Enable root to update the blacklist keyring
Subsystems (9)
v6 cover Enable root to update the blacklist keyring
This new patch series is a rebase on David Howells's keys-misc branch. This mainly fixes UEFI DBX and the new Eric Snowberg's feature to import asymmetric keys to the blacklist keyring.
I successfully tested this patch series with the 186 entries from
https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/dbxupdate_x64.bin (184 binary hashes and 2 certificates).
The goal of these patches is to add a new configuration option to enable the root user to load signed keys in the blacklist keyring. This keyring is useful to "untrust" certificates or files. Enabling to safely update this keyring without recompiling the kernel makes it more usable.
This can be applied on top of David Howells's keys-next branch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-next
Git commits can be found in https://github.com/l0kod/linux branch dyn-auth-blacklist-v6 commit fcf976b74ffcd4551683e6b70dbf5fb102cf9906 .
Previous patch series:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Regards,
Mickaël Salaün (5):
tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist
keyring
MAINTAINERS | 2 + certs/.gitignore | 1 + certs/Kconfig | 17 +- certs/Makefile | 17 +- certs/blacklist.c | 218 ++++++++++++++---- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 3 +- include/keys/system_keyring.h | 14 +- scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk | 37 +++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 26 +-- tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh | 91 ++++++++ 10 files changed, 346 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-) create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
base-commit: 5bcd72358a7d7794ade0452ed12919b8c4d6ffc7
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v6 1/5 tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Add a new helper print-cert-tbs-hash.sh to generate a TBSCertificate hash from a given certificate. This is useful to generate a blacklist key description used to forbid loading a specific certificate in a keyring, or to invalidate a certificate provided by a PKCS#7 file.
This kind of hash formatting is required to populate the file pointed out by CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST, but only the kernel code was available to understand how to effectively create such hash.
---
Changes since v5:
* Add Reviewed-by Jarkko.
Changes since v3:
* Explain in the commit message that this kind of formating is not new but it wasn't documented.
Changes since v1:
* Fix typo.
* Use "if" block instead of "||" .
--- MAINTAINERS | 1 + tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+) create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
@@ -4120,6 +4120,7 @@ F: Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst F: certs/ F: scripts/extract-cert.c F: scripts/sign-file.c +F: tools/certs/ CFAG12864B LCD DRIVER M: Miguel Ojeda Sandonis <[email protected]>
tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh new file +91 -0
91 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v6 2/5 certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the builtin blacklist hashes set with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST will effectively be taken into account as blacklisted hashes. This is useful to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes which could have been loaded in the kernel, but silently ignored, are now noticed and deal with by the user at kernel build time.
This also prevent stricter blacklist key description checking (provided by following commits) to failed for builtin hashes.
Update CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help to explain the content of a hash string and how to generate certificate ones.
---
Changes since v5:
* Rebase on keys-next and fix conflict as previously done by David Howells.
* Enable to use a file path relative to the kernel source directory. This align with the handling of CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS, CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY and CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS.
Changes since v3:
* Improve commit description.
* Update CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help.
* Remove Acked-by Jarkko Sakkinen because of the above changes.
Changes since v2:
* Add Jarkko's Acked-by.
Changes since v1:
* Prefix script path with $(scrtree)/ (suggested by David Howells).
* Fix hexadecimal number check.
--- MAINTAINERS | 1 + certs/.gitignore | 1 + certs/Kconfig | 7 ++++-- certs/Makefile | 17 +++++++++++++- scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
@@ -4118,6 +4118,7 @@ L: [email protected] S: Maintained F: Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst F: certs/ +F: scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk F: scripts/extract-cert.c F: scripts/sign-file.c F: tools/certs/
certs/.gitignore +1 -0
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +blacklist_hashes_checked x509_certificate_list
certs/Kconfig +5 -2
@@ -80,8 +80,11 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help If set, this option should be the filename of a list of hashes in the form "<hash>", "<hash>", ... . This will be included into a C - wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel. Each <hash> should - be a string of hex digits. + wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel. Each <hash> must be a + string starting with a prefix ("tbs" or "bin"), then a colon (":"), and + finally an even number of hexadecimal lowercase characters (up to 128). + Certificate hashes can be generated with + tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh . config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS string "X.509 certificates to be preloaded into the system blacklist keyring"
certs/Makefile +16 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,22 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o common.o obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist.o revocation_certificates.o common.o ifneq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST),"") + +quiet_cmd_check_blacklist_hashes = CHECK $(patsubst "%",%,$(2)) + cmd_check_blacklist_hashes = $(AWK) -f $(srctree)/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk $(2); touch $@ + +$(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST)) + +$(obj)/blacklist_hashes.o: $(obj)/blacklist_hashes_checked + +CFLAGS_blacklist_hashes.o += -I$(srctree) + +targets += blacklist_hashes_checked +$(obj)/blacklist_hashes_checked: $(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_SRCPREFIX)$(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_FILENAME) scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk FORCE + $(call if_changed,check_blacklist_hashes,$(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST)) + obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_hashes.o + else obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_nohashes.o endif
@@ -29,7 +44,7 @@ $(obj)/x509_certificate_list: scripts/extract-cert $(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREF $(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS)) endif # CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING -clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list x509_revocation_list +clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list x509_revocation_list blacklist_hashes_checked ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y) ###############################################################################
scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk new file +37 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +#!/usr/bin/awk -f +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright © 2020, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. +# +# Author: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]> +# +# Check that a CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST file contains a valid array of +# hash strings. Such string must start with a prefix ("tbs" or "bin"), then a +# colon (":"), and finally an even number of hexadecimal lowercase characters +# (up to 128). + +BEGIN { + RS = "," +} +{ + if (!match($0, "^[ \t\n\r]*\"([^\"]*)\"[ \t\n\r]*$", part1)) { + print "Not a string (item " NR "):", $0; + exit 1; + } + if (!match(part1[1], "^(tbs|bin):(.*)$", part2)) { + print "Unknown prefix (item " NR "):", part1[1]; + exit 1; + } + if (!match(part2[2], "^([0-9a-f]+)$", part3)) { + print "Not a lowercase hexadecimal string (item " NR "):", part2[2]; + exit 1; + } + if (length(part3[1]) > 128) { + print "Hash string too long (item " NR "):", part3[1]; + exit 1; + } + if (length(part3[1]) % 2 == 1) { + print "Not an even number of hexadecimal characters (item " NR "):", part3[1]; + exit 1; + } +}
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v6 3/5 certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Before exposing this new key type to user space, make sure that only meaningful blacklisted hashes are accepted. This is also checked for builtin blacklisted hashes, but a following commit make sure that the user will notice (at built time) and will fix the configuration if it already included errors.
Check that a blacklist key description starts with a valid prefix and then a valid hexadecimal string.
---
Changes since v5:
* Add Reviewed-by Jarkko.
Changes since v2:
* Fix typo in blacklist_vet_description() comment, spotted by Tyler Hicks.
* Add Jarkko's Acked-by.
Changes since v1:
* Return ENOPKG (instead of EINVAL) when a hash is greater than the maximum currently known hash (suggested by David Howells).
--- certs/blacklist.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +36 -10
@@ -19,6 +19,16 @@#include "blacklist.h" #include "common.h" +/* +* According to crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:x509_note_pkey_algo(), +* the size of the currently longest supported hash algorithm is 512 bits, +* which translates into 128 hex characters. +*/ +#define MAX_HASH_LEN 128 + +static const char tbs_prefix[] ="tbs" ; +static const char bin_prefix[] ="bin" ; +static struct key *blacklist_keyring;extern __initconst const u8 revocation_certificate_list[];
@@ -30,24 +40,40 @@ extern __initconst const unsigned long revocation_certificate_list_size;*/ static int blacklist_vet_description (const char *desc) { -int n =0 ; - -if (*desc ==':' ) -return -EINVAL ; -for (; *desc; desc++) -if (*desc ==':' ) - goto found_colon; +int i, prefix_len, tbs_step =0 , bin_step =0 ; + +/* The following algorithm only works if prefix lengths match. */ +BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (tbs_prefix) !=sizeof (bin_prefix)); + prefix_len =sizeof (tbs_prefix) -1 ; +for (i =0 ; *desc; desc++, i++) { +if (*desc ==':' ) { +if (tbs_step == prefix_len) + goto found_colon; +if (bin_step == prefix_len) + goto found_colon; +return -EINVAL ; + } +if (i >= prefix_len) +return -EINVAL ; +if (*desc == tbs_prefix[i]) + tbs_step++; +if (*desc == bin_prefix[i]) + bin_step++; + }return -EINVAL ; found_colon: desc++; -for (; *desc; desc++) { +for (i =0 ; *desc && i <MAX_HASH_LEN ; desc++, i++) {if (!isxdigit (*desc) ||isupper (*desc))return -EINVAL ; - n++; } +if (*desc) +/* The hash is greater than MAX_HASH_LEN. */ +return -ENOPKG ; -if (n ==0 || n &1 ) +/* Checks for an even number of hexadecimal characters. */ +if (i ==0 || i &1 )return -EINVAL ;return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v6 4/5 certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper. This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private, which help to manage them consistently.
---
Changes since v5:
* Rebase on keys-next and fix conflict as previously done by David Howells.
* Fix missing part to effectively handle UEFI DBX blacklisting.
* Remove Jarkko's Acked-by because of the above changes.
Changes since v2:
* Add Jarkko's Acked-by.
--- certs/blacklist.c | 76 ++++++++++++++----- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 3 +- include/keys/system_keyring.h | 14 +++- .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 26 +------ 4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +58 -18
@@ -107,11 +107,43 @@ static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = { .describe = blacklist_describe, }; +static char *get_raw_hash (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len, +enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type) +{ +size_t type_len; +const char *type_prefix; +char *buffer, *p; + +switch (hash_type) { +case BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS : + type_len =sizeof (tbs_prefix) -1 ; + type_prefix = tbs_prefix; +break ; +case BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY : + type_len =sizeof (bin_prefix) -1 ; + type_prefix = bin_prefix; +break ; +default : +WARN_ON_ONCE (1 ); +return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); + } + buffer =kmalloc (type_len +1 + hash_len *2 +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!buffer) +return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); + p =memcpy (buffer, type_prefix, type_len); + p += type_len; + *p++ =':' ; +bin2hex (p, hash, hash_len); + p += hash_len *2 ; + *p ='\0' ; +return buffer; +} +/** -* mark_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist +* mark_raw_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist * @hash: The hash as a hex string with a type prefix (eg. "tbs:23aa429783") */ -int mark_hash_blacklisted (const char *hash) +static int mark_raw_hash_blacklisted (const char *hash) {key_ref_t key;
@@ -163,29 +195,36 @@ int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)return -ENOKEY ; } +int mark_hash_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len, +enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type) +{ +const char *buffer; +int err; + + buffer =get_raw_hash (hash, hash_len, hash_type); +if (IS_ERR (buffer)) +return PTR_ERR (buffer); + err =mark_raw_hash_blacklisted (buffer); +kfree (buffer); +return err; +} +/** * is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted * @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob * @hash_len: The length of the binary hash -* @type: Type of hash +* @hash_type: Type of hash */ -int is_hash_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len,const char *type) +int is_hash_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len, +enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type) {key_ref_t kref; -size_t type_len =strlen (type); -char *buffer, *p; +const char *buffer;int ret =0 ; - buffer =kmalloc (type_len +1 + hash_len *2 +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!buffer) -return -ENOMEM ; - p =memcpy (buffer, type, type_len); - p += type_len; - *p++ =':' ; -bin2hex (p, hash, hash_len); - p += hash_len *2 ; - *p =0 ; - + buffer =get_raw_hash (hash, hash_len, hash_type); +if (IS_ERR (buffer)) +return PTR_ERR (buffer); kref =keyring_search (make_key_ref (blacklist_keyring, true), &key_type_blacklist, buffer, false);if (!IS_ERR (kref)) {
@@ -200,7 +239,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_hash_blacklisted);int is_binary_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len) { -if (is_hash_blacklisted (hash, hash_len,"bin" ) == -EKEYREJECTED ) +if (is_hash_blacklisted (hash, hash_len,BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY ) == + -EKEYREJECTED )return -EPERM ;return 0 ;
@@ -230,7 +270,7 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void)panic ("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n" );for (bl = blacklist_hashes; *bl; bl++) -if (mark_hash_blacklisted (*bl) <0 ) +if (mark_raw_hash_blacklisted (*bl) <0 )pr_err ("- blacklisting failed\n" );return 0 ; }
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +2 -1
@@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)if (ret <0 ) goto error_2; - ret =is_hash_blacklisted (sig->digest, sig->digest_size,"tbs" ); + ret =is_hash_blacklisted (sig->digest, sig->digest_size, +BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS );if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED ) {pr_err ("Cert %*phN is blacklisted\n" , sig->digest_size, sig->digest);
include/keys/system_keyring.h +11 -3
@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@#include <linux/key.h> +enum blacklist_hash_type { +/* TBSCertificate hash */ +BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS =1 , +/* Raw data hash */ +BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY =2 , +}; +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,
@@ -33,15 +40,16 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING -extern int mark_hash_blacklisted (const char *hash); +extern int mark_hash_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len, +enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);extern int add_key_to_revocation_list (const char *data,size_t size);extern int is_hash_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len, -const char *type); +enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);extern int is_binary_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len);extern int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);#else static inline int is_hash_blacklisted (const u8 *hash,size_t hash_len, -const char *type) +enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type) {return 0 ; }
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +2 -24
@@ -15,35 +15,13 @@ static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata =EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID ;static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid__initdata =EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID ; -/* -* Blacklist a hash. -*/ -static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash (const char *source,const void *data, -size_t len,const char *type, -size_t type_len) -{ -char *hash, *p; - - hash =kmalloc (type_len + len *2 +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!hash) -return ; - p =memcpy (hash, type, type_len); - p += type_len; -bin2hex (p, data, len); - p += len *2 ; - *p =0 ; - -mark_hash_blacklisted (hash); -kfree (hash); -} -/* * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash. */ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { -uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"tbs:" ,4 ); +mark_hash_blacklisted (data, len,BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS ); }/*
@@ -52,7 +30,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary (const char *source,const void *data,size_t len) { -uefi_blacklist_hash (source, data, len,"bin:" ,4 ); +mark_hash_blacklisted (data, len,BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY ); }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
PATCH v6 5/5 certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
In reply to Mickaël SalaünFrom: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be provided as the key payload.
Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones);
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the root user rights.
See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
---
Changes since v5:
* Rebase on keys-next, fix Kconfig conflict, and update the asymmetric key rights added to the blacklist keyring by the new add_key_to_revocation_list(): align with blacklist key rights by removing KEY_POS_WRITE as a safeguard, and add KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION to not be subject to restrict_link_for_blacklist() that only allows blacklist key types to be added to the keyring.
* Change the return code for restrict_link_for_blacklist() from -EPERM to -EOPNOTSUPP to align with asymmetric key keyrings.
Changes since v3:
* Update commit message for print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
Changes since v2:
* Add comment for blacklist_key_instantiate().
--- certs/Kconfig | 10 +++++ certs/blacklist.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
certs/Kconfig +10 -0
@@ -94,4 +94,14 @@ config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS containing X.509 certificates to be included in the default blacklist keyring. +config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE + bool "Allow root to add signed blacklist keys" + depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING + depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + If set, provide the ability to load new blacklist keys at run time if + they are signed and vouched by a certificate from the builtin trusted + keyring. The PKCS#7 signature of the description is set in the key + payload. Blacklist keys cannot be removed. + endmenu
certs/blacklist.c +75 -21
156 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
Re: [PATCH v6 5/5] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
Quoted 25 lines · Mickaël Salaün
From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
Add a kernel option
SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATEto enable the root user to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be provided as the key payload.
Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones);
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the root user rights.
Quoted 7 lines
See help in
tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh.Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>Cc Eric Snowberg <[email protected]>Cc Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
/Jarkko
Quoted 213 lines
---
Changes since v5:
* Rebase on keys-next, fixKconfigconflict, and update the asymmetric key rights added to the blacklist keyring by the newadd_key_to_revocation_list(): align with blacklist key rights by removingKEY_POS_WRITEas a safeguard, and addKEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTIONto not be subject torestrict_link_for_blacklist()that only allows blacklist key types to be added to the keyring.
* Change the return code forrestrict_link_for_blacklist()from-EPERMto-EOPNOTSUPPto align with asymmetric key keyrings.Changes since v3:
* Update commit message forprint-cert-tbs-hash.sh.Changes since v2:
* Add comment forblacklist_key_instantiate().--- certs/Kconfig | 10 +++++ certs/blacklist.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)certs/Kconfig +10
-0@@ -94,4 +94,14 @@ config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS containing X.509 certificates to be included in the default blacklist keyring. +config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE + bool "Allow root to add signed blacklist keys" + depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING + depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + If set, provide the ability to load new blacklist keys at run time if + they are signed and vouched by a certificate from the builtin trusted + keyring. The PKCS#7 signature of the description is set in the key + payload. Blacklist keys cannot be removed. + endmenucerts/blacklist.c +75
-21@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/uidgid.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> #include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include "blacklist.h" #include "common.h" @@ -26,6 +27,9 @@*/ #define MAX_HASH_LEN 128 +#define BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM (KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_POS_VIEW | \ + KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW) +static const char tbs_prefix[] ="tbs" ;static const char bin_prefix[] ="bin" ;@@ -78,19 +82,51 @@ static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc)return 0 ; } -/* -* The hash to be blacklisted is expected to be in the description. There will -* be no payload. -*/ -static int blacklist_preparse (struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +static int blacklist_key_instantiate (struct key *key, +struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { -if (prep->datalen >0 ) -return -EINVAL ; -return 0 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE +int err; +#endif + +/* Sets safe default permissions for keys loaded by user space. */ + key->perm =BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM ; + +/* +* Skips the authentication step for builtin hashes, they are not +* signed but still trusted. +*/ +if (key->flags & (1 <<KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN )) + goto out; + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE +/* +* Verifies the description's PKCS#7 signature against the builtin +* trusted keyring. +*/ + err =verify_pkcs7_signature (key->description, +strlen (key->description), prep->data, prep->datalen, +NULL ,VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE ,NULL ,NULL ); +if (err) +return err; +#else +/* +* It should not be possible to come here because the keyring doesn't +* have KEY_USR_WRITE and the only other way to call this function is +* for builtin hashes. +*/ +WARN_ON_ONCE (1 ); +return -EPERM ; +#endif + +out: +return generic_key_instantiate (key, prep); } -static void blacklist_free_preparse (struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +static int blacklist_key_update (struct key *key, +struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { +return -EPERM ; }static void blacklist_describe (const struct key *key,struct seq_file *m)@@ -101,9 +137,8 @@ static void blacklist_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = { .name ="blacklist" , .vet_description = blacklist_vet_description, - .preparse = blacklist_preparse, - .free_preparse = blacklist_free_preparse, - .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, + .instantiate = blacklist_key_instantiate, + .update = blacklist_key_update, .describe = blacklist_describe, };@@ -152,8 +187,7 @@ static int mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash) hash,NULL ,0 , - ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR ) | -KEY_USR_VIEW ), +BLACKLIST_KEY_PERM ,KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);if (IS_ERR (key)) {@@ -172,8 +206,10 @@ int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)NULL , data, size, - ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR ) |KEY_USR_VIEW ), - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN); +KEY_POS_VIEW |KEY_POS_READ |KEY_POS_SEARCH + |KEY_USR_VIEW , +KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN + | KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);if (IS_ERR (key)) {pr_err ("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n" ,PTR_ERR (key));@@ -247,25 +283,43 @@ int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (is_binary_blacklisted); +static int restrict_link_for_blacklist (struct key *dest_keyring, +const struct key_type *type,const union key_payload *payload, +struct key *restrict_key) +{ +if (type == &key_type_blacklist) +return 0 ; +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +/* * Initialise the blacklist */ static int __init blacklist_init (void ) {const char *const *bl; +struct key_restriction *restriction;if (register_key_type (&key_type_blacklist) <0 )panic ("Can't allocate system blacklist key type\n" ); + restriction =kzalloc (sizeof (*restriction),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!restriction) +panic ("Can't allocate blacklist keyring restriction\n" ); + restriction->check = restrict_link_for_blacklist; + blacklist_keyring =keyring_alloc (".blacklist" ,GLOBAL_ROOT_UID ,GLOBAL_ROOT_GID ,current_cred (), - (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR ) | -KEY_USR_VIEW |KEY_USR_READ | -KEY_USR_SEARCH , -KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | +KEY_POS_VIEW |KEY_POS_READ |KEY_POS_SEARCH | +KEY_POS_WRITE | +KEY_USR_VIEW |KEY_USR_READ |KEY_USR_SEARCH +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE + |KEY_USR_WRITE +#endif + ,KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP , -NULL ,NULL ); + restriction,NULL );if (IS_ERR (blacklist_keyring))panic ("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n" );Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
David, Eric, what is the status of this patch series?
Quoted 47 lines · Mickaël Salaün
This new patch series is a rebase on David Howells's keys-misc branch. This mainly fixes UEFI DBX and the new Eric Snowberg's feature to import asymmetric keys to the blacklist keyring.
I successfully tested this patch series with the 186 entries from
https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/dbxupdate_x64.bin (184 binary hashes and 2 certificates).The goal of these patches is to add a new configuration option to enable the root user to load signed keys in the blacklist keyring. This keyring is useful to "untrust" certificates or files. Enabling to safely update this keyring without recompiling the kernel makes it more usable.
This can be applied on top of David Howells's keys-next branch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-next
Git commits can be found in https://github.com/l0kod/linux branch dyn-auth-blacklist-v6 commitfcf976b74ffcd4551683e6b70dbf5fb102cf9906.Previous patch series:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/Regards,
Mickaël Salaün (5):
tools/certs: Addprint-cert-tbs-hash.sh
certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
certs: Makeblacklist_vet_description()more strict
certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist
keyringMAINTAINERS | 2 + certs/.gitignore | 1 + certs/Kconfig | 17 +- certs/Makefile | 17 +- certs/blacklist.c | 218 ++++++++++++++---- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 3 +- include/keys/system_keyring.h | 14 +- scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk | 37 +++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 26 +-- tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh | 91 ++++++++ 10 files changed, 346 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-) create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.shbase-commit:
5bcd72358a7d7794ade0452ed12919b8c4d6ffc7
Eric Snowberg
reviewerQuoted 4 lines · Mickaël Salaün
David, Eric, what is the status of this patch series?
All the previous issues I had identified have been resolved, so LGTM.
Quoted 48 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 47 lines
This new patch series is a rebase on David Howells's keys-misc branch. This mainly fixes UEFI DBX and the new Eric Snowberg's feature to import asymmetric keys to the blacklist keyring.
I successfully tested this patch series with the 186 entries from
https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/dbxupdate_x64.bin (184 binary hashes and 2 certificates).The goal of these patches is to add a new configuration option to enable the root user to load signed keys in the blacklist keyring. This keyring is useful to "untrust" certificates or files. Enabling to safely update this keyring without recompiling the kernel makes it more usable.
This can be applied on top of David Howells's keys-next branch:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-next
Git commits can be found in https://github.com/l0kod/linux branch dyn-auth-blacklist-v6 commitfcf976b74ffcd4551683e6b70dbf5fb102cf9906.Previous patch series:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/Regards,
Mickaël Salaün (5):
tools/certs: Addprint-cert-tbs-hash.sh
certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
certs: Makeblacklist_vet_description()more strict
certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist
keyringMAINTAINERS | 2 + certs/.gitignore | 1 + certs/Kconfig | 17 +- certs/Makefile | 17 +- certs/blacklist.c | 218 ++++++++++++++---- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 3 +- include/keys/system_keyring.h | 14 +- scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk | 37 +++ .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c | 26 +-- tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh | 91 ++++++++ 10 files changed, 346 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)create mode 100755
scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awkcreate mode 100755tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.shbase-commit:
5bcd72358a7d7794ade0452ed12919b8c4d6ffc7