X.509: Support parse long form of length octets in Authority Key Identifier
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 X.509: Support parse long form of length octets in Authority Key Identifier
Per X.509 spec in 4.2.1.1 section, the structure of Authority Key Identifier Exception is:
AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL }KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
When a certificate also provides
authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber then the length of AuthorityKeyIdentifier SEQUENCE is likely to long form format. e.g.
The example certificate demos/tunala/A-server.pem in openssl source:
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:49:FB:45:72:12:C4:CC:E1:45:A1:D3:08:9E:95:C4:2C:6D:55:3F:17
DirName:/C=NZ/L=Wellington/O=Really Irresponsible Authorisation Authority (RIAA)/OU=Cert-stamping/CN=Jackov al-Trades/[email protected]
serial:00Current parsing rule of OID_authorityKeyIdentifier only take care the short form format, it causes load certificate to modsign_keyring fail:
[ 12.061147] X.509: Extension: 47 [ 12.075121] MODSIGN: Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (-74)
So, this patch add the parsing rule for support long form format against Authority Key Identifier.
--- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +48 -8
@@ -373,6 +373,9 @@ int rsa_extract_mpi(void *context, size_t hdrlen,return 0 ; } +/* The keyIdentifier in AuthorityKeyIdentifier SEQUENCE is tag(CONT,PRIM,0) */ +#define SEQ_TAG_KEYID (ASN1_CONT << 6) +/* * Process certificate extensions that are used to qualify the certificate. */
@@ -407,21 +410,58 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen, }if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) { +size_t key_len; +/* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */ if (vlen <5 )return -EBADMSG ; -if (v[0 ] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS <<5 )) || - v[1 ] != vlen -2 || - v[2 ] != (ASN1_CONT <<6 ) || - v[3 ] != vlen -4 ) + +/* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */ +if (v[0 ] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS <<5 )))return -EBADMSG ; - v +=4 ; - vlen -=4 ; - f =kmalloc (vlen *2 +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); +/* Authority Key Identifier is not indefinite length */ +if (unlikely (vlen ==ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH )) +return -EBADMSG ; + +/* Short Form length */ +if (vlen <=127 ) { + +if (v[1 ] != vlen -2 || + v[2 ] !=SEQ_TAG_KEYID || + v[3 ] != vlen -4 ) +return -EBADMSG ; + + v +=4 ; + key_len = v[3 ]; + }else { +/* Long Form length */ +size_t seq_len =0 ; +int sub = v[1 ] -0x80 ; + +if (sub >2 ) +return -EBADMSG ; + +/* calculate the length from subsequent octet */ +for (i =0 ; i < sub; i++) { + seq_len <<=8 ; + seq_len |= v[2 + i]; + } + +/* check vlen should not less then length of keyid */ +if (seq_len != vlen -2 - sub || + v[2 + sub] !=SEQ_TAG_KEYID || + v[3 + sub] > vlen -4 - sub) +return -EBADMSG ; + + v += (4 + sub); + key_len = v[3 + sub]; + } + + f =kmalloc (key_len *2 +1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!f)return -ENOMEM ; -for (i =0 ; i < vlen; i++) +for (i =0 ; i < key_len; i++)sprintf (f + i *2 ,"%02x" , v[i]);pr_debug ("authority %s\n" , f); ctx->cert->authority = f;
Signature · 1 line
1.6.4.2
於 三,2013-02-06 於 13:08 +0800,Lee, Chun-Yi 提到:
Quoted 2 lines
Per X.509 spec in 4.2.1.1 section, the structure of Authority Key Identifier Exception is:
^^^^^^^^^^ Extension
Sorry for my typo, I will send patch again.
Thanks
Joey Lee
Quoted 120 lines
AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL }KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING
When a certificate also provides
authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber then the length of AuthorityKeyIdentifier SEQUENCE is likely to long form format. e.g.
The example certificate demos/tunala/A-server.pem in openssl source:X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:49:FB:45:72:12:C4:CC:E1:45:A1:D3:08:9E:95:C4:2C:6D:55:3F:17 DirName:/C=NZ/L=Wellington/O=Really Irresponsible Authorisation Authority (RIAA)/OU=Cert-stamping/CN=Jackov al-Trades/[email protected] serial:00Current parsing rule of
OID_authorityKeyIdentifieronly take care the short form format, it causes load certificate tomodsign_keyringfail:[ 12.061147] X.509: Extension: 47 [ 12.075121] MODSIGN: Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (-74)So, this patch add the parsing rule for support long form format against Authority Key Identifier.
Cc David Howells <[email protected]>Cc Rusty Russell <[email protected]>Cc Josh Boyer <[email protected]>Cc Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>Cc Herbert Xu <[email protected]>Cc "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Lee, Chun-Yi <[email protected]>--- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +48
-8@@ -373,6 +373,9 @@ int rsa_extract_mpi(void *context, size_t hdrlen,return 0 ; } +/* The keyIdentifier in AuthorityKeyIdentifier SEQUENCE is tag(CONT,PRIM,0) */ +#define SEQ_TAG_KEYID (ASN1_CONT << 6) +/* * Process certificate extensions that are used to qualify the certificate. */ @@ -407,21 +410,58 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen, }if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) { +size_t key_len; +/* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */ if (vlen <5 )return -EBADMSG ; -if (v[0 ] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS <<5 )) || - v[1 ] != vlen -2 || - v[2 ] != (ASN1_CONT <<6 ) || - v[3 ] != vlen -4 ) + +/* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */ +if (v[0 ] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS <<5 )))return -EBADMSG ; - v +=4 ; - vlen -=4 ; - f =kmalloc (vlen *2 +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); +/* Authority Key Identifier is not indefinite length */ +if (unlikely (vlen ==ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH )) +return -EBADMSG ; + +/* Short Form length */ +if (vlen <=127 ) { + +if (v[1 ] != vlen -2 || + v[2 ] !=SEQ_TAG_KEYID || + v[3 ] != vlen -4 ) +return -EBADMSG ; + + v +=4 ; + key_len = v[3 ]; + }else { +/* Long Form length */ +size_t seq_len =0 ; +int sub = v[1 ] -0x80 ; + +if (sub >2 ) +return -EBADMSG ; + +/* calculate the length from subsequent octet */ +for (i =0 ; i < sub; i++) { + seq_len <<=8 ; + seq_len |= v[2 + i]; + } + +/* check vlen should not less then length of keyid */ +if (seq_len != vlen -2 - sub || + v[2 + sub] !=SEQ_TAG_KEYID || + v[3 + sub] > vlen -4 - sub) +return -EBADMSG ; + + v += (4 + sub); + key_len = v[3 + sub]; + } + + f =kmalloc (key_len *2 +1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!f)return -ENOMEM ; -for (i =0 ; i < vlen; i++) +for (i =0 ; i < key_len; i++)sprintf (f + i *2 ,"%02x" , v[i]);pr_debug ("authority %s\n" , f); ctx->cert->authority = f;