a bunch of old bluetooth fixes
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 a bunch of old bluetooth fixes
This stuff has been sitting in my queue since March; basically,
several places in net/bluetooth assume that they are dealing with l2cap sockets, while it is possible to get an arbitrary socket to those. Results are not pretty.
* HIDPCONNADD gets an arbitrary user-supplied socket; the code
it calls (hidp_connection_add()) verifies that the socket is l2cap one, but before doing so it finds l2cap_pi(ctrl_sock->sk)->chan. It's not that big a deal (it's only 5 words past the end of struct sock), but it's trivial to avoid and, in theory, we might end up oopsing here if we are very unlucky and it happens to hit an unmapped page just past the actual object ctrl_sock->sk sits in.
* CMTP counterpart of that doesn't validate the socket at all.
It proceeds to
s = __cmtp_get_session(&l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->dst);
which can very easily oops - here ->chan is already garbage and we proceed to dereference that. As with HIDP, one needs CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger that, but it's really a clear bug. The only sanity check we do is verifying that nsock->sk->sk_state is equal to BT_CONNECTED, which is not unique to bluetooth, to put it mildly. It's just 1, so a TCP_ESTABLISHED tcp socket will pass that check just fune. The fix is trivial...
* BNEP situation is identical to CMTP one.
I've sent these patches back then (March 10), but they seem to have fallen through the cracks. The bugs are still there and the fixes still apply. If you would prefer me to resend them after -rc1, just tell...
Anyway, patches follow
PATCH 1/3 bluetooth: hidp_connection_add() unsafe use of l2cap_pi()
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
it's OK after we'd verified the sockets, but not before that.
--- net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c +2 -1
@@ -1314,13 +1314,14 @@ int hidp_connection_add(struct hidp_connadd_req *req, {struct hidp_session *session;struct l2cap_conn *conn; -struct l2cap_chan *chan =l2cap_pi (ctrl_sock->sk)->chan; +struct l2cap_chan *chan;int ret; ret =hidp_verify_sockets (ctrl_sock, intr_sock);if (ret)return ret; + chan =l2cap_pi (ctrl_sock->sk)->chan; conn =NULL ;l2cap_chan_lock (chan);if (chan->conn)
Signature · 1 line
2.1.3
Marcel Holtmann
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/3] bluetooth: hidp_connection_add() unsafe use of l2cap_pi()
Hi Al,
Quoted 6 lines
it's OK after we'd verified the sockets, but not before that.
Signed-off-by Al Viro <[email protected]>---
net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c| 3 ++-1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
patch has been applied to bluetooth tree.
Regards
Marcel
PATCH 2/3 cmtp: cmtp_add_connection() should verify that it's dealing with l2cap socket
In reply to Al ViroFrom: Al Viro <[email protected]>
... rather than relying on ciptool(8) never passing it anything else. Give it e.g. an AF_UNIX connected socket (from socketpair(2)) and it'll oops, trying to evaluate &l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->dst...
--- net/bluetooth/cmtp/core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/bluetooth/cmtp/core.c +2 -0
@@ -333,6 +333,8 @@ int cmtp_add_connection(struct cmtp_connadd_req *req, struct socket *sock)int i, err;BT_DBG ("" ); +if (!l2cap_is_socket (sock)) +return -EBADFD ; session =kzalloc (sizeof (struct cmtp_session ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!session)
Signature · 1 line
2.1.3
Marcel Holtmann
maintainerRe: [PATCH 2/3] cmtp: cmtp_add_connection() should verify that it's dealing with l2cap socket
Hi Al,
Quoted 10 lines
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
... rather than relying on ciptool(8) never passing it anything else. Give it e.g. an
AF_UNIXconnected socket (from socketpair(2)) and it'll oops, trying to evaluate &l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->dst...Signed-off-by Al Viro <[email protected]>---
net/bluetooth/cmtp/core.c| 2 ++1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
patch has been applied to bluetooth tree.
Regards
Marcel
PATCH 3/3 bnep: bnep_add_connection() should verify that it's dealing with l2cap socket
In reply to Al ViroFrom: Al Viro <[email protected]>
same story as cmtp
--- net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c +3 -0
@@ -533,6 +533,9 @@ int bnep_add_connection(struct bnep_connadd_req *req, struct socket *sock)BT_DBG ("" ); +if (!l2cap_is_socket (sock)) +return -EBADFD ; +baswap ((void *) dst, &l2cap_pi (sock->sk)->chan->dst);baswap ((void *) src, &l2cap_pi (sock->sk)->chan->src);
Signature · 1 line
2.1.3
Marcel Holtmann
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3] bnep: bnep_add_connection() should verify that it's dealing with l2cap socket
Hi Al,
Quoted 6 lines
same story as cmtp
Signed-off-by Al Viro <[email protected]>---
net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c| 3 +++1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
patch has been applied to bluetooth tree.
Regards
Marcel
Marcel Holtmann
maintainerHi Al,
Quoted 23 lines
This stuff has been sitting in my queue since March; basically,
several places in net/bluetooth assume that they are dealing with l2cap sockets, while it is possible to get an arbitrary socket to those. Results are not pretty.
* HIDPCONNADD gets an arbitrary user-supplied socket; the code
it calls (hidp_connection_add()) verifies that the socket is l2cap one, but before doing so it finds l2cap_pi(ctrl_sock->sk)->chan. It's not that big a deal (it's only 5 words past the end of struct sock), but it's trivial to avoid and, in theory, we might end up oopsing here if we are very unlucky and it happens to hit an unmapped page just past the actual objectctrl_sock->sksits in.
* CMTP counterpart of that doesn't validate the socket at all.
It proceeds tos = __cmtp_get_session(&l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->dst);which can very easily oops - here ->chan is already garbage and we proceed to dereference that. As with HIDP, one needs
CAP_NET_ADMINto trigger that, but it's really a clear bug. The only sanity check we do is verifying thatnsock->sk->sk_stateis equal toBT_CONNECTED, which is not unique to bluetooth, to put it mildly. It's just 1, so aTCP_ESTABLISHEDtcp socket will pass that check just fune. The fix is trivial...
* BNEP situation is identical to CMTP one.
Quoted 3 lines
I've sent these patches back then (March 10), but they seem to have fallen through the cracks. The bugs are still there and the fixes still apply. If you would prefer me to resend them after -rc1, just tell...
they must have really fallen through the cracks since I do not even remember them.
My take is that these should all go in before -rc1 and preferable also make it into stable. While you need CAP_NET_ADMIN capability, there are clear stupid bugs on our side.
Dave, we can prepare a pull request for these or do you want to take them directly into net tree?
Regards
Marcel
Hi Dave,
Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 23 lines
This stuff has been sitting in my queue since March; basically,
several places in net/bluetooth assume that they are dealing with l2cap sockets, while it is possible to get an arbitrary socket to those. Results are not pretty.
* HIDPCONNADD gets an arbitrary user-supplied socket; the code
it calls (hidp_connection_add()) verifies that the socket is l2cap one, but before doing so it finds l2cap_pi(ctrl_sock->sk)->chan. It's not that big a deal (it's only 5 words past the end of struct sock), but it's trivial to avoid and, in theory, we might end up oopsing here if we are very unlucky and it happens to hit an unmapped page just past the actual objectctrl_sock->sksits in.
* CMTP counterpart of that doesn't validate the socket at all.
It proceeds tos = __cmtp_get_session(&l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->dst);which can very easily oops - here ->chan is already garbage and we proceed to dereference that. As with HIDP, one needs
CAP_NET_ADMINto trigger that, but it's really a clear bug. The only sanity check we do is verifying thatnsock->sk->sk_stateis equal toBT_CONNECTED, which is not unique to bluetooth, to put it mildly. It's just 1, so aTCP_ESTABLISHEDtcp socket will pass that check just fune. The fix is trivial...
* BNEP situation is identical to CMTP one.Quoted 3 lines
I've sent these patches back then (March 10), but they seem to have fallen through the cracks. The bugs are still there and the fixes still apply. If you would prefer me to resend them after -rc1, just tell...
Quoted 5 lines
they must have really fallen through the cracks since I do not even remember them.
My take is that these should all go in before -rc1 and preferable also make it into stable. While you need
CAP_NET_ADMINcapability, there are clear stupid bugs on our side.Dave, we can prepare a pull request for these or do you want to take them directly into net tree?
and in case you decide to take them directly.
Regards
Marcel
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): 07BDA2A2-1560-4F78-A0B2-FC25E312CACE-kz+m5ild9QBg9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org
From: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 11:30:38 +0100
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Dave, we can prepare a pull request for these or do you want to take them directly into net tree?
and in case you decide to take them directly.
Acked-by Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Feel free to create a pull request for me, that works best.
Thanks.
Marcel Holtmann
maintainerHi Dave,
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Dave, we can prepare a pull request for these or do you want to take them directly into net tree?
and in case you decide to take them directly.
Acked-by Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>Feel free to create a pull request for me, that works best.
actually Johan already sent one. Should be in your inbox and on netdev.
Regards
Marcel
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): B0609FEE-1CE5-4618-A0B6-B2B82B1EC74D-kz+m5ild9QBg9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org
Hi Dave,
Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 23 lines
This stuff has been sitting in my queue since March; basically,
several places in net/bluetooth assume that they are dealing with l2cap sockets, while it is possible to get an arbitrary socket to those. Results are not pretty.
* HIDPCONNADD gets an arbitrary user-supplied socket; the code
it calls (hidp_connection_add()) verifies that the socket is l2cap one, but before doing so it finds l2cap_pi(ctrl_sock->sk)->chan. It's not that big a deal (it's only 5 words past the end of struct sock), but it's trivial to avoid and, in theory, we might end up oopsing here if we are very unlucky and it happens to hit an unmapped page just past the actual objectctrl_sock->sksits in.
* CMTP counterpart of that doesn't validate the socket at all.
It proceeds tos = __cmtp_get_session(&l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->dst);which can very easily oops - here ->chan is already garbage and we proceed to dereference that. As with HIDP, one needs
CAP_NET_ADMINto trigger that, but it's really a clear bug. The only sanity check we do is verifying thatnsock->sk->sk_stateis equal toBT_CONNECTED, which is not unique to bluetooth, to put it mildly. It's just 1, so aTCP_ESTABLISHEDtcp socket will pass that check just fune. The fix is trivial...
* BNEP situation is identical to CMTP one.Quoted 3 lines
I've sent these patches back then (March 10), but they seem to have fallen through the cracks. The bugs are still there and the fixes still apply. If you would prefer me to resend them after -rc1, just tell...
Quoted 5 lines
they must have really fallen through the cracks since I do not even remember them.
My take is that these should all go in before -rc1 and preferable also make it into stable. While you need
CAP_NET_ADMINcapability, there are clear stupid bugs on our side.Dave, we can prepare a pull request for these or do you want to take them directly into net tree?
never mind that. We have another bug in 6LoWPAN with wrongly freeing a skb. I took all 3 of Al's patches now and I will ask Johan to send you a pull request for the whole set for net tree inclusion.
Regards
Marcel