Allow customizable random offset to mmap_base address.
Subsystems (9)
v7 cover Allow customizable random offset to mmap_base address.
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to exploitation of user-space processes in the presence of security vulnerabilities by making it more difficult to find desired code/data which could help an attack. This is done by adding a random offset to the location of regions in the process address space, with a greater range of potential offset values corresponding to better protection/a larger search-space for brute force, but also to greater potential for fragmentation.
The offset added to the mmap_base address, which provides the basis for the majority of the mappings for a process, is set once on process exec in arch_pick_mmap_layout() and is done via hard-coded per-arch values, which reflect, hopefully, the best compromise for all systems. The trade-off between increased entropy in the offset value generation and the corresponding increased variability in address space fragmentation is not absolute, however, and some platforms may tolerate higher amounts of entropy. This patch introduces both new Kconfig values and a sysctl interface which may be used to change the amount of entropy used for offset generation on a system.
The direct motivation for this change was in response to the libstagefright vulnerabilities that affected Android, specifically to information provided by Google's project zero at:
http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/09/stagefrightened.html
The attack presented therein, by Google's project zero, specifically targeted the limited randomness used to generate the offset added to the mmap_base address in order to craft a brute-force-based attack. Concretely, the attack was against the mediaserver process, which was limited to respawning every 5 seconds, on an arm device. The hard-coded 8 bits used resulted in an average expected success rate of defeating the mmap ASLR after just over 10 minutes (128 tries at 5 seconds a piece). With this patch, and an accompanying increase in the entropy value to 16 bits, the same attack would take an average expected time of over 45 hours (32768 tries), which makes it both less feasible and more likely to be noticed.
The introduced Kconfig and sysctl options are limited by per-arch minimum and maximum values, the minimum of which was chosen to match the current hard-coded value and the maximum of which was chosen so as to give the greatest flexibility without generating an invalid mmap_base address, generally a 3-4 bits less than the number of bits in the user-space accessible virtual address space.
When decided whether or not to change the default value, a system developer should consider that mmap_base address could be placed anywhere up to 2^(value) bits away from the non-randomized location, which would introduce variable-sized areas above and below the mmap_base address such that the maximum vm_area_struct size may be reduced, preventing very large allocations.
Changes in v7:
* changed random bit-grabbing to explicit '&' rather than '%'
* removed unsupported ARM64 combinations for CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
* aligned default CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX to match ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
* whitespace change for x86 Kconfig
dcashman (4):
mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR.
arm: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS.
arm64: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS.
x86: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS.
Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt | 29 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/Kconfig | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm/Kconfig | 9 ++++++ arch/arm/mm/mmap.c | 3 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 29 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 8 ++++-- arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 +++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 12 ++++---- include/linux/mm.h | 11 ++++++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 22 +++++++++++++++ mm/mmap.c | 12 ++++++++ 11 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.6.0.rc2.230.g3dd15c0
PATCH v7 1/4 mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR.
From: dcashman <[email protected]>
ASLR only uses as few as 8 bits to generate the random offset for the mmap base address on 32 bit architectures. This value was chosen to prevent a poorly chosen value from dividing the address space in such a way as to prevent large allocations. This may not be an issue on all platforms. Allow the specification of a minimum number of bits so that platforms desiring greater ASLR protection may determine where to place the trade-off.
--- Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt | 29 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/Kconfig | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/mm.h | 11 ++++++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 22 +++++++++++++++ mm/mmap.c | 12 ++++++++ 5 files changed, 142 insertions(+)
Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt +29 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/vm: - min_slab_ratio - min_unmapped_ratio - mmap_min_addr +- mmap_rnd_bits +- mmap_rnd_compat_bits - nr_hugepages - nr_overcommit_hugepages - nr_trim_pages (only if CONFIG_MMU=n)
@@ -485,6 +487,33 @@ against future potential kernel bugs. ============================================================== +mmap_rnd_bits: + +This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to +determine the random offset to the base address of vma regions +resulting from mmap allocations on architectures which support +tuning address space randomization. This value will be bounded +by the architecture's minimum and maximum supported values. + +This value can be changed after boot using the +/proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits tunable + +============================================================== + +mmap_rnd_compat_bits: + +This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to +determine the random offset to the base address of vma regions +resulting from mmap allocations for applications run in +compatibility mode on architectures which support tuning address +space randomization. This value will be bounded by the +architecture's minimum and maximum supported values. + +This value can be changed after boot using the +/proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_compat_bits tunable + +============================================================== + nr_hugepages Change the minimum size of the hugepage pool.
arch/Kconfig +68 -0
74 lines not on this page · raw message
include/linux/mm.h +11 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,17 @@ extern int sysctl_legacy_va_layout;#define sysctl_legacy_va_layout 0#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS +extern const int mmap_rnd_bits_min; +extern const int mmap_rnd_bits_max; +extern int mmap_rnd_bits__read_mostly ; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS +extern const int mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min; +extern const int mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max; +extern int mmap_rnd_compat_bits__read_mostly ; +#endif +#include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/processor.h>
kernel/sysctl.c +22 -0
@@ -1568,6 +1568,28 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax, }, +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS + { + .procname = "mmap_rnd_bits", + .data = &mmap_rnd_bits, + .maxlen = sizeof(mmap_rnd_bits), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_bits_min, + .extra2 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_bits_max, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS + { + .procname = "mmap_rnd_compat_bits", + .data = &mmap_rnd_compat_bits, + .maxlen = sizeof(mmap_rnd_compat_bits), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min, + .extra2 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max, + }, +#endif { } };
mm/mmap.c +12 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,18 @@#define arch_rebalance_pgtables (addr, len) (addr)#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS +const int mmap_rnd_bits_min =CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ; +const int mmap_rnd_bits_max =CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX ; +int mmap_rnd_bits__read_mostly =CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS ; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS +const int mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min =CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ; +const int mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max =CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX ; +int mmap_rnd_compat_bits__read_mostly =CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS ; +#endif + +static void unmap_region (struct mm_struct *mm,struct vm_area_struct *vma,struct vm_area_struct *prev,unsigned long start,unsigned long end);
Signature · 1 line
2.6.0.rc2.230.g3dd15c0
PATCH v7 2/4 arm: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS.
From: dcashman <[email protected]>
arm: arch_mmap_rnd() uses a hard-code value of 8 to generate the random offset for the mmap base address. This value represents a compromise between increased ASLR effectiveness and avoiding address-space fragmentation. Replace it with a Kconfig option, which is sensibly bounded, so that platform developers may choose where to place this compromise. Keep 8 as the minimum acceptable value.
--- arch/arm/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++ arch/arm/mm/mmap.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm/Kconfig +9 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ config ARM select HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE if (CPU_32v7M || CPU_32v7) && !CPU_32v6 select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL if !XIP_KERNEL && !CPU_ENDIAN_BE32 select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if !CPU_ENDIAN_BE32 + select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER if (AEABI && !OABI_COMPAT) select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_BPF_JIT
@@ -308,6 +309,14 @@ config MMU Select if you want MMU-based virtualised addressing space support by paged memory management. If unsure, say 'Y'. +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN + default 8 + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX + default 14 if PAGE_OFFSET=0x40000000 + default 15 if PAGE_OFFSET=0x80000000 + default 16 + # # The "ARM system type" choice list is ordered alphabetically by option # text. Please add new entries in the option alphabetic order.
arch/arm/mm/mmap.c +1 -2
@@ -173,8 +173,7 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void) {unsigned long rnd; -/* 8 bits of randomness in 20 address space bits */ - rnd = (unsigned long )get_random_int () % (1 <<8 ); + rnd = (unsigned long )get_random_int () & ((1 << mmap_rnd_bits) -1 );return rnd <<PAGE_SHIFT ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.6.0.rc2.230.g3dd15c0
PATCH v7 3/4 arm64: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS.
From: dcashman <[email protected]>
arm64: arch_mmap_rnd() uses STACK_RND_MASK to generate the random offset for the mmap base address. This value represents a compromise between increased ASLR effectiveness and avoiding address-space fragmentation. Replace it with a Kconfig option, which is sensibly bounded, so that platform developers may choose where to place this compromise. Keep default values as new minimums.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 8 ++++++-- 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +29 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ config ARM64 select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP && !(ARM64_16K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_48) select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB + select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS + select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_BPF_JIT
@@ -104,6 +106,33 @@ config ARCH_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT config MMU def_bool y +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN + default 14 if ARM64_64K_PAGES + default 16 if ARM64_16K_PAGES + default 18 + +# max bits determined by the following formula: +# VA_BITS - PAGE_SHIFT - 3 +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX + default 19 if ARM64_VA_BITS=36 + default 24 if ARM64_VA_BITS=39 + default 27 if ARM64_VA_BITS=42 + default 30 if ARM64_VA_BITS=47 + default 29 if ARM64_VA_BITS=48 && ARM64_64K_PAGES + default 31 if ARM64_VA_BITS=48 && ARM64_16K_PAGES + default 33 if ARM64_VA_BITS=48 + default 14 if ARM64_64K_PAGES + default 16 if ARM64_16K_PAGES + default 18 + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN + default 7 if ARM64_64K_PAGES + default 9 if ARM64_16K_PAGES + default 11 + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX + default 16 + config NO_IOPORT_MAP def_bool y if !PCI
arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c +6 -2
@@ -51,8 +51,12 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void) {unsigned long rnd; - rnd = (unsigned long )get_random_int () &STACK_RND_MASK ; - +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +if (test_thread_flag (TIF_32BIT )) + rnd = (unsigned long )get_random_int () & ((1 << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) -1 ); + else +#endif + rnd = (unsigned long )get_random_int () & ((1 << mmap_rnd_bits) -1 );return rnd <<PAGE_SHIFT ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.6.0.rc2.230.g3dd15c0
PATCH v7 4/4 x86: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS.
From: dcashman <[email protected]>
x86: arch_mmap_rnd() uses hard-coded values, 8 for 32-bit and 28 for 64-bit, to generate the random offset for the mmap base address. This value represents a compromise between increased ASLR effectiveness and avoiding address-space fragmentation. Replace it with a Kconfig option, which is sensibly bounded, so that platform developers may choose where to place this compromise. Keep default values as new minimums.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 12 ++++++------ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +16 -0
@@ -82,6 +82,8 @@ config X86 select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if X86_64 && SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB select HAVE_ARCH_KMEMCHECK + select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU + select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if MMU && COMPAT select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY if X86_64 select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
@@ -183,6 +185,20 @@ config HAVE_LATENCYTOP_SUPPORT config MMU def_bool y +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN + default 28 if 64BIT + default 8 + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX + default 32 if 64BIT + default 16 + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN + default 8 + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX + default 16 + config SBUS bool
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c +6 -6
@@ -69,14 +69,14 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void) {unsigned long rnd; -/* -* 8 bits of randomness in 32bit mmaps, 20 address space bits -* 28 bits of randomness in 64bit mmaps, 40 address space bits -*/ if (mmap_is_ia32()) - rnd = (unsigned long )get_random_int () % (1 <<8 ); +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT + rnd = (unsigned long )get_random_int () & ((1 << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) -1 ); +#else + rnd = (unsigned long )get_random_int () & ((1 << mmap_rnd_bits) -1 ); +#endif else - rnd = (unsigned long )get_random_int () % (1 <<28 ); + rnd = (unsigned long )get_random_int () & ((1 << mmap_rnd_bits) -1 );return rnd <<PAGE_SHIFT ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.6.0.rc2.230.g3dd15c0
Quoted 39 lines · Daniel Cashman
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to exploitation of user-space processes in the presence of security vulnerabilities by making it more difficult to find desired code/data which could help an attack. This is done by adding a random offset to the location of regions in the process address space, with a greater range of potential offset values corresponding to better protection/a larger search-space for brute force, but also to greater potential for fragmentation.
The offset added to the
mmap_baseaddress, which provides the basis for the majority of the mappings for a process, is set once on process exec inarch_pick_mmap_layout()and is done via hard-coded per-arch values, which reflect, hopefully, the best compromise for all systems. The trade-off between increased entropy in the offset value generation and the corresponding increased variability in address space fragmentation is not absolute, however, and some platforms may tolerate higher amounts of entropy. This patch introduces both newKconfigvalues and a sysctl interface which may be used to change the amount of entropy used for offset generation on a system.The direct motivation for this change was in response to the libstagefright vulnerabilities that affected Android, specifically to information provided by Google's project zero at:
http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/09/stagefrightened.html
The attack presented therein, by Google's project zero, specifically targeted the limited randomness used to generate the offset added to the
mmap_baseaddress in order to craft a brute-force-based attack. Concretely, the attack was against the mediaserver process, which was limited to respawning every 5 seconds, on an arm device. The hard-coded 8 bits used resulted in an average expected success rate of defeating the mmap ASLR after just over 10 minutes (128 tries at 5 seconds a piece). With this patch, and an accompanying increase in the entropy value to 16 bits, the same attack would take an average expected time of over 45 hours (32768 tries), which makes it both less feasible and more likely to be noticed.The introduced
Kconfigand sysctl options are limited by per-arch minimum and maximum values, the minimum of which was chosen to match the current hard-coded value and the maximum of which was chosen so as to give the greatest flexibility without generating an invalidmmap_baseaddress, generally a 3-4 bits less than the number of bits in the user-space accessible virtual address space.When decided whether or not to change the default value, a system developer should consider that
mmap_baseaddress could be placed anywhere up to 2^(value) bits away from the non-randomized location, which would introduce variable-sized areas above and below themmap_baseaddress such that the maximumvm_area_structsize may be reduced, preventing very large allocations.Changes in v7:
* changed random bit-grabbing to explicit '&' rather than '%'
* removed unsupported ARM64 combinations forCONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
* aligned defaultCONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAXto matchARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
* whitespace change for x86Kconfigdcashman (4):
mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable formmap_baseASLR.
arm: mm: supportARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS.
arm64: mm: supportARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS.
x86: mm: supportARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS.Documentation/sysctl/vm.txt | 29 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/Kconfig | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm/Kconfig | 9 ++++++ arch/arm/mm/mmap.c | 3 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 29 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/mm/mmap.c | 8 ++++-- arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 +++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 12 ++++---- include/linux/mm.h | 11 ++++++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 22 +++++++++++++++ mm/mmap.c | 12 ++++++++ 11 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Quoted 3 lines
--
2.6.0.rc2.230.g3dd15c0
Please consider this series:
Thanks for chipping away at it! :)
-Kees
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Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security