KVM: VMX: Fix commit which broke PML
PATCH RESEND v2 1/1 KVM: VMX: Fix commit which broke PML
I found PML was broken since below commit:
commit feda805fe7c4ed9cf78158e73b1218752e3b4314
Author: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Date: Wed Sep 9 14:05:55 2015 +0800
KVM: VMX: unify SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL update
Unify the update in vmx_cpuid_update()
The reason is in above commit vmx_cpuid_update calls vmx_secondary_exec_control, in which currently SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML bit is cleared unconditionally (as PML is enabled in creating vcpu). Therefore if vcpu_cpuid_update is called after vcpu is created, PML will be disabled unexpectedly while log-dirty code still thinks PML is used.
Fix this by clearing SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML in vmx_secondary_exec_control only when PML is not supported or not enabled (!enable_pml). This is more reasonable as PML is currently either always enabled or disabled. With this explicit updating SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML in vmx_enable{disable}_pml is not needed so also rename vmx_enable{disable}_pml to vmx_create{destroy}_pml_buffer.
---
Sorry previous patch missed PATCH subject prefix. Resend by fixing that.
v1->v2: Fix this by following Paolo's suggestion. It's better to not to clear SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML in vmx_secondary_exec_control unconditionally but only clear it when PML is not supported or enabled.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 15 +++++++-------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +7 -8
@@ -4718,8 +4718,9 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)a current VMCS12 */ exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS ; -/* PML is enabled/disabled in creating/destorying vcpu */ - exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML ; + +if (!enable_pml) + exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML ;/* Currently, we allow L1 guest to directly run pcommit instruction. */ exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_PCOMMIT ;
@@ -7804,7 +7805,7 @@ static void vmx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *info1, u64 *info2) *info2 =vmcs_read32 (VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO ); } -static int vmx_enable_pml (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +static int vmx_create_pml_buffer (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) {struct page *pml_pg;
@@ -7817,12 +7818,10 @@ static int vmx_enable_pml(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)vmcs_write64 (PML_ADDRESS ,page_to_phys (vmx->pml_pg));vmcs_write16 (GUEST_PML_INDEX ,PML_ENTITY_NUM -1 ); -vmcs_set_bits (SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL ,SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML ); -return 0 ; } -static void vmx_disable_pml (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) +static void vmx_destroy_pml_buffer (struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) {ASSERT (vmx->pml_pg);__free_page (vmx->pml_pg);
@@ -8706,7 +8705,7 @@ static void vmx_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)struct vcpu_vmx *vmx =to_vmx (vcpu);if (enable_pml) -vmx_disable_pml (vmx); +vmx_destroy_pml_buffer (vmx);free_vpid (vmx->vpid);leave_guest_mode (vcpu);vmx_load_vmcs01 (vcpu);
@@ -8790,7 +8789,7 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)* for the guest, etc. */ if (enable_pml) { - err =vmx_enable_pml (vmx); + err =vmx_create_pml_buffer (vmx);if (err) goto free_vmcs; }
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2.5.0