netfilter fixes for net
Subsystems (4)
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainercover netfilter fixes for net
Hi David,
The following patchset contains three netfilter fixes for your net tree, they are:
* A couple of fixes to resolve info leak to userspace due to uninitialized memory area in ulogd, from Mathias Krause.
* Fix instruction ordering issues that may lead to the access of uninitialized data in x_tables. The problem involves the table update (producer) and the main packet matching (consumer) routines. Detected in SMP ARMv7, from Will Deacon.
You can pull these changes from:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf.git master
Thanks!
----------------------------------------------------------------
The following changes since commit c31eeaced22ce8bd61268a3c595d542bb38c0a4f:
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net (2013-10-01 12:58:48 -0700)
are available in the git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf.git master
for you to fetch changes up to b416c144f46af1a30ddfa4e4319a8f077381ad63:
netfilter: x_tables: fix ordering of jumpstack allocation and table update (2013-10-22 10:11:29 +0200)
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Mathias Krause (2):
netfilter: ebt_ulog: fix info leaks
netfilter: ipt_ULOG: fix info leaks
Will Deacon (1):
netfilter: x_tables: fix ordering of jumpstack allocation and table update
net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_ulog.c | 9 +++------ net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 5 +++++ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 5 +++++ net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ULOG.c | 7 +------ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 5 +++++ net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 7 ++++++- 6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerPATCH 1/3 netfilter: ebt_ulog: fix info leaks
From: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
The ulog messages leak heap bytes by the means of padding bytes and incompletely filled string arrays. Fix those by memset(0)'ing the whole struct before filling it.
--- net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_ulog.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_ulog.c +3 -6
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ static void ebt_ulog_packet(struct net *net, unsigned int hooknr, ub->qlen++; pm =nlmsg_data (nlh); +memset (pm,0 ,sizeof (*pm));/* Fill in the ulog data */ pm->version =EBT_ULOG_VERSION ;
@@ -193,8 +194,6 @@ static void ebt_ulog_packet(struct net *net, unsigned int hooknr, pm->hook = hooknr;if (uloginfo->prefix !=NULL )strcpy (pm->prefix, uloginfo->prefix); -else - *(pm->prefix) ='\0' ;if (in) {strcpy (pm->physindev, in->name);
@@ -204,16 +203,14 @@ static void ebt_ulog_packet(struct net *net, unsigned int hooknr,strcpy (pm->indev,br_port_get_rcu (in)->br->dev->name); else strcpy(pm->indev, in->name); - }else - pm->indev[0 ] = pm->physindev[0 ] ='\0' ; + }if (out) {/* If out exists, then out is a bridge port */ strcpy (pm->physoutdev, out->name);/* rcu_read_lock()ed by nf_hook_slow */ strcpy (pm->outdev,br_port_get_rcu (out)->br->dev->name); - }else - pm->outdev[0 ] = pm->physoutdev[0 ] ='\0' ; + }if (skb_copy_bits (skb, -ETH_HLEN , pm->data, copy_len) <0 )BUG ();
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerPATCH 2/3 netfilter: ipt_ULOG: fix info leaks
In reply to Pablo Neira AyusoFrom: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
The ulog messages leak heap bytes by the means of padding bytes and incompletely filled string arrays. Fix those by memset(0)'ing the whole struct before filling it.
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ULOG.c | 7 +------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_ULOG.c +1 -6
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ static void ipt_ulog_packet(struct net *net, ub->qlen++; pm =nlmsg_data (nlh); +memset (pm,0 ,sizeof (*pm));/* We might not have a timestamp, get one */ if (skb->tstamp.tv64 ==0 )
@@ -238,8 +239,6 @@ static void ipt_ulog_packet(struct net *net, }else if (loginfo->prefix[0 ] !='\0' )strncpy (pm->prefix, loginfo->prefix,sizeof (pm->prefix)); -else - *(pm->prefix) ='\0' ; if (in && in->hard_header_len > 0 && skb->mac_header != skb->network_header &&
@@ -251,13 +250,9 @@ static void ipt_ulog_packet(struct net *net,if (in)strncpy (pm->indev_name, in->name,sizeof (pm->indev_name)); -else - pm->indev_name[0 ] ='\0' ;if (out)strncpy (pm->outdev_name, out->name,sizeof (pm->outdev_name)); -else - pm->outdev_name[0 ] ='\0' ;/* copy_len <= skb->len, so can't fail. */ if (skb_copy_bits (skb,0 , pm->payload, copy_len) <0 )
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerPATCH 3/3 netfilter: x_tables: fix ordering of jumpstack allocation and table update
In reply to Pablo Neira AyusoFrom: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
During kernel stability testing on an SMP ARMv7 system, Yalin Wang reported the following panic from the netfilter code:
1fe0: 0000001c 5e2d3b10 4007e779 4009e110 60000010 00000032 ff565656 ff545454 [<c06c48dc>] (ipt_do_table+0x448/0x584) from [<c0655ef0>] (nf_iterate+0x48/0x7c) [<c0655ef0>] (nf_iterate+0x48/0x7c) from [<c0655f7c>] (nf_hook_slow+0x58/0x104) [<c0655f7c>] (nf_hook_slow+0x58/0x104) from [<c0683bbc>] (ip_local_deliver+0x88/0xa8) [<c0683bbc>] (ip_local_deliver+0x88/0xa8) from [<c0683718>] (ip_rcv_finish+0x418/0x43c) [<c0683718>] (ip_rcv_finish+0x418/0x43c) from [<c062b1c4>] (__netif_receive_skb+0x4cc/0x598) [<c062b1c4>] (__netif_receive_skb+0x4cc/0x598) from [<c062b314>] (process_backlog+0x84/0x158) [<c062b314>] (process_backlog+0x84/0x158) from [<c062de84>] (net_rx_action+0x70/0x1dc) [<c062de84>] (net_rx_action+0x70/0x1dc) from [<c0088230>] (__do_softirq+0x11c/0x27c) [<c0088230>] (__do_softirq+0x11c/0x27c) from [<c008857c>] (do_softirq+0x44/0x50) [<c008857c>] (do_softirq+0x44/0x50) from [<c0088614>] (local_bh_enable_ip+0x8c/0xd0) [<c0088614>] (local_bh_enable_ip+0x8c/0xd0) from [<c06b0330>] (inet_stream_connect+0x164/0x298) [<c06b0330>] (inet_stream_connect+0x164/0x298) from [<c061d68c>] (sys_connect+0x88/0xc8) [<c061d68c>] (sys_connect+0x88/0xc8) from [<c000e340>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30)
Code: 2a000021 e59d2028 e59de01c e59f011c (e7824103) ---[ end trace da227214a82491bd ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
This comes about because CPU1 is executing xt_replace_table in response to a setsockopt syscall, resulting in:
ret = xt_jumpstack_alloc(newinfo); --> newinfo->jumpstack = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); [...] table->private = newinfo; newinfo->initial_entries = private->initial_entries;
Meanwhile, CPU0 is handling the network receive path and ends up in ipt_do_table, resulting in:
private = table->private; [...] jumpstack = (struct ipt_entry **)private->jumpstack[cpu];
On weakly ordered memory architectures, the writes to table->private and newinfo->jumpstack from CPU1 can be observed out of order by CPU0. Furthermore, on architectures which don't respect ordering of address dependencies (i.e. Alpha), the reads from CPU0 can also be re-ordered.
This patch adds an smp_wmb() before the assignment to table->private (which is essentially publishing newinfo) to ensure that all writes to newinfo will be observed before plugging it into the table structure. A dependent-read barrier is also added on the consumer sides, to ensure the same ordering requirements are also respected there.
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 5 +++++ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 5 +++++ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 5 +++++ net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 7 ++++++- 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +5 -0
@@ -271,6 +271,11 @@ unsigned int arpt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,local_bh_disable (); addend =xt_write_recseq_begin (); private = table->private; +/* +* Ensure we load private-> members after we've fetched the base +* pointer. +*/ +smp_read_barrier_depends (); table_base = private->entries[smp_processor_id ()]; e =get_entry (table_base, private->hook_entry[hook]);
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +5 -0
@@ -327,6 +327,11 @@ ipt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb, addend =xt_write_recseq_begin (); private = table->private; cpu =smp_processor_id (); +/* +* Ensure we load private-> members after we've fetched the base +* pointer. +*/ +smp_read_barrier_depends (); table_base = private->entries[cpu]; jumpstack = (struct ipt_entry **)private->jumpstack[cpu]; stackptr =per_cpu_ptr (private->stackptr, cpu);
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +5 -0
@@ -349,6 +349,11 @@ ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,local_bh_disable (); addend =xt_write_recseq_begin (); private = table->private; +/* +* Ensure we load private-> members after we've fetched the base +* pointer. +*/ +smp_read_barrier_depends (); cpu =smp_processor_id (); table_base = private->entries[cpu]; jumpstack = (struct ip6t_entry **)private->jumpstack[cpu];
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +6 -1
@@ -845,8 +845,13 @@ xt_replace_table(struct xt_table *table,return NULL ; } - table->private = newinfo; newinfo->initial_entries = private->initial_entries; +/* +* Ensure contents of newinfo are visible before assigning to +* private. +*/ +smp_wmb (); + table->private = newinfo;/* * Even though table entries have now been swapped, other CPU's
Signature · 1 line
1.7.10.4
RE: [PATCH 3/3] netfilter: x_tables: fix ordering of jumpstack allocation and table update
Quoted 1 line
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] netfilter:
x_tables: fix ordering of jumpstack allocation and table update
...
Quoted 9 lines
Meanwhile, CPU0 is handling the network receive path and ends up in
ipt_do_table, resulting in:private = table->private; [...] jumpstack = (struct ipt_entry **)private->jumpstack[cpu];
Quoted 4 lines
On weakly ordered memory architectures, the writes to
table->privateandnewinfo->jumpstackfrom CPU1 can be observed out of order by CPU0. Furthermore, on architectures which don't respect ordering of address dependencies (i.e. Alpha), the reads from CPU0 can also be re-ordered.
Which reads might be out of order?
AFAICT they are strongly sequenced because they second depends on the value read by the first.
So I don't see why the read barrier is needed.
I presume the above code is tied to a single cpu.
...
net/netfilter/x_tables.c xt_replace_table(struct xt_table *table, · line 854
Quoted 9 lines
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +6
-1- table->private = newinfo; newinfo->initial_entries = private->initial_entries; +/* +* Ensure contents of newinfo are visible before assigning to +* private. +*/ +smp_wmb (); + table->private = newinfo;
Those writes were in the wrong order on all systems.
Also gcc needs to be told not to reorder the writes even on non-smp systems (if the code might be pre-empted).
So an asm volatile (:::"memory") is needed there even if no specific synchronisation instruction is needed.
David
RE: [PATCH 3/3] netfilter: x_tables: fix ordering of jumpstack allocation and table update
Quoted 5 lines · David Laight
Those writes were in the wrong order on all systems.
Also gcc needs to be told not to reorder the writes even on non-smp systems (if the code might be pre-empted).
So an asm volatile (:::"memory") is needed there even if no specific synchronisation instruction is needed.
smp_wmb() contains this compiler barrier already.
Re: [PATCH 3/3] netfilter: x_tables: fix ordering of jumpstack allocation and table update
In reply to David LaightHi David,
Quoted 16 lines · David Laight
Quoted 1 line
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] netfilter:
x_tables: fix ordering of jumpstack allocation and table update...
Quoted 9 lines
Meanwhile, CPU0 is handling the network receive path and ends up in
ipt_do_table, resulting in:private = table->private; [...] jumpstack = (struct ipt_entry **)private->jumpstack[cpu];Quoted 4 lines
On weakly ordered memory architectures, the writes to
table->privateandnewinfo->jumpstackfrom CPU1 can be observed out of order by CPU0. Furthermore, on architectures which don't respect ordering of address dependencies (i.e. Alpha), the reads from CPU0 can also be re-ordered.
Quoted 4 lines
Which reads might be out of order?
AFAICT they are strongly sequenced because they second depends on the value read by the first.
So I don't see why the read barrier is needed.
That is why this is a dependent read barrier. Some architectures (e.g. Alpha) *do* allow dependent reads to be observed out of order, so you can effectively load the data pointed to by a pointer before you load the pointer itself!
Take a look at Paul's paper about memory ordering if you're curious:
http://www.rdrop.com/users/paulmck/scalability/paper/whymb.2009.04.05a.pdf
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +4
-1- table->private = newinfo; newinfo->initial_entries = private->initial_entries; +/* +* Ensure contents of newinfo are visible before assigning to +* private. +*/
Quoted 8 lines
net/netfilter/x_tables.c xt_replace_table(struct xt_table *table, · line 854
Quoted 2 lines
net/netfilter/x_tables.c +2
-0+smp_wmb (); + table->private = newinfo;Those writes were in the wrong order on all systems.
Also gcc needs to be told not to reorder the writes even on non-smp systems (if the code might be pre-empted).
So an asm volatile (:::"memory") is needed there even if no specific synchronisation instruction is needed.
The smp_* barriers expand to barrier() when !CONFIG_SMP, which gives you the memory clobber you want.
What I'm *not* 100% sure about is the table freeing path. There is a mutex there for removing the table from a list, but I'm not sure how we ensure that there are no parallel readers at that point.
Will
Re: [PATCH 3/3] netfilter: x_tables: fix ordering of jumpstack allocation and table update
Quoted 3 lines · Will Deacon
What I'm *not* 100% sure about is the table freeing path. There is a mutex there for removing the table from a list, but I'm not sure how we ensure that there are no parallel readers at that point.
Sequence is :
xt_replace_table();get_counters();xt_free_table_info();
get_counters() is the way we ensure no cpu is using old copy of the table before freeing.
David Miller
maintainerFrom: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 11:15:21 +0200
Quoted 6 lines
The following patchset contains three netfilter fixes for your net tree, they are:
* A couple of fixes to resolve info leak to userspace due to uninitialized memory area in ulogd, from Mathias Krause.
Quoted 8 lines
* Fix instruction ordering issues that may lead to the access of uninitialized data in
x_tables. The problem involves the table update (producer) and the main packet matching (consumer) routines. Detected in SMP ARMv7, from Will Deacon.You can pull these changes from:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf.gitmaster
Pulled, thanks Pablo.