three patches to external/sepolicy
[PATCH 1/3] external/sepolicy: the media apps from third-party are labeled with media_app instead of untrusted_app The applications installed from third party, which will be "untrusted_app" (e.g., cts test apks), do not have "seinfo==media". Therefore, these applications will not be labeled as "media_app" (policy in seapp_contexts). But these applications will call the same permissions of regular media_app. So, we need to add these untrusted_app to media_app class.
Note that those application are for CTS test (currently we do not find others). So a better way should be proposing bool-enabled scheme in seapp_contexts, which has been discussed among us yesterday. We could update later if the new scheme is done. (Waiting for you guys' comments)
[PATCH 2/3] external/sepolicy: install daemon link/unlink application data files the installer daemon get the permissions (link, unlink) the application data files.
[PATCH 3/3] external/sepolicy: system r/w udp_socket of untrusted apps system get the read/write permissions on udp_socket related to untrusted applications.
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PATCH 1/3 external/sepolicy: the media apps from third-party are labeled with media_app instead of untrusted_app
From: hqjiang <[email protected]>
--- seapp_contexts | 1 + 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
seapp_contexts +1 -0
@@ -38,3 +38,4 @@ user=app_* seinfo=shared domain=shared_app levelFromUid=true user=app_* seinfo=media domain=media_app levelFromUid=true user=app_* seinfo=release domain=release_app levelFromUid=true user=app_* seinfo=release name=com.android.browser domain=browser_app levelFromUid=true +user=app_* name=android.process.media domain=media_app levelFromUid=true
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Re: [PATCH 1/3] external/sepolicy: the media apps from third-party are labeled with media_app instead of untrusted_app
Quoted 11 lines · Haiqing Jiang
From: hqjiang <[email protected]>
--- seapp_contexts | 1 + 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)seapp_contexts +0
-0
seapp_contexts user=app_* seinfo=shared domain=shared_app levelFromUid=true · line 41
Quoted 4 lines
seapp_contexts +1
-0@@ -38,3 +38,4 @@ user=app_* seinfo=shared domain=shared_app levelFromUid=true user=app_* seinfo=media domain=media_app levelFromUid=true user=app_* seinfo=release domain=release_app levelFromUid=true user=app_* seinfo=release name=com.android.browser domain=browser_app levelFromUid=true +user=app_* name=android.process.media domain=media_app levelFromUid=true
Wouldn't this allow an arbitrary third party app to run in media_app, just by using android.process.media as its package name?
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Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Re: [PATCH 1/3] external/sepolicy: the media apps from third-party are labeled with media_app instead of untrusted_app
Right.. It could be. We are thinking of adding bool-enabled scheme in seapp_contexts.
Quoted 27 lines · Stephen Smalley
seapp_contexts user=app_* seinfo=shared domain=shared_app
Quoted 11 lines · Haiqing Jiang
From: hqjiang <[email protected]>
--- seapp_contexts | 1 + 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)seapp_contexts +0
-0@@ -38,3 +38,4 @@ user=app_* seinfo=shared domain=shared_applevelFromUid=true
seapp_contexts user=app_* seinfo=shared domain=shared_app levelFromUid=true
Quoted 3 lines
seapp_contexts +0
-0user=app_* seinfo=media domain=media_app levelFromUid=true user=app_* seinfo=release domain=release_app levelFromUid=true user=app_* seinfo=release name=com.android.browser domain=browser_applevelFromUid=true
seapp_contexts user=app_* seinfo=shared domain=shared_app levelFromUid=true · line 41
Quoted 1 line
seapp_contexts +1
-0+user=app_* name=android.process.media domain=media_app levelFromUid=trueWouldn't this allow an arbitrary third party app to run in
media_app, just by using android.process.media as its package name?--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
Signature · 4 lines
----------------------------------- Haiqing Jiang, PH.D student Computer Science Department, North Carolina State University
PATCH 2/3 external/sepolicy: install daemon link/unlink application data files
In reply to Haiqing JiangFrom: hqjiang <[email protected]>
--- installd.te | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
installd.te +2 -0
@@ -20,3 +20,5 @@ dontaudit installd self:capability sys_admin; selinux_check_context(installd) # Read /seapp_contexts, presently on the rootfs. allow installd rootfs:file r_file_perms; +# Link/Unlink app_data_file +allow installd app_data_file:lnk_file link_file_perms;
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Re: [PATCH 2/3] external/sepolicy: install daemon link/unlink application data files
Quoted 11 lines · Haiqing Jiang
From: hqjiang <[email protected]>
--- installd.te | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)installd.te +0
-0
installd.te dontaudit installd self:capability sys_admin; · line 24
Quoted 5 lines
installd.te +2
-0@@ -20,3 +20,5 @@ dontaudit installd self:capability sys_admin; selinux_check_context(installd) # Read /seapp_contexts, presently on the rootfs. allow installd rootfs:file r_file_perms; +# Link/Unlink app_data_file +allow installd app_data_file:lnk_file link_file_perms;
What actual permissions were required? link (create a hard link) doesn't make sense on a symlink (lnk_file). unlink and rename are legitimate, but wondering whether anything other than unlink was required.
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Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Re: [PATCH 2/3] external/sepolicy: install daemon link/unlink application data files
You are right. Only required permission is unlink.
Quoted 28 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 11 lines · Haiqing Jiang
From: hqjiang <[email protected]>
--- installd.te | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)installd.te +0
-0installd.te dontaudit installd self:capability sys_admin; · line 24
Quoted 5 lines
installd.te +2
-0@@ -20,3 +20,5 @@ dontaudit installd self:capability sys_admin; selinux_check_context(installd) # Read /seapp_contexts, presently on the rootfs. allow installd rootfs:file r_file_perms; +# Link/Unlink app_data_file +allow installd app_data_file:lnk_file link_file_perms;What actual permissions were required? link (create a hard link) doesn't make sense on a symlink (
lnk_file). unlink and rename are legitimate, but wondering whether anything other than unlink was required.--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
Signature · 4 lines
----------------------------------- Haiqing Jiang, PH.D student Computer Science Department, North Carolina State University
PATCH 3/3 external/sepolicy: system r/w udp_socket of untrusted apps
In reply to Haiqing JiangFrom: hqjiang <[email protected]>
--- system.te | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
system.te +3 -0
@@ -196,3 +196,6 @@ allow system domain:file r_file_perms; # to uart driver and ctrl proc entry allow system gps_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; allow system gps_control:file rw_file_perms; + +# system Read/Write udp_socket of untrusted_app +allow system untrusted_app:udp_socket { read write };
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Re: [PATCH 3/3] external/sepolicy: system r/w udp_socket of untrusted apps
Quoted 11 lines · Haiqing Jiang
From: hqjiang <[email protected]>
--- system.te | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)system.te +0
-0
system.te allow system domain:file r_file_perms; · line 201
Quoted 6 lines
system.te +3
-0@@ -196,3 +196,6 @@ allow system domain:file r_file_perms; # to uart driver and ctrl proc entry allow system gps_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; allow system gps_control:file rw_file_perms; + +# system Read/Write udp_socket of untrusted_app +allow system untrusted_app:udp_socket { read write };
So an app is passing a socket fd to the system_server over Binder and the system_server is then writing to the socket? Wonder why. Anyway, rather than writing this only in terms of one app domain (untrusted_app), cover all cases by using the appdomain attribute, i.e. allow system appdomain:udp_socket { read write };
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Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Re: [PATCH 3/3] external/sepolicy: system r/w udp_socket of untrusted apps
That will be fine. Appdomain is more general. Thanks.
Quoted 30 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 11 lines · Haiqing Jiang
From: hqjiang <[email protected]>
--- system.te | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)system.te +0
-0system.te allow system domain:file r_file_perms; · line 201
Quoted 6 lines
system.te +3
-0@@ -196,3 +196,6 @@ allow system domain:file r_file_perms; # to uart driver and ctrl proc entry allow system gps_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; allow system gps_control:file rw_file_perms; + +# system Read/Write udp_socket of untrusted_app +allow system untrusted_app:udp_socket { read write };So an app is passing a socket fd to the
system_serverover Binder and thesystem_serveris then writing to the socket? Wonder why. Anyway, rather than writing this only in terms of one app domain (untrusted_app), cover all cases by using the appdomain attribute, i.e. allow system appdomain:udp_socket { read write };--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
Signature · 4 lines
----------------------------------- Haiqing Jiang, PH.D student Computer Science Department, North Carolina State University