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suppress page allocation failure warnings from sys_listxattr

PATCH Dave Jones 6 participants 20 messages Mar 13, 2012 – Mar 29, 2012

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Dave Jones

author
#0 lore raw

This size is user controllable, and so it's trivial for someone to trigger a stream of order:4 page allocation errors.

Signed-off-by Dave Jones <[email protected]>

---
There's also a similar problem in setxattr, but I'm not sure how we want to pass NOWARN down to memdup_user. Thoughts ?

fs/xattr.c +1 -1
index 82f4337..544df90 100644
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user *list, size_t size)
 	if (size) {
 		if (size > XATTR_LIST_MAX)
 			size = XATTR_LIST_MAX;
-		klist = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		klist = kmalloc(size, __GFP_NOWARN | GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!klist)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 	}
#1 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Dave Jones

This size is user controllable, and so it's trivial for someone to trigger a stream of order:4 page allocation errors.

I spent some time today struggling with an order:4 allocation failure (my application uses CLONE_NEWNET to make an empty network stack for software builds, and apparently one of the netfilter caches requires this).

But is that the general principle, that we just add GFP_NOWARN if the allocation size is trivially user controllable? I guess examples like fs/pipe.c:pipe_set_size() agree with you, but it feels kind of like it's papering over the problem...

#2 lore raw
In reply to Dave Jones
Quoted 14 lines · On Tue, 13 Mar 2012 14:22:20 -0400 Dave Jones <[email protected]> wrote:

This size is user controllable, and so it's trivial for someone to trigger a stream of order:4 page allocation errors.

Signed-off-by Dave Jones <[email protected]>

---
There's also a similar problem in setxattr, but I'm not sure how we want to pass NOWARN down to memdup_user. Thoughts ?

fs/xattr.c +0 -0
index 82f4337..544df90 100644

fs/xattr.c listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user *list, size_t size) · line 502

Quoted 8 lines
fs/xattr.c +1 -1
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user *list, size_t size)
 	if (size) {
 		if (size > XATTR_LIST_MAX)
 			size = XATTR_LIST_MAX;
-		klist = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		klist = kmalloc(size, __GFP_NOWARN | GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!klist)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 	}

hm. The patch is good, but one would hope that it isn't "trivial" to trigger a page allocation failure for a kmalloc(65536, GFP_KERNEL) - the VM is supposed to be able to handle that.

Is it really *that* easy, or is Something Unusual happening with that machine?

author
#3 lore raw
Quoted 30 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 14 lines · On Tue, 13 Mar 2012 14:22:20 -0400 Dave Jones <[email protected]> wrote:

This size is user controllable, and so it's trivial for someone to trigger a stream of order:4 page allocation errors.

Signed-off-by Dave Jones <[email protected]>

---
There's also a similar problem in setxattr, but I'm not sure how we want to pass NOWARN down to memdup_user. Thoughts ?

fs/xattr.c +0 -0
index 82f4337..544df90 100644

fs/xattr.c listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user *list, size_t size) · line 502

Quoted 8 lines
fs/xattr.c +1 -1
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user *list, size_t size)
 	if (size) {
 		if (size > XATTR_LIST_MAX)
 			size = XATTR_LIST_MAX;
-		klist = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		klist = kmalloc(size, __GFP_NOWARN | GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!klist)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 	}

hm. The patch is good, but one would hope that it isn't "trivial" to trigger a page allocation failure for a kmalloc(65536, GFP_KERNEL) - the VM is supposed to be able to handle that.

Quoted 2 lines

Is it really *that* easy, or is Something Unusual happening with that machine?

Well, the unusual thing was that I was fuzzing system calls for a few hours.

My fuzzing tool was able to trigger these very easily after an hour or two of uptime and memory had fragmented a little, so yeah, quite trivial.

Dave

#4 lore raw
Quoted 31 lines · On Tue, 27 Mar 2012 20:15:50 -0400 Dave Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 30 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 14 lines · On Tue, 13 Mar 2012 14:22:20 -0400 Dave Jones <[email protected]> wrote:

This size is user controllable, and so it's trivial for someone to trigger a stream of order:4 page allocation errors.

Signed-off-by Dave Jones <[email protected]>

---
There's also a similar problem in setxattr, but I'm not sure how we want to pass NOWARN down to memdup_user. Thoughts ?

fs/xattr.c +0 -0
index 82f4337..544df90 100644

fs/xattr.c listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user *list, size_t size) · line 502

Quoted 8 lines
fs/xattr.c +1 -1
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user *list, size_t size)
 	if (size) {
 		if (size > XATTR_LIST_MAX)
 			size = XATTR_LIST_MAX;
-		klist = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		klist = kmalloc(size, __GFP_NOWARN | GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!klist)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 	}

hm. The patch is good, but one would hope that it isn't "trivial" to trigger a page allocation failure for a kmalloc(65536, GFP_KERNEL) - the VM is supposed to be able to handle that.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Is it really *that* easy, or is Something Unusual happening with that machine?

Well, the unusual thing was that I was fuzzing system calls for a few hours.

My fuzzing tool was able to trigger these very easily after an hour or two of uptime and memory had fragmented a little, so yeah, quite trivial.

/*
* PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER is the order at which allocations are deemed
* costly to service. That is between allocation orders which should
* coelesce naturally under reasonable reclaim pressure and those which
* will not.
*/
#define PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER 3

Death to magic numbers :(

Acked-by
#5 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Andrew Morton

/*
* PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER is the order at which allocations are deemed
* costly to service. That is between allocation orders which should
* coelesce naturally under reasonable reclaim pressure and those which
* will not.
*/
#define PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER 3

Death to magic numbers :(

This isn't as dire as it sounds, memory compaction is specifically targeted to run when the order is greater than this, see compaction_ready(). If direct reclaim and compaction both fail then there's nothing the VM can do other than oom kill to free memory and we avoid doing that because there's no guarantee of freeing enough memory that the high-order allocation will be successful.

Not even __GFP_REPEAT is going to be helpful since we can't oom kill anything, the only alternative would be to use __GFP_NOFAIL and that would just be deadly for such an allocation request. This error is recoverable, so

Acked-by David Rientjes <[email protected]>

to the patch.

#6 lore raw
In reply to Dave Jones
Quoted 31 lines · Dave Jones
Quoted 30 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 14 lines · On Tue, 13 Mar 2012 14:22:20 -0400 Dave Jones <[email protected]> wrote:

This size is user controllable, and so it's trivial for someone to trigger a stream of order:4 page allocation errors.

Signed-off-by Dave Jones <[email protected]>

---
There's also a similar problem in setxattr, but I'm not sure how we want to pass NOWARN down to memdup_user. Thoughts ?

fs/xattr.c +0 -0
index 82f4337..544df90 100644

fs/xattr.c listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user *list, size_t size) · line 502

Quoted 8 lines
fs/xattr.c +1 -1
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user *list, size_t size)
 	if (size) {
 		if (size > XATTR_LIST_MAX)
 			size = XATTR_LIST_MAX;
-		klist = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		klist = kmalloc(size, __GFP_NOWARN | GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!klist)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 	}

hm. The patch is good, but one would hope that it isn't "trivial" to trigger a page allocation failure for a kmalloc(65536, GFP_KERNEL) - the VM is supposed to be able to handle that.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Is it really *that* easy, or is Something Unusual happening with that machine?

Well, the unusual thing was that I was fuzzing system calls for a few hours.

My fuzzing tool was able to trigger these very easily after an hour or two of uptime and memory had fragmented a little, so yeah, quite trivial.

We've recently been seeing reports of xfsdump trigging a similar allocation failures in the XFS attr code when we are doing hundreds of thousands of attribute lookups to back them up.

ad650f5 xfs: fallback to vmalloc for large buffers in xfs_attrmulti_attr_get

I think that falling back to vmalloc here is much better solution than failing to retreive the attribute - it will work no matter how fragmented memory gets. That means we don't get incomplete backups occurring after days or months of uptime and successful backups...

Cheers,

Dave.

Signature · 2 lines
Dave Chinner
[email protected]
#7 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · On Wed, 28 Mar 2012 15:39:51 +1100 Dave Chinner <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 4 lines

Well, the unusual thing was that I was fuzzing system calls for a few hours.

My fuzzing tool was able to trigger these very easily after an hour or two of uptime and memory had fragmented a little, so yeah, quite trivial.

We've recently been seeing reports of xfsdump trigging a similar allocation failures in the XFS attr code when we are doing hundreds of thousands of attribute lookups to back them up.

Quoted 7 lines

ad650f5 xfs: fallback to vmalloc for large buffers in xfs_attrmulti_attr_get

I think that falling back to vmalloc here is much better solution than failing to retreive the attribute - it will work no matter how fragmented memory gets. That means we don't get incomplete backups occurring after days or months of uptime and successful backups...

Yup. How does the below look?

This patch needs more Davids.

From: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Subject: fs/xattr.c:listxattr(): fall back to vmalloc() if kmalloc() failed

This allocation can be as large as 64k. As David points out, "falling back to vmalloc here is much better solution than failing to retreive the attribute - it will work no matter how fragmented memory gets. That means we don't get incomplete backups occurring after days or months of uptime and successful backups".

Cc Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Cc David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

---

 fs/xattr.c |   14 +++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/xattr.c renamed from fs/xattr.c~fs-xattrc-listxattr-fall-back-to-vmalloc-if-kmalloc-failed +11 -3
diff -puN fs/xattr.c~fs-xattrc-listxattr-fall-back-to-vmalloc-if-kmalloc-failed fs/xattr.c
@@ -492,13 +492,18 @@ listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user 
 {
 	ssize_t error;
 	char *klist = NULL;
+	char *vlist = NULL;	/* If non-NULL, we used vmalloc() */
 
 	if (size) {
 		if (size > XATTR_LIST_MAX)
 			size = XATTR_LIST_MAX;
 		klist = kmalloc(size, __GFP_NOWARN | GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!klist)
-			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (!klist) {
+			vlist = vmalloc(size);
+			if (!vlist)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+			klist = vlist;
+		}
 	}
 
 	error = vfs_listxattr(d, klist, size);

@@ -510,7 +515,10 @@ listxattr(struct dentry *d, char __user 
 		   than XATTR_LIST_MAX bytes. Not possible. */
 		error = -E2BIG;
 	}
-	kfree(klist);
+	if (vlist)
+		vfree(vlist);
+	else
+		kfree(klist);
 	return error;
 }

_

author
#8 lore raw
Quoted 14 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 11 lines · On Wed, 28 Mar 2012 15:39:51 +1100 Dave Chinner <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 4 lines

Well, the unusual thing was that I was fuzzing system calls for a few hours.

My fuzzing tool was able to trigger these very easily after an hour or two of uptime and memory had fragmented a little, so yeah, quite trivial.

We've recently been seeing reports of xfsdump trigging a similar allocation failures in the XFS attr code when we are doing hundreds of thousands of attribute lookups to back them up.

ad650f5 xfs: fallback to vmalloc for large buffers in xfs_attrmulti_attr_get

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

I think that falling back to vmalloc here is much better solution than failing to retreive the attribute - it will work no matter how fragmented memory gets. That means we don't get incomplete backups occurring after days or months of uptime and successful backups...

Yup. How does the below look?

Don't see anything immediately wrong with it.
Any thoughts on what to do about the similar problem in setxattr ? (memdup_user)

Dave

#9 lore raw
Quoted 21 lines · On Wed, 28 Mar 2012 20:54:42 -0400 Dave Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 20 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 16 lines · On Wed, 28 Mar 2012 15:39:51 +1100 Dave Chinner <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 4 lines

Well, the unusual thing was that I was fuzzing system calls for a few hours.

My fuzzing tool was able to trigger these very easily after an hour or two of uptime and memory had fragmented a little, so yeah, quite trivial.

We've recently been seeing reports of xfsdump trigging a similar allocation failures in the XFS attr code when we are doing hundreds of thousands of attribute lookups to back them up.

ad650f5 xfs: fallback to vmalloc for large buffers in xfs_attrmulti_attr_get

I think that falling back to vmalloc here is much better solution than failing to retreive the attribute - it will work no matter how fragmented memory gets. That means we don't get incomplete backups occurring after days or months of uptime and successful backups...

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

Yup. How does the below look?

Don't see anything immediately wrong with it.
Any thoughts on what to do about the similar problem in setxattr ? (memdup_user)

I can't think of anything clever.

The dumb approach:

From: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Subject: fs/xattr.c:setxattr(): improve handling of allocation failures

This allocation can be as large as 64k.

- Add __GFP_NOWARN so that a falied kmalloc() is silent

- Fall back to vmalloc() if the kmalloc() failed

Cc Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Cc David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

---

 fs/xattr.c |   21 +++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/xattr.c renamed from fs/xattr.c~fs-xattrc-setxattr-improve-handling-of-allocation-failures +17 -4
diff -puN fs/xattr.c~fs-xattrc-setxattr-improve-handling-of-allocation-failures fs/xattr.c
@@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __
 {
 	int error;
 	void *kvalue = NULL;
+	void *vvalue = NULL;	/* If non-NULL, we used vmalloc() */
 	char kname[XATTR_NAME_MAX + 1];
 
 	if (flags & ~(XATTR_CREATE|XATTR_REPLACE))

@@ -334,13 +335,25 @@ setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __
 	if (size) {
 		if (size > XATTR_SIZE_MAX)
 			return -E2BIG;
-		kvalue = memdup_user(value, size);
-		if (IS_ERR(kvalue))
-			return PTR_ERR(kvalue);
+		kvalue = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
+		if (!kvalue) {
+			vvalue = vmalloc(size);
+			if (!vvalue)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+			kvalue = vvalue;
+		}
+		if (copy_from_user(kvalue, value, size)) {
+			error = -EFAULT;
+			goto out;
+		}
 	}
 
 	error = vfs_setxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size, flags);
-	kfree(kvalue);
+out:
+	if (vvalue)
+		vfree(vvalue);
+	else
+		kfree(kvalue);
 	return error;
 }

_

#10 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 3 lines · On Wed, 28 Mar 2012 20:54:42 -0400 Dave Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line

Yup. How does the below look?

Don't see anything immediately wrong with it.
Any thoughts on what to do about the similar problem in setxattr ? (memdup_user)

[]

Quoted 1 line

diff -puN fs/xattr.c~fs-xattrc-setxattr-improve-handling-of-allocation-failures fs/xattr.c

[]

Review setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __

Quoted 1 line
(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -334,13 +335,25 @@ setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __

[]

fs/xattr.c setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __ · line 340

Quoted 3 lines
fs/xattr.c renamed from fs/xattr.c~fs-xattrc-setxattr-improve-handling-of-allocation-failures +3 -0
+		kvalue = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
+		if (!kvalue) {
+			vvalue = vmalloc(size);

[]

fs/xattr.c setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __ · line 357

Quoted 5 lines
fs/xattr.c renamed from fs/xattr.c~fs-xattrc-setxattr-improve-handling-of-allocation-failures +4 -0
+	if (vvalue)
+		vfree(vvalue);
+	else
+		kfree(kvalue);
 	return error;

These patterns are pretty common, maybe create a standard helper?

#11 lore raw
Quoted 14 lines · On Wed, 28 Mar 2012 18:28:43 -0700 Joe Perches <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 4 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 3 lines · On Wed, 28 Mar 2012 20:54:42 -0400 Dave Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line

Yup. How does the below look?

Don't see anything immediately wrong with it.
Any thoughts on what to do about the similar problem in setxattr ? (memdup_user)

[]

Quoted 1 line

diff -puN fs/xattr.c~fs-xattrc-setxattr-improve-handling-of-allocation-failures fs/xattr.c

[]

Review setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __

Quoted 1 line
(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -334,13 +335,25 @@ setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __

[]

fs/xattr.c setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __ · line 340

Quoted 3 lines
fs/xattr.c renamed from fs/xattr.c~fs-xattrc-setxattr-improve-handling-of-allocation-failures +3 -0
+		kvalue = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
+		if (!kvalue) {
+			vvalue = vmalloc(size);

[]

Quoted 7 lines

fs/xattr.c setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __ · line 357

Quoted 5 lines
fs/xattr.c renamed from fs/xattr.c~fs-xattrc-setxattr-improve-handling-of-allocation-failures +4 -0
+	if (vvalue)
+		vfree(vvalue);
+	else
+		kfree(kvalue);
 	return error;

These patterns are pretty common, maybe create a standard helper?

Could. There was some discussion last year and implementations were tossed around.

I'm a bit apprehensive - kernel code is supposed to be robust, and large allocations are not robust and vmalloc() is crappy. Formalising these things in an API probably won't make anything worse, but will deprive us of opportunities for ritualistic humiliation and knuckle-rapping.

author
#12 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Andrew Morton

Could. There was some discussion last year and implementations were tossed around.

I'm a bit apprehensive - kernel code is supposed to be robust, and large allocations are not robust and vmalloc() is crappy.

Can you expand on crappy ? Also, what happens if something allocates and sits on a bunch of vmalloc'd memory ? would we start seeing oom kills ? (thinking of the context of my fuzzing tool where a bunch of instances could
feasibly call these syscalls and not sit on huge amounts per thread, but collectively... I'm wondering if it could be provoked into killing processes I don't own)

Dave

#13 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · On Wed, 28 Mar 2012 21:50:59 -0400 Dave Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 5 lines · Andrew Morton

Could. There was some discussion last year and implementations were tossed around.

I'm a bit apprehensive - kernel code is supposed to be robust, and large allocations are not robust and vmalloc() is crappy.

Can you expand on crappy ?

It's expensive on a per-call basis and can end up failing due to internal fragmentation of vmalloc()'s virtually-addressed arena. I don't think I've ever seen a report of anyone getting a vmalloc() failure due to the fragmentation issue, so it's largely theoretical. But of course, the more we use it (especially for long-lived allocations), the greater the risk becomes. Mainly to 32-bit machines, I assume.

Quoted 2 lines

Also, what happens if something allocates
and sits on a bunch of vmalloc'd memory ? would we start seeing oom kills ?

vmalloc() would fail.

Quoted 4 lines

(thinking of the context of my fuzzing tool where a bunch of instances could
feasibly call these syscalls and not sit on huge amounts per thread, but collectively... I'm wondering if it could be provoked into killing processes I don't own)

umm, if you wanted to deliberately trigger a vmalloc() failure then I guess a good approach would be to locate a vmalloc() site which can persist beyond the syscall (modprobe is a good one!) then exercise it in a way so that there are no N-byte holes left in the arena, then trigger an N-byte vmalloc().

author
#14 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 2 lines

Also, what happens if something allocates
and sits on a bunch of vmalloc'd memory ? would we start seeing oom kills ?

vmalloc() would fail.

Ok, that's a pretty boring failure mode, so not a big deal probably.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines

(thinking of the context of my fuzzing tool where a bunch of instances could
feasibly call these syscalls and not sit on huge amounts per thread, but collectively... I'm wondering if it could be provoked into killing processes I don't own)

umm, if you wanted to deliberately trigger a vmalloc() failure then I guess a good approach would be to locate a vmalloc() site which can persist beyond the syscall (modprobe is a good one!) then exercise it in a way so that there are no N-byte holes left in the arena, then trigger an N-byte vmalloc().

Well modprobe is root-only, so that's not so bad. But it looks like key_add (see other thread from this evening) and probably others can be called as a user and gobble up vmalloc space. omnomnom.

Dave

#15 lore raw
Quoted 14 lines · On Wed, 28 Mar 2012 22:08:20 -0400 Dave Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 4 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 2 lines

Also, what happens if something allocates
and sits on a bunch of vmalloc'd memory ? would we start seeing oom kills ?

vmalloc() would fail.

Ok, that's a pretty boring failure mode, so not a big deal probably.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines

(thinking of the context of my fuzzing tool where a bunch of instances could
feasibly call these syscalls and not sit on huge amounts per thread, but collectively... I'm wondering if it could be provoked into killing processes I don't own)

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

umm, if you wanted to deliberately trigger a vmalloc() failure then I guess a good approach would be to locate a vmalloc() site which can persist beyond the syscall (modprobe is a good one!) then exercise it in a way so that there are no N-byte holes left in the arena, then trigger an N-byte vmalloc().

Well modprobe is root-only, so that's not so bad.

Even if it's root-only, we can still end up with a toasted machine. Accidentally toasted, not deliberately.

Quoted 3 lines

But it looks like
key_add (see other thread from this evening) and probably others can be called as a user and gobble up vmalloc space. omnomnom.

hm, the keys code appears to prevent the user from reserving more than 20000 bytes of memory total (key_payload_reserve()), so it doesn't look very useful for screwing up vmalloc().

author
#16 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 3 lines

But it looks like
key_add (see other thread from this evening) and probably others can be called as a user and gobble up vmalloc space. omnomnom.

hm, the keys code appears to prevent the user from reserving more than 20000 bytes of memory total (key_payload_reserve()), so it doesn't look very useful for screwing up vmalloc().

Then how did I trick it into trying an order 8 allocation ?

trinity: page allocation failure: order:8, mode:0x40d0
Pid: 27119, comm: trinity Not tainted 3.3.0+ #31

Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8115dd66>] warn_alloc_failed+0xf6/0x160
 [<ffffffff816ad436>] ? __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0x1d0/0x1e2
 [<ffffffff81162492>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x8b2/0xb10
 [<ffffffff8119dae6>] alloc_pages_current+0xb6/0x120
 [<ffffffff8115d3b4>] __get_free_pages+0x14/0x50
 [<ffffffff811ac64f>] kmalloc_order_trace+0x3f/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff811aca0a>] __kmalloc+0x25a/0x280
 [<ffffffff812c034a>] sys_add_key+0x9a/0x210
 [<ffffffff813386be>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
 [<ffffffff816c04e9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
#17 lore raw
Quoted 13 lines · On Wed, 28 Mar 2012 23:00:00 -0400 Dave Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 7 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 3 lines

But it looks like
key_add (see other thread from this evening) and probably others can be called as a user and gobble up vmalloc space. omnomnom.

hm, the keys code appears to prevent the user from reserving more than 20000 bytes of memory total (key_payload_reserve()), so it doesn't look very useful for screwing up vmalloc().

Then how did I trick it into trying an order 8 allocation ?

trinity: page allocation failure: order:8, mode:0x40d0
Pid: 27119, comm: trinity Not tainted 3.3.0+ #31

Quoted 11 lines
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8115dd66>] warn_alloc_failed+0xf6/0x160
 [<ffffffff816ad436>] ? __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0x1d0/0x1e2
 [<ffffffff81162492>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x8b2/0xb10
 [<ffffffff8119dae6>] alloc_pages_current+0xb6/0x120
 [<ffffffff8115d3b4>] __get_free_pages+0x14/0x50
 [<ffffffff811ac64f>] kmalloc_order_trace+0x3f/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff811aca0a>] __kmalloc+0x25a/0x280
 [<ffffffff812c034a>] sys_add_key+0x9a/0x210
 [<ffffffff813386be>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
 [<ffffffff816c04e9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Ah, that's different. The memory at *payload doesn't live beyond the syscall so it can't be used to cause vmalloc fragmentation.

We should squish the warning:

From: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Subject: security/keys/keyctl.c: suppress memory allocation failure warning

This allocation may be large. The code is probing to see if it will succeed and if not, it falls back to vmalloc(). We should suppress any page-allocation failure messages when the fallback happens.

Reported-by Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Cc David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc James Morris <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Andrew Morton <[email protected]>

---

 security/keys/keyctl.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/keys/keyctl.c renamed from security/keys/keyctl.c~security-keys-keyctlc-suppress-memory-allocation-failure-warning +1 -1
diff -puN security/keys/keyctl.c~security-keys-keyctlc-suppress-memory-allocation-failure-warning security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __us
 	vm = false;
 	if (_payload) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
 		if (!payload) {
 			if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
 				goto error2;

_

author
#18 lore raw
Quoted 28 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 13 lines · On Wed, 28 Mar 2012 23:00:00 -0400 Dave Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 7 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 3 lines

But it looks like
key_add (see other thread from this evening) and probably others can be called as a user and gobble up vmalloc space. omnomnom.

hm, the keys code appears to prevent the user from reserving more than 20000 bytes of memory total (key_payload_reserve()), so it doesn't look very useful for screwing up vmalloc().

Then how did I trick it into trying an order 8 allocation ?

trinity: page allocation failure: order:8, mode:0x40d0
Pid: 27119, comm: trinity Not tainted 3.3.0+ #31

Quoted 11 lines
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8115dd66>] warn_alloc_failed+0xf6/0x160
 [<ffffffff816ad436>] ? __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0x1d0/0x1e2
 [<ffffffff81162492>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x8b2/0xb10
 [<ffffffff8119dae6>] alloc_pages_current+0xb6/0x120
 [<ffffffff8115d3b4>] __get_free_pages+0x14/0x50
 [<ffffffff811ac64f>] kmalloc_order_trace+0x3f/0x1a0
 [<ffffffff811aca0a>] __kmalloc+0x25a/0x280
 [<ffffffff812c034a>] sys_add_key+0x9a/0x210
 [<ffffffff813386be>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
 [<ffffffff816c04e9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Quoted 4 lines

Ah, that's different. The memory at *payload doesn't live beyond the syscall so it can't be used to cause vmalloc fragmentation.

We should squish the warning:

That's the same patch I sent in the other thread, so ack ;-)

Dave

#19 lore raw
In reply to Andrew Morton
Quoted 24 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 14 lines · On Wed, 28 Mar 2012 18:28:43 -0700 Joe Perches <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 4 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 3 lines · On Wed, 28 Mar 2012 20:54:42 -0400 Dave Jones <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line

Yup. How does the below look?

Don't see anything immediately wrong with it.
Any thoughts on what to do about the similar problem in setxattr ? (memdup_user)

[]

Quoted 1 line

diff -puN fs/xattr.c~fs-xattrc-setxattr-improve-handling-of-allocation-failures fs/xattr.c

[]

Review setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __

Quoted 1 line
(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -334,13 +335,25 @@ setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __

[]

fs/xattr.c setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __ · line 340

Quoted 3 lines
fs/xattr.c renamed from fs/xattr.c~fs-xattrc-setxattr-improve-handling-of-allocation-failures +3 -0
+		kvalue = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
+		if (!kvalue) {
+			vvalue = vmalloc(size);

[]

Quoted 7 lines

fs/xattr.c setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __ · line 357

Quoted 5 lines
fs/xattr.c renamed from fs/xattr.c~fs-xattrc-setxattr-improve-handling-of-allocation-failures +4 -0
+	if (vvalue)
+		vfree(vvalue);
+	else
+		kfree(kvalue);
 	return error;

These patterns are pretty common, maybe create a standard helper?

Quoted 8 lines

Could. There was some discussion last year and implementations were tossed around.

I'm a bit apprehensive - kernel code is supposed to be robust, and large allocations are not robust and vmalloc() is crappy. Formalising these things in an API probably won't make anything worse, but will deprive us of opportunities for ritualistic humiliation and knuckle-rapping.

I did a sweep of this recently, considering helpers for exactly such an allocation and replacing the existing per-filesystem wrappers for it. IIRC, there are wrappper functions in ext4, gfs2, and ntfs, XFS now open codes it in a couple of places, there's alloc_fdmem(), cgroup pidlists and the network code does it in several places, etc. Even some drivers are doing this. It's a widespread pattern.

The easiest way to find the trivial wrappers is to grep for is_vmalloc_addr, because all the wrapper functions use this code to determine what to do:

	if (is_vmalloc_addr(p))
		vfree(p)
	else
		kfree(p)

Cheers,

Dave.

Signature · 2 lines
Dave Chinner
[email protected]