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Bluetooth: Fix HCI User Channel permission check in hci_sock_sendmsg

PATCH Applied Marcel Holtmann 2 participants 2 messages Dec 17, 2013

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Marcel Holtmann

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 Bluetooth: Fix HCI User Channel permission check in hci_sock_sendmsg

The HCI User Channel is an admin operation which enforces CAP_NET_ADMIN when binding the socket. Problem now is that it then requires also CAP_NET_RAW when calling into hci_sock_sendmsg. This is not intended and just an oversight since general HCI sockets (which do not require special permission to bind) and HCI User Channel share the same code path here.

Remove the extra CAP_NET_RAW check for HCI User Channel write operation since the permission check has already been enforced when binding the socket. This also makes it possible to open HCI User Channel from a privileged process and then hand the file descriptor to an unprivilged process.

---
 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c +16 -10
index 6a6c8bb4fd72..7552f9e3089c 100644
@@ -940,8 +940,22 @@ static int hci_sock_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
 	bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type = *((unsigned char *) skb->data);
 	skb_pull(skb, 1);
 
-	if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_RAW &&
-	    bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type == HCI_COMMAND_PKT) {
+	if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_USER) {
+		/* No permission check is needed for user channel
+		 * since that gets enforced when binding the socket.
+		 *
+		 * However check that the packet type is valid.
+		 */
+		if (bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_COMMAND_PKT &&
+		    bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_ACLDATA_PKT &&
+		    bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_SCODATA_PKT) {
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto drop;
+		}
+
+		skb_queue_tail(&hdev->raw_q, skb);
+		queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &hdev->tx_work);
+	} else if (bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type == HCI_COMMAND_PKT) {
 		u16 opcode = get_unaligned_le16(skb->data);
 		u16 ogf = hci_opcode_ogf(opcode);
 		u16 ocf = hci_opcode_ocf(opcode);
@@ -972,14 +986,6 @@ static int hci_sock_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
 			goto drop;
 		}
 
-		if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_USER &&
-		    bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_COMMAND_PKT &&
-		    bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_ACLDATA_PKT &&
-		    bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_SCODATA_PKT) {
-			err = -EINVAL;
-			goto drop;
-		}
-
 		skb_queue_tail(&hdev->raw_q, skb);
 		queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &hdev->tx_work);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
#1 lore raw

Hi Marcel,

Quoted 13 lines · Marcel Holtmann

The HCI User Channel is an admin operation which enforces CAP_NET_ADMIN when binding the socket. Problem now is that it then requires also CAP_NET_RAW when calling into hci_sock_sendmsg. This is not intended and just an oversight since general HCI sockets (which do not require special permission to bind) and HCI User Channel share the same code path here.

Remove the extra CAP_NET_RAW check for HCI User Channel write operation since the permission check has already been enforced when binding the socket. This also makes it possible to open HCI User Channel from a privileged process and then hand the file descriptor to an unprivilged process.

Quoted 4 lines
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

Applied to bluetooth.git. Thanks.

Johan