xen/kexec: Clear unused registers before jumping into an image
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 xen/kexec: Clear unused registers before jumping into an image
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
--- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/kexec_reloc.S | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+)
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/kexec_reloc.S +37 -0
@@ -71,6 +71,29 @@ identity_mapped: jnz call_32_bit call_64_bit: + /* + * Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way + * loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific + * info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also + * does not mean that the image may expect that a given register + * is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random + * value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state. + */ + xorl %eax, %eax + xorl %ebx, %ebx + xorl %ecx, %ecx + xorl %edx, %edx + xorl %esi, %esi + xorl %edi, %edi + xorl %r8d, %r8d + xorl %r9d, %r9d + xorl %r10d, %r10d + xorl %r11d, %r11d + xorl %r12d, %r12d + xorl %r13d, %r13d + xorl %r14d, %r14d + xorl %r15d, %r15d + /* Call the image entry point. This should never return. */ callq *%rbp ud2
@@ -164,6 +187,20 @@ compatibility_mode: xorl %eax, %eax movl %eax, %cr4 + /* + * Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way + * loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific + * info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also + * does not mean that the image may expect that a given register + * is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random + * value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state. + */ + xorl %ebx, %ebx + xorl %ecx, %ecx + xorl %edx, %edx + xorl %esi, %esi + xorl %edi, %edi + /* Call the image entry point. This should never return. */ call *%ebp ud2
Signature · 7 lines
1.7.10.4 _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
David
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
David
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Quoted 8 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
I do not agree with you but respect your opinion. So could you provide a patch with a comment why our implementation deviate from our reference implementation (I think about Linux one) and even we use kexec-tools designed for Linux implementation which does things mentioned above? I hope that this solve this last, widely discussed issue.
Daniel
Quoted 8 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
I do not agree with you but respect your opinion. So could you provide a patch with a comment why our implementation deviate from our reference implementation (I think about Linux one) and even we use kexec-tools designed for Linux implementation which does things mentioned above? I hope that this solve this last, widely discussed issue.
Daniel
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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Jan
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Jan
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kexec mailing list
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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Right, but on the other hand this way we lose completely chance to differentiate between old and new implementation of kexec if we would like to do that in the future (yes, this is small chance but it still exists). Additionally, I think it could be quite difficult because at this stage there is no simple reliable RNGs. Although there are some CPUs with RNGs but they are not very common right now. However, I will do not object if we find another simple RNG.
Daniel
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Right, but on the other hand this way we lose completely chance to differentiate between old and new implementation of kexec if we would like to do that in the future (yes, this is small chance but it still exists). Additionally, I think it could be quite difficult because at this stage there is no simple reliable RNGs. Although there are some CPUs with RNGs but they are not very common right now. However, I will do not object if we find another simple RNG.
Daniel
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kexec mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Right, but on the other hand this way we lose completely chance to differentiate between old and new implementation of kexec if we would like to do that in the future (yes, this is small chance but it still exists). Additionally, I think it could be quite difficult because at this stage there is no simple reliable RNGs. Although there are some CPUs with RNGs but they are not very common right now. However, I will do not object if we find another simple RNG.
We surely wouldn't need a good quality random number here - the TSC would very likely already be more random than anything we need.
Jan
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Right, but on the other hand this way we lose completely chance to differentiate between old and new implementation of kexec if we would like to do that in the future (yes, this is small chance but it still exists). Additionally, I think it could be quite difficult because at this stage there is no simple reliable RNGs. Although there are some CPUs with RNGs but they are not very common right now. However, I will do not object if we find another simple RNG.
We surely wouldn't need a good quality random number here - the TSC would very likely already be more random than anything we need.
Jan
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kexec mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 29 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Right, but on the other hand this way we lose completely chance to differentiate between old and new implementation of kexec if we would like to do that in the future (yes, this is small chance but it still exists). Additionally, I think it could be quite difficult because at this stage there is no simple reliable RNGs. Although there are some CPUs with RNGs but they are not very common right now. However, I will do not object if we find another simple RNG.
Quoted 3 lines
We surely wouldn't need a good quality random number here - the TSC would very likely already be more random than anything we need.
I forgot about TSC. This is OK in that case. Thanks. Personally I prefer zeroing (I explained above and in other emails why) but if David do not like it we could use TSC. David?
Daniel
Quoted 29 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Right, but on the other hand this way we lose completely chance to differentiate between old and new implementation of kexec if we would like to do that in the future (yes, this is small chance but it still exists). Additionally, I think it could be quite difficult because at this stage there is no simple reliable RNGs. Although there are some CPUs with RNGs but they are not very common right now. However, I will do not object if we find another simple RNG.
Quoted 3 lines
We surely wouldn't need a good quality random number here - the TSC would very likely already be more random than anything we need.
I forgot about TSC. This is OK in that case. Thanks. Personally I prefer zeroing (I explained above and in other emails why) but if David do not like it we could use TSC. David?
Daniel
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
I really don't think there is anything more to be said on this.
David
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
I really don't think there is anything more to be said on this.
David
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 19 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
David, my comment clearly states why we are doing that and what should be expected. What is wrong with it? I could improve it but say how?
Daniel
Quoted 19 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
David, my comment clearly states why we are doing that and what should be expected. What is wrong with it? I could improve it but say how?
Daniel
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 17 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 16 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 15 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
David, my comment clearly states why we are doing that and what should be expected. What is wrong with it? I could improve it but say how?
You seem to be saying that the registers may contain useful information about Xen that are not part of the spec, and you are worried that the image may decide to use these and come to rely on them, making it hard to change the interface in the future.
David has a similar concern -- that if the registers are zeroed, the image may come to rely on the registers being pre-zeroed, and not zero them itself. This would also make it hard to change the interface in the future.
A simple solution would be to "poison" the registers with useless data: 0xdeadbeef is a favorite. Anyone seeing that in the registers will immediately know, "Someone used a value that they shouldn't have."
Of course, it's *possible* that then the images might come to rely on that poison being there; having a non-deterministic value there, like a hash of the TSC, would make this impossible. But even then, you could make the argument that the image may come to rely on a *pseudo-random* number being there, which it uses for some other kind of seed somewhere. At some point you just have to give up on this like of thought. :-)
Personally I think having a poison is likely to be more useful -- if you crash because your pointer is 0xdeadbeef, then it's immediately obvious what kind of bug you have; whereas if you crash with a random value that changes every time, it's not so obvious.
-George
Quoted 17 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 16 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 15 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
David, my comment clearly states why we are doing that and what should be expected. What is wrong with it? I could improve it but say how?
You seem to be saying that the registers may contain useful information about Xen that are not part of the spec, and you are worried that the image may decide to use these and come to rely on them, making it hard to change the interface in the future.
David has a similar concern -- that if the registers are zeroed, the image may come to rely on the registers being pre-zeroed, and not zero them itself. This would also make it hard to change the interface in the future.
A simple solution would be to "poison" the registers with useless data: 0xdeadbeef is a favorite. Anyone seeing that in the registers will immediately know, "Someone used a value that they shouldn't have."
Of course, it's *possible* that then the images might come to rely on that poison being there; having a non-deterministic value there, like a hash of the TSC, would make this impossible. But even then, you could make the argument that the image may come to rely on a *pseudo-random* number being there, which it uses for some other kind of seed somewhere. At some point you just have to give up on this like of thought. :-)
Personally I think having a poison is likely to be more useful -- if you crash because your pointer is 0xdeadbeef, then it's immediately obvious what kind of bug you have; whereas if you crash with a random value that changes every time, it's not so obvious.
-George
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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 42 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 17 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 16 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 15 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
David, my comment clearly states why we are doing that and what should be expected. What is wrong with it? I could improve it but say how?
You seem to be saying that the registers may contain useful information about Xen that are not part of the spec, and you are worried that the image may decide to use these and come to rely on them, making it hard to change the interface in the future.
David has a similar concern -- that if the registers are zeroed, the image may come to rely on the registers being pre-zeroed, and not zero them itself. This would also make it hard to change the interface in the future.
A simple solution would be to "poison" the registers with useless
data:0xdeadbeefis a favorite. Anyone seeing that in the registers will immediately know, "Someone used a value that they shouldn't have."
Quoted 7 lines
Of course, it's *possible* that then the images might come to rely on that poison being there; having a non-deterministic value there, like a hash of the TSC, would make this impossible. But even then, you could make the argument that the image may come to rely on a *pseudo-random* number being there, which it uses for some other kind of seed somewhere. At some point you just have to give up on this like of thought. :-)
:-)))
Quoted 4 lines
Personally I think having a poison is likely to be more useful -- if you crash because your pointer is
0xdeadbeef, then it's immediately obvious what kind of bug you have; whereas if you crash with a random value that changes every time, it's not so obvious.
It works for me too. Any solution has pros and cons. However, in general I think that wiping registers in that case is nice idea. So we could zero registers, write 0xdeadbeef into them or even use TSC. But please do not leave registers as is.
Daniel
Quoted 42 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 17 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 16 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 15 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
David, my comment clearly states why we are doing that and what should be expected. What is wrong with it? I could improve it but say how?
You seem to be saying that the registers may contain useful information about Xen that are not part of the spec, and you are worried that the image may decide to use these and come to rely on them, making it hard to change the interface in the future.
David has a similar concern -- that if the registers are zeroed, the image may come to rely on the registers being pre-zeroed, and not zero them itself. This would also make it hard to change the interface in the future.
A simple solution would be to "poison" the registers with useless
data:0xdeadbeefis a favorite. Anyone seeing that in the registers will immediately know, "Someone used a value that they shouldn't have."
Quoted 7 lines
Of course, it's *possible* that then the images might come to rely on that poison being there; having a non-deterministic value there, like a hash of the TSC, would make this impossible. But even then, you could make the argument that the image may come to rely on a *pseudo-random* number being there, which it uses for some other kind of seed somewhere. At some point you just have to give up on this like of thought. :-)
:-)))
Quoted 4 lines
Personally I think having a poison is likely to be more useful -- if you crash because your pointer is
0xdeadbeef, then it's immediately obvious what kind of bug you have; whereas if you crash with a random value that changes every time, it's not so obvious.
It works for me too. Any solution has pros and cons. However, in general I think that wiping registers in that case is nice idea. So we could zero registers, write 0xdeadbeef into them or even use TSC. But please do not leave registers as is.
Daniel
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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 58 lines · On Mon, 18 Nov 2013 13:41:02 +0100 Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 42 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 17 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 16 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 15 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
David, my comment clearly states why we are doing that and what should be expected. What is wrong with it? I could improve it but say how?
You seem to be saying that the registers may contain useful information about Xen that are not part of the spec, and you are worried that the image may decide to use these and come to rely on them, making it hard to change the interface in the future.
David has a similar concern -- that if the registers are zeroed, the image may come to rely on the registers being pre-zeroed, and not zero them itself. This would also make it hard to change the interface in the future.
A simple solution would be to "poison" the registers with useless
data:0xdeadbeefis a favorite. Anyone seeing that in the registers will immediately know, "Someone used a value that they shouldn't have."Quoted 7 lines
Of course, it's *possible* that then the images might come to rely on that poison being there; having a non-deterministic value there, like a hash of the TSC, would make this impossible. But even then, you could make the argument that the image may come to rely on a *pseudo-random* number being there, which it uses for some other kind of seed somewhere. At some point you just have to give up on this like of thought. :-)
:-)))
Quoted 4 lines
Personally I think having a poison is likely to be more useful -- if you crash because your pointer is
0xdeadbeef, then it's immediately obvious what kind of bug you have; whereas if you crash with a random value that changes every time, it's not so obvious.
Quoted 4 lines
It works for me too. Any solution has pros and cons. However, in general I think that wiping registers in that case is nice idea. So we could zero registers, write
0xdeadbeefinto them or even use TSC. But please do not leave registers as is.
DEADBABE or DEADBEEF sounds best. It even makes it possible to distinguish between an old version and a new version if we ever need to extend the interface and actually use a register to pass down something useful to the boot loader.
Hmm, so maybe we could poison all registers, except e.g. RDI (1st argument in the standard ABI), which could be zeroed and _documented_ as containing the interface version.
Petr T
Quoted 58 lines · On Mon, 18 Nov 2013 13:41:02 +0100 Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 42 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 17 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 16 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 15 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
David, my comment clearly states why we are doing that and what should be expected. What is wrong with it? I could improve it but say how?
You seem to be saying that the registers may contain useful information about Xen that are not part of the spec, and you are worried that the image may decide to use these and come to rely on them, making it hard to change the interface in the future.
David has a similar concern -- that if the registers are zeroed, the image may come to rely on the registers being pre-zeroed, and not zero them itself. This would also make it hard to change the interface in the future.
A simple solution would be to "poison" the registers with useless
data:0xdeadbeefis a favorite. Anyone seeing that in the registers will immediately know, "Someone used a value that they shouldn't have."Quoted 7 lines
Of course, it's *possible* that then the images might come to rely on that poison being there; having a non-deterministic value there, like a hash of the TSC, would make this impossible. But even then, you could make the argument that the image may come to rely on a *pseudo-random* number being there, which it uses for some other kind of seed somewhere. At some point you just have to give up on this like of thought. :-)
:-)))
Quoted 4 lines
Personally I think having a poison is likely to be more useful -- if you crash because your pointer is
0xdeadbeef, then it's immediately obvious what kind of bug you have; whereas if you crash with a random value that changes every time, it's not so obvious.
Quoted 4 lines
It works for me too. Any solution has pros and cons. However, in general I think that wiping registers in that case is nice idea. So we could zero registers, write
0xdeadbeefinto them or even use TSC. But please do not leave registers as is.
DEADBABE or DEADBEEF sounds best. It even makes it possible to distinguish between an old version and a new version if we ever need to extend the interface and actually use a register to pass down something useful to the boot loader.
Hmm, so maybe we could poison all registers, except e.g. RDI (1st argument in the standard ABI), which could be zeroed and _documented_ as containing the interface version.
Petr T
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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 58 lines · Petr Tesarik
Quoted 55 lines · On Mon, 18 Nov 2013 13:41:02 +0100 Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 41 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 17 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 16 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 15 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
David, my comment clearly states why we are doing that and what should be expected. What is wrong with it? I could improve it but say how?
You seem to be saying that the registers may contain useful information about Xen that are not part of the spec, and you are worried that the image may decide to use these and come to rely on them, making it hard to change the interface in the future.
David has a similar concern -- that if the registers are zeroed, the image may come to rely on the registers being pre-zeroed, and not zero them itself. This would also make it hard to change the interface in the future.
A simple solution would be to "poison" the registers with useless
data:0xdeadbeefis a favorite. Anyone seeing that in the registers will immediately know, "Someone used a value that they shouldn't have."Quoted 7 lines
Of course, it's *possible* that then the images might come to rely on that poison being there; having a non-deterministic value there, like a hash of the TSC, would make this impossible. But even then, you could make the argument that the image may come to rely on a *pseudo-random* number being there, which it uses for some other kind of seed somewhere. At some point you just have to give up on this like of thought. :-)
:-)))
Quoted 4 lines
Personally I think having a poison is likely to be more useful -- if you crash because your pointer is
0xdeadbeef, then it's immediately obvious what kind of bug you have; whereas if you crash with a random value that changes every time, it's not so obvious.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
It works for me too. Any solution has pros and cons. However, in general I think that wiping registers in that case is nice idea. So we could zero registers, write
0xdeadbeefinto them or even use TSC. But please do not leave registers as is.DEADBABE or DEADBEEF sounds best.
"DEADBABE" sounds awful. We have enough problems with getting women to contribute to the kernel without reminding them of the risks of violence they face on a regular basis.
-George
Quoted 58 lines · Petr Tesarik
Quoted 55 lines · On Mon, 18 Nov 2013 13:41:02 +0100 Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 41 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 17 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 16 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 15 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 5 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.
I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.
Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
David, my comment clearly states why we are doing that and what should be expected. What is wrong with it? I could improve it but say how?
You seem to be saying that the registers may contain useful information about Xen that are not part of the spec, and you are worried that the image may decide to use these and come to rely on them, making it hard to change the interface in the future.
David has a similar concern -- that if the registers are zeroed, the image may come to rely on the registers being pre-zeroed, and not zero them itself. This would also make it hard to change the interface in the future.
A simple solution would be to "poison" the registers with useless
data:0xdeadbeefis a favorite. Anyone seeing that in the registers will immediately know, "Someone used a value that they shouldn't have."Quoted 7 lines
Of course, it's *possible* that then the images might come to rely on that poison being there; having a non-deterministic value there, like a hash of the TSC, would make this impossible. But even then, you could make the argument that the image may come to rely on a *pseudo-random* number being there, which it uses for some other kind of seed somewhere. At some point you just have to give up on this like of thought. :-)
:-)))
Quoted 4 lines
Personally I think having a poison is likely to be more useful -- if you crash because your pointer is
0xdeadbeef, then it's immediately obvious what kind of bug you have; whereas if you crash with a random value that changes every time, it's not so obvious.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
It works for me too. Any solution has pros and cons. However, in general I think that wiping registers in that case is nice idea. So we could zero registers, write
0xdeadbeefinto them or even use TSC. But please do not leave registers as is.DEADBABE or DEADBEEF sounds best.
"DEADBABE" sounds awful. We have enough problems with getting women to contribute to the kernel without reminding them of the risks of violence they face on a regular basis.
-George
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 65 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 64 lines · Petr Tesarik
Quoted 61 lines · On Mon, 18 Nov 2013 13:41:02 +0100 Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 43 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 19 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 18 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 17 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 7 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from
the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a
zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
David, my comment clearly states why we are doing that and what should be expected. What is wrong with it? I could improve it but say how?
You seem to be saying that the registers may contain useful information about Xen that are not part of the spec, and you are worried that the image may decide to use these and come to rely on them, making it hard to change the interface in the future.
David has a similar concern -- that if the registers are zeroed, the image may come to rely on the registers being pre-zeroed, and not zero them itself. This would also make it hard to change the interface in the future.
A simple solution would be to "poison" the registers with useless
data:0xdeadbeefis a favorite. Anyone seeing that in the registers will immediately know, "Someone used a value that they shouldn't have."Quoted 7 lines
Of course, it's *possible* that then the images might come to rely on that poison being there; having a non-deterministic value there, like a hash of the TSC, would make this impossible. But even then, you could make the argument that the image may come to rely on a *pseudo-random* number being there, which it uses for some other kind of seed somewhere. At some point you just have to give up on this like of thought. :-)
:-)))
Quoted 4 lines
Personally I think having a poison is likely to be more useful -- if you crash because your pointer is
0xdeadbeef, then it's immediately obvious what kind of bug you have; whereas if you crash with a random value that changes every time, it's not so obvious.It works for me too. Any solution has pros and cons. However, in general I think that wiping registers in that case is nice idea. So we could zero registers, write
0xdeadbeefinto them or even use TSC. But please do not leave registers as is.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
DEADBABE or DEADBEEF sounds best.
"DEADBABE" sounds awful. We have enough problems with getting women to contribute to the kernel without reminding them of the risks of violence they face on a regular basis.
<nods>
I would like to point out that Eric Biederman stated that the reason for using 0 was:
0/NULL is a good choice because if you are expecting pointer for some
strange reason interesting things happen.
" (See http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1577040).
Which is a bit inline with - we don't want folks to depend on it, so we make sure to poison it (with zeros in this case).
0xdeadbeef would get the same thing. If we are going that route we perhaps we should do the same thing on Linux?
Quoted 65 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 64 lines · Petr Tesarik
Quoted 61 lines · On Mon, 18 Nov 2013 13:41:02 +0100 Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 43 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 19 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 18 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 17 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 7 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from
the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a
zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
David, my comment clearly states why we are doing that and what should be expected. What is wrong with it? I could improve it but say how?
You seem to be saying that the registers may contain useful information about Xen that are not part of the spec, and you are worried that the image may decide to use these and come to rely on them, making it hard to change the interface in the future.
David has a similar concern -- that if the registers are zeroed, the image may come to rely on the registers being pre-zeroed, and not zero them itself. This would also make it hard to change the interface in the future.
A simple solution would be to "poison" the registers with useless
data:0xdeadbeefis a favorite. Anyone seeing that in the registers will immediately know, "Someone used a value that they shouldn't have."Quoted 7 lines
Of course, it's *possible* that then the images might come to rely on that poison being there; having a non-deterministic value there, like a hash of the TSC, would make this impossible. But even then, you could make the argument that the image may come to rely on a *pseudo-random* number being there, which it uses for some other kind of seed somewhere. At some point you just have to give up on this like of thought. :-)
:-)))
Quoted 4 lines
Personally I think having a poison is likely to be more useful -- if you crash because your pointer is
0xdeadbeef, then it's immediately obvious what kind of bug you have; whereas if you crash with a random value that changes every time, it's not so obvious.It works for me too. Any solution has pros and cons. However, in general I think that wiping registers in that case is nice idea. So we could zero registers, write
0xdeadbeefinto them or even use TSC. But please do not leave registers as is.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
DEADBABE or DEADBEEF sounds best.
"DEADBABE" sounds awful. We have enough problems with getting women to contribute to the kernel without reminding them of the risks of violence they face on a regular basis.
<nods>
I would like to point out that Eric Biederman stated that the reason for using 0 was:
0/NULL is a good choice because if you are expecting pointer for some
strange reason interesting things happen.
" (See http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1577040).
Which is a bit inline with - we don't want folks to depend on it, so we make sure to poison it (with zeros in this case).
0xdeadbeef would get the same thing. If we are going that route we perhaps we should do the same thing on Linux?
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 66 lines · Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Quoted 65 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 64 lines · Petr Tesarik
Quoted 61 lines · On Mon, 18 Nov 2013 13:41:02 +0100 Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 43 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 19 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 18 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 17 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 7 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from
the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a
zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
David, my comment clearly states why we are doing that and what should be expected. What is wrong with it? I could improve it but say how?
You seem to be saying that the registers may contain useful information about Xen that are not part of the spec, and you are worried that the image may decide to use these and come to rely on them, making it hard to change the interface in the future.
David has a similar concern -- that if the registers are zeroed, the image may come to rely on the registers being pre-zeroed, and not zero them itself. This would also make it hard to change the interface in the future.
A simple solution would be to "poison" the registers with useless
data:0xdeadbeefis a favorite. Anyone seeing that in the registers will immediately know, "Someone used a value that they shouldn't have."Quoted 7 lines
Of course, it's *possible* that then the images might come to rely on that poison being there; having a non-deterministic value there, like a hash of the TSC, would make this impossible. But even then, you could make the argument that the image may come to rely on a *pseudo-random* number being there, which it uses for some other kind of seed somewhere. At some point you just have to give up on this like of thought. :-)
:-)))
Quoted 4 lines
Personally I think having a poison is likely to be more useful -- if you crash because your pointer is
0xdeadbeef, then it's immediately obvious what kind of bug you have; whereas if you crash with a random value that changes every time, it's not so obvious.It works for me too. Any solution has pros and cons. However, in general I think that wiping registers in that case is nice idea. So we could zero registers, write
0xdeadbeefinto them or even use TSC. But please do not leave registers as is.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
DEADBABE or DEADBEEF sounds best.
"DEADBABE" sounds awful. We have enough problems with getting women to contribute to the kernel without reminding them of the risks of violence they face on a regular basis.
<nods>
Just to clarify - I completely agree with George. That 'DEADBABE' or any other (see http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2012/07/b16b00b5/) are offensive.
Quoted 17 lines
I would like to point out that Eric Biederman stated that the reason for using 0 was:
0/NULL is a good choice because if you are expecting pointer for some
strange reason interesting things happen.
" (See http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1577040).Which is a bit inline with - we don't want folks to depend on it, so we make sure to poison it (with zeros in this case).
0xdeadbeefwould get the same thing. If we are going that route we perhaps we should do the same thing on Linux?_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
Quoted 66 lines · Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Quoted 65 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 64 lines · Petr Tesarik
Quoted 61 lines · On Mon, 18 Nov 2013 13:41:02 +0100 Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 43 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 19 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 18 lines · David Vrabel
Quoted 17 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · David Vrabel
Quoted 6 lines · Daniel Kiper
Clear unused registers before jumping into an image. This way loaded image could not assume that any register has an specific info about earlier running Xen hypervisor. However, it also does not mean that the image may expect that a given register is zeroed. The image MUST assume that every register has a random value or in other words it is uninitialized or has undefined state.
Quoted 7 lines
I think this, where the specification (registers undefined) differs from
the implementation (registers zeroed), is the worst option.I also think it is more likely for an image to inadvertently rely on a
zero value that whatever junk Xen has left behind.Preventing users to rely on anything would likely make it desirable to put some random value into all unused registers.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I don't think we need to go that far.
I would just like to avoid someone looking that the implementation (and not the documentation) and concluding that zero-ing of the registers is part of the specified behaviour, or looking at the implementation and documentation and wondering why they don't agree.
David, my comment clearly states why we are doing that and what should be expected. What is wrong with it? I could improve it but say how?
You seem to be saying that the registers may contain useful information about Xen that are not part of the spec, and you are worried that the image may decide to use these and come to rely on them, making it hard to change the interface in the future.
David has a similar concern -- that if the registers are zeroed, the image may come to rely on the registers being pre-zeroed, and not zero them itself. This would also make it hard to change the interface in the future.
A simple solution would be to "poison" the registers with useless
data:0xdeadbeefis a favorite. Anyone seeing that in the registers will immediately know, "Someone used a value that they shouldn't have."Quoted 7 lines
Of course, it's *possible* that then the images might come to rely on that poison being there; having a non-deterministic value there, like a hash of the TSC, would make this impossible. But even then, you could make the argument that the image may come to rely on a *pseudo-random* number being there, which it uses for some other kind of seed somewhere. At some point you just have to give up on this like of thought. :-)
:-)))
Quoted 4 lines
Personally I think having a poison is likely to be more useful -- if you crash because your pointer is
0xdeadbeef, then it's immediately obvious what kind of bug you have; whereas if you crash with a random value that changes every time, it's not so obvious.It works for me too. Any solution has pros and cons. However, in general I think that wiping registers in that case is nice idea. So we could zero registers, write
0xdeadbeefinto them or even use TSC. But please do not leave registers as is.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
DEADBABE or DEADBEEF sounds best.
"DEADBABE" sounds awful. We have enough problems with getting women to contribute to the kernel without reminding them of the risks of violence they face on a regular basis.
<nods>
Just to clarify - I completely agree with George. That 'DEADBABE' or any other (see http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2012/07/b16b00b5/) are offensive.
Quoted 10 lines
I would like to point out that Eric Biederman stated that the reason for using 0 was:
0/NULL is a good choice because if you are expecting pointer for some
strange reason interesting things happen.
" (See http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1577040).Which is a bit inline with - we don't want folks to depend on it, so we make sure to poison it (with zeros in this case).
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0xdeadbeefwould get the same thing. If we are going that route we perhaps we should do the same thing on Linux?_______________________________________________
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