set // to a real var size, returns // successfully and overwrites // a 1024-bytes kernel buffer up(&efivars_lock)This can be reproduced by concurrent reading of an efi variable which size is more than 1024 bytes:
ts# for cpu in $(seq 0 $(nproc --ignore=1)); do ( taskset -c $cpu \
cat/sys/firmware/efi/vars/KEKDefault*/size& ) ; doneFix this by protecting struct
efi_variableaccess byefivars_lockby using efivar_entry_iter_begin()/efivar_entry_iter_end(). Brush up and unify efivar_entry_[gs]et() and __efivar_entry_[gs]et() for this. This looks simpler than introducing a separate lock for every structefi_variable.
Quoted 5 lines
Also fix the same race in
efivar_store_raw()andefivar_show_raw(). The call inefi_pstore_read_func()is protected like this already.Signed-off-by Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
I have reviewed and tested this patch. It's good to me if we still want to use efi_variable structure as the return buffer of UEFI get/set_variable protocols.
Please feel free to add:
Regards
Joey Lee
Quoted 304 lines
--- drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c | 2 +- drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------- drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c | 47 ++++++++++++-------- include/linux/efi.h | 2 + 4 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)drivers/firmware/efi/efi-pstore.c +1
-1@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int efi_pstore_scan_sysfs_exit(struct efivar_entry *pos,* * @record: pstore record to pass to callback * -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * */ drivers/firmware/efi/efivars.c +57
-15@@ -88,9 +88,15 @@ efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + }if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE ) str +=sprintf (str,"EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE\n" );@@ -109,6 +115,8 @@ efivar_attr_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf) "EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS\n");if (var->Attributes &EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE ) str +=sprintf (str,"EFI_VARIABLE_APPEND_WRITE\n" ); + +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return str - buf; }@@ -121,11 +129,19 @@ efivar_size_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + } str +=sprintf (str,"0x%lx\n" , var->DataSize); + +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return str - buf; }@@ -137,11 +153,19 @@ efivar_data_read(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return -EINVAL ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, var->Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + }memcpy (buf, var->Data, var->DataSize); + +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return var->DataSize; }@@ -197,13 +221,21 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count)efi_guid_t vendor;u32 attributes;u8 *data; -int err; +int err =0 ; + +if (!entry || !buf) +return -EINVAL ; + +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ;if (in_compat_syscall ()) {struct compat_efi_variable *compat; -if (count !=sizeof (*compat)) -return -EINVAL ; +if (count !=sizeof (*compat)) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } compat = (struct compat_efi_variable *)buf; attributes = compat->Attributes;@@ -214,12 +246,14 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) err =sanity_check (var, name, vendor, size, attributes, data);if (err) -return err; + goto out;copy_out_compat (&entry->var, compat); }else { -if (count !=sizeof (struct efi_variable )) -return -EINVAL ; +if (count !=sizeof (struct efi_variable )) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } new_var = (struct efi_variable *)buf;@@ -231,18 +265,20 @@ efivar_store_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, const char *buf, size_t count) err =sanity_check (var, name, vendor, size, attributes, data);if (err) -return err; + goto out;memcpy (&entry->var, new_var, count); } - err =efivar_entry_set (entry, attributes, size, data,NULL ); + err =__efivar_entry_set (entry, attributes, size, data,NULL );if (err) {printk (KERN_WARNING "efivars: set_variable() failed: status=%d\n" , err); -return -EIO ; + err = -EIO ; } -return count; +out: +efivar_entry_iter_end (); +return err ?: count; } static ssize_t@@ -255,10 +291,15 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)if (!entry || !buf)return 0 ; +if (efivar_entry_iter_begin ()) +return -EINTR ; + var->DataSize =1024 ; -if (efivar_entry_get (entry, &entry->var.Attributes, - &entry->var.DataSize, entry->var.Data)) +if (__efivar_entry_get (entry, &var->Attributes, &var->DataSize, + var->Data)) { +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return -EIO ; + }if (in_compat_syscall ()) { compat = (struct compat_efi_variable *)buf;@@ -276,6 +317,7 @@ efivar_show_raw(struct efivar_entry *entry, char *buf)memcpy (buf, var, size); } +efivar_entry_iter_end ();return size; }drivers/firmware/efi/vars.c +30
-17@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ int efivar_entry_delete(struct efivar_entry *entry)EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (efivar_entry_delete);/** -* efivar_entry_set - call set_variable() +* __efivar_entry_set - call set_variable() * @entry: entry containing the EFI variable to write * @attributes: variable attributes * @size: size of @data buffer @@ -655,8 +655,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_delete);* Returns 0 on success, -EINTR if we can't grab the semaphore, * -EEXIST if a lookup is performed and the entry already exists on * the list, or a converted EFI status code if set_variable() fails. +* +* The caller MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() and +* efivar_entry_iter_end() before and after the invocation of this +* function, respectively. */ -int efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes, +int __efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes,unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head) {const struct efivar_operations *ops;@@ -664,9 +668,6 @@ int efivar_entry_set(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes,efi_char16_t *name = entry->var.VariableName;efi_guid_t vendor = entry->var.VendorGuid; -if (down_interruptible (&efivars_lock)) -return -EINTR ; -if (!__efivars) {up (&efivars_lock);return -EINVAL ;@@ -682,10 +683,28 @@ int efivar_entry_set(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes, status = ops->set_variable (name, &vendor, attributes, size, data); -up (&efivars_lock); -return efi_status_to_err (status); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__efivar_entry_set); +/** +* efivar_entry_set - call set_variable() +* +* This function takes efivars_lock and calls __efivar_entry_set() +*/ +int efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes, +unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head) +{ +int ret; + +if (down_interruptible (&efivars_lock)) +return -EINTR ; + + ret =__efivar_entry_set (entry, attributes, size, data, head); + +up (&efivars_lock); + +return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (efivar_entry_set);@@ -914,22 +933,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__efivar_entry_get);int efivar_entry_get (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 *attributes,unsigned long *size,void *data) { -efi_status_t status; +int ret;if (down_interruptible (&efivars_lock))return -EINTR ; -if (!__efivars) { -up (&efivars_lock); -return -EINVAL ; - } + ret =__efivar_entry_get (entry, attributes, size, data); - status = __efivars->ops->get_variable (entry->var.VariableName, - &entry->var.VendorGuid, - attributes, size, data);up (&efivars_lock); -return efi_status_to_err (status); +return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (efivar_entry_get);@@ -1071,7 +1084,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(efivar_entry_iter_end);* entry on the list. It is safe for @func to remove entries in the * list via efivar_entry_delete(). * -* You MUST call efivar_enter_iter_begin() before this function, and +* You MUST call efivar_entry_iter_begin() before this function, and * efivar_entry_iter_end() afterwards. * * It is possible to begin iteration from an arbitrary entry within include/linux/efi.h +2
-0@@ -1414,6 +1414,8 @@ int __efivar_entry_get(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 *attributes, unsigned long *size, void *data);int efivar_entry_get (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 *attributes,unsigned long *size,void *data); +int __efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes, +unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head);int efivar_entry_set (struct efivar_entry *entry,u32 attributes,unsigned long size,void *data,struct list_head *head); int efivar_entry_set_get_size(struct efivar_entry *entry, u32 attributes,Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Hello, Joey, all,
Let me address both of your emails here.
Quoted 8 lines
Looks that kernel uses EFI protocol to query variable everytime, then why should kernel keeps a copy of variable data size, data and attributes in memory? It makes sense to keep VariableName and VendorGuid, but why data?
The
efi_variablecan be used to interactive with userland. But we do not need to keep a data copy inefi_variablewithefivar_entry. e.g. Theefivarfs_file_read()allocates a buffer for reading variable instead of usingefi_variable->Data.
Indeed, as far as I understand the code, we keep var's data in a memory. I cannot tell why such was done when this code was written. Given that this code is considered "old" and may even be obsoleted, I wouldn't like to start a deep rewrite, and only focus on fixing bugs, like the one mentioned.
Quoted 6 lines
I have reviewed and tested this patch. It's good to me if we still want to use
efi_variablestructure as the return buffer of UEFI get/set_variable protocols.Please feel free to add:
Reviewed-by Joey Lee <[email protected]>
Thank you for your time on the review! Much appreciated. Still, I've just sent out a v2 patch (with you in To:) which is indeed simpler and implements and idea Ard suggested, and fixes only the exact bug mentioned. I'm not sure which one will be accepted (if any), could you please, to look at v2 also?
Best regards,
Vladis Dronov | Red Hat, Inc. | The Core Kernel | Senior Software Engineer