CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processes
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processes
This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744 plus fixing it a different way...
We found, when trying to run an application from an application which had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status.
Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4 capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are undefined future capabilities.
The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl() we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.
So the 'parent' will look something like:
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: 0000000000000000
CapEff: 0000000000000000
CapBnd: ffffffc000000000
All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do...
So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does. They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls execve() the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are 'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't have.
The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity.
The solution here is 2 things.
1) stop hiding capability bits in status
we hide those upper bits which meant I couldn't spot this issue
2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init and you won't get them in any other task either.
--- fs/proc/array.c | 9 --------- include/linux/capability.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/proc/array.c +0 -9
@@ -302,10 +302,6 @@ static void render_cap_t(struct seq_file *m, const char *header,seq_putc (m,'\n' ); } -/* Remove non-existent capabilities */ -#define NORM_CAPS (v) (v.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(CAP_LAST_CAP)] &= \ - CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) - 1) -static inline void task_cap (struct seq_file *m,struct task_struct *p) {const struct cred *cred;
@@ -319,11 +315,6 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) cap_bset = cred->cap_bset;rcu_read_unlock (); -NORM_CAPS (cap_inheritable); -NORM_CAPS (cap_permitted); -NORM_CAPS (cap_effective); -NORM_CAPS (cap_bset); -render_cap_t (m,"CapInh:\t" , &cap_inheritable);render_cap_t (m,"CapPrm:\t" , &cap_permitted);render_cap_t (m,"CapEff:\t" , &cap_effective);
include/linux/capability.h +1 -1
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */ # define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }}) -# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }}) +# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) -1 }})# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \ CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
Quoted 100 lines · Eric Paris
This is effectively a revert of
7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744plus fixing it a different way...We found, when trying to run an application from an application which had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those undefined bits are hidden from
/proc/$PID/status.Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4 capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps less than
CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are undefined future capabilities.The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl() we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits higher than
CAP_LAST_CAP.So the 'parent' will look something like:
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: 0000000000000000
CapEff: 0000000000000000
CapBnd:ffffffc000000000All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do...
So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does. They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls
execve()the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset however does not block bits higher thanCAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are 'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't have.The problem is now in
cred_cap_issubset()(or any operation which does a subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity.The solution here is 2 things.
1) stop hiding capability bits in status
we hide those upper bits which meant I couldn't spot this issue
2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you don't put those invalid bits inCAP_FULL_SETyou won't get them in init and you won't get them in any other task either.Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Vagin <[email protected]>Cc Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>Cc Steve Grubb <[email protected]>Cc Dan Walsh <[email protected]>--- fs/proc/array.c | 9 --------- include/linux/capability.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)fs/proc/array.c +0
-9@@ -302,10 +302,6 @@ static void render_cap_t(struct seq_file *m, const char *header,seq_putc (m,'\n' ); } -/* Remove non-existent capabilities */ -#define NORM_CAPS (v) (v.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(CAP_LAST_CAP)] &= \ - CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) - 1) -static inline void task_cap (struct seq_file *m,struct task_struct *p) {const struct cred *cred;@@ -319,11 +315,6 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) cap_bset = cred->cap_bset;rcu_read_unlock (); -NORM_CAPS (cap_inheritable); -NORM_CAPS (cap_permitted); -NORM_CAPS (cap_effective); -NORM_CAPS (cap_bset); -render_cap_t (m,"CapInh:\t" , &cap_inheritable);render_cap_t (m,"CapPrm:\t" , &cap_permitted);render_cap_t (m,"CapEff:\t" , &cap_effective);include/linux/capability.h +0
-0
include/linux/capability.h extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set; · line 82
Quoted 5 lines
include/linux/capability.h +1
-1@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */ # define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }}) -# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }}) +# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) -1 }})
" - 1", please.
--Andy
Quoted 55 lines · Eric Paris
This is effectively a revert of
7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744plus fixing it a different way...We found, when trying to run an application from an application which had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those undefined bits are hidden from
/proc/$PID/status.Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4 capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps less than
CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are undefined future capabilities.The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl() we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits higher than
CAP_LAST_CAP.So the 'parent' will look something like:
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: 0000000000000000
CapEff: 0000000000000000
CapBnd:ffffffc000000000All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do...
So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does. They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls
execve()the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset however does not block bits higher thanCAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are 'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't have.The problem is now in
cred_cap_issubset()(or any operation which does a subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity.The solution here is 2 things.
1) stop hiding capability bits in status
we hide those upper bits which meant I couldn't spot this issue
2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you don't put those invalid bits inCAP_FULL_SETyou won't get them in init and you won't get them in any other task either.
Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Vagin <[email protected]>Cc Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Quoted 57 lines
--- fs/proc/array.c | 9 --------- include/linux/capability.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)fs/proc/array.c +0
-9@@ -302,10 +302,6 @@ static void render_cap_t(struct seq_file *m, const char *header,seq_putc (m,'\n' ); } -/* Remove non-existent capabilities */ -#define NORM_CAPS (v) (v.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(CAP_LAST_CAP)] &= \ - CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) - 1) -static inline void task_cap (struct seq_file *m,struct task_struct *p) {const struct cred *cred;@@ -319,11 +315,6 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) cap_bset = cred->cap_bset;rcu_read_unlock (); -NORM_CAPS (cap_inheritable); -NORM_CAPS (cap_permitted); -NORM_CAPS (cap_effective); -NORM_CAPS (cap_bset); -render_cap_t (m,"CapInh:\t" , &cap_inheritable);render_cap_t (m,"CapPrm:\t" , &cap_permitted);render_cap_t (m,"CapEff:\t" , &cap_effective);include/linux/capability.h +1
-1@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */ # define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }}) -# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }}) +# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) -1 }})# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \ CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })Signature · 7 lines
1.9.3 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Quoted 48 lines · Eric Paris
This is effectively a revert of
7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744plus fixing it a different way...We found, when trying to run an application from an application which had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those undefined bits are hidden from
/proc/$PID/status.Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4 capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps less than
CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are undefined future capabilities.The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl() we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits higher than
CAP_LAST_CAP.So the 'parent' will look something like:
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: 0000000000000000
CapEff: 0000000000000000
CapBnd:ffffffc000000000All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do...
So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does. They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls
execve()the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset however does not block bits higher thanCAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are 'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't have.The problem is now in
cred_cap_issubset()(or any operation which does a subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity.
Quoted 6 lines
The solution here is 2 things.
1) stop hiding capability bits in status
we hide those upper bits which meant I couldn't spot this issue
2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you don't put those invalid bits inCAP_FULL_SETyou won't get them in init and you won't get them in any other task either.
Pls, look at the comment for my first patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/10/5/374
The following command fails with this patch (and succeeds without).
[root@avagin-fc19-cr ~]# capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash Unable to set capabilities [--caps=all=eip]
Quoted 57 lines
Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Vagin <[email protected]>Cc Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>Cc Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>Cc Steve Grubb <[email protected]>Cc Dan Walsh <[email protected]>--- fs/proc/array.c | 9 --------- include/linux/capability.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)fs/proc/array.c +0
-9@@ -302,10 +302,6 @@ static void render_cap_t(struct seq_file *m, const char *header,seq_putc (m,'\n' ); } -/* Remove non-existent capabilities */ -#define NORM_CAPS (v) (v.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(CAP_LAST_CAP)] &= \ - CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) - 1) -static inline void task_cap (struct seq_file *m,struct task_struct *p) {const struct cred *cred;@@ -319,11 +315,6 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) cap_bset = cred->cap_bset;rcu_read_unlock (); -NORM_CAPS (cap_inheritable); -NORM_CAPS (cap_permitted); -NORM_CAPS (cap_effective); -NORM_CAPS (cap_bset); -render_cap_t (m,"CapInh:\t" , &cap_inheritable);render_cap_t (m,"CapPrm:\t" , &cap_permitted);render_cap_t (m,"CapEff:\t" , &cap_effective);include/linux/capability.h +1
-1@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */ # define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }}) -# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }}) +# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) -1 }})# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \ CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })Signature · 1 line
1.9.3
Quoted 56 lines · Andrew Vagin
Quoted 48 lines · Eric Paris
This is effectively a revert of
7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744plus fixing it a different way...We found, when trying to run an application from an application which had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those undefined bits are hidden from
/proc/$PID/status.Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4 capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps less than
CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are undefined future capabilities.The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl() we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits higher than
CAP_LAST_CAP.So the 'parent' will look something like:
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: 0000000000000000
CapEff: 0000000000000000
CapBnd:ffffffc000000000All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do...
So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does. They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls
execve()the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset however does not block bits higher thanCAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are 'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't have.The problem is now in
cred_cap_issubset()(or any operation which does a subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity.Quoted 6 lines
The solution here is 2 things.
1) stop hiding capability bits in status
we hide those upper bits which meant I couldn't spot this issue
2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you don't put those invalid bits inCAP_FULL_SETyou won't get them in init and you won't get them in any other task either.
Quoted 6 lines
Pls, look at the comment for my first patch: https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/10/5/374
The following command fails with this patch (and succeeds without).
[root@avagin-fc19-cr ~]# capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c
/bin/bashUnable to set capabilities [--caps=all=eip]
Thanks - so at least capset will need to mask what is passed in by the user with CAP_FULL_SET.