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X.509: Remove validity check of certificate date

PATCH New Lee, Chun-Yi 1 participant 1 message Sep 25, 2013

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PATCH 1/1 X.509: Remove validity check of certificate date

The check of valid_from and valid_to fields on X.509 certificate is a time bomb to MODSIGN function, It causes kernel module could not be load because the RTC on system may messed by user action (e.g. refresh BIOS) that should not be trusted.

Base on the discussion of David Howells's "[PATCH] X.509: Remove certificate date checks":
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/14/257

This patch removed the validity check of certificate date but still keep the valid_from and valid_to fields for future usage.

cc David Howells <[email protected]>
cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
cc Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
cc Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
cc Alexander Holler <[email protected]>
cc Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
cc Peter Jones <[email protected]>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c |   38 ------------------------------
 1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +0 -38
index 06007f0..52222a2 100644
@@ -106,7 +106,6 @@ error_no_sig:
 static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
 	struct x509_certificate *cert;
-	struct tm now;
 	size_t srlen, sulen;
 	char *desc = NULL;
 	int ret;
@@ -137,43 +136,6 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		goto error_free_cert;
 	}
 
-	time_to_tm(CURRENT_TIME.tv_sec, 0, &now);
-	pr_devel("Now: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
-		 now.tm_year + 1900, now.tm_mon + 1, now.tm_mday,
-		 now.tm_hour, now.tm_min,  now.tm_sec);
-	if (now.tm_year < cert->valid_from.tm_year ||
-	    (now.tm_year == cert->valid_from.tm_year &&
-	     (now.tm_mon < cert->valid_from.tm_mon ||
-	      (now.tm_mon == cert->valid_from.tm_mon &&
-	       (now.tm_mday < cert->valid_from.tm_mday ||
-		(now.tm_mday == cert->valid_from.tm_mday &&
-		 (now.tm_hour < cert->valid_from.tm_hour ||
-		  (now.tm_hour == cert->valid_from.tm_hour &&
-		   (now.tm_min < cert->valid_from.tm_min ||
-		    (now.tm_min == cert->valid_from.tm_min &&
-		     (now.tm_sec < cert->valid_from.tm_sec
-		      ))))))))))) {
-		pr_warn("Cert %s is not yet valid\n", cert->fingerprint);
-		ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
-		goto error_free_cert;
-	}
-	if (now.tm_year > cert->valid_to.tm_year ||
-	    (now.tm_year == cert->valid_to.tm_year &&
-	     (now.tm_mon > cert->valid_to.tm_mon ||
-	      (now.tm_mon == cert->valid_to.tm_mon &&
-	       (now.tm_mday > cert->valid_to.tm_mday ||
-		(now.tm_mday == cert->valid_to.tm_mday &&
-		 (now.tm_hour > cert->valid_to.tm_hour ||
-		  (now.tm_hour == cert->valid_to.tm_hour &&
-		   (now.tm_min > cert->valid_to.tm_min ||
-		    (now.tm_min == cert->valid_to.tm_min &&
-		     (now.tm_sec > cert->valid_to.tm_sec
-		      ))))))))))) {
-		pr_warn("Cert %s has expired\n", cert->fingerprint);
-		ret = -EKEYEXPIRED;
-		goto error_free_cert;
-	}
-
 	cert->pub->algo = x509_public_key_algorithms[cert->pkey_algo];
 	cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
 
Signature · 1 line
1.6.4.2