Recent /proc/pid/mem exploit
So I read through the recent privilege escalation vulnerability using su and gpasswd which exploits weak permission checks in /proc/pid/mem and tried to figure out why we didn't stop it. What it comes down to is that /proc/pid and everything under it is given the same type as the process itself. In the case of the gpasswd that type is groupadd_t. Looking at the kernel code for /proc/pid/mem and its read/write functions it seems that the only permission checking we do on that node is done by the vfs. So from the SELinux perspective you would need allow groupadd_t groupadd_t file:{open read write} to have access to /proc/pid/mem. For some odd reason tons and tons of applications have file:{open read and write} on itself.
One question that should be asked is why is is that we have so many rules that contain sometype_t sometype_t file: {open read write}. Is it necessary or something that is just being pulled in from a macro. If this is necessary for other reasons the followup to this would be should /proc/pid/mem have the same type as the process or should we have some additional requirements permission wise for a process to read and write to its own memory through /proc/pid/mem. What are the valid reasons for a process to be poking around through its memory using /proc/pid/mem?
Dave
--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 12 lines · David Quigley
So I read through the recent privilege escalation vulnerability using su and gpasswd which exploits weak permission checks in
/proc/pid/memand tried to figure out why we didn't stop it. What it comes down to is that/proc/pidand everything under it is given the same type as the process itself. In the case of the gpasswd that type isgroupadd_t. Looking at the kernel code for/proc/pid/memand its read/write functions it seems that the only permission checking we do on that node is done by the vfs. So from the SELinux perspective you would need allowgroupadd_tgroupadd_tfile:{open read write} to have access to/proc/pid/mem. For some odd reason tons and tons of applications have file:{open read and write} on itself.
Quoted 8 lines
One question that should be asked is why is is that we have so many rules that contain
sometype_tsometype_tfile: {open read write}. Is it necessary or something that is just being pulled in from a macro. If this is necessary for other reasons the followup to this would be should/proc/pid/memhave the same type as the process or should we have some additional requirements permission wise for a process to read and write to its own memory through/proc/pid/mem. What are the valid reasons for a process to be poking around through its memory using/proc/pid/mem?
The /proc/pid files are labeled with the same security context as the associated task via security_task_to_inode() -> selinux_task_to_inode(). There is presently no support for distinguishing /proc/pid files in policy, unlike other files in /proc. As processes are expected to be able to write to various files under /proc/self, this is allowed by policy.
Implementing support for labeling different /proc/pid inodes differently might be an interesting project.
Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 22 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 12 lines · David Quigley
So I read through the recent privilege escalation vulnerability using su and gpasswd which exploits weak permission checks in
/proc/pid/memand tried to figure out why we didn't stop it. What it comes down to is that/proc/pidand everything under it is given the same type as the process itself. In the case of the gpasswd that type isgroupadd_t. Looking at the kernel code for/proc/pid/memand its read/write functions it seems that the only permission checking we do on that node is done by the vfs. So from the SELinux perspective you would need allowgroupadd_tgroupadd_tfile:{open read write} to have access to/proc/pid/mem. For some odd reason tons and tons of applications have file:{open read and write} on itself.Quoted 8 lines
One question that should be asked is why is is that we have so many rules that contain
sometype_tsometype_tfile: {open read write}. Is it necessary or something that is just being pulled in from a macro. If this is necessary for other reasons the followup to this would be should/proc/pid/memhave the same type as the process or should we have some additional requirements permission wise for a process to read and write to its own memory through/proc/pid/mem. What are the valid reasons for a process to be poking around through its memory using/proc/pid/mem?
Quoted 6 lines
The
/proc/pidfiles are labeled with the same security context as the associated task viasecurity_task_to_inode()->selinux_task_to_inode(). There is presently no support for distinguishing/proc/pidfiles in policy, unlike other files in /proc. As processes are expected to be able to write to various files under/proc/self, this is allowed by policy.
And to be specific, all domains are allowed to rw their own /proc/pid files in refpolicy (see domain.te).
Signature · 8 lines
Chris PeBenito Tresys Technology, LLC www.tresys.com | oss.tresys.com -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.