Input: evdev - add EVIOCREVOKE ioctl
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 Input: evdev - add EVIOCREVOKE ioctl
If we have multiple sessions on a system, we normally don't want background sessions to read input events. Otherwise, it could capture passwords and more entered by the user on the foreground session. This is a real world problem as the recent XMir development showed:
http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/27327.html
We currently rely on sessions to release input devices when being deactivated. This relies on trust across sessions. But that's not given on usual systems. We therefore need a way to control which processes have access to input devices.
With VTs the kernel simply routed them through the active /dev/ttyX. This is not possible with evdev devices, though. Moreover, we want to avoid routing input-devices through some dispatcher-daemon in userspace (which would add some latency).
This patch introduces EVIOCREVOKE. If called on an evdev fd, this revokes device-access irrecoverably for that *single* open-file. Hence, once you call EVIOCREVOKE on any dup()ed fd, all fds for that open-file will be rather useless now (but still valid compared to close()!). This allows us to pass fds directly to session-processes from a trusted source. The source keeps a dup()ed fd and revokes access once the session-process is no longer active.
Compared to the EVIOCMUTE proposal, we can avoid the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restriction now as there is no way to revive the fd again. Hence, a user is free to call EVIOCREVOKE themself to kill the fd.
Additionally, this ioctl allows multi-layer access-control (again compared to EVIOCMUTE which was limited to one layer via CAP_SYS_ADMIN). A middle layer can simply request a new open-file from the layer above and pass it to the layer below. Now each layer can call EVIOCREVOKE on the fds to revoke access for all layers below, at the expense of one fd per layer.
There's already ongoing experimental user-space work which demonstrates how it can be used:
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-August/012897.html
--- drivers/input/evdev.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- include/uapi/linux/input.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/input/evdev.c +29 -1
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct evdev_client {struct evdev *evdev;struct list_head node;int clkid; +bool revoked;unsigned int bufsize;struct input_event buffer[]; };
@@ -164,6 +165,9 @@ static void evdev_pass_values(struct evdev_client *client,struct input_event event;bool wakeup = false; +if (client->revoked) +return ; + event.time =ktime_to_timeval (client->clkid ==CLOCK_MONOTONIC ? mono : real);
@@ -795,6 +799,15 @@ static int evdev_handle_mt_request(struct input_dev *dev,return 0 ; } +static int evdev_revoke (struct evdev *evdev,struct evdev_client *client, +struct file *file) +{ + client->revoked = true; +input_flush_device (&evdev->handle, file); + +return 0 ; +} +static long evdev_do_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,void __user *p,int compat_mode) {
@@ -808,12 +821,27 @@ static long evdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,unsigned int size;int error; -/* First we check for fixed-length commands */ +/* First check for ioctls allowed while revoked */ switch (cmd) {case EVIOCGVERSION :return put_user (EV_VERSION , ip); +case EVIOCREVOKE : +if (p) +return -EINVAL ; +else +return evdev_revoke (evdev, client, file); + +default : +if (client->revoked) +return -EACCES ; +break ; + } + +/* Then check for fixed-length commands */ +switch (cmd) { +case EVIOCGID :if (copy_to_user (p, &dev->id,sizeof (struct input_id )))return -EFAULT ;
include/uapi/linux/input.h +1 -0
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ struct input_keymap_entry {#define EVIOCGEFFECTS _IOR('E', 0x84, int)/* Report number of effects playable at the same time */ #define EVIOCGRAB _IOW('E', 0x90, int)/* Grab/Release device */ +#define EVIOCREVOKE _IOW('E', 0x91, int)/* Revoke device access */ #define EVIOCSCLOCKID _IOW('E', 0xa0, int)/* Set clockid to be used for timestamps */
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4
PATCH v2 1/1 Input: evdev - add EVIOCREVOKE ioctl
If we have multiple sessions on a system, we normally don't want background sessions to read input events. Otherwise, it could capture passwords and more entered by the user on the foreground session. This is a real world problem as the recent XMir development showed:
http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/27327.html
We currently rely on sessions to release input devices when being deactivated. This relies on trust across sessions. But that's not given on usual systems. We therefore need a way to control which processes have access to input devices.
With VTs the kernel simply routed them through the active /dev/ttyX. This is not possible with evdev devices, though. Moreover, we want to avoid routing input-devices through some dispatcher-daemon in userspace (which would add some latency).
This patch introduces EVIOCREVOKE. If called on an evdev fd, this revokes device-access irrecoverably for that *single* open-file. Hence, once you call EVIOCREVOKE on any dup()ed fd, all fds for that open-file will be rather useless now (but still valid compared to close()!). This allows us to pass fds directly to session-processes from a trusted source. The source keeps a dup()ed fd and revokes access once the session-process is no longer active.
Compared to the EVIOCMUTE proposal, we can avoid the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restriction now as there is no way to revive the fd again. Hence, a user is free to call EVIOCREVOKE themself to kill the fd.
Additionally, this ioctl allows multi-layer access-control (again compared to EVIOCMUTE which was limited to one layer via CAP_SYS_ADMIN). A middle layer can simply request a new open-file from the layer above and pass it to the layer below. Now each layer can call EVIOCREVOKE on the fds to revoke access for all layers below, at the expense of one fd per layer.
There's already ongoing experimental user-space work which demonstrates how it can be used:
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-August/012897.html
---
v2:
- ungrab device during revoke
- wake-up blocking read()s of the client
- return -EACCES from write() for revoked clients
- signal POLLHUP | POLLERR for revoked clients
- don't signal POLLOUT for revoked clients
drivers/input/evdev.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- include/uapi/linux/input.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/input/evdev.c +40 -3
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct evdev_client {struct evdev *evdev;struct list_head node;int clkid; +bool revoked;unsigned int bufsize;struct input_event buffer[]; };
@@ -164,6 +165,9 @@ static void evdev_pass_values(struct evdev_client *client,struct input_event event;bool wakeup = false; +if (client->revoked) +return ; + event.time =ktime_to_timeval (client->clkid ==CLOCK_MONOTONIC ? mono : real);
@@ -432,6 +436,9 @@ static ssize_t evdev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,if (!evdev->exist) { retval = -ENODEV ; goto out; + }else if (client->revoked) { + retval = -EACCES ; + goto out; }while (retval +input_event_size () <= count) {
@@ -511,7 +518,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,if (!(file->f_flags &O_NONBLOCK )) { error =wait_event_interruptible (evdev->wait, client->packet_head != client->tail || - !evdev->exist); + !evdev->exist || client->revoked);if (error)return error; }
@@ -529,7 +536,11 @@ static unsigned int evdev_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)poll_wait (file, &evdev->wait, wait); - mask = evdev->exist ?POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM :POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (evdev->exist && !client->revoked) + mask =POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM ; +else + mask =POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (client->packet_head != client->tail) mask |=POLLIN |POLLRDNORM ;
@@ -795,6 +806,17 @@ static int evdev_handle_mt_request(struct input_dev *dev,return 0 ; } +static int evdev_revoke (struct evdev *evdev,struct evdev_client *client, +struct file *file) +{ + client->revoked = true; +evdev_ungrab (evdev, client); +input_flush_device (&evdev->handle, file); +wake_up_interruptible (&evdev->wait); + +return 0 ; +} +static long evdev_do_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,void __user *p,int compat_mode) {
@@ -808,12 +830,27 @@ static long evdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,unsigned int size;int error; -/* First we check for fixed-length commands */ +/* First check for ioctls allowed while revoked */ switch (cmd) {case EVIOCGVERSION :return put_user (EV_VERSION , ip); +case EVIOCREVOKE : +if (p) +return -EINVAL ; +else +return evdev_revoke (evdev, client, file); + +default : +if (client->revoked) +return -EACCES ; +break ; + } + +/* Then check for fixed-length commands */ +switch (cmd) { +case EVIOCGID :if (copy_to_user (p, &dev->id,sizeof (struct input_id )))return -EFAULT ;
include/uapi/linux/input.h +1 -0
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ struct input_keymap_entry {#define EVIOCGEFFECTS _IOR('E', 0x84, int)/* Report number of effects playable at the same time */ #define EVIOCGRAB _IOW('E', 0x90, int)/* Grab/Release device */ +#define EVIOCREVOKE _IOW('E', 0x91, int)/* Revoke device access */ #define EVIOCSCLOCKID _IOW('E', 0xa0, int)/* Set clockid to be used for timestamps */
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4
Dmitry Torokhov
maintainerHi David,
Quoted 73 lines · David Herrmann
If we have multiple sessions on a system, we normally don't want background sessions to read input events. Otherwise, it could capture passwords and more entered by the user on the foreground session. This is a real world problem as the recent XMir development showed:
http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/27327.htmlWe currently rely on sessions to release input devices when being deactivated. This relies on trust across sessions. But that's not given on usual systems. We therefore need a way to control which processes have access to input devices.
With VTs the kernel simply routed them through the active
/dev/ttyX. This is not possible with evdev devices, though. Moreover, we want to avoid routing input-devices through some dispatcher-daemon in userspace (which would add some latency).This patch introduces EVIOCREVOKE. If called on an evdev fd, this revokes device-access irrecoverably for that *single* open-file. Hence, once you call EVIOCREVOKE on any dup()ed fd, all fds for that open-file will be rather useless now (but still valid compared to
close()!). This allows us to pass fds directly to session-processes from a trusted source. The source keeps a dup()ed fd and revokes access once the session-process is no longer active.
Compared to the EVIOCMUTE proposal, we can avoid theCAP_SYS_ADMINrestriction now as there is no way to revive the fd again. Hence, a user is free to call EVIOCREVOKE themself to kill the fd.Additionally, this ioctl allows multi-layer access-control (again compared to EVIOCMUTE which was limited to one layer via
CAP_SYS_ADMIN). A middle layer can simply request a new open-file from the layer above and pass it to the layer below. Now each layer can call EVIOCREVOKE on the fds to revoke access for all layers below, at the expense of one fd per layer.There's already ongoing experimental user-space work which demonstrates how it can be used:
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-August/012897.htmlSigned-off-by David Herrmann <[email protected]>---
v2:
- ungrab device during revoke
- wake-up blocking read()s of the client
- return-EACCESfromwrite()for revoked clients
- signal POLLHUP | POLLERR for revoked clients
- don't signal POLLOUT for revoked clientsdrivers/input/evdev.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- include/uapi/linux/input.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)drivers/input/evdev.c +4
-0@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct evdev_client {struct evdev *evdev;struct list_head node;int clkid; +bool revoked;unsigned int bufsize;struct input_event buffer[]; };@@ -164,6 +165,9 @@ static void evdev_pass_values(struct evdev_client *client,struct input_event event;bool wakeup = false; +if (client->revoked) +return ; + event.time =ktime_to_timeval (client->clkid ==CLOCK_MONOTONIC ? mono : real);
drivers/input/evdev.c static ssize_t evdev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, · line 441
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/input/evdev.c +3
-0@@ -432,6 +436,9 @@ static ssize_t evdev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,if (!evdev->exist) { retval = -ENODEV ; goto out; + }else if (client->revoked) { + retval = -EACCES ; + goto out;
Why do we treat revoke differently form device going away? I'd return -ENODEV in both cases.
Quoted 55 lines
drivers/input/evdev.c +19
-3}while (retval +input_event_size () <= count) {@@ -511,7 +518,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,if (!(file->f_flags &O_NONBLOCK )) { error =wait_event_interruptible (evdev->wait, client->packet_head != client->tail || - !evdev->exist); + !evdev->exist || client->revoked);if (error)return error; }@@ -529,7 +536,11 @@ static unsigned int evdev_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)poll_wait (file, &evdev->wait, wait); - mask = evdev->exist ?POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM :POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (evdev->exist && !client->revoked) + mask =POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM ; +else + mask =POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (client->packet_head != client->tail) mask |=POLLIN |POLLRDNORM ;@@ -795,6 +806,17 @@ static int evdev_handle_mt_request(struct input_dev *dev,return 0 ; } +static int evdev_revoke (struct evdev *evdev,struct evdev_client *client, +struct file *file) +{ + client->revoked = true; +evdev_ungrab (evdev, client); +input_flush_device (&evdev->handle, file); +wake_up_interruptible (&evdev->wait); + +return 0 ; +} +static long evdev_do_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,void __user *p,int compat_mode) {@@ -808,12 +830,27 @@ static long evdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,unsigned int size;int error; -/* First we check for fixed-length commands */ +/* First check for ioctls allowed while revoked */ switch (cmd) {case EVIOCGVERSION :return put_user (EV_VERSION , ip); +case EVIOCREVOKE :
drivers/input/evdev.c static long evdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, · line 849
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/input/evdev.c +10
-0+if (p) +return -EINVAL ; +else +return evdev_revoke (evdev, client, file); + +default : +if (client->revoked) +return -EACCES ; +break ; + }
Here as well, I'd check revoked in the same place where we check exist and bail if device gone away or our access was revoked.
Quoted 22 lines
drivers/input/evdev.c +4
-0+ +/* Then check for fixed-length commands */ +switch (cmd) { +case EVIOCGID :if (copy_to_user (p, &dev->id,sizeof (struct input_id )))return -EFAULT ;include/uapi/linux/input.h +1
-0@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ struct input_keymap_entry {#define EVIOCGEFFECTS _IOR('E', 0x84, int)/* Report number of effects playable at the same time */ #define EVIOCGRAB _IOW('E', 0x90, int)/* Grab/Release device */ +#define EVIOCREVOKE _IOW('E', 0x91, int)/* Revoke device access */ #define EVIOCSCLOCKID _IOW('E', 0xa0, int)/* Set clockid to be used for timestamps */ Signature · 1 line
1.8.4
Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
Dmitry
Hi
Quoted 75 lines · Dmitry Torokhov
Hi David,
Quoted 72 lines · David Herrmann
If we have multiple sessions on a system, we normally don't want background sessions to read input events. Otherwise, it could capture passwords and more entered by the user on the foreground session. This is a real world problem as the recent XMir development showed:
http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/27327.htmlWe currently rely on sessions to release input devices when being deactivated. This relies on trust across sessions. But that's not given on usual systems. We therefore need a way to control which processes have access to input devices.
With VTs the kernel simply routed them through the active
/dev/ttyX. This is not possible with evdev devices, though. Moreover, we want to avoid routing input-devices through some dispatcher-daemon in userspace (which would add some latency).This patch introduces EVIOCREVOKE. If called on an evdev fd, this revokes device-access irrecoverably for that *single* open-file. Hence, once you call EVIOCREVOKE on any dup()ed fd, all fds for that open-file will be rather useless now (but still valid compared to
close()!). This allows us to pass fds directly to session-processes from a trusted source. The source keeps a dup()ed fd and revokes access once the session-process is no longer active.
Compared to the EVIOCMUTE proposal, we can avoid theCAP_SYS_ADMINrestriction now as there is no way to revive the fd again. Hence, a user is free to call EVIOCREVOKE themself to kill the fd.Additionally, this ioctl allows multi-layer access-control (again compared to EVIOCMUTE which was limited to one layer via
CAP_SYS_ADMIN). A middle layer can simply request a new open-file from the layer above and pass it to the layer below. Now each layer can call EVIOCREVOKE on the fds to revoke access for all layers below, at the expense of one fd per layer.There's already ongoing experimental user-space work which demonstrates how it can be used:
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-August/012897.htmlSigned-off-by David Herrmann <[email protected]>---
v2:
- ungrab device during revoke
- wake-up blocking read()s of the client
- return-EACCESfromwrite()for revoked clients
- signal POLLHUP | POLLERR for revoked clients
- don't signal POLLOUT for revoked clientsdrivers/input/evdev.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- include/uapi/linux/input.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)drivers/input/evdev.c +4
-0@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct evdev_client {struct evdev *evdev;struct list_head node;int clkid; +bool revoked;unsigned int bufsize;struct input_event buffer[]; };@@ -164,6 +165,9 @@ static void evdev_pass_values(struct evdev_client *client,struct input_event event;bool wakeup = false; +if (client->revoked) +return ; + event.time =ktime_to_timeval (client->clkid ==CLOCK_MONOTONIC ? mono : real);
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/input/evdev.c static ssize_t evdev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, · line 441
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/input/evdev.c +3
-0@@ -432,6 +436,9 @@ static ssize_t evdev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,if (!evdev->exist) { retval = -ENODEV ; goto out; + }else if (client->revoked) { + retval = -EACCES ; + goto out;Why do we treat revoke differently form device going away? I'd return
-ENODEVin both cases.
My plan was to allow applications to react to revoke. So if someone remotely revokes their fd, they notice it via EACCES, not via ENODEV. They could just close the fd but keep contexts around (they may get a new fd soon). If they receive ENODEV (or some other error), they could drop all their contexts and just remove the device.
However, I just noticed that it is very unlikely that they're revoked during write(). It's more likely during poll() (which returns POLLHUP for both). So I guess you're right. Will rethink it again, but if I don't come up with some idea I'll just drop it for v3.
Thanks!
David
Quoted 96 lines
Quoted 55 lines
drivers/input/evdev.c +19
-3}while (retval +input_event_size () <= count) {@@ -511,7 +518,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,if (!(file->f_flags &O_NONBLOCK )) { error =wait_event_interruptible (evdev->wait, client->packet_head != client->tail || - !evdev->exist); + !evdev->exist || client->revoked);if (error)return error; }@@ -529,7 +536,11 @@ static unsigned int evdev_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)poll_wait (file, &evdev->wait, wait); - mask = evdev->exist ?POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM :POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (evdev->exist && !client->revoked) + mask =POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM ; +else + mask =POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (client->packet_head != client->tail) mask |=POLLIN |POLLRDNORM ;@@ -795,6 +806,17 @@ static int evdev_handle_mt_request(struct input_dev *dev,return 0 ; } +static int evdev_revoke (struct evdev *evdev,struct evdev_client *client, +struct file *file) +{ + client->revoked = true; +evdev_ungrab (evdev, client); +input_flush_device (&evdev->handle, file); +wake_up_interruptible (&evdev->wait); + +return 0 ; +} +static long evdev_do_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,void __user *p,int compat_mode) {@@ -808,12 +830,27 @@ static long evdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,unsigned int size;int error; -/* First we check for fixed-length commands */ +/* First check for ioctls allowed while revoked */ switch (cmd) {case EVIOCGVERSION :return put_user (EV_VERSION , ip); +case EVIOCREVOKE :drivers/input/evdev.c static long evdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, · line 849
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/input/evdev.c +10
-0+if (p) +return -EINVAL ; +else +return evdev_revoke (evdev, client, file); + +default : +if (client->revoked) +return -EACCES ; +break ; + }Here as well, I'd check revoked in the same place where we check exist and bail if device gone away or our access was revoked.
Quoted 20 lines
drivers/input/evdev.c +4
-0+ +/* Then check for fixed-length commands */ +switch (cmd) { +case EVIOCGID :if (copy_to_user (p, &dev->id,sizeof (struct input_id )))return -EFAULT ;include/uapi/linux/input.h +1
-1@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ struct input_keymap_entry {#define EVIOCGEFFECTS _IOR('E', 0x84, int)/* Report number of effects playable at the same time */ #define EVIOCGRAB _IOW('E', 0x90, int)/* Grab/Release device */ +#define EVIOCREVOKE _IOW('E', 0x91, int)/* Revoke device access */ #define EVIOCSCLOCKID _IOW('E', 0xa0, int)/* Set clockid to be used for timestamps */ --Quoted 2 lines
1.8.4
Thanks.
--
Dmitry
PATCH v3 1/1 Input: evdev - add EVIOCREVOKE ioctl
In reply to David HerrmannIf we have multiple sessions on a system, we normally don't want background sessions to read input events. Otherwise, it could capture passwords and more entered by the user on the foreground session. This is a real world problem as the recent XMir development showed:
http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/27327.html
We currently rely on sessions to release input devices when being deactivated. This relies on trust across sessions. But that's not given on usual systems. We therefore need a way to control which processes have access to input devices.
With VTs the kernel simply routed them through the active /dev/ttyX. This is not possible with evdev devices, though. Moreover, we want to avoid routing input-devices through some dispatcher-daemon in userspace (which would add some latency).
This patch introduces EVIOCREVOKE. If called on an evdev fd, this revokes device-access irrecoverably for that *single* open-file. Hence, once you call EVIOCREVOKE on any dup()ed fd, all fds for that open-file will be rather useless now (but still valid compared to close()!). This allows us to pass fds directly to session-processes from a trusted source. The source keeps a dup()ed fd and revokes access once the session-process is no longer active.
Compared to the EVIOCMUTE proposal, we can avoid the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restriction now as there is no way to revive the fd again. Hence, a user is free to call EVIOCREVOKE themself to kill the fd.
Additionally, this ioctl allows multi-layer access-control (again compared to EVIOCMUTE which was limited to one layer via CAP_SYS_ADMIN). A middle layer can simply request a new open-file from the layer above and pass it to the layer below. Now each layer can call EVIOCREVOKE on the fds to revoke access for all layers below, at the expense of one fd per layer.
There's already ongoing experimental user-space work which demonstrates how it can be used:
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-August/012897.html
---
Changes from v2:
- Handle client->revoked like evdev->exist to avoid special-casing "revoked"
drivers/input/evdev.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- include/uapi/linux/input.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/input/evdev.c +29 -4
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct evdev_client {struct evdev *evdev;struct list_head node;int clkid; +bool revoked;unsigned int bufsize;struct input_event buffer[]; };
@@ -164,6 +165,9 @@ static void evdev_pass_values(struct evdev_client *client,struct input_event event;bool wakeup = false; +if (client->revoked) +return ; + event.time =ktime_to_timeval (client->clkid ==CLOCK_MONOTONIC ? mono : real);
@@ -429,7 +433,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,if (retval)return retval; -if (!evdev->exist) { +if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked) { retval = -ENODEV ; goto out; }
@@ -511,7 +515,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,if (!(file->f_flags &O_NONBLOCK )) { error =wait_event_interruptible (evdev->wait, client->packet_head != client->tail || - !evdev->exist); + !evdev->exist || client->revoked);if (error)return error; }
@@ -529,7 +533,11 @@ static unsigned int evdev_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)poll_wait (file, &evdev->wait, wait); - mask = evdev->exist ?POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM :POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (evdev->exist && !client->revoked) + mask =POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM ; +else + mask =POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (client->packet_head != client->tail) mask |=POLLIN |POLLRDNORM ;
@@ -795,6 +803,17 @@ static int evdev_handle_mt_request(struct input_dev *dev,return 0 ; } +static int evdev_revoke (struct evdev *evdev,struct evdev_client *client, +struct file *file) +{ + client->revoked = true; +evdev_ungrab (evdev, client); +input_flush_device (&evdev->handle, file); +wake_up_interruptible (&evdev->wait); + +return 0 ; +} +static long evdev_do_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,void __user *p,int compat_mode) {
@@ -857,6 +876,12 @@ static long evdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,else return evdev_ungrab (evdev, client); +case EVIOCREVOKE : +if (p) +return -EINVAL ; +else +return evdev_revoke (evdev, client, file); +case EVIOCSCLOCKID :if (copy_from_user (&i, p,sizeof (unsigned int )))return -EFAULT ;
@@ -1002,7 +1027,7 @@ static long evdev_ioctl_handler(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,if (retval)return retval; -if (!evdev->exist) { +if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked) { retval = -ENODEV ; goto out; }
include/uapi/linux/input.h +1 -0
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ struct input_keymap_entry {#define EVIOCGEFFECTS _IOR('E', 0x84, int)/* Report number of effects playable at the same time */ #define EVIOCGRAB _IOW('E', 0x90, int)/* Grab/Release device */ +#define EVIOCREVOKE _IOW('E', 0x91, int)/* Revoke device access */ #define EVIOCSCLOCKID _IOW('E', 0xa0, int)/* Set clockid to be used for timestamps */
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4
Hi Dmitry
Quoted 33 lines · David Herrmann
If we have multiple sessions on a system, we normally don't want background sessions to read input events. Otherwise, it could capture passwords and more entered by the user on the foreground session. This is a real world problem as the recent XMir development showed:
http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/27327.htmlWe currently rely on sessions to release input devices when being deactivated. This relies on trust across sessions. But that's not given on usual systems. We therefore need a way to control which processes have access to input devices.
With VTs the kernel simply routed them through the active
/dev/ttyX. This is not possible with evdev devices, though. Moreover, we want to avoid routing input-devices through some dispatcher-daemon in userspace (which would add some latency).This patch introduces EVIOCREVOKE. If called on an evdev fd, this revokes device-access irrecoverably for that *single* open-file. Hence, once you call EVIOCREVOKE on any dup()ed fd, all fds for that open-file will be rather useless now (but still valid compared to
close()!). This allows us to pass fds directly to session-processes from a trusted source. The source keeps a dup()ed fd and revokes access once the session-process is no longer active.
Compared to the EVIOCMUTE proposal, we can avoid theCAP_SYS_ADMINrestriction now as there is no way to revive the fd again. Hence, a user is free to call EVIOCREVOKE themself to kill the fd.Additionally, this ioctl allows multi-layer access-control (again compared to EVIOCMUTE which was limited to one layer via
CAP_SYS_ADMIN). A middle layer can simply request a new open-file from the layer above and pass it to the layer below. Now each layer can call EVIOCREVOKE on the fds to revoke access for all layers below, at the expense of one fd per layer.
Quoted 3 lines
There's already ongoing experimental user-space work which demonstrates how it can be used:
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-August/012897.html
I've been running this logind-feature for some time on my machine now. I haven't seen any problems. Could you let us know what your plans are for this patch?
3.12 would be very nice so we could continue pushing the user-space parts. There are even existing programs (like weston-launch) which could already make great use of that with just a <10 line patch.
Thanks
David
Quoted 117 lines
Signed-off-by David Herrmann <[email protected]>---
Changes from v2:
- Handleclient->revokedlikeevdev->existto avoid special-casing "revoked"drivers/input/evdev.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- include/uapi/linux/input.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)drivers/input/evdev.c +29
-4@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct evdev_client {struct evdev *evdev;struct list_head node;int clkid; +bool revoked;unsigned int bufsize;struct input_event buffer[]; };@@ -164,6 +165,9 @@ static void evdev_pass_values(struct evdev_client *client,struct input_event event;bool wakeup = false; +if (client->revoked) +return ; + event.time =ktime_to_timeval (client->clkid ==CLOCK_MONOTONIC ? mono : real);@@ -429,7 +433,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,if (retval)return retval; -if (!evdev->exist) { +if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked) { retval = -ENODEV ; goto out; }@@ -511,7 +515,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,if (!(file->f_flags &O_NONBLOCK )) { error =wait_event_interruptible (evdev->wait, client->packet_head != client->tail || - !evdev->exist); + !evdev->exist || client->revoked);if (error)return error; }@@ -529,7 +533,11 @@ static unsigned int evdev_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)poll_wait (file, &evdev->wait, wait); - mask = evdev->exist ?POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM :POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (evdev->exist && !client->revoked) + mask =POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM ; +else + mask =POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (client->packet_head != client->tail) mask |=POLLIN |POLLRDNORM ;@@ -795,6 +803,17 @@ static int evdev_handle_mt_request(struct input_dev *dev,return 0 ; } +static int evdev_revoke (struct evdev *evdev,struct evdev_client *client, +struct file *file) +{ + client->revoked = true; +evdev_ungrab (evdev, client); +input_flush_device (&evdev->handle, file); +wake_up_interruptible (&evdev->wait); + +return 0 ; +} +static long evdev_do_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,void __user *p,int compat_mode) {@@ -857,6 +876,12 @@ static long evdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,else return evdev_ungrab (evdev, client); +case EVIOCREVOKE : +if (p) +return -EINVAL ; +else +return evdev_revoke (evdev, client, file); +case EVIOCSCLOCKID :if (copy_from_user (&i, p,sizeof (unsigned int )))return -EFAULT ;@@ -1002,7 +1027,7 @@ static long evdev_ioctl_handler(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,if (retval)return retval; -if (!evdev->exist) { +if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked) { retval = -ENODEV ; goto out; }include/uapi/linux/input.h +1
-1@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ struct input_keymap_entry {#define EVIOCGEFFECTS _IOR('E', 0x84, int)/* Report number of effects playable at the same time */ #define EVIOCGRAB _IOW('E', 0x90, int)/* Grab/Release device */ +#define EVIOCREVOKE _IOW('E', 0x91, int)/* Revoke device access */ #define EVIOCSCLOCKID _IOW('E', 0xa0, int)/* Set clockid to be used for timestamps */ --1.8.4
Kristian Høgsberg
Reviewed-byQuoted 40 lines · David Herrmann
Hi Dmitry
Quoted 33 lines · David Herrmann
If we have multiple sessions on a system, we normally don't want background sessions to read input events. Otherwise, it could capture passwords and more entered by the user on the foreground session. This is a real world problem as the recent XMir development showed:
http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/27327.htmlWe currently rely on sessions to release input devices when being deactivated. This relies on trust across sessions. But that's not given on usual systems. We therefore need a way to control which processes have access to input devices.
With VTs the kernel simply routed them through the active
/dev/ttyX. This is not possible with evdev devices, though. Moreover, we want to avoid routing input-devices through some dispatcher-daemon in userspace (which would add some latency).This patch introduces EVIOCREVOKE. If called on an evdev fd, this revokes device-access irrecoverably for that *single* open-file. Hence, once you call EVIOCREVOKE on any dup()ed fd, all fds for that open-file will be rather useless now (but still valid compared to
close()!). This allows us to pass fds directly to session-processes from a trusted source. The source keeps a dup()ed fd and revokes access once the session-process is no longer active.
Compared to the EVIOCMUTE proposal, we can avoid theCAP_SYS_ADMINrestriction now as there is no way to revive the fd again. Hence, a user is free to call EVIOCREVOKE themself to kill the fd.Additionally, this ioctl allows multi-layer access-control (again compared to EVIOCMUTE which was limited to one layer via
CAP_SYS_ADMIN). A middle layer can simply request a new open-file from the layer above and pass it to the layer below. Now each layer can call EVIOCREVOKE on the fds to revoke access for all layers below, at the expense of one fd per layer.Quoted 3 lines
There's already ongoing experimental user-space work which demonstrates how it can be used:
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-August/012897.html
Quoted 6 lines
I've been running this logind-feature for some time on my machine now. I haven't seen any problems. Could you let us know what your plans are for this patch?
3.12 would be very nice so we could continue pushing the user-space parts. There are even existing programs (like weston-launch) which could already make great use of that with just a <10 line patch.
I think we have good use cases for this - with revoke we can give input fds to a non-trusted, non-root display-severs and standalone KMS+evdev applications and reliably revoke them when their session is deactivated (vt switched away typically). EVIOCREVOKE is usable in logind and standalone setuid helpers such as weston-launch,. Everything other priviledge operation a display server needs can be done in logind or weston-launch, this ioctl is the final piece that lets us run X without root priviledges.
Quoted 109 lines
Quoted 109 lines
Signed-off-by David Herrmann <[email protected]>---
Changes from v2:
- Handleclient->revokedlikeevdev->existto avoid special-casing "revoked"drivers/input/evdev.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- include/uapi/linux/input.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)drivers/input/evdev.c +29
-4@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct evdev_client {struct evdev *evdev;struct list_head node;int clkid; +bool revoked;unsigned int bufsize;struct input_event buffer[]; };@@ -164,6 +165,9 @@ static void evdev_pass_values(struct evdev_client *client,struct input_event event;bool wakeup = false; +if (client->revoked) +return ; + event.time =ktime_to_timeval (client->clkid ==CLOCK_MONOTONIC ? mono : real);@@ -429,7 +433,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,if (retval)return retval; -if (!evdev->exist) { +if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked) { retval = -ENODEV ; goto out; }@@ -511,7 +515,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,if (!(file->f_flags &O_NONBLOCK )) { error =wait_event_interruptible (evdev->wait, client->packet_head != client->tail || - !evdev->exist); + !evdev->exist || client->revoked);if (error)return error; }@@ -529,7 +533,11 @@ static unsigned int evdev_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)poll_wait (file, &evdev->wait, wait); - mask = evdev->exist ?POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM :POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (evdev->exist && !client->revoked) + mask =POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM ; +else + mask =POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (client->packet_head != client->tail) mask |=POLLIN |POLLRDNORM ;@@ -795,6 +803,17 @@ static int evdev_handle_mt_request(struct input_dev *dev,return 0 ; } +static int evdev_revoke (struct evdev *evdev,struct evdev_client *client, +struct file *file) +{ + client->revoked = true; +evdev_ungrab (evdev, client); +input_flush_device (&evdev->handle, file); +wake_up_interruptible (&evdev->wait); + +return 0 ; +} +static long evdev_do_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,void __user *p,int compat_mode) {@@ -857,6 +876,12 @@ static long evdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,else return evdev_ungrab (evdev, client); +case EVIOCREVOKE : +if (p) +return -EINVAL ; +else +return evdev_revoke (evdev, client, file); +case EVIOCSCLOCKID :if (copy_from_user (&i, p,sizeof (unsigned int )))return -EFAULT ;@@ -1002,7 +1027,7 @@ static long evdev_ioctl_handler(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,if (retval)return retval; -if (!evdev->exist) { +if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked) { retval = -ENODEV ; goto out; }include/uapi/linux/input.h +0
-0@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ struct input_keymap_entry {#define EVIOCGEFFECTS _IOR('E', 0x84, int)/* Report number of effects playable at the same time */
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
include/uapi/linux/input.h +1
-1#define EVIOCGRAB _IOW('E', 0x90, int)/* Grab/Release device */ +#define EVIOCREVOKE _IOW('E', 0x91, int)/* Revoke device access */ #define EVIOCSCLOCKID _IOW('E', 0xa0, int)/* Set clockid to be used for timestamps */ --1.8.4
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PATCH v4 1/1 Input: evdev - add EVIOCREVOKE ioctl
In reply to David HerrmannIf we have multiple sessions on a system, we normally don't want background sessions to read input events. Otherwise, it could capture passwords and more entered by the user on the foreground session. This is a real world problem as the recent XMir development showed:
http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/27327.html
We currently rely on sessions to release input devices when being deactivated. This relies on trust across sessions. But that's not given on usual systems. We therefore need a way to control which processes have access to input devices.
With VTs the kernel simply routed them through the active /dev/ttyX. This is not possible with evdev devices, though. Moreover, we want to avoid routing input-devices through some dispatcher-daemon in userspace (which would add some latency).
This patch introduces EVIOCREVOKE. If called on an evdev fd, this revokes device-access irrecoverably for that *single* open-file. Hence, once you call EVIOCREVOKE on any dup()ed fd, all fds for that open-file will be rather useless now (but still valid compared to close()!). This allows us to pass fds directly to session-processes from a trusted source. The source keeps a dup()ed fd and revokes access once the session-process is no longer active.
Compared to the EVIOCMUTE proposal, we can avoid the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restriction now as there is no way to revive the fd again. Hence, a user is free to call EVIOCREVOKE themself to kill the fd.
Additionally, this ioctl allows multi-layer access-control (again compared to EVIOCMUTE which was limited to one layer via CAP_SYS_ADMIN). A middle layer can simply request a new open-file from the layer above and pass it to the layer below. Now each layer can call EVIOCREVOKE on the fds to revoke access for all layers below, at the expense of one fd per layer.
There's already ongoing experimental user-space work which demonstrates how it can be used:
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-August/012897.html
---
Hi Dmitry
Given the recent ABS_*-regression, I wrote a bunch of more aggressive stress-tests for this. I didn't found any regressions if EVIOCREVOKE is not used, but one with revoke on an empty queue in evdev_read(). Now fixed. Please let me know what your plans for this patch are (-next or -rc1?) so we can schedule accordingly. As a side note, will you attend LPC this year? We have a bunch of fancy stuff I'd like your opinion on (including device-properties, device-detection, ABS_* bit extension).
Thanks and cheers
David
drivers/input/evdev.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ include/uapi/linux/input.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/input/evdev.c +31 -6
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct evdev_client {struct evdev *evdev;struct list_head node;int clkid; +bool revoked;unsigned int bufsize;struct input_event buffer[]; };
@@ -164,6 +165,9 @@ static void evdev_pass_values(struct evdev_client *client,struct input_event event;bool wakeup = false; +if (client->revoked) +return ; + event.time =ktime_to_timeval (client->clkid ==CLOCK_MONOTONIC ? mono : real);
@@ -240,7 +244,7 @@ static int evdev_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t id)if (retval)return retval; -if (!evdev->exist) +if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked) retval = -ENODEV ;else retval =input_flush_device (&evdev->handle, file);
@@ -429,7 +433,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,if (retval)return retval; -if (!evdev->exist) { +if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked) { retval = -ENODEV ; goto out; }
@@ -482,7 +486,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,return -EINVAL ;for (;;) { -if (!evdev->exist) +if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked)return -ENODEV ; if (client->packet_head == client->tail &&
@@ -511,7 +515,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,if (!(file->f_flags &O_NONBLOCK )) { error =wait_event_interruptible (evdev->wait, client->packet_head != client->tail || - !evdev->exist); + !evdev->exist || client->revoked);if (error)return error; }
@@ -529,7 +533,11 @@ static unsigned int evdev_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)poll_wait (file, &evdev->wait, wait); - mask = evdev->exist ?POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM :POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (evdev->exist && !client->revoked) + mask =POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM ; +else + mask =POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (client->packet_head != client->tail) mask |=POLLIN |POLLRDNORM ;
@@ -795,6 +803,17 @@ static int evdev_handle_mt_request(struct input_dev *dev,return 0 ; } +static int evdev_revoke (struct evdev *evdev,struct evdev_client *client, +struct file *file) +{ + client->revoked = true; +evdev_ungrab (evdev, client); +input_flush_device (&evdev->handle, file); +wake_up_interruptible (&evdev->wait); + +return 0 ; +} +static long evdev_do_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,void __user *p,int compat_mode) {
@@ -857,6 +876,12 @@ static long evdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,else return evdev_ungrab (evdev, client); +case EVIOCREVOKE : +if (p) +return -EINVAL ; +else +return evdev_revoke (evdev, client, file); +case EVIOCSCLOCKID :if (copy_from_user (&i, p,sizeof (unsigned int )))return -EFAULT ;
@@ -1002,7 +1027,7 @@ static long evdev_ioctl_handler(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,if (retval)return retval; -if (!evdev->exist) { +if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked) { retval = -ENODEV ; goto out; }
include/uapi/linux/input.h +1 -0
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ struct input_keymap_entry {#define EVIOCGEFFECTS _IOR('E', 0x84, int)/* Report number of effects playable at the same time */ #define EVIOCGRAB _IOW('E', 0x90, int)/* Grab/Release device */ +#define EVIOCREVOKE _IOW('E', 0x91, int)/* Revoke device access */ #define EVIOCSCLOCKID _IOW('E', 0xa0, int)/* Set clockid to be used for timestamps */
Signature · 1 line
1.8.4
Dmitry Torokhov
maintainerQuoted 53 lines · David Herrmann
If we have multiple sessions on a system, we normally don't want background sessions to read input events. Otherwise, it could capture passwords and more entered by the user on the foreground session. This is
a real world problem as the recent XMir development showed:
http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/27327.htmlWe currently rely on sessions to release input devices when being deactivated. This relies on trust across sessions. But that's not given on
usual systems. We therefore need a way to control which processes have access to input devices.With VTs the kernel simply routed them through the active
/dev/ttyX. This
is not possible with evdev devices, though. Moreover, we want to avoid routing input-devices through some dispatcher-daemon in userspace (which
would add some latency).This patch introduces EVIOCREVOKE. If called on an evdev fd, this revokes
device-access irrecoverably for that *single* open-file. Hence, once you
call EVIOCREVOKE on any dup()ed fd, all fds for that open-file will be rather useless now (but still valid compared toclose()!). This allows us
to pass fds directly to session-processes from a trusted source. The source keeps a dup()ed fd and revokes access once the session-process is
no longer active.
Compared to the EVIOCMUTE proposal, we can avoid theCAP_SYS_ADMINrestriction now as there is no way to revive the fd again. Hence, a user
is free to call EVIOCREVOKE themself to kill the fd.Additionally, this ioctl allows multi-layer access-control (again compared
to EVIOCMUTE which was limited to one layer viaCAP_SYS_ADMIN). A middle
layer can simply request a new open-file from the layer above and pass it
to the layer below. Now each layer can call EVIOCREVOKE on the fds to revoke access for all layers below, at the expense of one fd per layer.There's already ongoing experimental user-space work which demonstrates how it can be used:
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-August/012897.htmlSigned-off-by David Herrmann <[email protected]>---
Hi Dmitry
Quoted 8 lines
Given the recent ABS_*-regression, I wrote a bunch of more aggressive stress-tests for this. I didn't found any regressions if EVIOCREVOKE is not
used, but one with revoke on an empty queue inevdev_read(). Now fixed. Please
let me know what your plans for this patch are (-next or -rc1?) so we can
schedule accordingly.
I think this one is safer than extending axis numbers as there is no concerns about breaking stuff - it's brand new. So I think we can work it in -rc1.
Quoted 4 lines
As a side note, will you attend LPC this year? We have a
bunch of fancy stuff I'd like your opinion on (including device-properties, device-detection, ABS_* bit extension).
Yes. I'll get to new Orleans a couple days earlier (Sunday night) so if you are in town we could meet for drinks or such.
Quoted 137 lines
Thanks and cheers
David
drivers/input/evdev.c| 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------include/uapi/linux/input.h| 1 +2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)drivers/input/evdev.c +5
-1@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct evdev_client {struct evdev *evdev;struct list_head node;int clkid; +bool revoked;unsigned int bufsize;struct input_event buffer[]; };@@ -164,6 +165,9 @@ static void evdev_pass_values(struct evdev_client *client, struct input_event event;bool wakeup = false; +if (client->revoked) +return ; + event.time =ktime_to_timeval (client->clkid ==CLOCK_MONOTONIC ? mono : real);@@ -240,7 +244,7 @@ static int evdev_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t id)if (retval)return retval; -if (!evdev->exist) +if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked) retval = -ENODEV ;else retval = input_flush_device(&evdev->handle, file);drivers/input/evdev.c +1
-1@@ -429,7 +433,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, if (retval) return retval; -if (!evdev->exist) { +if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked) { retval = -ENODEV ; goto out;}drivers/input/evdev.c +1
-1@@ -482,7 +486,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_read(struct file *file, char__user *buffer, return -EINVAL ;for (;;) { -if (!evdev->exist) +if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked)return -ENODEV ;if (client->packet_head == client->tail &&drivers/input/evdev.c +1
-1@@ -511,7 +515,7 @@ static ssize_t evdev_read(struct file *file, char__user *buffer, if (!(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)) { error =wait_event_interruptible (evdev->wait, client->packet_head != client->tail || - !evdev->exist); + !evdev->exist || client->revoked);if (error)return error;}drivers/input/evdev.c +16
-1@@ -529,7 +533,11 @@ static unsigned int evdev_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) poll_wait(file, &evdev->wait, wait); - mask = evdev->exist ?POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM :POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (evdev->exist && !client->revoked) + mask =POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM ; +else + mask =POLLHUP |POLLERR ; +if (client->packet_head != client->tail) mask |=POLLIN |POLLRDNORM ;@@ -795,6 +803,17 @@ static int evdev_handle_mt_request(structinput_dev *dev, return 0; } +static int evdev_revoke (struct evdev *evdev,struct evdev_client *client, +struct file *file) +{ + client->revoked = true; +evdev_ungrab (evdev, client); +input_flush_device (&evdev->handle, file); +wake_up_interruptible (&evdev->wait); + +return 0 ; +} + static long evdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,void
__user*p, intcompat_mode)
{drivers/input/evdev.c +6
-0@@ -857,6 +876,12 @@ static long evdev_do_ioctl(struct file *file,unsigned int cmd, else return evdev_ungrab(evdev, client); +case EVIOCREVOKE : +if (p) +return -EINVAL ; +else +return evdev_revoke (evdev, client, file); +case EVIOCSCLOCKID :if (copy_from_user (&i, p,sizeof (unsigned int )))return -EFAULT;drivers/input/evdev.c +1
-1@@ -1002,7 +1027,7 @@ static long evdev_ioctl_handler(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, if (retval) return retval; -if (!evdev->exist) { +if (!evdev->exist || client->revoked) { retval = -ENODEV ; goto out;}include/uapi/linux/input.h +0
-0@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ struct input_keymap_entry {#define EVIOCGEFFECTS _IOR('E', 0x84, int)/* Report number of effects playable at the same time */
Quoted 6 lines
#define EVIOCGRAB
_IOW('E', 0x90, int)/* Grab/Release device */
+#define EVIOCREVOKE_IOW('E', 0x91, int)/* Revoke device access */#define EVIOCSCLOCKID
_IOW('E', 0xa0, int)/* Set clockid to be used
for timestamps */
Hi David,
Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
Dmitry
Hi Dmitry
Quoted 11 lines · Dmitry Torokhov
Quoted 8 lines · David Herrmann
Given the recent ABS_*-regression, I wrote a bunch of more aggressive stress-tests for this. I didn't found any regressions if EVIOCREVOKE is not
used, but one with revoke on an empty queue inevdev_read(). Now fixed. Please
let me know what your plans for this patch are (-next or -rc1?) so we can
schedule accordingly.I think this one is safer than extending axis numbers as there is no concerns about breaking stuff - it's brand new. So I think we can work it in -rc1.
Sounds good, thanks.
The ABS-fixes will take some time, yepp. We can retry these with the guitar/drums ABS bits for 3.13. EVIOC[SG]ABS2 is probably the way to go.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
As a side note, will you attend LPC this year? We have a
bunch of fancy stuff I'd like your opinion on (including device-properties, device-detection, ABS_* bit extension).Yes. I'll get to new Orleans a couple days earlier (Sunday night) so if you are in town we could meet for drinks or such.
I'll arrive there on Saturday-evening, will drop you a message. See you in New Orleans.
Thanks
David
Hi David,
Sorry for reviving this old thread (I didn't find more recent patch series at first glance or have not been using the proper keyword while searching).
At FOSDEM 2015 last Sunday Hans presented libinput X input driver and mentioned evdev FD revoking.
A question I raise was how are input devices to be put in a reasonable state on FD revoking?
The specific case of force-feedback game-pads/wheels and the like that libinput is expected to pass through to games was the main trigger.
Assume:
- Game triggers some force-feedback event like vibrating device
- Game looses focus and gets its evdev FD revoked
- Newly focused application does not care about the game-pad/wheel
How should the force-feedback activity get stopped on that focus change and thus FD revoking?
Is the game expected to react before the FD being revoked (how long to wait?) or should the kernel somehow reset the device to a sane state on revoke (and if so, under which conditions?).
Should some other evdev devices also receive a special treatment to reset them into a known/idle state (eventually LEDs on keyboards, beep, ...)?
Bruno
Quoted 36 lines · On Tue, 27 August 2013 David Herrmann <[email protected]> wrote:
If we have multiple sessions on a system, we normally don't want background sessions to read input events. Otherwise, it could capture passwords and more entered by the user on the foreground session. This is a real world problem as the recent XMir development showed:
http://mjg59.dreamwidth.org/27327.htmlWe currently rely on sessions to release input devices when being deactivated. This relies on trust across sessions. But that's not given on usual systems. We therefore need a way to control which processes have access to input devices.
With VTs the kernel simply routed them through the active
/dev/ttyX. This is not possible with evdev devices, though. Moreover, we want to avoid routing input-devices through some dispatcher-daemon in userspace (which would add some latency).This patch introduces EVIOCREVOKE. If called on an evdev fd, this revokes device-access irrecoverably for that *single* open-file. Hence, once you call EVIOCREVOKE on any dup()ed fd, all fds for that open-file will be rather useless now (but still valid compared to
close()!). This allows us to pass fds directly to session-processes from a trusted source. The source keeps a dup()ed fd and revokes access once the session-process is no longer active.
Compared to the EVIOCMUTE proposal, we can avoid theCAP_SYS_ADMINrestriction now as there is no way to revive the fd again. Hence, a user is free to call EVIOCREVOKE themself to kill the fd.Additionally, this ioctl allows multi-layer access-control (again compared to EVIOCMUTE which was limited to one layer via
CAP_SYS_ADMIN). A middle layer can simply request a new open-file from the layer above and pass it to the layer below. Now each layer can call EVIOCREVOKE on the fds to revoke access for all layers below, at the expense of one fd per layer.There's already ongoing experimental user-space work which demonstrates how it can be used:
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2013-August/012897.html
Hi
Quoted 18 lines · Bruno Prémont
Hi David,
Sorry for reviving this old thread (I didn't find more recent patch series at first glance or have not been using the proper keyword while searching).
At FOSDEM 2015 last Sunday Hans presented libinput X input driver and mentioned evdev FD revoking.
A question I raise was how are input devices to be put in a reasonable state on FD revoking?
The specific case of force-feedback game-pads/wheels and the like that libinput is expected to pass through to games was the main trigger.Assume:
- Game triggers some force-feedback event like vibrating device
- Game looses focus and gets its evdev FD revoked
- Newly focused application does not care about the game-pad/wheel
Quoted 8 lines
How should the force-feedback activity get stopped on that focus change and thus FD revoking?
Is the game expected to react before the FD being revoked (how long to wait?) or should the kernel somehow reset the device to a sane state on revoke (and if so, under which conditions?).Should some other evdev devices also receive a special treatment to reset them into a known/idle state (eventually LEDs on keyboards, beep, ...)?
We call input_device_flush() on EVIOCREVOKE, which stops any ongoing FF owned by this handle. Same should be done for any per-handle state. However, LEDs are not associated with a handle, so it will stay the same. Applications are expected to re-sync their LEDs after they revoked a file-descriptor of someone else.
Thanks
David
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Hi David,
Quoted 25 lines · On Wed, 04 February 2015 David Herrmann wrote:
Quoted 24 lines · Bruno Prémont
Hi David,
Sorry for reviving this old thread (I didn't find more recent patch series at first glance or have not been using the proper keyword while searching).
At FOSDEM 2015 last Sunday Hans presented libinput X input driver and mentioned evdev FD revoking.
A question I raise was how are input devices to be put in a reasonable state on FD revoking?
The specific case of force-feedback game-pads/wheels and the like that libinput is expected to pass through to games was the main trigger.Assume:
- Game triggers some force-feedback event like vibrating device
- Game looses focus and gets its evdev FD revoked
- Newly focused application does not care about the game-pad/wheelHow should the force-feedback activity get stopped on that focus change and thus FD revoking?
Is the game expected to react before the FD being revoked (how long to wait?) or should the kernel somehow reset the device to a sane state on revoke (and if so, under which conditions?).
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Should some other evdev devices also receive a special treatment to reset them into a known/idle state (eventually LEDs on keyboards, beep, ...)?
We call
input_device_flush()on EVIOCREVOKE, which stops any ongoing FF owned by this handle. Same should be done for any per-handle state. However, LEDs are not associated with a handle, so it will stay the same. Applications are expected to re-sync their LEDs after they revoked a file-descriptor of someone else.
Thanks for the explanation!
It answers my question.
So all that's needed should be there unless a specific kernel-side driver does not properly have state associated to handles.
Quoted 2 lines
Thanks
David
Bruno
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