Bug 4.1.16: self-detected stall in net/unix/?
Subsystems (3)
Hi,
we recently updated our kernel to 4.1.16 + patch for "unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets" and have since then self-detected stalls triggered by the Samba daemon:
Quoted 57 lines
Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU { 3} (t=162780 jiffies g=47565 c=47564 q=1055670) Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] Task dump for CPU 3: Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] smbd R running task 0 5938 1 0x0000000c Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] 0000000000000004 ffffffff81851340 ffffffff810d3c84 000000000000b9cd Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] ffff8801bfd97100 ffffffff81851340 ffffffff81851340 ffffffff818f6c60 Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] ffffffff810d7659 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00001e847fc2f700 Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] Call Trace: Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] <IRQ> [<ffffffff810d3c84>] ? rcu_dump_cpu_stacks+0x84/0xc0 Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] [<ffffffff810d7659>] ? rcu_check_callbacks+0x449/0x740 Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] [<ffffffff810ec7c0>] ? tick_sched_do_timer+0x40/0x40 Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] [<ffffffff810dcc54>] ? update_process_times+0x34/0x70 Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] [<ffffffff810ec45c>] ? tick_sched_handle.isra.12+0x2c/0x70 Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] [<ffffffff810ec809>] ? tick_sched_timer+0x49/0x80 Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] [<ffffffff810dd57d>] ? __run_hrtimer+0x6d/0x1b0 Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] [<ffffffff810ddd4d>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0xed/0x210 Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] [<ffffffff815a0ed9>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x39/0x50 Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] [<ffffffff8159ef7e>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x80Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] <EOI> [<ffffffff8159de85>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x35/0x50 Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] [<ffffffff8153b343>] ? unix_dgram_connect+0x93/0x200 Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] [<ffffffff8147f248>] ? SYSC_connect+0xe8/0x100 Feb 1 09:03:14 dcs1 kernel: [ 1152.840007] [<ffffffff8159e0f2>] ? system_call_fast_compare_end+0xc/0x6bFeb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162254] INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU { 0} (t=5250 jiffies g=6586733 c=6586732 q=6757) Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162264] Task dump for CPU 0: Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162267] smbd R running 0 4615 4609 0x00000008 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162272] 00200082 f5863b90 c10b3fe9 c1682cc0 c1682cc0 c1682cc0 f79d2b00 f 5863bdc Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162276] c10b722d c15bd400 00001482 0064816d 0064816c 00001a65 f79cd840 c 108b166 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162280] 00000001 f5863bb8 f5863bb8 00000000 c1682cc0 f6808cf0 00001a65 f 6808cf0 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162285] Call Trace: Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162296] [<c10b3fe9>] ? rcu_dump_cpu_stacks+0x79/0xc0 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162300] [<c10b722d>] ? rcu_check_callbacks+0x3cd/0x630 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162304] [<c108b166>] ? account_process_tick+0x66/0x160 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162307] [<c10bbe4f>] ? update_process_times+0x2f/0x60 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162310] [<c10cbf9d>] ? tick_sched_handle.isra.12+0x2d/0x60 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162328] [<c10cc210>] ? tick_sched_timer+0x40/0x80 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162331] [<c10bc6b0>] ? __remove_hrtimer+0x40/0xa0 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162334] [<c10bc97f>] ? __run_hrtimer+0x6f/0x190 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162337] [<c10cc1d0>] ? tick_sched_do_timer+0x30/0x30 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162339] [<c10bd15f>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0xef/0x260 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162343] [<c119ae3d>] ? getname_kernel+0x2d/0x100 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162348] [<c1046f7f>] ? local_apic_timer_interrupt+0x2f/0x60 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162353] [<c14e4543>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x50 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162355] [<c14e3c7c>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x34/0x3cFeb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162358] [<c14e2dc1>] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x51/0x70 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162362] [<c148c075>] ? unix_state_double_lock+0x25/0x60 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162365] [<c148de10>] ? unix_dgram_connect+0x90/0x1f0 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162369] [<c13e4267>] ? SYSC_connect+0xc7/0xe0 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162371] [<c13e2931>] ? sock_map_fd+0x41/0x60 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162374] [<c13e5014>] ? SYSC_socketcall+0x1b4/0xa20 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162376] [<c10c2940>] ? ktime_get+0x50/0x100 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162379] [<c10466db>] ? lapic_next_event+0x1b/0x20 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162381] [<c10ca0ed>] ? clockevents_program_event+0x9d/0x140 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162385] [<c129e068>] ? list_del+0x8/0x20 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162388] [<c1097ef7>] ? remove_wait_queue+0x27/0x40
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Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162392] [<c11c8795>] ? inotify_read+0x295/0x340 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162396] [<c10acc76>] ? handle_irq_event_percpu+0xa6/0x1a0 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162399] [<c11a786f>] ? set_close_on_exec+0x2f/0x60 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162402] [<c119d084>] ? do_fcntl+0x2f4/0x4e0 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162405] [<c107d6df>] ? commit_creds+0xff/0x1f0 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162407] [<c119d380>] ? SyS_fcntl64+0x60/0x100 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162409] [<c13e5953>] ? SyS_socketcall+0x13/0x20 Feb 1 11:48:13 ucs22f kernel: [307999.162412] [<c14e30db>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x12
We have not yet been able to reproduce the hang, but going back to our previous kernel 4.1.12 makes the problem go away.
Is this a known issue or do you have an idea where to look? What information should I collect next time it happens?
(Can unix_diag.ko with ss help?)
What other kernel configs should I enable do debug this dead-lock?
Thanks in advance
Philipp
Quoted 7 lines · Philipp Hahn
Hi,
we recently updated our kernel to 4.1.16 + patch for "unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets" and have since then self-detected stalls triggered by the Samba daemon:
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 5 lines
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[...]
We have not yet been able to reproduce the hang, but going back to our previous kernel 4.1.12 makes the problem go away.
Can you remove the patch "unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets" and see if the problem still happens?
I couldn't quickly see any problems with your added patch. I currently suspect a tight loop because of a SOCK_DEAD flag set but the socket not removed from unix_socket_table or the vfs. Hmmm...
The stack trace is rather unreliable, maybe something completely different happend. Do you happend to see better reports?
Quoted 4 lines
Is this a known issue or do you have an idea where to look? What information should I collect next time it happens?
(Can unix_diag.ko with
sshelp?)
Would be interesting if it is a conventional file based socket or autobounded one (sun_path[0] != '\0').
Thanks,
Hannes
Hello Hannes,
thank you for your previous reply.
Am 03.02.2016 um 02:43 schrieb Hannes Frederic Sowa:
Quoted 4 lines · Philipp Hahn
Quoted 3 lines
we recently updated our kernel to 4.1.16 + patch for "unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets" and have since then self-detected stalls triggered by the Samba daemon:
...
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
We have not yet been able to reproduce the hang, but going back to our previous kernel 4.1.12 makes the problem go away.
Can you remove the patch "unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets" and see if the problem still happens?
I will try.
The problem is that I can't trigger the bug reliably. It always happens to "smbd", but I don't know the triggering condition.
Quoted 3 lines
I couldn't quickly see any problems with your added patch. I currently suspect a tight loop because of a
SOCK_DEADflag set but the socket not removed fromunix_socket_tableor the vfs. Hmmm...
All occurrences of the bug show _raw_spin_lock() as the sleeping function, never anything other thus far.
I have seen the bug both on amd64 and i386.
If it would spin in
Quoted 5 lines
1097 restart:
1098 »···»···other =unix_find_other(net, sunaddr, alen, sock->type, hash, &err); 1099 »···»···if (!other)
1100 »···»···»···goto out;
1101
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1102 »···»···unix_state_double_lock(sk, other);
1103
1104 »···»···/* Apparently VFS overslept socket death. Retry. */ 1105 »···»···if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) {
1106 »···»···»···unix_state_double_unlock(sk, other); 1107 »···»···»···sock_put(other);
1108 »···»···»···goto restart;
1109 »···»···}
I would expect some other function to show up in the trace, but it's always the call chain "unix_dgram_connect -> unix_state_double_lock -> _raw_spin_lock".
The only case I see is that unix_find_other() returns the same "other" again and again.
Q: How will that dead "other" be garbage collected finally? The kernel is
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#
CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONEis not setCONFIG_PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY=y
#CONFIG_PREEMPTis not set
During my hunt I found the following difference between 4.4 and 4.1.16 in net/unix/af_unix.c:
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commit
1586a5877db9eee313379738d6581bc7c6ffb5e3Author: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Date: Fri Oct 23 10:59:16 2015 -0700
af_unix: do not report POLLOUT on listenerspoll(POLLOUT) on a listener should not report fd is ready for a
write().This would break some applications using
poll()and pfd.events = -1, as they would not block inpoll()Signed-off-by Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>Reported-by Alan Burlison <[email protected]>Tested-by Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David S. Miller <[email protected]>
...
Review
Quoted 7 lines
(quoted diff) +3
-2-static inline int unix_writable(struct sock *sk) +static int unix_writable(const struct sock *sk) { - return (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) << 2) <= sk->sk_sndbuf; + return sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN && + (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) << 2) <= sk->sk_sndbuf; }
Q: That *TCP*_LISTEN in net/*unix*/ looks strange to my eyes, but I'm not a kernel guru (yet).
There is one hunk in 5c77e26862ce604edea05b3442ed765e9756fe0f, which uses the result of that function, which might explain the difference, why it shows with 4.1.16 but not with 4.4?
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(quoted diff) +2
-8@@ -2245,14 +2388,16 @@ static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, writable = unix_writable(sk); - other = unix_peer_get(sk); - if (other) { - if (unix_peer(other) != sk) { - sock_poll_wait(file, &unix_sk(other)->peer_wait, wait); - if (unix_recvq_full(other)) - writable = 0; - } - sock_put(other); + if (writable) { + unix_state_lock(sk);
Review static unsigned int unix_dgram_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, · line 2400
Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +8
-0+ + other = unix_peer(sk); + if (other && unix_peer(other) != sk && + unix_recvq_full(other) && + unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other)) + writable = 0; + + unix_state_unlock(sk); } if (writable)
I will for now build a new kernel with
Quoted 4 lines
$ git log --oneline v4.1.12..v4.1.17 -- net/unix dc6b0ec unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets cc01a0a af_unix: Revert 'lock_interruptible' in stream receive code 5c77e26 unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
reverted to see if it still happens. The "middle" patch seems harmless, as it only changes a code path for STREAMS, while the bug triggers with DGRAMS only.
Quoted 2 lines
The stack trace is rather unreliable, maybe something completely different happend. Do you happend to see better reports?
So far they look all the same.
Anything more I can do to prepare for collection better information next time I get that bug?
Thanks again.
Philipp
Philipp Hahn
Reviewed-by Jason BaronHi,
Am 05.02.2016 um 16:28 schrieb Philipp Hahn:
Quoted 9 lines
Am 03.02.2016 um 02:43 schrieb Hannes Frederic Sowa:
Quoted 4 lines · Philipp Hahn
Quoted 3 lines
we recently updated our kernel to 4.1.16 + patch for "unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets" and have since then self-detected stalls triggered by the Samba daemon:
...
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 2 lines
We have not yet been able to reproduce the hang, but going back to our previous kernel 4.1.12 makes the problem go away.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Can you remove the patch "unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets" and see if the problem still happens?
I will try.
The problem is that I can't trigger the bug reliably. It always happens to "smbd", but I don't know the triggering condition.
Probably the same bug was also reported to samba-technical by Karolin Seeger; she filed the bug for 3.19-ckt with Ubuntu:
<https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux-lts-trusty/+bug/1543980>
Running the Samba test suite reproduces the problem; see bug for details.
Quoted 9 lines
I will for now build a new kernel with
Quoted 4 lines
$ git log --oneline v4.1.12..v4.1.17 -- net/unix dc6b0ec unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets cc01a0a af_unix: Revert 'lock_interruptible' in stream receive code 5c77e26 unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queuereverted to see if it still happens. The "middle" patch seems harmless, as it only changes a code path for STREAMS, while the bug triggers with DGRAMS only.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The stack trace is rather unreliable, maybe something completely different happend. Do you happend to see better reports?
So far they look all the same.
Anything more I can do to prepare for collection better information next time I get that bug?
I've enabled more Kernel debug options and got the following:
Quoted 29 lines
[ 598.482787] [ 598.492559] ===================================== [ 598.502646] [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ] [ 598.512874] 4.1.16+ #24 Not tainted [ 598.523134] ------------------------------------- [ 598.533592] smbd/8659 is trying to release lock (&(&u->lock)->rlock) at: [ 598.544429] [<ffffffff815d1319>] spin_unlock+0x9/0x10 [ 598.555148] but there are no more locks to release! [ 598.565892] [ 598.565892] other info that might help us debug this: [ 598.586936] no locks held by smbd/8659. [ 598.597478] [ 598.597478] stack backtrace: [ 598.618275] CPU: 3 PID: 8659 Comm: smbd Not tainted 4.1.16+ #24 [ 598.628820] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/P7F-X Series, BIOS 0703 09/24/2010 [ 598.650020] ffffffff815d1319 ffff8800b8efbb88 ffffffff8163ee73 0000000000000000 [ 598.661051] ffff880034fc4110 ffff8800b8efbbb8 ffffffff810db540 ffff880034fc4110 [ 598.671990] ffff880034fc4110 ffff88023206bd40 ffffffff815d1319 ffff8800b8efbc08 [ 598.682736] Call Trace: [ 598.693187] [<ffffffff815d1319>] ? spin_unlock+0x9/0x10 [ 598.703798] [<ffffffff8163ee73>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65 [ 598.714223] [<ffffffff810db540>] print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x100/0x110 [ 598.724611] [<ffffffff815d1319>] ? spin_unlock+0x9/0x10 [ 598.734763] [<ffffffff810e0d8e>] lock_release+0x2be/0x430 [ 598.744636] [<ffffffff81648303>] _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40 [ 598.754230] [<ffffffff815d41a8>] ? unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x288/0x6f0 [ 598.763840] [<ffffffff815d1319>] spin_unlock+0x9/0x10 [ 598.773126] [<ffffffff815d41e7>] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x2c7/0x6f0 [ 598.782209] [<ffffffff814f6c9d>] sock_sendmsg+0x4d/0x60
Quoted 8 lines
[ 598.791313] [<ffffffff814f7c3b>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x2db/0x2f0 [ 598.800369] [<ffffffff812083c8>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x328/0x360 [ 598.809383] [<ffffffff8127c1c0>] ? locks_free_lock+0x50/0x60 [ 598.818157] [<ffffffff814f8649>] __sys_sendmsg+0x49/0x90 [ 598.826742] [<ffffffff814f86a2>] SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20 [ 598.835110] [<ffffffff816486f2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x7a [ 598.843546] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 598.851999] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 8659 at net/core/skbuff.c:691 skb_release_head_state+0xaa/0xb0()
I continued bisecting "v4.1.12..v4.1.17 -- net/unix/" and found:
Reverting the attached patch in 4.1 fixes my problem (for now). The original patch went into 4.4, but was back-ported to several stable trees:
v3.2: a3b0f6e8a21ef02f69a15abac440572d8cde8c2a
v3.18: 72032798034d921ed565e3bf8dfdc3098f6473e2
v4.1: 5c77e26862ce604edea05b3442ed765e9756fe0f
v4.2: bad967fdd8ecbdd171f5f243657be033d2d081a7
v4.3: 58a6a46a036ce81a2a8ecaa6fc1537c894349e3f
v4.4: 7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c
Philipp
From 7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id: <7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c.1455198101.git.hahn@univention.de>
From: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 22:07:23 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Organization: Univention GmbH, Bremen, Germany
Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
--- include/net/af_unix.h | 1 + net/unix/af_unix.c | 183 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
include/net/af_unix.h +1 -0
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct unix_sock {#define UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE 0#define UNIX_GC_MAYBE_CYCLE 1struct socket_wq peer_wq; +wait_queue_t peer_wake; };static inline struct unix_sock *unix_sk (const struct sock *sk)
net/unix/af_unix.c +164 -19
257 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.1.4
Philipp Hahn <[email protected]> writes:
[...]
Quoted 7 lines
Probably the same bug was also reported to samba-technical by Karolin Seeger; she filed the bug for 3.19-ckt with Ubuntu:
<https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux-lts-trusty/+bug/1543980>
Running the Samba test suite reproduces the problem; see bug for details.
JFTR: The oops in this bug report is for 3.13.0-77 and the patch you reverted for 4.1 is not part of that (at least not of the upstream 3.13).
[...]
Quoted 28 lines
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[ 598.492559] ===================================== [ 598.502646] [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ] [ 598.512874] 4.1.16+ #24 Not tainted [ 598.523134] ------------------------------------- [ 598.533592] smbd/8659 is trying to release lock (&(&u->lock)->rlock) at: [ 598.544429] [<ffffffff815d1319>] spin_unlock+0x9/0x10 [ 598.555148] but there are no more locks to release! [ 598.565892] [ 598.565892] other info that might help us debug this: [ 598.586936] no locks held by smbd/8659. [ 598.597478] [ 598.597478] stack backtrace: [ 598.618275] CPU: 3 PID: 8659 Comm: smbd Not tainted 4.1.16+ #24 [ 598.628820] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/P7F-X Series, BIOS 0703 09/24/2010 [ 598.650020] ffffffff815d1319 ffff8800b8efbb88 ffffffff8163ee73 0000000000000000 [ 598.661051] ffff880034fc4110 ffff8800b8efbbb8 ffffffff810db540 ffff880034fc4110 [ 598.671990] ffff880034fc4110 ffff88023206bd40 ffffffff815d1319 ffff8800b8efbc08 [ 598.682736] Call Trace: [ 598.693187] [<ffffffff815d1319>] ? spin_unlock+0x9/0x10 [ 598.703798] [<ffffffff8163ee73>] dump_stack+0x4c/0x65 [ 598.714223] [<ffffffff810db540>] print_unlock_imbalance_bug+0x100/0x110 [ 598.724611] [<ffffffff815d1319>] ? spin_unlock+0x9/0x10 [ 598.734763] [<ffffffff810e0d8e>] lock_release+0x2be/0x430 [ 598.744636] [<ffffffff81648303>] _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40 [ 598.754230] [<ffffffff815d41a8>] ? unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x288/0x6f0 [ 598.763840] [<ffffffff815d1319>] spin_unlock+0x9/0x10 [ 598.773126] [<ffffffff815d41e7>] unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x2c7/0x6f0 [ 598.782209] [<ffffffff814f6c9d>] sock_sendmsg+0x4d/0x60
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
[ 598.791313] [<ffffffff814f7c3b>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x2db/0x2f0 [ 598.800369] [<ffffffff812083c8>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x328/0x360 [ 598.809383] [<ffffffff8127c1c0>] ? locks_free_lock+0x50/0x60 [ 598.818157] [<ffffffff814f8649>] __sys_sendmsg+0x49/0x90 [ 598.826742] [<ffffffff814f86a2>] SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20 [ 598.835110] [<ffffffff816486f2>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x7a [ 598.843546] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 598.851999] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 8659 at net/core/skbuff.c:691 skb_release_head_state+0xaa/0xb0()
Could you send your disassembled unix_dgram_sendmsg (objdump -d)? This would be enormously helpful wrt determining which unlock is involved here.
Quoted 9 lines · Rainer Weikusat
Philipp Hahn <[email protected]> writes:
[...]
Quoted 5 lines
Probably the same bug was also reported to samba-technical by Karolin Seeger; she filed the bug for 3.19-ckt with Ubuntu:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Running the Samba test suite reproduces the problem; see bug for details.
JFTR: The oops in this bug report is for 3.13.0-77 and the patch you reverted for 4.1 is not part of that (at least not of the upstream 3.13).
[...]
It is in 3.13-ckt and basically all the stable branches.
Does the patch below fix this bug?
Ben.
---
unix: Fix potential double-unlock in unix_dgram_sendmsg()
A datagram socket may be peered with itself, so that sk == other. We use unix_state_double_lock() to lock sk and other in the right order, which also guards against this and only locks the socket once, but we then end up trying to unlock it twice. Add the check for sk != other.
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +0 -0
@@ -1810,7 +1810,7 @@ restart_locked:
}
}
- if (unlikely(sk_locked))
+ if (unlikely(sk_locked) && sk != other)
unix_state_unlock(sk);
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
@@ -1826,7 +1826,7 @@ restart_locked:
return len;
out_unlock:
- if (sk_locked)
+ if (sk_locked && sk != other)
unix_state_unlock(sk);
unix_state_unlock(other);
out_free:
Signature · 2 lines
Ben Hutchings Who are all these weirdos? - David Bowie, reading IRC for the first time
Quoted 24 lines · Ben Hutchings
Quoted 9 lines · Rainer Weikusat
Philipp Hahn <[email protected]> writes:
[...]
Quoted 5 lines
Probably the same bug was also reported to samba-technical by Karolin Seeger; she filed the bug for 3.19-ckt with Ubuntu:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Running the Samba test suite reproduces the problem; see bug for details.
JFTR: The oops in this bug report is for 3.13.0-77 and the patch you reverted for 4.1 is not part of that (at least not of the upstream 3.13).
[...]
It is in 3.13-ckt and basically all the stable branches.
Does the patch below fix this bug?
Ben.
Quoted 7 lines
---
unix: Fix potential double-unlock inunix_dgram_sendmsg()A datagram socket may be peered with itself, so that sk == other. We use
unix_state_double_lock()to lock sk and other in the right order, which also guards against this and only locks the socket once, but we then end up trying to unlock it twice. Add the check for sk != other.
That's a good observation but I think this happens in another way. The code setting sk_logged is
if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
if (timeo) {
timeo = unix_wait_for_peer(other, timeo);
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
if (signal_pending(current))
goto out_free;
goto restart;
}
if (!sk_locked) {
unix_state_unlock(other);
unix_state_double_lock(sk, other);
}
if (unix_peer(sk) != other ||
unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(sk, other)) {
err = -EAGAIN;
sk_locked = 1;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (!sk_locked) {
sk_locked = 1;
goto restart_locked;
}
}This means it only gets locked if unix_peer(other) != sk and this cannot happen if other == sk and unix_peer(sk) == other, however, the 2nd condition isn't guaranteed: other might indeed be == sk and not the peer of it because someone could be using _sendmsg to send a message via a socket to an address bound to the same socket. In this case, other was found via
if (!other) {
err = -ECONNRESET;
if (sunaddr == NULL)
goto out_free;
other = unix_find_other(net, sunaddr, namelen, sk->sk_type,
hash, &err);
if (other == NULL)
goto out_free;
}and the if-block leading to the double lock should never have been executed as it's supposed to deal with the case where sk is connect to other but other not to sk (eg, /dev/log).
If the description correct, the patch below should fix it (as sunaddr gets cleared if and only if unix_peer(sk) == other.
This is a 'preview', ie, not even compiled. It's provided for discussion/ testing. I'll try to create a test program for this and a more formal patch.
---
net/unix/af_unix.c +1 -1
@@ -1698,7 +1698,7 @@ restart_locked: goto out_unlock; } -if (unlikely (unix_peer (other) != sk &&unix_recvq_full (other))) { +if (!sunaddr &&unlikely (unix_peer (other) != sk &&unix_recvq_full (other))) {if (timeo) { timeo =unix_wait_for_peer (other, timeo);
Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]> writes:
[...]
Quoted 6 lines
This means it only gets locked if
unix_peer(other)!= sk and this cannot happen if other == sk andunix_peer(sk)== other, however, the 2nd condition isn't guaranteed: other might indeed be == sk and not the peer of it because someone could be using_sendmsgto send a message via a socket to an address bound to the same socket. In this case, other was found via
A second way to hits this (probably somewhat difficult to trigger in practice): sk happened to be connected to itself by the time the unix_peer_get(sk) was executed but was disconnected before the unix_state_lock(other) below.
Quoted 1 line · Rainer Weikusat
Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> writes:
[...]
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
unix: Fix potential double-unlock in
unix_dgram_sendmsg()A datagram socket may be peered with itself, so that sk == other. We use
unix_state_double_lock()to lock sk and other in the right order, which also guards against this and only locks the socket once, but we then end up trying to unlock it twice. Add the check for sk != other.
[...]
Quoted 13 lines
other was found via
if (!other) { err = -ECONNRESET; if (sunaddr == NULL) goto out_free; other = unix_find_other(net, sunaddr, namelen, sk->sk_type, hash, &err); if (other == NULL) goto out_free; }
Quoted 3 lines
and the if-block leading to the double lock should never have been executed as it's supposed to deal with the case where sk is connect to other but other not to sk (eg,
/dev/log).
Test program triggering a double unlock (w/o the MSG_DONTWAIT, it blocks which it isn't supposed to do):
--------
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define SUN_NAME "\0other-is-me"
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct sockaddr_un sun;
unsigned max;
int sk, rc;
sk = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
sun.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strncpy(sun.sun_path, SUN_NAME, sizeof(sun.sun_path));
bind(sk, (struct sockaddr *)&sun, sizeof(sun));
max = 12;
do
sendto(sk, &sun, sizeof(sun), MSG_DONTWAIT,
(struct sockaddr *)&sun, sizeof(sun));
while (--max);
return 0;
}PATCH 1/1 af_unix: Guard against other == sk in unix_dgram_sendmsg
The unix_dgram_sendmsg routine use the following test
if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
to determine if sk and other are in an n:1 association (either established via connect or by using sendto to send messages to an unrelated socket identified by address). This isn't correct as the specified address could have been bound to the sending socket itself or because this socket could have been connected to itself by the time of the unix_peer_get but disconnected before the unix_state_lock(other). In both cases, the if-block would be entered despite other == sk which might either block the sender unintentionally or lead to trying to unlock the same spin lock twice for a non-blocking send. Add a other != sk check to guard against this.
---
net/unix/af_unix.c +6 -1
@@ -1781,7 +1781,12 @@ restart_locked: goto out_unlock; } -if (unlikely (unix_peer (other) != sk &&unix_recvq_full (other))) { +/* other == sk && unix_peer(other) != sk if +* - unix_peer(sk) == NULL, destination address bound to sk +* - unix_peer(sk) == sk by time of get but disconnected before lock +*/ +if (other != sk && +unlikely (unix_peer (other) != sk &&unix_recvq_full (other))) {if (timeo) { timeo =unix_wait_for_peer (other, timeo);
Re: [PATCH net] af_unix: Guard against other == sk in unix_dgram_sendmsg
Hello Rainer,
Am 11.02.2016 um 20:37 schrieb Rainer Weikusat:
Quoted 28 lines
The
unix_dgram_sendmsgroutine use the following testif (
unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {to determine if sk and other are in an n:1 association (either established via connect or by using sendto to send messages to an unrelated socket identified by address). This isn't correct as the specified address could have been bound to the sending socket itself or because this socket could have been connected to itself by the time of the
unix_peer_getbut disconnected before theunix_state_lock(other). In both cases, the if-block would be entered despite other == sk which might either block the sender unintentionally or lead to trying to unlock the same spin lock twice for a non-blocking send. Add a other != sk check to guard against this.Fixes 7d267278a9ec ("unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue")Reported-By Philipp Hahn <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>---
net/unix/af_unix.c +0
-0@@ -1781,7 +1781,12 @@ restart_locked: goto out_unlock; }
net/unix/af_unix.c restart_locked: · line 1792
Quoted 10 lines
net/unix/af_unix.c +6
-1-if (unlikely (unix_peer (other) != sk &&unix_recvq_full (other))) { +/* other == sk && unix_peer(other) != sk if +* - unix_peer(sk) == NULL, destination address bound to sk +* - unix_peer(sk) == sk by time of get but disconnected before lock +*/ +if (other != sk && +unlikely (unix_peer (other) != sk &&unix_recvq_full (other))) {if (timeo) { timeo =unix_wait_for_peer (other, timeo);
After applying that patch at least my machine running the samba test no longer crashes. So you might add
Thanks for looking it that issues.
Philipp
Re: [PATCH net] af_unix: Guard against other == sk in unix_dgram_sendmsg
Quoted 6 lines · Philipp Hahn
Hello Rainer,
Am 11.02.2016 um 20:37 schrieb Rainer Weikusat:
Quoted 3 lines
The
unix_dgram_sendmsgroutine use the following testif (
unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
[...]
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This isn't correct as the> specified address could have been bound to the sending socket itself
[...]
Quoted 2 lines
After applying that patch at least my machine running the samba test no longer crashes.
There's a possible gotcha in there: Send-to-self used to be limited by the queue limit. But the rationale for that (IIRC) was that someone could keep using newly created sockets to queue ever more data to a single, unrelated receiver. I don't think this should apply when receiving and sending sockets are identical. But that's just my opinion. The other option would be to avoid the unix_state_double_lock for sk == other. I'd be willing to change this accordingly if someone thinks the queue limit should apply to send-to-self.
Re: [PATCH net] af_unix: Guard against other == sk in unix_dgram_sendmsg
Quoted 19 lines · Rainer Weikusat
Quoted 6 lines · Philipp Hahn
Hello Rainer,
Am 11.02.2016 um 20:37 schrieb Rainer Weikusat:
Quoted 3 lines
The
unix_dgram_sendmsgroutine use the following testif (
unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {[...]
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This isn't correct as the> specified address could have been bound to the sending socket itself
[...]
Quoted 2 lines
After applying that patch at least my machine running the samba test no longer crashes.
Quoted 7 lines
There's a possible gotcha in there: Send-to-self used to be limited by the queue limit. But the rationale for that (IIRC) was that someone could keep using newly created sockets to queue ever more data to a single, unrelated receiver. I don't think this should apply when receiving and sending sockets are identical. But that's just my opinion. The other option would be to avoid the
unix_state_double_lockfor sk == other.
Given that unix_state_double_lock() already handles sk == other, I'm not sure why you think it needs to be avoided.
Quoted 2 lines
I'd be willing to change this accordingly if someone thinks the queue limit should apply to send-to-self.
If we don't check the queue limit here, does anything else prevent the queue growing to the point it's a DoS?
Ben.
Signature · 2 lines
Ben Hutchings I say we take off; nuke the site from orbit. It's the only way to be sure.
Re: [PATCH net] af_unix: Guard against other == sk in unix_dgram_sendmsg
Quoted 27 lines · Ben Hutchings
Quoted 18 lines · Rainer Weikusat
Quoted 6 lines · Philipp Hahn
Hello Rainer,
Am 11.02.2016 um 20:37 schrieb Rainer Weikusat:
Quoted 3 lines
The
unix_dgram_sendmsgroutine use the following testif (
unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {[...]
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This isn't correct as the> specified address could have been bound to the sending socket itself
[...]
Quoted 2 lines
After applying that patch at least my machine running the samba test no longer crashes.
Quoted 7 lines
There's a possible gotcha in there: Send-to-self used to be limited by the queue limit. But the rationale for that (IIRC) was that someone could keep using newly created sockets to queue ever more data to a single, unrelated receiver. I don't think this should apply when receiving and sending sockets are identical. But that's just my opinion. The other option would be to avoid the
unix_state_double_lockfor sk == other.
Quoted 2 lines
Given that
unix_state_double_lock()already handles sk == other, I'm not sure why you think it needs to be avoided.
Because the whole complication of restarting the operation after locking both sk and other because other had to be unlocked before calling unix_state_double_lock is useless for this case: As other == sk, there's no reason to drop the lock on it which guarantees that the result of all the earlier checks is still valid: If the -EAGAIN condition is not true, execution can just continue.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I'd be willing to change this accordingly if someone thinks the queue limit should apply to send-to-self.
If we don't check the queue limit here, does anything else prevent the queue growing to the point it's a DoS?
The max_dgram_qlen limit exists specifically to prevent someone sending 'a lot' of messages to a socket unrelated to it by repeatedly creating a socket, sending as many messages as the send buffer size will allow, closing the socket, creating a new socket, ..., cf
http://netdev.vger.kernel.narkive.com/tcZIFJeC/get-rid-of-proc-sys-net-unix-max-dgram-qlen#post4
(first copy I found)
This 'attack' will obviously not work very well when sending and receiving socket are identical.
Re: [PATCH net] af_unix: Guard against other == sk in unix_dgram_sendmsg
Quoted 31 lines · Rainer Weikusat
Quoted 27 lines · Ben Hutchings
Quoted 18 lines · Rainer Weikusat
Quoted 6 lines · Philipp Hahn
Hello Rainer,
Am 11.02.2016 um 20:37 schrieb Rainer Weikusat:
Quoted 3 lines
The
unix_dgram_sendmsgroutine use the following testif (
unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {[...]
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This isn't correct as the> specified address could have been bound to the sending socket itself
[...]
Quoted 2 lines
After applying that patch at least my machine running the samba test no longer crashes.
Quoted 7 lines
There's a possible gotcha in there: Send-to-self used to be limited by the queue limit. But the rationale for that (IIRC) was that someone could keep using newly created sockets to queue ever more data to a single, unrelated receiver. I don't think this should apply when receiving and sending sockets are identical. But that's just my opinion. The other option would be to avoid the
unix_state_double_lockfor sk == other.Quoted 2 lines
Given that
unix_state_double_lock()already handles sk == other, I'm not sure why you think it needs to be avoided.
Quoted 6 lines
Because the whole complication of restarting the operation after locking both sk and other because other had to be unlocked before calling
unix_state_double_lockis useless for this case: As other == sk, there's no reason to drop the lock on it which guarantees that the result of all the earlier checks is still valid: If the-EAGAINcondition is not true, execution can just continue.
Well of course it's useless, but it's also harmless. If we really wanted to optimise this we could also skip unlocking if other < sk.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I'd be willing to change this accordingly if someone thinks the queue limit should apply to send-to-self.
If we don't check the queue limit here, does anything else prevent the queue growing to the point it's a DoS?
The
max_dgram_qlenlimit exists specifically to prevent someone sending 'a lot' of messages to a socket unrelated to it by repeatedly creating a socket, sending as many messages as the send buffer size will allow, closing the socket, creating a new socket, ..., cf
Quoted 5 lines
http://netdev.vger.kernel.narkive.com/tcZIFJeC/get-rid-of-proc-sys-net-unix-max-dgram-qlen#post4
(first copy I found)This 'attack' will obviously not work very well when sending and receiving socket are identical.
It looked to me like the queue length was the only limit here, as I was looking in vain for a charge to the receiving socket's memory. However, to answer my own question, AF_UNIX skbs are always charged to the sending socket (which is the same thing in this case, but still affects where the buffer limit is applied).
Ben.
Signature · 2 lines
Ben Hutchings I say we take off; nuke the site from orbit. It's the only way to be sure.
Re: [PATCH net] af_unix: Guard against other == sk in unix_dgram_sendmsg
Quoted 1 line · Ben Hutchings
On Fri, 2016-02-12 at 20:17 +0000, Rainer Weikusat wrote:
[...]
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I don't think this should apply when
receiving and sending sockets are identical. But that's just my opinion. The other option would be to avoid theunix_state_double_lockfor sk == other.Given that
unix_state_double_lock()already handles sk == other, I'm not sure why you think it needs to be avoided.Because the whole complication of restarting the operation after locking both sk and other because other had to be unlocked before calling
unix_state_double_lockis useless for this case:
[...]
Quoted 1 line
Well of course it's useless, but it's also harmless.
As is adding a
for (i = 0; i < 1000000; ++i);
between any two statements. And this isn't even entirely true as the pointless double-lock will then require "did we pointlessly doube-lock" checks elsewhere. I think it should be possible to do this in a simpler way by not pointlessly double-locking (this may be wrong but it's worth a try).
Quoted 2 lines
If we really wanted to optimise this we could also skip unlocking if other < sk.
I wouldn't want to hardcode assumptions about the unix_state_double_lock algorithm in functions using it.
David Miller
maintainerRe: [PATCH net] af_unix: Guard against other == sk in unix_dgram_sendmsg
In reply to Rainer WeikusatFrom: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2016 19:37:27 +0000
Quoted 15 lines
The
unix_dgram_sendmsgroutine use the following testif (
unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {to determine if sk and other are in an n:1 association (either established via connect or by using sendto to send messages to an unrelated socket identified by address). This isn't correct as the specified address could have been bound to the sending socket itself or because this socket could have been connected to itself by the time of the
unix_peer_getbut disconnected before theunix_state_lock(other). In both cases, the if-block would be entered despite other == sk which might either block the sender unintentionally or lead to trying to unlock the same spin lock twice for a non-blocking send. Add a other != sk check to guard against this.
Quoted 3 lines
Fixes 7d267278a9ec ("unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue")Reported-By Philipp Hahn <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]>
Also applied and queued up for -stable, thanks.