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Allow GSSAPI to try to acquire credentials first.

PATCH In review Simo Sorce 3 participants 6 messages Apr 10, 2013 – Apr 22, 2013

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Simo Sorce

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 Allow GSSAPI to try to acquire credentials first.

GSSAPI can be given a uid number as a special name, and then gss_acquire_cred() can use the name to try to find credentials for the user.

Give GSSAPI a chance to do it on its own, then fallback to the classic method of trolling through the file system to find a credential cache.

This patch uses a little know feature of GSSAPI that permits to acquire crdentials specifying the user's UID. Normally GSSAPI will simply perform a getpwuid() call and use the user name to generate a principal name and then see if it can find a TGT for that principal in the local ccache.

This feature is vital to allow the GSS-Proxy to be able to initiate crdentials on behalf of rpc.gssd using client keytabs stored in the filsystem.

GSS-Proxy works through an interposer-type plugin (new feature in MIT 1.11) that allows to intercept all GSSAPI requestes and relay them to a system daemon via a socket. This daemon (GSS-Proxy) then can perform operations on behalf of other applications with additional logic.

In the rpc.gssd case the GSS-Proxy daemon allows applications running as system users to properly access krb5 protected shares by creating a credential cache on the fly when necessary.

This way all applications that need access to krb5 protected shares do not need to be taught how to initiate crdentials on their own, nor they need to be wrapped in additional init scripts like k5start or use wasteful cronjobs to keep credentials fresh. All is needed is to drop a keytab with the right keys in a special location on the system and gss-proxy will do the rest.

---
 utils/gssd/gssd_proc.c | 22 ++++++++++-----
 utils/gssd/krb5_util.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 utils/gssd/krb5_util.h |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
utils/gssd/gssd_proc.c +15 -7
index b1239785500f8e1bc601e4033a5f212c5b5b6c76..afc2076cde74e3cea6764408ec839a6f99b86ea4 100644
@@ -817,7 +817,8 @@ create_auth_rpc_client(struct clnt_info *clp,
 		       CLIENT **clnt_return,
 		       AUTH **auth_return,
 		       uid_t uid,
-		       int authtype)
+		       int authtype,
+		       gss_cred_id_t cred)
 {
 	CLIENT			*rpc_clnt = NULL;
 	struct rpc_gss_sec	sec;
@@ -843,7 +844,7 @@ create_auth_rpc_client(struct clnt_info *clp,
 
 	sec.qop = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
 	sec.svc = RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_NONE;
-	sec.cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+	sec.cred = cred;
 	sec.req_flags = 0;
 	if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_KRB5) {
 		sec.mech = (gss_OID)&krb5oid;
@@ -968,6 +969,7 @@ process_krb5_upcall(struct clnt_info *clp, uid_t uid, int fd, char *tgtname,
 	char			**dirname;
 	int			create_resp = -1;
 	int			err, downcall_err = -EACCES;
+	gss_cred_id_t		gss_cred;
 	OM_uint32		maj_stat, min_stat, lifetime_rec;
 
 	printerr(1, "handling krb5 upcall (%s)\n", clp->dirname);
@@ -1002,15 +1004,20 @@ process_krb5_upcall(struct clnt_info *clp, uid_t uid, int fd, char *tgtname,
 	if (uid != 0 || (uid == 0 && root_uses_machine_creds == 0 &&
 				service == NULL)) {
 		/* Tell krb5 gss which credentials cache to use */
-		for (dirname = ccachesearch; *dirname != NULL; dirname++) {
+		/* Try first to acquire credentials directly via GSSAPI */
+		err = gssd_acquire_user_cred(uid, &gss_cred);
+		if (!err)
+			create_resp = create_auth_rpc_client(clp, &rpc_clnt, &auth, uid,
+							     AUTHTYPE_KRB5, gss_cred);
+		/* if create_auth_rplc_client fails try the traditional method of
+		 * trolling for credentials */
+		for (dirname = ccachesearch; create_resp != 0 && *dirname != NULL; dirname++) {
 			err = gssd_setup_krb5_user_gss_ccache(uid, clp->servername, *dirname);
 			if (err == -EKEYEXPIRED)
 				downcall_err = -EKEYEXPIRED;
 			else if (!err)
 				create_resp = create_auth_rpc_client(clp, &rpc_clnt, &auth, uid,
-							     AUTHTYPE_KRB5);
-			if (create_resp == 0)
-				break;
+							     AUTHTYPE_KRB5, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL);
 		}
 	}
 	if (create_resp != 0) {
@@ -1036,7 +1043,8 @@ process_krb5_upcall(struct clnt_info *clp, uid_t uid, int fd, char *tgtname,
 					gssd_setup_krb5_machine_gss_ccache(*ccname);
 					if ((create_auth_rpc_client(clp, &rpc_clnt,
 								    &auth, uid,
-								    AUTHTYPE_KRB5)) == 0) {
+								    AUTHTYPE_KRB5,
+								    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)) == 0) {
 						/* Success! */
 						success++;
 						break;
utils/gssd/krb5_util.c +58 -19

111 lines not on this page · raw message

utils/gssd/krb5_util.h +2 -0
index 9f41625858fe136a63f08d757b4140508729423e..eed12944a73024c015d79f1c4aace2a9d31a1688 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ int  gssd_refresh_krb5_machine_credential(char *hostname,
 char *gssd_k5_err_msg(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code);
 void gssd_k5_get_default_realm(char **def_realm);
 
+int gssd_acquire_user_cred(uid_t uid, gss_cred_id_t *gss_cred);
+
 #ifdef HAVE_SET_ALLOWABLE_ENCTYPES
 extern int limit_to_legacy_enctypes;
 int limit_krb5_enctypes(struct rpc_gss_sec *sec);
Signature · 1 line
1.8.1.4
#1 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Simo Sorce

This way all applications that need access to krb5 protected shares do not need to be taught how to initiate crdentials on their own, nor they need to be wrapped in additional init scripts like k5start or use wasteful cronjobs to keep credentials fresh. All is needed is to drop a keytab with the right keys in a special location on the system and gss-proxy will do the rest.

Can you explain further? Will this for instance work with Active Directory servers as well as MIT and Heimdal?

Signature · 6 lines
Trond Myklebust
Linux NFS client maintainer

NetApp
[email protected]
www.netapp.com
author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Trond
Quoted 5 lines · Simo Sorce

This way all applications that need access to krb5 protected shares do not need to be taught how to initiate crdentials on their own, nor they need to be wrapped in additional init scripts like k5start or use wasteful cronjobs to keep credentials fresh. All is needed is to drop a keytab with the right keys in a special location on the system and gss-proxy will do the rest.

Can you explain further? Will this for instance work with Active Directory servers as well as MIT and Heimdal?

GSS-Proxy on the client works only with MIT 1.11 as explained, but the patch itself does not depend on GSS-Proxy so it is safe from rpc.gssd to include it.

GSS-Proxy doesn't really care what it the Kerberos infrastructure is used on the KDC, so it will work with any KDC, be it MIT, Heimdal or Active Directory.

Simo.

Signature · 1 line
Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York
#3 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Simo Sorce
Quoted 8 lines · Trond
Quoted 5 lines · Simo Sorce

This way all applications that need access to krb5 protected shares do not need to be taught how to initiate crdentials on their own, nor they need to be wrapped in additional init scripts like k5start or use wasteful cronjobs to keep credentials fresh. All is needed is to drop a keytab with the right keys in a special location on the system and gss-proxy will do the rest.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Can you explain further? Will this for instance work with Active Directory servers as well as MIT and Heimdal?

GSS-Proxy on the client works only with MIT 1.11 as explained, but the patch itself does not depend on GSS-Proxy so it is safe from rpc.gssd to include it.

OK.

Quoted 3 lines

GSS-Proxy doesn't really care what it the Kerberos infrastructure is used on the KDC, so it will work with any KDC, be it MIT, Heimdal or Active Directory.

So what kind of privileges do the keys in this keytab need in order to allow gss-proxy to perform automatic renewal of gss sessions?

Signature · 6 lines
Trond Myklebust
Linux NFS client maintainer

NetApp
[email protected]
www.netapp.com
author
#4 lore raw
Quoted 17 lines · Trond
Quoted 9 lines · Simo Sorce
Quoted 8 lines · Trond
Quoted 5 lines · Simo Sorce

This way all applications that need access to krb5 protected shares do not need to be taught how to initiate crdentials on their own, nor they need to be wrapped in additional init scripts like k5start or use wasteful cronjobs to keep credentials fresh. All is needed is to drop a keytab with the right keys in a special location on the system and gss-proxy will do the rest.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Can you explain further? Will this for instance work with Active Directory servers as well as MIT and Heimdal?

GSS-Proxy on the client works only with MIT 1.11 as explained, but the patch itself does not depend on GSS-Proxy so it is safe from rpc.gssd to include it.

Quoted 8 lines

OK.

Quoted 3 lines

GSS-Proxy doesn't really care what it the Kerberos infrastructure is used on the KDC, so it will work with any KDC, be it MIT, Heimdal or Active Directory.

So what kind of privileges do the keys in this keytab need in order to allow gss-proxy to perform automatic renewal of gss sessions?

Sorry I am not sure I understand the question.

Let me make an example that may answer your question though.

Assume you have a cronjob that runs as the user 'apache' (assume uid 1234) that needs access to a nfs share to write some backup.

All you need to do is obtain a keytab for [email protected] and place it in /var/lib/gssproxy/clients/1234.keytab and gss-proxy will use this keytab to get a ticket for the principal [email protected] when the user apache walks into the nfs mountpoint and triggers a gss auth request via rpc.gssd

Note that the principal name do not really need to match the local user name, all is needed is that the principal in the client keytab is allowed access by nfs server to the directory the local user is walking in.

Simo.

Signature · 1 line
Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York
#5 lore raw
In reply to Simo Sorce
Quoted 24 lines · Simo Sorce

GSSAPI can be given a uid number as a special name, and then gss_acquire_cred() can use the name to try to find credentials for the user.

Give GSSAPI a chance to do it on its own, then fallback to the classic method of trolling through the file system to find a credential cache.

This patch uses a little know feature of GSSAPI that permits to acquire crdentials specifying the user's UID. Normally GSSAPI will simply perform a getpwuid() call and use the user name to generate a principal name and then see if it can find a TGT for that principal in the local ccache.

This feature is vital to allow the GSS-Proxy to be able to initiate crdentials on behalf of rpc.gssd using client keytabs stored in the filsystem.

GSS-Proxy works through an interposer-type plugin (new feature in MIT 1.11) that allows to intercept all GSSAPI requestes and relay them to a system daemon via a socket. This daemon (GSS-Proxy) then can perform operations on behalf of other applications with additional logic.

In the rpc.gssd case the GSS-Proxy daemon allows applications running as system users to properly access krb5 protected shares by creating a credential cache on the fly when necessary.

Quoted 7 lines

This way all applications that need access to krb5 protected shares do not need to be taught how to initiate crdentials on their own, nor they need to be wrapped in additional init scripts like k5start or use wasteful cronjobs to keep credentials fresh. All is needed is to drop a keytab with the right keys in a special location on the system and gss-proxy will do the rest.

Committed

steved.

Quoted 204 lines
---
 utils/gssd/gssd_proc.c | 22 ++++++++++-----
 utils/gssd/krb5_util.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 utils/gssd/krb5_util.h |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
utils/gssd/gssd_proc.c +15 -7
index b1239785500f8e1bc601e4033a5f212c5b5b6c76..afc2076cde74e3cea6764408ec839a6f99b86ea4 100644
@@ -817,7 +817,8 @@ create_auth_rpc_client(struct clnt_info *clp,
 		       CLIENT **clnt_return,
 		       AUTH **auth_return,
 		       uid_t uid,
-		       int authtype)
+		       int authtype,
+		       gss_cred_id_t cred)
 {
 	CLIENT			*rpc_clnt = NULL;
 	struct rpc_gss_sec	sec;
@@ -843,7 +844,7 @@ create_auth_rpc_client(struct clnt_info *clp,
 
 	sec.qop = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
 	sec.svc = RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_NONE;
-	sec.cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+	sec.cred = cred;
 	sec.req_flags = 0;
 	if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_KRB5) {
 		sec.mech = (gss_OID)&krb5oid;
@@ -968,6 +969,7 @@ process_krb5_upcall(struct clnt_info *clp, uid_t uid, int fd, char *tgtname,
 	char			**dirname;
 	int			create_resp = -1;
 	int			err, downcall_err = -EACCES;
+	gss_cred_id_t		gss_cred;
 	OM_uint32		maj_stat, min_stat, lifetime_rec;
 
 	printerr(1, "handling krb5 upcall (%s)\n", clp->dirname);
@@ -1002,15 +1004,20 @@ process_krb5_upcall(struct clnt_info *clp, uid_t uid, int fd, char *tgtname,
 	if (uid != 0 || (uid == 0 && root_uses_machine_creds == 0 &&
 				service == NULL)) {
 		/* Tell krb5 gss which credentials cache to use */
-		for (dirname = ccachesearch; *dirname != NULL; dirname++) {
+		/* Try first to acquire credentials directly via GSSAPI */
+		err = gssd_acquire_user_cred(uid, &gss_cred);
+		if (!err)
+			create_resp = create_auth_rpc_client(clp, &rpc_clnt, &auth, uid,
+							     AUTHTYPE_KRB5, gss_cred);
+		/* if create_auth_rplc_client fails try the traditional method of
+		 * trolling for credentials */
+		for (dirname = ccachesearch; create_resp != 0 && *dirname != NULL; dirname++) {
 			err = gssd_setup_krb5_user_gss_ccache(uid, clp->servername, *dirname);
 			if (err == -EKEYEXPIRED)
 				downcall_err = -EKEYEXPIRED;
 			else if (!err)
 				create_resp = create_auth_rpc_client(clp, &rpc_clnt, &auth, uid,
-							     AUTHTYPE_KRB5);
-			if (create_resp == 0)
-				break;
+							     AUTHTYPE_KRB5, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL);
 		}
 	}
 	if (create_resp != 0) {
@@ -1036,7 +1043,8 @@ process_krb5_upcall(struct clnt_info *clp, uid_t uid, int fd, char *tgtname,
 					gssd_setup_krb5_machine_gss_ccache(*ccname);
 					if ((create_auth_rpc_client(clp, &rpc_clnt,
 								    &auth, uid,
-								    AUTHTYPE_KRB5)) == 0) {
+								    AUTHTYPE_KRB5,
+								    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)) == 0) {
 						/* Success! */
 						success++;
 						break;
utils/gssd/krb5_util.c +58 -19
index 20b55b37c0f38405794be18f4bebd8ac089dccd2..6275dd8717c64c69939481444bc4b115a2a93a13 100644
@@ -1350,6 +1350,57 @@ gssd_k5_get_default_realm(char **def_realm)
 	krb5_free_context(context);
 }
 
+static int
+gssd_acquire_krb5_cred(gss_name_t name, gss_cred_id_t *gss_cred)
+{
+	OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
+	gss_OID_set_desc desired_mechs = { 1, &krb5oid };
+
+	maj_stat = gss_acquire_cred(&min_stat, name, GSS_C_INDEFINITE,
+				    &desired_mechs, GSS_C_INITIATE,
+				    gss_cred, NULL, NULL);
+
+	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+		if (get_verbosity() > 0)
+			pgsserr("gss_acquire_cred",
+				maj_stat, min_stat, &krb5oid);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+gssd_acquire_user_cred(uid_t uid, gss_cred_id_t *gss_cred)
+{
+	OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
+	gss_buffer_desc name_buf;
+	gss_name_t name;
+	char buf[11];
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = snprintf(buf, 11, "%u", uid);
+	if (ret < 1 || ret > 10) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+	name_buf.value = buf;
+	name_buf.length = ret + 1;
+
+	maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &name_buf,
+				   GSS_C_NT_STRING_UID_NAME, &name);
+	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+		if (get_verbosity() > 0)
+			pgsserr("gss_import_name",
+				maj_stat, min_stat, &krb5oid);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	ret = gssd_acquire_krb5_cred(name, gss_cred);
+
+	maj_stat = gss_release_name(&min_stat, &name);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 #ifdef HAVE_SET_ALLOWABLE_ENCTYPES
 /*
  * this routine obtains a credentials handle via gss_acquire_cred()
@@ -1368,28 +1419,18 @@ int
 limit_krb5_enctypes(struct rpc_gss_sec *sec)
 {
 	u_int maj_stat, min_stat;
-	gss_cred_id_t credh;
-	gss_OID_set_desc  desired_mechs;
 	krb5_enctype enctypes[] = { ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
 				    ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5,
 				    ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4 };
 	int num_enctypes = sizeof(enctypes) / sizeof(enctypes[0]);
 	extern int num_krb5_enctypes;
 	extern krb5_enctype *krb5_enctypes;
+	int err = -1;
 
-	/* We only care about getting a krb5 cred */
-	desired_mechs.count = 1;
-	desired_mechs.elements = &krb5oid;
-
-	maj_stat = gss_acquire_cred(&min_stat, NULL, 0,
-				    &desired_mechs, GSS_C_INITIATE,
-				    &credh, NULL, NULL);
-
-	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-		if (get_verbosity() > 0)
-			pgsserr("gss_acquire_cred",
-				maj_stat, min_stat, &krb5oid);
-		return -1;
+	if (sec->cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
+		err = gssd_acquire_krb5_cred(GSS_C_NO_NAME, &sec->cred);
+		if (err)
+			return -1;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -1397,19 +1438,17 @@ limit_krb5_enctypes(struct rpc_gss_sec *sec)
 	 * list of supported enctypes, use local default here.
 	 */
 	if (krb5_enctypes == NULL || limit_to_legacy_enctypes)
-		maj_stat = gss_set_allowable_enctypes(&min_stat, credh,
+		maj_stat = gss_set_allowable_enctypes(&min_stat, sec->cred,
 					&krb5oid, num_enctypes, enctypes);
 	else
-		maj_stat = gss_set_allowable_enctypes(&min_stat, credh,
+		maj_stat = gss_set_allowable_enctypes(&min_stat, sec->cred,
 					&krb5oid, num_krb5_enctypes, krb5_enctypes);
 
 	if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
 		pgsserr("gss_set_allowable_enctypes",
 			maj_stat, min_stat, &krb5oid);
-		gss_release_cred(&min_stat, &credh);
 		return -1;
 	}
-	sec->cred = credh;
 
 	return 0;
 }
utils/gssd/krb5_util.h +2 -0
index 9f41625858fe136a63f08d757b4140508729423e..eed12944a73024c015d79f1c4aace2a9d31a1688 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ int  gssd_refresh_krb5_machine_credential(char *hostname,
 char *gssd_k5_err_msg(krb5_context context, krb5_error_code code);
 void gssd_k5_get_default_realm(char **def_realm);
 
+int gssd_acquire_user_cred(uid_t uid, gss_cred_id_t *gss_cred);
+
 #ifdef HAVE_SET_ALLOWABLE_ENCTYPES
 extern int limit_to_legacy_enctypes;
 int limit_krb5_enctypes(struct rpc_gss_sec *sec);