fork: reorder permissions when violating number of processes limits
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 fork: reorder permissions when violating number of processes limits
When a task is attempting to violate the RLIMIT_NPROC limit we have a check to see if the task is sufficiently priviledged. The check first looks at CAP_SYS_ADMIN, then CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, then if the task is uid=0. A result is that tasks which are allowed by the uid=0 check are first checked against the security subsystem. This results in the security subsystem auditting a denial for sys_admin and sys_resource and then the task passing the uid=0 check. This patch rearrainges the code to first check uid=0, since if we pass that we shouldn't hit the security system at all. We then check sys_resource, since it is the smallest capability which will solve the problem. Lastly we check the fallback everything cap_sysadmin. We don't want to give this capability many places since it is so powerful. This will eliminate many of the false positive/needless denial messages we get when a root task tries to violate the nproc limit. (note that kthreads count against root, so on a sufficiently large machine we can actually get past the default limits before any userspace tasks are launched.)
--- kernel/fork.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/fork.c +2 -2
@@ -1199,8 +1199,8 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags, retval = -EAGAIN ;if (atomic_read (&p->real_cred->user->processes) >=task_rlimit (p,RLIMIT_NPROC )) { -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && - p->real_cred->user !=INIT_USER ) +if (p->real_cred->user !=INIT_USER && + !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) goto bad_fork_free; } current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED ;
Signature · 1 line
1.8.2.1