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add read permission over dev_type to appdomain on android_cts enabled

PATCH In review Haiqing Jiang 2 participants 6 messages Jul 27, 2012 – Jul 30, 2012 SELinux security module

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 add read permission over dev_type to appdomain on android_cts enabled

---
 cts.te |    2 +-
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
cts.te +1 -1
index 489be1a..ff8a9f0 100644
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ allow appdomain file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain fs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain dev_type:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain file_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
-allow appdomain dev_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
+allow appdomain dev_type:dir_file_class_set { getattr read };
 allow appdomain fs_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
 
 # Execute the shell or other system executables.
Signature · 7 lines
1.7.0.4


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#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Haiqing Jiang
---
 cts.te |    2 +-
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
cts.te +0 -0
index 489be1a..ff8a9f0 100644

cts.te allow appdomain file_type:dir r_dir_perms; · line 26

Quoted 8 lines
cts.te +1 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ allow appdomain file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain fs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain dev_type:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain file_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
-allow appdomain dev_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
+allow appdomain dev_type:dir_file_class_set { getattr read };
 allow appdomain fs_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
 
 # Execute the shell or other system executables.

I don't think you want to allow all app domains to read all devices. Nor should that be required even for CTS. Which devices triggered denials?

Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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#2 lore raw

The denial information is shown as below:

*<5>[ 2219.393524] type=1400 audit(1342221801.398:17): avc: denied { read } for pid=2687 comm="ationTestRunner" name="mtdblock0" dev=tmpfs ino=2562 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c38 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=lnk_file

<5>[ 2219.399566] type=1400 audit(1342221801.406:18): avc:  denied  { read

} for pid=2687 comm="ationTestRunner" name="radio" dev=tmpfs ino=2527 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c38 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=lnk_file

<5>[ 2005.011016] type=1400 audit(1342224760.046:32): avc:  denied  { read

} for pid=7264 comm="onCtsTestRunner" name="events" dev=tmpfs ino=2902 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c38 tcontext=u:object_r:log_device:s0 tclass=chr_file*

Quoted 28 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 9 lines · Haiqing Jiang
---
 cts.te |    2 +-
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
cts.te +0 -0
index 489be1a..ff8a9f0 100644

cts.te allow appdomain file_type:dir r_dir_perms; · line 26

Quoted 8 lines
cts.te +1 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ allow appdomain file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain fs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain dev_type:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain file_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
-allow appdomain dev_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
+allow appdomain dev_type:dir_file_class_set { getattr read };
 allow appdomain fs_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
 
 # Execute the shell or other system executables.

I don't think you want to allow all app domains to read all devices. Nor should that be required even for CTS. Which devices triggered denials?

--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

Signature · 4 lines
-----------------------------------
Haiqing Jiang, PH.D student

Computer Science Department, North Carolina State University
#3 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Haiqing Jiang

The denial information is shown as below:

<5>[ 2219.393524] type=1400 audit(1342221801.398:17): avc:  denied
 { read } for  pid=2687 comm="ationTestRunner" name="mtdblock0"
Quoted 7 lines

dev=tmpfs ino=2562 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c38 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=lnk_file

<5>[ 2219.399566] type=1400 audit(1342221801.406:18): avc:  denied

{ read } for pid=2687 comm="ationTestRunner" name="radio" dev=tmpfs ino=2527 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c38 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=lnk_file

So you should only allow read for dev_type:lnk_file, not read access to all devices.

Quoted 4 lines
<5>[ 2005.011016] type=1400 audit(1342224760.046:32): avc:  denied

{ read } for pid=7264 comm="onCtsTestRunner" name="events" dev=tmpfs ino=2902 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c38 tcontext=u:object_r:log_device:s0 tclass=chr_file

So you should just allow this one for reading logcat output:
allow appdomain log_device:chr_file read;

But you should definitely not allow reading arbitrary devices; you don't want apps reading raw block devices (shouldn't be possible anyway due to DAC controls, but in case of DAC privilege escalation via setuid binary).

Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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#4 lore raw
In reply to Haiqing Jiang

The policy to the denials should be: allow untrusted_app {block_device, radio_device, log_device}:lnk_file read; (ignore the syntax error). Do you think it's OK to merge it to: allow appdomain dev_type:dir_file_class_set { getattr read }???? Or we need to add separate policies? (like, allow untrusted_app specific device type:lnk_file read;)

Quoted 58 lines · Haiqing Jiang

The denial information is shown as below:

*<5>[ 2219.393524] type=1400 audit(1342221801.398:17): avc: denied { read } for pid=2687 comm="ationTestRunner" name="mtdblock0" dev=tmpfs ino=2562 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c38 tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=lnk_file

<5>[ 2219.399566] type=1400 audit(1342221801.406:18): avc:  denied  { read

} for pid=2687 comm="ationTestRunner" name="radio" dev=tmpfs ino=2527 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c38 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=lnk_file

<5>[ 2005.011016] type=1400 audit(1342224760.046:32): avc:  denied  { read

} for pid=7264 comm="onCtsTestRunner" name="events" dev=tmpfs ino=2902 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c38 tcontext=u:object_r:log_device:s0 tclass=chr_file*

Quoted 23 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 9 lines · Haiqing Jiang
---
 cts.te |    2 +-
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
cts.te +0 -0
index 489be1a..ff8a9f0 100644

cts.te allow appdomain file_type:dir r_dir_perms; · line 26

Quoted 8 lines
cts.te +1 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ allow appdomain file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain fs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain dev_type:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain file_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
-allow appdomain dev_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
+allow appdomain dev_type:dir_file_class_set { getattr read };
 allow appdomain fs_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
 
 # Execute the shell or other system executables.

I don't think you want to allow all app domains to read all devices. Nor should that be required even for CTS. Which devices triggered denials?

Quoted 5 lines

--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

--
-----------------------------------
Haiqing Jiang, PH.D student

Computer Science Department, North Carolina State University

Signature · 4 lines
-----------------------------------
Haiqing Jiang, PH.D student

Computer Science Department, North Carolina State University
#5 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Haiqing Jiang

The policy to the denials should be: allow untrusted_app {block_device, radio_device, log_device}:lnk_file read; (ignore the syntax error). Do you think it's OK to merge it to: allow appdomain dev_type:dir_file_class_set { getattr read }???? Or we need to add separate policies? (like, allow untrusted_app specific device type:lnk_file read;)

Merging into the dev_type:dir_class_file_set rule opens up far more access than is necessary or desired - read access to every device in the system. So here you want a more specific rule. You can still use appdomain and dev_type attributes, but only for symlinks:

	allow appdomain dev_type:lnk_file read;

And for the log device, a specific rule for its type:

	allow appdomain log_device:chr_file read;
Quoted 89 lines

On Mon, Jul 30, 2012 at 10:33 AM, Haiqing Jiang
<[email protected]> wrote:

        The denial information is shown as below:
        
        
        <5>[ 2219.393524] type=1400 audit(1342221801.398:17): avc:
         denied  { read } for  pid=2687 comm="ationTestRunner"
        name="mtdblock0" dev=tmpfs ino=2562
        scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c38
        tcontext=u:object_r:block_device:s0 tclass=lnk_file
        
        <5>[ 2219.399566] type=1400 audit(1342221801.406:18): avc:
         denied  { read } for  pid=2687 comm="ationTestRunner"
        name="radio" dev=tmpfs ino=2527
        scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c38
        tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=lnk_file
        
        <5>[ 2005.011016] type=1400 audit(1342224760.046:32): avc:
         denied  { read } for  pid=7264 comm="onCtsTestRunner"
        name="events" dev=tmpfs ino=2902
        scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0:c38
        tcontext=u:object_r:log_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
        
        
        On Mon, Jul 30, 2012 at 5:14 AM, Stephen Smalley
        <[email protected]> wrote:
                On Fri, 2012-07-27 at 15:40 -0700, Haiqing Jiang
                wrote:
                > ---
                >  cts.te |    2 +-
                >  1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
                >
                > diff --git a/cts.te b/cts.te
                > index 489be1a..ff8a9f0 100644
                > --- a/cts.te
                > +++ b/cts.te
                > @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ allow appdomain file_type:dir
                r_dir_perms;
                >  allow appdomain fs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
                >  allow appdomain dev_type:dir r_dir_perms;
                >  allow appdomain file_type:dir_file_class_set
                getattr;
                > -allow appdomain dev_type:dir_file_class_set
                getattr;
                > +allow appdomain dev_type:dir_file_class_set
                { getattr read };
                >  allow appdomain fs_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
                >
                >  # Execute the shell or other system executables.
                
                
                I don't think you want to allow all app domains to
                read all devices.
                Nor should that be required even for CTS.  Which
                devices triggered
                denials?
                
                --
                Stephen Smalley
                National Security Agency
                
        
        
        
        
        -- 
        -----------------------------------
        Haiqing Jiang, PH.D student
        
        
        Computer Science Department, North Carolina State University
Signature · 5 lines
-----------------------------------
Haiqing Jiang, PH.D student


Computer Science Department, North Carolina State University
Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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