prctl.2: document new seccomp options
PATCH 1/3 prctl.2: document new seccomp options
the seccomp stuff requires
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
But I am not sure where/how to specify that.
--- man2/prctl.2 | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 108 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
man2/prctl.2 +108 -25
@@ -41,11 +41,14 @@ .\" 2012-04 Cyrill Gorcunov, Document PR_SET_MM .\" 2012-04-25 Michael Kerrisk, Document PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE and .\" PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE +.\" 2012-08-03 Shawn Landden, Document PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, +.\" SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER +.\" (thx Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> 259e5e6c) .\" .\" FIXME: Document PR_SET_TIMERSLACK and PR_GET_TIMERSLACK (new in 2.6.28) .\" commit 6976675d94042fbd446231d1bd8b7de71a980ada .\" -.TH PRCTL 2 2012-04-23 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" +.TH PRCTL 2 2012-08-03 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME prctl \- operations on a process .SH SYNOPSIS
@@ -231,16 +234,53 @@ Return the current value of the parent process death signal, in the location pointed to by .IR "(int\ *) arg2" . .TP +.BR PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS " (since Linux 3.4)" +Takes a boolean argument as +.IR arg2 . +After being set, the process and all its children can never gain new privleges. +Operations that grant new privileges (i.e. execve) +will either fail or not grant them. This affects suid/sgid, +file capabilities, and LSMs. + +Operations that merely manipulate or drop existing privileges ( +.BR setresuid (2) , +.BR capset (2) , +etc.) will still work. Drop those privileges if you want them gone. + +Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege. So, for example, +asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with +.BR runcon (1)) +will result +in execve returning +.BR EPERM . +See +.IR Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt +for more details. +.TP +.BR PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS " (since Linux 3.4)" +Return the no_new_privs status of the calling thread. Returns 1 if set and 0 +if not set. +.TP .BR PR_SET_SECCOMP " (since Linux 2.6.23)" .\" See http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/542632 .\" [PATCH 0 of 2] seccomp updates .\" andrea-Vyt77T80VFVWk0Htik3J/[email protected] -Set the secure computing mode for the calling thread. -In the current implementation, -.IR arg2 -must be 1. -After the secure computing mode has been set to 1, -the only system calls that the thread is permitted to make are +Set the secure computing mode for the calling thread. Secure computing mode is +useful for number-crunching applications +that may need to execute untrusted byte code, +perhaps obtained by reading from a pipe or socket. +These operations are only available +if the kernel is configured with +.BR CONFIG_SECCOMP +or +.BR CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER +enabled, respectively. The value in +.I arg2 +is one of the options below. +.RS +.TP +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT +The only system calls that the thread is permitted to make are .BR read (2), .BR write (2), .BR _exit (2),
@@ -249,24 +289,37 @@ and Other system calls result in the delivery of a .BR SIGKILL signal. -Secure computing mode is useful for number-crunching applications -that may need to execute untrusted byte code, -perhaps obtained by reading from a pipe or socket. -This operation is only available -if the kernel is configured with CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled. +.TP +.\" See https://lwn.net/Articles/475043/ +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER " (since Linux 3.5 on x86)" +Filter syscalls based on a user supplied program in the format of +.BR "struct seccomp_data" +in +.IR arg3 . +In order to use +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER +without the +.BR CAP_SYS_ADMIN +capability, you must +first set +.BR PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS +to 1. +.RE .TP .BR PR_GET_SECCOMP " (since Linux 2.6.23)" -Return the secure computing mode of the calling thread. -Not very useful for the current implementation (mode equals 1), -but may be useful for other possible future modes: -if the caller is not in secure computing mode, this operation returns 0; -if the caller is in secure computing mode, then the +Return the secure computing mode of the calling thread. Returns +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED , +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT , +or +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER . +If the caller is in secure computing mode, then the .BR prctl () call will cause a .B SIGKILL signal to be sent to the process. -This operation is only available -if the kernel is configured with CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled. +This operation is only available if the kernel is configured with +.BR CONFIG_SECCOMP +enabled. .TP .BR PR_SET_SECUREBITS " (since Linux 2.6.26)" Set the "securebits" flags of the calling thread to the value supplied in
@@ -551,6 +604,7 @@ On success, .BR PR_GET_TIMING , .BR PR_GET_SECUREBITS , .BR PR_MCE_KILL_GET , +.BR PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS , and (if it returns) .BR PR_GET_SECCOMP return the nonnegative values described above.
@@ -562,6 +616,19 @@ On error, \-1 is returned, and is set appropriately. .SH ERRORS .TP +.B EACCES +.I option +is +.BR PR_SET_SECCOMP , +.I arg2 +is +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER , +the caller does not have the +.BR CAP_SYS_ADMIN +capability, and +.BR PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS +has not been set as documented above. +.TP .B EFAULT .I arg2 is an invalid address.
@@ -579,6 +646,10 @@ or .BR PR_MCE_KILL_GET or .BR PR_SET_MM , +or +.BR PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS , +or +.BR PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS , and unused .BR prctl () arguments were not specified as zero.
@@ -593,9 +664,15 @@ is not valid value for this is .BR PR_SET_SECCOMP or -.BR PR_SET_SECCOMP , +.BR PR_GET_SECCOMP , and the kernel was not configured with .BR CONFIG_SECCOMP . +(or +.BR CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER +if +.I arg2 +is +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER ) .TP .B EINVAL .I option
@@ -603,11 +680,6 @@ is .BR PR_SET_MM , and one of the following is true .RS -.IP * 3 -.I arg4 -or -.I arg5 -is nonzero; .IP * .I arg3 is greater than
@@ -637,6 +709,17 @@ or specifies a value that would cause the resource limit to be exceeded. .RE .TP +.B EINVAL +.I option +is +.BR PR_SET_SECCOMP , +.I arg2 +is +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER , +and +.I arg3 +is not a valid filter program. +.TP .B EPERM .I option is
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PATCH 2/3 prctl.2: document PR_GET_TIMESLACK and PR_SET_TIMESLACK
--- man2/prctl.2 | 22 +++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
man2/prctl.2 +19 -3
@@ -44,9 +44,7 @@ .\" 2012-08-03 Shawn Landden, Document PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, .\" SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER .\" (thx Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> 259e5e6c) -.\" -.\" FIXME: Document PR_SET_TIMERSLACK and PR_GET_TIMERSLACK (new in 2.6.28) -.\" commit 6976675d94042fbd446231d1bd8b7de71a980ada +.\" PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, PR_GET_TIMESLACK .\" .TH PRCTL 2 2012-08-03 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME
@@ -417,6 +415,24 @@ for information on versions and architectures) Return unaligned access control bits, in the location pointed to by .IR "(int\ *) arg2" . .TP +.BR PR_SET_TIMERSLACK " (since Linux 2.6.27)" +.\" see commit 6976675d94042fbd446231d1bd8b7de71a980ada +Controls the "rounding" that is used by +.BR select (2) +and +.BR poll (2) +and friends. +If +.I arg2 +is a positive integer, set timer slack to +.IR arg2 . +Otherwise reset to timer stack to its value when the process was created. +(default 50 usec) This setting inherits on +.BR fork (2) . +.TP +.BR PR_GET_TIMESLACK " (since Linux 2.6.27)" +Returns the current timer slack. +.TP .BR PR_MCE_KILL " (since Linux 2.6.32)" Set the machine check memory corruption kill policy for the current thread. If
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PATCH 3/3 prctl.2, proc.5: document arm alignment trap via /proc/apu/alignment
In reply to a message not in the archive--- man2/prctl.2 | 7 +++++-- man5/proc.5 | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
man2/prctl.2 +5 -2
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ .\" 2012-08-03 Shawn Landden, Document PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, .\" SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER .\" (thx Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> 259e5e6c) -.\" PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, PR_GET_TIMESLACK +.\" PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, PR_GET_TIMESLACK, ARM alignment trap handler .\" .TH PRCTL 2 2012-08-03 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME
@@ -406,7 +406,10 @@ Pass \fBPR_UNALIGN_NOPRINT\fP to silently fix up unaligned user accesses, or \fBPR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS\fP to generate .B SIGBUS -on unaligned user access. +on unaligned user access. ARM is set system-wide via /proc/cpu/alignment (see +.IR Documentation/arm/mem_alignment +or +.BR proc (5)). .TP .B PR_GET_UNALIGN (see
man5/proc.5 +20 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ .\" to see what information could be imported from that file .\" into this file. .\" -.TH PROC 5 2012-05-03 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" +.TH PROC 5 2012-08-04 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME proc \- process information pseudo-file system .SH DESCRIPTION
@@ -1229,6 +1229,25 @@ cat /lib/modules/$(uname \-r)/build/.config is only provided if the kernel is configured with .BR CONFIG_IKCONFIG_PROC . .TP +.IR /proc/cpu/alignment " (ARM only)" +Set the behavior of the user-mode alignment trap handler. When writing, takes a +number that is the sum of the fallowing: 1, print message to syslog; (signal) 2, +fix up the user process performing the unaligned access; (fixup) 4, send a +.BR SIGBUS +signal ( +.BR SIGILL +before 2.6.35) to the user process performing the unaligned access. (signal) +Signal and fixup cannot be used together. On armv6+ either fixup or signal must +be used, to prevent possible deadlock. + +Reading will provide statistics on fixups performed since boot in user and +system mode, as well as the current user-mode trap behavior. + +Other architectures set this behavior on a per-process level, via +.B prctl(PR_SET_UNALIGN). +See +.BR prctl (2). +.TP .I /proc/cpuinfo This is a collection of CPU and system architecture dependent items, for each supported architecture a different list.
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Re: [PATCH 3/3] prctl.2, proc.5: document arm alignment trap via /proc/apu/alignment
this interface has been like this from the pre-git days, and I did not track down the specific version it was added to its present location (it was once in sysfs)
Quoted 69 lines · Shawn Landden
--- man2/prctl.2 | 7 +++++-- man5/proc.5 | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)man2/prctl.2 +5
-2@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ .\" 2012-08-03 Shawn Landden, Document PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, .\" SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER .\" (thx Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> 259e5e6c) -.\" PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, PR_GET_TIMESLACK +.\" PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, PR_GET_TIMESLACK, ARM alignment trap handler .\" .TH PRCTL 2 2012-08-03 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME@@ -406,7 +406,10 @@ Pass \fBPR_UNALIGN_NOPRINT\fP to silently fix up unaligned user accesses, or \fBPR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS\fP to generate .B SIGBUS -on unaligned user access. +on unaligned user access. ARM is set system-wide via /proc/cpu/alignment (see +.IR Documentation/arm/mem_alignment +or +.BR proc (5)). .TP .B PR_GET_UNALIGN (seeman5/proc.5 +20
-1@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ .\" to see what information could be imported from that file .\" into this file. .\" -.TH PROC 5 2012-05-03 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" +.TH PROC 5 2012-08-04 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME proc \- process information pseudo-file system .SH DESCRIPTION@@ -1229,6 +1229,25 @@ cat /lib/modules/$(uname \-r)/build/.config is only provided if the kernel is configured with .BR CONFIG_IKCONFIG_PROC . .TP +.IR /proc/cpu/alignment " (ARM only)" +Set the behavior of the user-mode alignment trap handler. When writing, takes a +number that is the sum of the fallowing: 1, print message to syslog; (signal) 2, +fix up the user process performing the unaligned access; (fixup) 4, send a +.BR SIGBUS +signal ( +.BR SIGILL +before 2.6.35) to the user process performing the unaligned access. (signal) +Signal and fixup cannot be used together. On armv6+ either fixup or signal must +be used, to prevent possible deadlock. + +Reading will provide statistics on fixups performed since boot in user and +system mode, as well as the current user-mode trap behavior. + +Other architectures set this behavior on a per-process level, via +.B prctl(PR_SET_UNALIGN). +See +.BR prctl (2). +.TP .I /proc/cpuinfo This is a collection of CPU and system architecture dependent items, for each supported architecture a different list.
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Re: [PATCH 3/3] prctl.2, proc.5: document arm alignment trap via /proc/apu/alignment
In reply to a message not in the archiveQuoted 1 line
From
21c133d764dd8047ad48f79a5adc9d23abdb98dbMon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shawn Landden <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 4 Aug 2012 14:39:02 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] prctl.2: note about filter stacking
--- man2/prctl.2 | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
man2/prctl.2 +3 -1
@@ -301,7 +301,9 @@ without the capability, you must first set .BR PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS -to 1. +to 1. If +.BR prctl (2) +is allowed by the attached filter, additional filters may be attached. .RE .TP .BR PR_GET_SECCOMP " (since Linux 2.6.23)"
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PATCH 1/4 prctl.2: document new seccomp options
In reply to a message not in the archivethe seccomp stuff requires
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
But I am not sure where/how to specify that.
--- man2/prctl.2 | 135 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 110 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
man2/prctl.2 +110 -25
@@ -41,11 +41,14 @@ .\" 2012-04 Cyrill Gorcunov, Document PR_SET_MM .\" 2012-04-25 Michael Kerrisk, Document PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE and .\" PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE +.\" 2012-08-03 Shawn Landden, Document PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, +.\" SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER +.\" (thx Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> 259e5e6c) .\" .\" FIXME: Document PR_SET_TIMERSLACK and PR_GET_TIMERSLACK (new in 2.6.28) .\" commit 6976675d94042fbd446231d1bd8b7de71a980ada .\" -.TH PRCTL 2 2012-04-23 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" +.TH PRCTL 2 2012-08-03 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME prctl \- operations on a process .SH SYNOPSIS
@@ -231,16 +234,53 @@ Return the current value of the parent process death signal, in the location pointed to by .IR "(int\ *) arg2" . .TP +.BR PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS " (since Linux 3.4)" +Takes a boolean argument as +.IR arg2 . +After being set, the process and all its children can never gain new privleges. +Operations that grant new privileges (i.e. execve) +will either fail or not grant them. This affects suid/sgid, +file capabilities, and LSMs. + +Operations that merely manipulate or drop existing privileges ( +.BR setresuid (2) , +.BR capset (2) , +etc.) will still work. Drop those privileges if you want them gone. + +Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege. So, for example, +asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with +.BR runcon (1)) +will result +in execve returning +.BR EPERM . +See +.IR Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt +for more details. +.TP +.BR PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS " (since Linux 3.4)" +Return the no_new_privs status of the calling thread. Returns 1 if set and 0 +if not set. +.TP .BR PR_SET_SECCOMP " (since Linux 2.6.23)" .\" See http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/542632 .\" [PATCH 0 of 2] seccomp updates .\" andrea-Vyt77T80VFVWk0Htik3J/[email protected] -Set the secure computing mode for the calling thread. -In the current implementation, -.IR arg2 -must be 1. -After the secure computing mode has been set to 1, -the only system calls that the thread is permitted to make are +Set the secure computing mode for the calling thread. Secure computing mode is +useful for number-crunching applications +that may need to execute untrusted byte code, +perhaps obtained by reading from a pipe or socket. +These operations are only available +if the kernel is configured with +.BR CONFIG_SECCOMP +or +.BR CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER +enabled, respectively. The value in +.I arg2 +is one of the options below. +.RS +.TP +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT +The only system calls that the thread is permitted to make are .BR read (2), .BR write (2), .BR _exit (2),
@@ -249,24 +289,39 @@ and Other system calls result in the delivery of a .BR SIGKILL signal. -Secure computing mode is useful for number-crunching applications -that may need to execute untrusted byte code, -perhaps obtained by reading from a pipe or socket. -This operation is only available -if the kernel is configured with CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled. +.TP +.\" See https://lwn.net/Articles/475043/ +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER " (since Linux 3.5 on x86)" +Filter syscalls based on a user supplied program in the format of +.BR "struct seccomp_data" +in +.IR arg3 . +In order to use +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER +without the +.BR CAP_SYS_ADMIN +capability, you must +first set +.BR PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS +to 1. If +.BR prctl (2) +is allowed by the attached filter, additional filters may be attached. +.RE .TP .BR PR_GET_SECCOMP " (since Linux 2.6.23)" -Return the secure computing mode of the calling thread. -Not very useful for the current implementation (mode equals 1), -but may be useful for other possible future modes: -if the caller is not in secure computing mode, this operation returns 0; -if the caller is in secure computing mode, then the +Return the secure computing mode of the calling thread. Returns +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED , +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT , +or +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER . +If the caller is in secure computing mode, then the .BR prctl () call will cause a .B SIGKILL signal to be sent to the process. -This operation is only available -if the kernel is configured with CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled. +This operation is only available if the kernel is configured with +.BR CONFIG_SECCOMP +enabled. .TP .BR PR_SET_SECUREBITS " (since Linux 2.6.26)" Set the "securebits" flags of the calling thread to the value supplied in
@@ -551,6 +606,7 @@ On success, .BR PR_GET_TIMING , .BR PR_GET_SECUREBITS , .BR PR_MCE_KILL_GET , +.BR PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS , and (if it returns) .BR PR_GET_SECCOMP return the nonnegative values described above.
@@ -562,6 +618,19 @@ On error, \-1 is returned, and is set appropriately. .SH ERRORS .TP +.B EACCES +.I option +is +.BR PR_SET_SECCOMP , +.I arg2 +is +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER , +the caller does not have the +.BR CAP_SYS_ADMIN +capability, and +.BR PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS +has not been set as documented above. +.TP .B EFAULT .I arg2 is an invalid address.
@@ -579,6 +648,10 @@ or .BR PR_MCE_KILL_GET or .BR PR_SET_MM , +or +.BR PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS , +or +.BR PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS , and unused .BR prctl () arguments were not specified as zero.
@@ -593,9 +666,15 @@ is not valid value for this is .BR PR_SET_SECCOMP or -.BR PR_SET_SECCOMP , +.BR PR_GET_SECCOMP , and the kernel was not configured with .BR CONFIG_SECCOMP . +(or +.BR CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER +if +.I arg2 +is +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER ) .TP .B EINVAL .I option
@@ -603,11 +682,6 @@ is .BR PR_SET_MM , and one of the following is true .RS -.IP * 3 -.I arg4 -or -.I arg5 -is nonzero; .IP * .I arg3 is greater than
@@ -637,6 +711,17 @@ or specifies a value that would cause the resource limit to be exceeded. .RE .TP +.B EINVAL +.I option +is +.BR PR_SET_SECCOMP , +.I arg2 +is +.BR SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER , +and +.I arg3 +is not a valid filter program. +.TP .B EPERM .I option is
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PATCH 2/4 prctl.2: document PR_GET_TIMESLACK and PR_SET_TIMESLACK
--- man2/prctl.2 | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
man2/prctl.2 +20 -3
@@ -44,9 +44,7 @@ .\" 2012-08-03 Shawn Landden, Document PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, .\" SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER .\" (thx Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> 259e5e6c) -.\" -.\" FIXME: Document PR_SET_TIMERSLACK and PR_GET_TIMERSLACK (new in 2.6.28) -.\" commit 6976675d94042fbd446231d1bd8b7de71a980ada +.\" PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, PR_GET_TIMESLACK .\" .TH PRCTL 2 2012-08-03 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME
@@ -419,6 +417,25 @@ for information on versions and architectures) Return unaligned access control bits, in the location pointed to by .IR "(int\ *) arg2" . .TP +.BR PR_SET_TIMERSLACK " (since Linux 2.6.27)" +.\" see commit 6976675d94042fbd446231d1bd8b7de71a980ada +Controls the "rounding" that is used by +.BR select (2) +and +.BR poll (2) +and friends. +If +.I arg2 +is a positive integer, set timer slack to +.IR arg2 . +(in nanoseconds) Otherwise reset to timer stack to its value when the process +was created. (default 50 usec) This setting inherits on +.BR fork (2) . +Setting this higher may reduce power consumption. +.TP +.BR PR_GET_TIMESLACK " (since Linux 2.6.27)" +Returns the current timer slack. +.TP .BR PR_MCE_KILL " (since Linux 2.6.32)" Set the machine check memory corruption kill policy for the current thread. If
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PATCH 3/4 prctl.2, proc.5: document arm alignment trap via /proc/apu/alignment
In reply to a message not in the archive--- man2/prctl.2 | 7 +++++-- man5/proc.5 | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
man2/prctl.2 +5 -2
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ .\" 2012-08-03 Shawn Landden, Document PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, .\" SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER .\" (thx Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> 259e5e6c) -.\" PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, PR_GET_TIMESLACK +.\" PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, PR_GET_TIMESLACK, ARM alignment trap handler .\" .TH PRCTL 2 2012-08-03 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME
@@ -408,7 +408,10 @@ Pass \fBPR_UNALIGN_NOPRINT\fP to silently fix up unaligned user accesses, or \fBPR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS\fP to generate .B SIGBUS -on unaligned user access. +on unaligned user access. ARM is set system-wide via /proc/cpu/alignment (see +.IR Documentation/arm/mem_alignment +or +.BR proc (5)). .TP .B PR_GET_UNALIGN (see
man5/proc.5 +20 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ .\" to see what information could be imported from that file .\" into this file. .\" -.TH PROC 5 2012-05-03 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" +.TH PROC 5 2012-08-04 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME proc \- process information pseudo-file system .SH DESCRIPTION
@@ -1229,6 +1229,25 @@ cat /lib/modules/$(uname \-r)/build/.config is only provided if the kernel is configured with .BR CONFIG_IKCONFIG_PROC . .TP +.IR /proc/cpu/alignment " (ARM only)" +Set the behavior of the user-mode alignment trap handler. When writing, takes a +number that is the sum of the fallowing: 1, print message to syslog; (signal) 2, +fix up the user process performing the unaligned access; (fixup) 4, send a +.BR SIGBUS +signal ( +.BR SIGILL +before 2.6.35) to the user process performing the unaligned access. (signal) +Signal and fixup cannot be used together. On armv6+ either fixup or signal must +be used, to prevent possible deadlock. + +Reading will provide statistics on fixups performed since boot in user and +system mode, as well as the current user-mode trap behavior. + +Other architectures set this behavior on a per-process level, via +.B prctl(PR_SET_UNALIGN). +See +.BR prctl (2). +.TP .I /proc/cpuinfo This is a collection of CPU and system architecture dependent items, for each supported architecture a different list.
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PATCH 4/4 prctl.2: document PR_SET_PTRACER
In reply to a message not in the archive--- man2/prctl.2 | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
man2/prctl.2 +29 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ .\" SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER .\" (thx Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> 259e5e6c) .\" PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, PR_GET_TIMESLACK, ARM alignment trap handler +.\" PR_SET_PTRACER .\" .TH PRCTL 2 2012-08-03 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME
@@ -321,6 +322,18 @@ This operation is only available if the kernel is configured with .BR CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled. .TP +.BR PR_SET_PTRACER " (since Linux 3.3)" +When using restricted ptrace, permit process of pid +.I arg2 +to ptrace the current task. A value of 0 means "no process", and the special +value +.B PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY +disables restricted ptrace for this process. Restricted ptrace is set via +.IR /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope +when the kernel has been configured with +.B CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA +and the yama LSM is active. +.TP .BR PR_SET_SECUREBITS " (since Linux 2.6.26)" Set the "securebits" flags of the calling thread to the value supplied in .IR arg2 .
@@ -699,6 +712,16 @@ is .B EINVAL .I option is +.BR PR_SET_PTRACER +and +.I arg2 +is not 0, +.BR PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY , +or the pid of an active process. +.TP +.B EINVAL +.I option +is .BR PR_SET_MM , and one of the following is true .RS
@@ -742,6 +765,12 @@ and .I arg3 is not a valid filter program. .TP +.B ENOMEM +.I option +is +.BR PR_SET_PTRACER +and insufficient memory to set up ptrace relation with given pid. +.TP .B EPERM .I option is
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PATCH 1/1 prctl.2: PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER
From: Shawn Landden <[email protected]>
--- man2/prctl.2 | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
man2/prctl.2 +25 -1
@@ -42,10 +42,12 @@ .\" 2012-04-25 Michael Kerrisk, Document PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE and .\" PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE .\" 2012-08-03 Shawn Landden, Document PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, -.\" SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER .\" (thx Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> 259e5e6c) +.\" SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, .\" PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, PR_GET_TIMESLACK, ARM alignment trap handler .\" PR_SET_PTRACER +.\" PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER, PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER +.\" (thx Lennart Poettering <[email protected]> ebec18a6) .\" .TH PRCTL 2 2012-08-03 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME
@@ -323,6 +325,7 @@ This operation is only available if the kernel is configured with enabled. .TP .BR PR_SET_PTRACER " (since Linux 3.3)" +.\" see commit ebec18a6d3aa1e7d84aab16225e87fd25170ec2b When using restricted ptrace, permit process of pid .I arg2 to ptrace the current task. A value of 0 means "no process", and the special
@@ -334,6 +337,27 @@ when the kernel has been configured with .B CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA and the yama LSM is active. .TP +.BR PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER " (since Linux 3.3)" +Sets a process, such as a service manager, such that orphan (double-forking) +child processes re-parent to this process instead of +.BR init (8). +The service manager +is able to receive +.B SIGCHLD +signals and is able to investigate the process until +it calls +.BR wait (2). +All children of this process will inherit a flag if they should +look for a child_subreaper process at exit. Set +.I arg2 +to 1 or 0 to enable or disable, respectively. +.TP +.BR PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER " (since Linux 3.3)" +Returns whether calling process is a child subreaper (see +.BR PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER ), +in the location pointed to by +.IR "(int\ *) arg2" . +.TP .BR PR_SET_SECUREBITS " (since Linux 2.6.26)" Set the "securebits" flags of the calling thread to the value supplied in .IR arg2 .
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Re: [PATCH] prctl.2: PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER
[CC=+Lennart et al.]
Lennart,
Could you please review Shawn's patch or provide an alternative?
Thanks,
Michael
Quoted 63 lines · On Thu, Aug 9, 2012 at 9:09 PM, <[email protected]…
From: Shawn Landden <[email protected]>
--- man2/prctl.2 | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)man2/prctl.2 +25
-2@@ -42,10 +42,12 @@ .\" 2012-04-25 Michael Kerrisk, Document PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE and .\" PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE .\" 2012-08-03 Shawn Landden, Document PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, -.\" SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER .\" (thx Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> 259e5e6c) +.\" SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, .\" PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, PR_GET_TIMESLACK, ARM alignment trap handler .\" PR_SET_PTRACER +.\" PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER, PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER +.\" (thx Lennart Poettering <[email protected]> ebec18a6) .\" .TH PRCTL 2 2012-08-03 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME@@ -323,6 +325,7 @@ This operation is only available if the kernel is configured with enabled. .TP .BR PR_SET_PTRACER " (since Linux 3.3)" +.\" see commit ebec18a6d3aa1e7d84aab16225e87fd25170ec2b When using restricted ptrace, permit process of pid .I arg2 to ptrace the current task. A value of 0 means "no process", and the special@@ -334,6 +337,27 @@ when the kernel has been configured with .B CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA and the yama LSM is active. .TP +.BR PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER " (since Linux 3.3)" +Sets a process, such as a service manager, such that orphan (double-forking) +child processes re-parent to this process instead of +.BR init (8). +The service manager +is able to receive +.B SIGCHLD +signals and is able to investigate the process until +it calls +.BR wait (2). +All children of this process will inherit a flag if they should +look for a child_subreaper process at exit. Set +.I arg2 +to 1 or 0 to enable or disable, respectively. +.TP +.BR PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER " (since Linux 3.3)" +Returns whether calling process is a child subreaper (see +.BR PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER ), +in the location pointed to by +.IR "(int\ *) arg2" . +.TP .BR PR_SET_SECUREBITS " (since Linux 2.6.26)" Set the "securebits" flags of the calling thread to the value supplied in .IR arg2 . --1.7.9.5
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Re: [PATCH] prctl.2: PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER
Quoted 3 lines · Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
man2/prctl.2 when the kernel has been configured with · line 352
Quoted 3 lines
man2/prctl.2 +3
-0+All children of this process will inherit a flag if they should +look for a child_subreaper process at exit. Set +.I arg2
This is a non-interesting kernel implementation detail, a simple optimization in the kernel code flow, which should not be documented here.
It actually is a bit misguiding, I think, because it might give the impression to the reader, that this can be influenced with the prctl. Children processes cannot escape the sub-reaper parent, they can only become a new sub-reaper themselves.
I'll check with Lennart later today for a reworded sentence.
Thanks,
Kay
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Re: [PATCH] prctl.2: PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER
In reply to a message not in the archiveOn Thu, 10.01.13 23:51, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages) ([email protected]) wrote:
Hey,
sorry for never doing the doc work! Here are my comments:
Quoted 4 lines
man2/prctl.2 when the kernel has been configured with · line 343
Quoted 4 lines
+.BR
PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER" (since Linux 3.3)"man2/prctl.2 +3
-0+Sets a process, such as a service manager, such that orphan (double-forking) +child processes re-parent to this process instead of +.BR init (8).
I don't like this reference to "double-forking" here. After all, this also applies to triple-forking, quadruple-forking and even quintuple-forking... ;-)
Expressing this is difficult, but here's my try:
"Enables that the process becomes a 'subreaper' for all its (immediate or indirect) offspring processes. Any process whose immediate parent dies and whose ancestry includes a process where this flag is set will be reparented to the closest process with this flag set, instead of PID
1. A 'subreaper' hence receives SIGHCLD signals for any orphaned offspring processes, that otherwise would be received by the init process."
Quoted 6 lines
man2/prctl.2 when the kernel has been configured with · line 349
Quoted 6 lines
man2/prctl.2 +6
-0+The service manager +is able to receive +.B SIGCHLD +signals and is able to investigate the process until +it calls +.BR wait (2).
Drop this.
Quoted 2 lines
man2/prctl.2 when the kernel has been configured with · line 351
Quoted 2 lines
man2/prctl.2 +2
-0+All children of this process will inherit a flag if they should +look for a child_subreaper process at exit. Set
This bit should go, it's an inplementation detail, als Kay already pointed out.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
+.I arg2
man2/prctl.2 +4
-0+to 1 or 0 to enable or disable, respectively. +.TP +.BR PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER " (since Linux 3.3)" +Returns whether calling process is a child subreaper (see
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
+.BR
PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER),
+in the location pointed to by
+.IR "(int\ *) arg2" .
+.TP
.BRPR_SET_SECUREBITS" (since Linux 2.6.26)"
Set the "securebits" flags of the calling thread to the value supplied in .IR arg2 .
Otherwise sounds good.
Lennart
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PATCH 1/1 prctl.2: PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER
--- man2/prctl.2 | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
man2/prctl.2 +17 -0
@@ -379,6 +379,23 @@ if the kernel is configured with .B CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled. .TP +.BR PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER " (since Linux 3.3)" +Designates this process as a service manager for its' (immediate and +indirect) offspring processes. Any process whose immediate parent +dies and whose ancestry includes a process where this flag is set will +be reparented to the closest process with this flag set, instead of PID +1. A 'subreaper' hence receives +.B SIGHCLD +signals for any orphaned +offspring processes, that otherwise would be received by +.BR init (8). +.TP +.BR PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER " (since Linux 3.3)" +Returns whether calling process is a child subreaper (see +.BR PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER ), +in the location pointed to by +.IR "(int\ *) arg2" . +.TP .BR PR_SET_SECUREBITS " (since Linux 2.6.26)" Set the "securebits" flags of the calling thread to the value supplied in .IR arg2 .
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Re: [PATCH] prctl.2: PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER
Shawn, Lennart, Kay,
Quoted 23 lines · Shawn Landden
Signed-off-by Shawn Landden <[email protected]>--- man2/prctl.2 | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)man2/prctl.2 +10
-0@@ -379,6 +379,23 @@ if the kernel is configured with .B CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled. .TP +.BR PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER " (since Linux 3.3)" +Designates this process as a service manager for its' (immediate and +indirect) offspring processes. Any process whose immediate parent +dies and whose ancestry includes a process where this flag is set will +be reparented to the closest process with this flag set, instead of PID +1. A 'subreaper' hence receives +.B SIGHCLD +signals for any orphaned +offspring processes, that otherwise would be received by +.BR init (8).
man2/prctl.2 if the kernel is configured with · line 401
Quoted 10 lines
man2/prctl.2 +7
-0+.TP +.BR PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER " (since Linux 3.3)" +Returns whether calling process is a child subreaper (see +.BR PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER ), +in the location pointed to by +.IR "(int\ *) arg2" . +.TP .BR PR_SET_SECUREBITS " (since Linux 2.6.26)" Set the "securebits" flags of the calling thread to the value supplied in .IR arg2 .
Shawn, there was some imprecision in your patch. I've instead come up with an alternative.
Kay, Lennart, is the following correct?
PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER (since Linux 3.4)
If arg2 is nonzero, set the "child subreaper" attribute of the calling process; if arg2 is zero, unset the
attribute. When a process is marked as a child sub‐
reaper, all of the children that it creates, and their descendants, will be marked as having a subreaper. in effect, a subreaper fulfills the role of init(1) for its
descendant processes. Upon termination of a process
that is orphaned (i.e., its immediate parent has already terminated) and marked as having a subreaper, the near‐ est still living ancestor subreaper will receive a SIGCHLD signal and be able to wait(2) on the process to diiscover its termination status.
PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER (since Linux 3.4)
Return the "child subreaper" setting of the caller, in the location pointed to by (int *) arg2.
Cheers,
Michael
Signature · 7 lines
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Re: [PATCH] prctl.2: PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER
Quoted 57 lines · Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
Shawn, Lennart, Kay,
Quoted 23 lines · Shawn Landden
Signed-off-by Shawn Landden <[email protected]>--- man2/prctl.2 | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)man2/prctl.2 +10
-0@@ -379,6 +379,23 @@ if the kernel is configured with .B CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled. .TP +.BR PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER " (since Linux 3.3)" +Designates this process as a service manager for its' (immediate and +indirect) offspring processes. Any process whose immediate parent +dies and whose ancestry includes a process where this flag is set will +be reparented to the closest process with this flag set, instead of PID +1. A 'subreaper' hence receives +.B SIGHCLD +signals for any orphaned +offspring processes, that otherwise would be received by +.BR init (8).man2/prctl.2 if the kernel is configured with · line 401
Quoted 10 lines
man2/prctl.2 +7
-0+.TP +.BR PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER " (since Linux 3.3)" +Returns whether calling process is a child subreaper (see +.BR PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER ), +in the location pointed to by +.IR "(int\ *) arg2" . +.TP .BR PR_SET_SECUREBITS " (since Linux 2.6.26)" Set the "securebits" flags of the calling thread to the value supplied in .IR arg2 .Shawn, there was some imprecision in your patch. I've instead come up with an alternative.
Kay, Lennart, is the following correct?
PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER(since Linux 3.4)
If arg2 is nonzero, set the "child subreaper" attribute of the calling process; if arg2 is zero, unset the
attribute. When a process is marked as a child sub‐
reaper, all of the children that it creates, and their descendants, will be marked as having a subreaper. in effect, a subreaper fulfills the role of init(1) for its
descendant processes. Upon termination of a process
that is orphaned (i.e., its immediate parent has already terminated) and marked as having a subreaper, the near‐ est still living ancestor subreaper will receive a SIGCHLD signal and be able to wait(2) on the process to diiscover its termination status.
Quoted 4 lines
PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER(since Linux 3.4)
Return the "child subreaper" setting of the caller, in the location pointed to by (int *) arg2.
Sounds good to me! Though s/in/In/ once in there.
Thanks for putting this together, sorry for never having done this myself.
Oh, yeah, and I still need to do that book review for you, too!
Lennart
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Re: [PATCH] prctl.2: PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER
Quoted 59 lines · Lennart Poettering
Quoted 57 lines · Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
Shawn, Lennart, Kay,
Quoted 23 lines · Shawn Landden
Signed-off-by Shawn Landden <[email protected]>--- man2/prctl.2 | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)man2/prctl.2 +10
-0@@ -379,6 +379,23 @@ if the kernel is configured with .B CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled. .TP +.BR PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER " (since Linux 3.3)" +Designates this process as a service manager for its' (immediate and +indirect) offspring processes. Any process whose immediate parent +dies and whose ancestry includes a process where this flag is set will +be reparented to the closest process with this flag set, instead of PID +1. A 'subreaper' hence receives +.B SIGHCLD +signals for any orphaned +offspring processes, that otherwise would be received by +.BR init (8).man2/prctl.2 if the kernel is configured with · line 401
Quoted 10 lines
man2/prctl.2 +7
-0+.TP +.BR PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER " (since Linux 3.3)" +Returns whether calling process is a child subreaper (see +.BR PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER ), +in the location pointed to by +.IR "(int\ *) arg2" . +.TP .BR PR_SET_SECUREBITS " (since Linux 2.6.26)" Set the "securebits" flags of the calling thread to the value supplied in .IR arg2 .Shawn, there was some imprecision in your patch. I've instead come up with an alternative.
Kay, Lennart, is the following correct?
PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER(since Linux 3.4)
If arg2 is nonzero, set the "child subreaper" attribute of the calling process; if arg2 is zero, unset the
attribute. When a process is marked as a child sub‐
reaper, all of the children that it creates, and their descendants, will be marked as having a subreaper. in effect, a subreaper fulfills the role of init(1) for its
descendant processes. Upon termination of a process
that is orphaned (i.e., its immediate parent has already terminated) and marked as having a subreaper, the near‐ est still living ancestor subreaper will receive a SIGCHLD signal and be able to wait(2) on the process to diiscover its termination status.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER(since Linux 3.4)
Return the "child subreaper" setting of the caller, in the location pointed to by (int *) arg2.Sounds good to me! Though s/in/In/ once in there.
Thanks. Fixed.
Quoted 2 lines
Thanks for putting this together, sorry for never having done this myself.
You'll do better next time, right ;-)
Cheers,
Michael
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Re: [PATCH 4/4] prctl.2: document PR_SET_PTRACER
In reply to a message not in the archiveShawn,
Following up after a log time having this sit in my queue... Kees Cook (developer of the PR_SET_PTRACER code) eventually sent me a patch for this which I've taken instead of yours, but Kees missed documenting the EINVAL error, and I've taken that piece from you. Thanks!
Michael
Quoted 68 lines · Shawn Landden
--- man2/prctl.2 | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)man2/prctl.2 +29
-1@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ .\" SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER .\" (thx Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> 259e5e6c) .\" PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, PR_GET_TIMESLACK, ARM alignment trap handler +.\" PR_SET_PTRACER .\" .TH PRCTL 2 2012-08-03 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual" .SH NAME@@ -321,6 +322,18 @@ This operation is only available if the kernel is configured with .BR CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled. .TP +.BR PR_SET_PTRACER " (since Linux 3.3)" +When using restricted ptrace, permit process of pid +.I arg2 +to ptrace the current task. A value of 0 means "no process", and the special +value +.B PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY +disables restricted ptrace for this process. Restricted ptrace is set via +.IR /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope +when the kernel has been configured with +.B CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA +and the yama LSM is active. +.TP .BR PR_SET_SECUREBITS " (since Linux 2.6.26)" Set the "securebits" flags of the calling thread to the value supplied in .IR arg2 .@@ -699,6 +712,16 @@ is .B EINVAL .I option is +.BR PR_SET_PTRACER +and +.I arg2 +is not 0, +.BR PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY , +or the pid of an active process. +.TP +.B EINVAL +.I option +is .BR PR_SET_MM , and one of the following is true .RS@@ -742,6 +765,12 @@ and .I arg3 is not a valid filter program. .TP +.B ENOMEM +.I option +is +.BR PR_SET_PTRACER +and insufficient memory to set up ptrace relation with given pid. +.TP .B EPERM .I option is --1.7.9.5
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