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Patch "eCryptfs: Sanitize write counts of /dev/ecryptfs" has been added to the 3.0-stable tree

PATCH [email protected] 1 participant 1 message Jan 26, 2012

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This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

eCryptfs: Sanitize write counts of /dev/ecryptfs

to the 3.0-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
ecryptfs-sanitize-write-counts-of-dev-ecryptfs.patch
and it can be found in the queue-3.0 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <[email protected]> know about it.

Quoted 1 line

From db10e556518eb9d21ee92ff944530d84349684f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2012 11:30:44 +0100
Subject: eCryptfs: Sanitize write counts of /dev/ecryptfs

From: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>

commit db10e556518eb9d21ee92ff944530d84349684f4 upstream.

A malicious count value specified when writing to /dev/ecryptfs may result in a a very large kernel memory allocation.

This patch peeks at the specified packet payload size, adds that to the size of the packet headers and compares the result with the write count value. The resulting maximum memory allocation size is approximately 532 bytes.

---
 fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c |   56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c +38 -18
@@ -409,11 +409,47 @@ ecryptfs_miscdev_write(struct file *file
 	ssize_t sz = 0;
 	char *data;
 	uid_t euid = current_euid();
+	unsigned char packet_size_peek[3];
 	int rc;
 
-	if (count == 0)
+	if (count == 0) {
 		goto out;
+	} else if (count == (1 + 4)) {
+		/* Likely a harmless MSG_HELO or MSG_QUIT - no packet length */
+		goto memdup;
+	} else if (count < (1 + 4 + 1)
+		   || count > (1 + 4 + 2 + sizeof(struct ecryptfs_message) + 4
+			       + ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES)) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Acceptable packet size range is "
+		       "[%d-%lu], but amount of data written is [%zu].",
+		       __func__, (1 + 4 + 1),
+		       (1 + 4 + 2 + sizeof(struct ecryptfs_message) + 4
+			+ ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES), count);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (copy_from_user(packet_size_peek, (buf + 1 + 4),
+			   sizeof(packet_size_peek))) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Error while inspecting packet size\n",
+		       __func__);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
 
+	rc = ecryptfs_parse_packet_length(packet_size_peek, &packet_size,
+					  &packet_size_length);
+	if (rc) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Error parsing packet length; "
+		       "rc = [%d]\n", __func__, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	if ((1 + 4 + packet_size_length + packet_size) != count) {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Invalid packet size [%zu]\n", __func__,
+		       packet_size);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+memdup:
 	data = memdup_user(buf, count);
 	if (IS_ERR(data)) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: memdup_user returned error [%ld]\n",
@@ -435,23 +471,7 @@ ecryptfs_miscdev_write(struct file *file
 		}
 		memcpy(&counter_nbo, &data[i], 4);
 		seq = be32_to_cpu(counter_nbo);
-		i += 4;
-		rc = ecryptfs_parse_packet_length(&data[i], &packet_size,
-						  &packet_size_length);
-		if (rc) {
-			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Error parsing packet length; "
-			       "rc = [%d]\n", __func__, rc);
-			goto out_free;
-		}
-		i += packet_size_length;
-		if ((1 + 4 + packet_size_length + packet_size) != count) {
-			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: (1 + packet_size_length([%zd])"
-			       " + packet_size([%zd]))([%zd]) != "
-			       "count([%zd]). Invalid packet format.\n",
-			       __func__, packet_size_length, packet_size,
-			       (1 + packet_size_length + packet_size), count);
-			goto out_free;
-		}
+		i += 4 + packet_size_length;
 		rc = ecryptfs_miscdev_response(&data[i], packet_size,
 					       euid, current_user_ns(),
 					       task_pid(current), seq);

Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email protected] are

queue-3.0/ecryptfs-fix-oops-when-printing-debug-info-in-extent-crypto-functions.patch queue-3.0/ecryptfs-sanitize-write-counts-of-dev-ecryptfs.patch queue-3.0/ecryptfs-check-inode-changes-in-setattr.patch queue-3.0/ecryptfs-make-truncate-path-killable.patch queue-3.0/ecryptfs-improve-metadata-read-failure-logging.patch