6.1.84-rc1 review
Subsystems (7)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 270/272 x86/sev: Skip ROM range scans and validation for SEV-SNP guests
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kevin Loughlin <[email protected]>
commit 0f4a1e80989aca185d955fcd791d7750082044a2 upstream.
SEV-SNP requires encrypted memory to be validated before access. Because the ROM memory range is not part of the e820 table, it is not pre-validated by the BIOS. Therefore, if a SEV-SNP guest kernel wishes to access this range, the guest must first validate the range.
The current SEV-SNP code does indeed scan the ROM range during early boot and thus attempts to validate the ROM range in probe_roms(). However, this behavior is neither sufficient nor necessary for the following reasons:
* With regards to sufficiency, if EFI_CONFIG_TABLES are not enabled and CONFIG_DMI_SCAN_MACHINE_NON_EFI_FALLBACK is set, the kernel will attempt to access the memory at SMBIOS_ENTRY_POINT_SCAN_START (which falls in the ROM range) prior to validation.
For example, Project Oak Stage 0 provides a minimal guest firmware that currently meets these configuration conditions, meaning guests booting atop Oak Stage 0 firmware encounter a problematic call chain during dmi_setup() -> dmi_scan_machine() that results in a crash during boot if SEV-SNP is enabled.
* With regards to necessity, SEV-SNP guests generally read garbage (which changes across boots) from the ROM range, meaning these scans are unnecessary. The guest reads garbage because the legacy ROM range is unencrypted data but is accessed via an encrypted PMD during early boot (where the PMD is marked as encrypted due to potentially mapping actually-encrypted data in other PMD-contained ranges).
In one exceptional case, EISA probing treats the ROM range as unencrypted data, which is inconsistent with other probing.
Continuing to allow SEV-SNP guests to use garbage and to inconsistently classify ROM range encryption status can trigger undesirable behavior. For instance, if garbage bytes appear to be a valid signature, memory may be unnecessarily reserved for the ROM range. Future code or other use cases may result in more problematic (arbitrary) behavior that should be avoided.
While one solution would be to overhaul the early PMD mapping to always treat the ROM region of the PMD as unencrypted, SEV-SNP guests do not currently rely on data from the ROM region during early boot (and even if they did, they would be mostly relying on garbage data anyways).
As a simpler solution, skip the ROM range scans (and the otherwise- necessary range validation) during SEV-SNP guest early boot. The potential SEV-SNP guest crash due to lack of ROM range validation is thus avoided by simply not accessing the ROM range.
In most cases, skip the scans by overriding problematic x86_init functions during sme_early_init() to SNP-safe variants, which can be likened to x86_init overrides done for other platforms (ex: Xen); such overrides also avoid the spread of cc_platform_has() checks throughout the tree.
In the exceptional EISA case, still use cc_platform_has() for the simplest change, given (1) checks for guest type (ex: Xen domain status) are already performed here, and (2) these checks occur in a subsys initcall instead of an x86_init function.
[ bp: Massage commit message, remove "we"s. ]
--- arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/eisa.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c | 10 ---------- arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 3 +-- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 27 ++++++++++++--------------- arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +2 -2
@@ -196,12 +196,12 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_private unsigned long npages);void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr,unsigned long npages); -void __init snp_prep_memory (unsigned long paddr,unsigned int sz,enum psc_op op);void snp_set_memory_shared (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long npages);void snp_set_memory_private (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long npages);void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu (void );bool snp_init (struct boot_params *bp);void __init __noreturn snp_abort (void ); +void snp_dmi_setup (void );int snp_issue_guest_request (u64 exit_code,struct snp_req_data *input,struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio);u64 snp_get_unsupported_features (u64 status);u64 sev_get_status (void );
@@ -219,12 +219,12 @@ static inline void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long npages) { }static inline void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long paddr,unsigned long npages) { } -static inline void __init snp_prep_memory (unsigned long paddr,unsigned int sz,enum psc_op op) { }static inline void snp_set_memory_shared (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long npages) { }static inline void snp_set_memory_private (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long npages) { }static inline void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu (void ) { }static inline bool snp_init (struct boot_params *bp) {return false; }static inline void snp_abort (void ) { } +static inline void snp_dmi_setup (void ) { }static inline int snp_issue_guest_request (u64 exit_code,struct snp_req_data *input,struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) {return -ENOTTY ;
arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h +2 -1
@@ -30,12 +30,13 @@ struct x86_init_mpparse {* @reserve_resources: reserve the standard resources for the * platform * @memory_setup: platform specific memory setup -* +* @dmi_setup: platform specific DMI setup */ struct x86_init_resources {void (*probe_roms)(void );void (*reserve_resources)(void );char *(*memory_setup)(void ); +void (*dmi_setup)(void ); };/**
arch/x86/kernel/eisa.c +2 -1
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@/* * EISA specific code */ +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> #include <linux/ioport.h> #include <linux/eisa.h> #include <linux/io.h>
@@ -12,7 +13,7 @@ static __init int eisa_bus_probe(void) {void __iomem *p; -if (xen_pv_domain () && !xen_initial_domain ()) +if ((xen_pv_domain () && !xen_initial_domain ()) ||cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP ))return 0 ; p =ioremap (0x0FFFD9 ,4 );
arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c +0 -10
@@ -203,16 +203,6 @@ void __init probe_roms(void)unsigned char c;int i; -/* -* The ROM memory range is not part of the e820 table and is therefore not -* pre-validated by BIOS. The kernel page table maps the ROM region as encrypted -* memory, and SNP requires encrypted memory to be validated before access. -* Do that here. -*/ -snp_prep_memory (video_rom_resource.start, - ((system_rom_resource.end +1 ) - video_rom_resource.start), -SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE ); -/* video rom */ upper = adapter_rom_resources[0 ].start;for (start = video_rom_resource.start; start < upper; start +=2048 ) {
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c +1 -2
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@#include <linux/console.h> #include <linux/crash_dump.h> #include <linux/dma-map-ops.h> -#include <linux/dmi.h> #include <linux/efi.h> #include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/init_ohci1394_dma.h>
@@ -1032,7 +1031,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)if (efi_enabled (EFI_BOOT ))efi_init (); -dmi_setup (); + x86_init.resources.dmi_setup ();/* * VMware detection requires dmi to be available, so this
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +12 -15
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@#include <linux/platform_device.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/psp-sev.h> +#include <linux/dmi.h> #include <uapi/linux/sev-guest.h> #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
@@ -768,21 +769,6 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(early_set_pages_state (paddr, npages,SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED ); } -void __init snp_prep_memory (unsigned long paddr,unsigned int sz,enum psc_op op) -{ -unsigned long vaddr, npages; - - vaddr = (unsigned long )__va (paddr); - npages =PAGE_ALIGN (sz) >>PAGE_SHIFT ; - -if (op ==SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE ) -early_snp_set_memory_private (vaddr, paddr, npages); -else if (op ==SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED ) -early_snp_set_memory_shared (vaddr, paddr, npages); -else -WARN (1 ,"invalid memory op %d\n" , op); -} -static int vmgexit_psc (struct snp_psc_desc *desc) {int cur_entry, end_entry, ret =0 ;
@@ -2152,6 +2138,17 @@ void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void)sev_es_terminate (SEV_TERM_SET_GEN ,GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED ); } +/* +* SEV-SNP guests should only execute dmi_setup() if EFI_CONFIG_TABLES are +* enabled, as the alternative (fallback) logic for DMI probing in the legacy +* ROM region can cause a crash since this region is not pre-validated. +*/ +void __init snp_dmi_setup (void ) +{ +if (efi_enabled (EFI_CONFIG_TABLES )) +dmi_setup (); +} +static void dump_cpuid_table (void ) {const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table =snp_cpuid_get_table ();
arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c +2 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@* * For licencing details see kernel-base/COPYING */ +#include <linux/dmi.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/ioport.h> #include <linux/export.h>
@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ struct x86_init_ops x86_init __initdata .probe_roms = probe_roms, .reserve_resources = reserve_standard_io_resources, .memory_setup = e820__memory_setup_default, + .dmi_setup = dmi_setup, }, .mpparse = {
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c +18 -0
@@ -513,6 +513,24 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)*/ if (sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED )ia32_disable (); + +/* +* Override init functions that scan the ROM region in SEV-SNP guests, +* as this memory is not pre-validated and would thus cause a crash. +*/ +if (sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED ) { + x86_init.mpparse.find_smp_config = x86_init_noop; + x86_init.pci.init_irq = x86_init_noop; + x86_init.resources.probe_roms = x86_init_noop; + +/* +* DMI setup behavior for SEV-SNP guests depends on +* efi_enabled(EFI_CONFIG_TABLES), which hasn't been +* parsed yet. snp_dmi_setup() will run after that +* parsing has happened. +*/ + x86_init.resources.dmi_setup = snp_dmi_setup; + } }void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem (void )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 271/272 USB: core: Fix deadlock in usb_deauthorize_interface()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
commit 80ba43e9f799cbdd83842fc27db667289b3150f5 upstream.
Among the attribute file callback routines in drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c, the interface_authorized_store() function is the only one which acquires a device lock on an ancestor device: It calls usb_deauthorize_interface(), which locks the interface's parent USB device.
The will lead to deadlock if another process already owns that lock and tries to remove the interface, whether through a configuration change or because the device has been disconnected. As part of the removal procedure, device_del() waits for all ongoing sysfs attribute callbacks to complete. But usb_deauthorize_interface() can't complete until the device lock has been released, and the lock won't be released until the removal has finished.
The mechanism provided by sysfs to prevent this kind of deadlock is to use the sysfs_break_active_protection() function, which tells sysfs not to wait for the attribute callback.
Reported-and-tested by: Yue Sun <[email protected]> Reported by: xingwei lee <[email protected]>
--- drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c +13 -3
@@ -1170,14 +1170,24 @@ static ssize_t interface_authorized_stor {struct usb_interface *intf =to_usb_interface (dev);bool val; +struct kernfs_node *kn;if (strtobool (buf, &val) !=0 )return -EINVAL ; -if (val) +if (val) {usb_authorize_interface (intf); -else -usb_deauthorize_interface (intf); + }else { +/* +* Prevent deadlock if another process is concurrently +* trying to unregister intf. +*/ + kn =sysfs_break_active_protection (&dev->kobj, &attr->attr); +if (kn) { +usb_deauthorize_interface (intf); +sysfs_unbreak_active_protection (kn); + } + }return count; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 272/272 tools/resolve_btfids: fix build with musl libc
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Natanael Copa <[email protected]>
commit 62248b22d01e96a4d669cde0d7005bd51ebf9e76 upstream.
Include the header that defines u32.
This fixes build of 6.6.23 and 6.1.83 kernels for Alpine Linux, which uses musl libc. I assume that GNU libc indirecly pulls in linux/types.h.
--- tools/include/linux/btf_ids.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
tools/include/linux/btf_ids.h +2 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_BTF_IDS_H #define _LINUX_BTF_IDS_H +#include <linux/types.h> /* for u32 */ + struct btf_id_set { u32 cnt; u32 ids[];
Hello,
Quoted 5 lines · On Mon, 1 Apr 2024 17:43:10 +0200 Greg Kroah-Hartman…
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.84 release. There are 272 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 8 lines
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Apr 2024 15:24:46 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.84-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
This rc kernel passes DAMON functionality test[1] on my test machine. Attaching the test results summary below. Please note that I retrieved the kernel from linux-stable-rc tree[2].
[1] https://github.com/awslabs/damon-tests/tree/next/corr
[2] aa2042702765 ("Linux 6.1.84-rc1")
Thanks,
SJ
[...]
---
ok 1 selftests: damon: debugfs_attrs.sh
ok 2 selftests: damon: debugfs_schemes.sh
ok 3 selftests: damon: debugfs_target_ids.sh
ok 4 selftests: damon: debugfs_empty_targets.sh
ok 5 selftests: damon: debugfs_huge_count_read_write.sh
ok 6 selftests: damon: debugfs_duplicate_context_creation.sh
ok 7 selftests: damon: sysfs.sh
ok 1 selftests: damon-tests: kunit.sh
ok 2 selftests: damon-tests: huge_count_read_write.sh
ok 3 selftests: damon-tests: buffer_overflow.sh
ok 4 selftests: damon-tests: rm_contexts.sh
ok 5 selftests: damon-tests: record_null_deref.sh
ok 6 selftests: damon-tests: dbgfs_target_ids_read_before_terminate_race.sh ok 7 selftests: damon-tests: dbgfs_target_ids_pid_leak.sh
ok 8 selftests: damon-tests: damo_tests.sh
ok 9 selftests: damon-tests: masim-record.sh
ok 10 selftests: damon-tests: build_i386.sh
ok 11 selftests: damon-tests: build_arm64.sh
ok 12 selftests: damon-tests: build_m68k.sh
ok 13 selftests: damon-tests: build_i386_idle_flag.sh
ok 14 selftests: damon-tests: build_i386_highpte.sh
ok 15 selftests: damon-tests: build_nomemcg.sh
[33m
[92mPASS [39m
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.84 release. There are 272 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Apr 2024 15:24:46 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.84-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENERIC:
Signature · 1 line
Florian
Hi!
Quoted 4 lines
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.84 release. There are 272 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
CIP testing did not find any problems here:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-6.1.y
Best regards,
Pavel
Signature · 2 lines
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Erika Unter HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.84 release. There are 272 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Apr 2024 15:24:46 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.84-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
Quoted 6 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.84 release. There are 272 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Apr 2024 15:24:46 +0000.
No regressions found on WSL (x86 and arm64).
Built, booted, and reviewed dmesg.
Thank you. :)
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.84 release. There are 272 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Apr 2024 15:24:46 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.84-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.84 release. There are 272 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Apr 2024 15:24:46 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.84-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
## Build
* kernel: 6.1.84-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-6.1.y
* git commit: aa2042702765a33750c326a9e153901b313636ac
* git describe: v6.1.83-273-gaa2042702765
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-6.1.y/build/v6.1.83-273-gaa2042702765
## Test Regressions (compared to v6.1.83)
## Metric Regressions (compared to v6.1.83)
## Test Fixes (compared to v6.1.83)
## Metric Fixes (compared to v6.1.83)
## Test result summary
total: 146089, pass: 124663, fail: 2421, skip: 18867, xfail: 138
## Build Summary
* arc: 5 total, 5 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 138 total, 138 passed, 0 failed
* arm64: 41 total, 40 passed, 1 failed
* i386: 30 total, 30 passed, 0 failed
* mips: 25 total, 25 passed, 0 failed
* parisc: 4 total, 4 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 34 total, 34 passed, 0 failed
* riscv: 11 total, 11 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 16 total, 15 passed, 1 failed
* sh: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 8 total, 8 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 35 total, 34 passed, 1 failed
## Test suites summary
* boot
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-drivers-dma-buf
* kselftest-exec
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-ftrace
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memfd
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mm
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-net-forwarding
* kselftest-net-mptcp
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-user_events
* kselftest-vDSO
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kunit
* libgpiod
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-io
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-smoketest
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* perf
* rcutorture
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.84 release. There are 272 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
W dniu 1.04.2024 o 17:43, Greg Kroah-Hartman pisze:
Quoted 9 lines
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.84 release. There are 272 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Apr 2024 15:24:46 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.84-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Hello,
Tested on a HP 17-by0001nw laptop with an Intel Kaby Lake CPU and Ubuntu 20.04.
Stack:
- amd64,
- ext4 on top of LVM on top of LUKS on top of mdraid on top of NVMe and SATA drives (the SATA drive in the write-mostly mode).
Tested (lightly):
- suspend to RAM,
- suspend to disk,
- GPU (Intel HD Graphics 620, with an old game on Wine and ~3 Unigine benchmarks)
- WiFi (Realtek RTL8822BE),
- Bluetooth (Realtek RTL8822BE),
- PCI soundcard (Intel HD Audio),
- USB soundcard (Logitech Pro X),
- webcam,
Filesystems tested very lightly (mounting, listing and opening files):
- NFS,
- exFAT
- vfat,
- NTFS via FUSE
Nitpicks:
- I got the following error in dmesg from Bluetooth after resume from suspend:
[ 4058.056834] usb 1-3: 1:1: cannot get freq at ep 0x81
Greetings,
Mateusz
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.84 release. There are 272 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Apr 2024 15:24:46 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.84-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
All tests passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v6.1:
10 builds: 10 pass, 0 fail
26 boots: 26 pass, 0 fail
116 tests: 116 pass, 0 failLinux version: 6.1.84-rc1-gaa2042702765
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,
tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra194-p3509-0000+p3668-0000,
tegra20-ventana, tegra210-p2371-2180,
tegra210-p3450-0000, tegra30-cardhu-a04Jon
Hi Greg,
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.84 release. There are 272 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Apr 2024 15:24:46 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Quoted 7 lines
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.1.84-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.1.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
I tested 6.1.84-rc1 (aa2042702765) on Kalray kvx arch (not upstream yet) and everything looks good!
It ran on real hw (k200, k200lp and k300 boards), on qemu as well as on our internal instruction set simulator (ISS).
Tests were run on several interfaces/drivers (usb, qsfp ethernet, eMMC, PCIe endpoint+RC, SPI, remoteproc, uart, iommu). LTP and uClibc-ng testsuites are also run without any regression.
Everything looks fine to us.
Signature · 1 line
Yann
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.1.84 release. There are 272 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.