Patch "fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags" has been added to the 4.8-stable tree
Subsystems (3)
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags
to the 4.8-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
fs-exec-apply-cloexec-before-changing-dumpable-task-flags.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.8 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <[email protected]> know about it.
Quoted 1 line
From
613cc2b6f272c1a8ad33aefa21cad77af23139f7Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2016 16:26:24 +1100
Subject: fs: exec: apply CLOEXEC before changing dumpable task flags
From: Aleksa Sarai <[email protected]>
commit 613cc2b6f272c1a8ad33aefa21cad77af23139f7 upstream.
If you have a process that has set itself to be non-dumpable, and it then undergoes exec(2), any CLOEXEC file descriptors it has open are "exposed" during a race window between the dumpable flags of the process being reset for exec(2) and CLOEXEC being applied to the file descriptors. This can be exploited by a process by attempting to access /proc/<pid>/fd/... during this window, without requiring CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
The race in question is after set_dumpable has been (for get_link, though the trace is basically the same for readlink):
[vfs]
-> proc_pid_link_inode_operations.get_link
-> proc_pid_get_link
-> proc_fd_access_allowed
-> ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);Which will return 0, during the race window and CLOEXEC file descriptors will still be open during this window because do_close_on_exec has not been called yet. As a result, the ordering of these calls should be reversed to avoid this race window.
This is of particular concern to container runtimes, where joining a PID namespace with file descriptors referring to the host filesystem can result in security issues (since PRCTL_SET_DUMPABLE doesn't protect against access of CLOEXEC file descriptors -- file descriptors which may reference filesystem objects the container shouldn't have access to).
--- fs/exec.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +8 -2
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@* current->executable is only used by the procfs. This allows a dispatch * table to check for several different types of binary formats. We keep * trying until we recognize the file or we run out of supported binary -* formats. +* formats. */ #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -1261,6 +1261,13 @@ int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm *flush_thread (); current->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear; +/* +* We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is +* dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace +* trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process +* undergoing exec(2). +*/ +do_close_on_exec (current->files);return 0 ; out:
@@ -1323,7 +1330,6 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprmgroup */ current->self_exec_id++;flush_signal_handlers (current,0 ); -do_close_on_exec (current->files); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (setup_new_exec);
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email protected] are
queue-4.8/fs-exec-apply-cloexec-before-changing-dumpable-task-flags.patch