security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs
This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for cgroupfs. For instance, this allows to label the "release_agent" file within each cgroup mount and limit writes to it.
--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
security/selinux/hooks.c +2 -0
@@ -808,6 +808,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,if (!strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"debugfs" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"sysfs" ) || + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup" ) || + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup2" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"pstore" )) sbsec->flags |=SE_SBGENFS ;
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Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · Antonio Murdaca
This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for cgroupfs. For instance, this allows to label the "
release_agent" file within each cgroup mount and limit writes to it.Signed-off-by Antonio Murdaca <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
Now that the merge window is behind us, let's get this merged, but could you update it to use the selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel policy capability? See 2651225b5ebcdde ("selinux: wrap cgroup seclabel support with its own policy capability") for more information.
Also, how goes the testing?
Quoted 21 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +2
-1@@ -808,6 +808,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,if (!strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"debugfs" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"sysfs" ) || + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup" ) || + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup2" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"pstore" )) sbsec->flags |=SE_SBGENFS ; --2.9.3
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paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Quoted 13 lines · Paul Moore
On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 10:58 AM, Antonio Murdaca <[email protected]
Quoted 11 lines
wrote:
This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for cgroupfs. For instance,
this allows to label the "release_agent" file within each cgroup mount and limit writes to it.Signed-off-by Antonio Murdaca <[email protected]>---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
Quoted 5 lines
Now that the merge window is behind us, let's get this merged, but could you update it to use the
selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabelpolicy
capability? See2651225b5ebcdde("selinux: wrap cgroup seclabel support with its own policy capability") for more information.
I don't think that is necessary. This change unlike the other one should not yield any difference in behavior with existing policy; it just allows one to specify fine-grained labeling for cgroup nodes in future policy. It doesn't affect any userspace interface.
Quoted 27 lines
Also, how goes the testing?
Quoted 24 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +0
-0@@ -808,6 +808,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2") ||!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
sbsec->flags |=SE_SBGENFS;--
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Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 20 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 13 lines · Paul Moore
On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 10:58 AM, Antonio Murdaca <[email protected]
Quoted 11 lines
wrote:
This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for cgroupfs. For instance,
this allows to label the "release_agent" file within each cgroup mount and limit writes to it.Signed-off-by Antonio Murdaca <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)Quoted 5 lines
Now that the merge window is behind us, let's get this merged, but could you update it to use the
selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabelpolicy
capability? See2651225b5ebcdde("selinux: wrap cgroup seclabel support with its own policy capability") for more information.
Quoted 4 lines
I don't think that is necessary. This change unlike the other one should not yield any difference in behavior with existing policy; it just allows one to specify fine-grained labeling for cgroup nodes in future policy. It doesn't affect any userspace interface.
Yes, I thought about that, and if the policy capability was already present in a released kernel then I wouldn't worry about it much, but since the policy capability still only lives in the v4.11-rcX kernels I'd prefer to see this code wrapped with the policy capability ... even if all it really does is give me that warm fuzzy feeling.
Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 27 lines
Also, how goes the testing?
Quoted 24 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +2
-1@@ -808,6 +808,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"sysfs" ) || + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup" ) || + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup2" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"pstore" )) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; --2.9.3
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Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 26 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 20 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 13 lines · Paul Moore
On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 10:58 AM, Antonio Murdaca <[email protected]
Quoted 11 lines
wrote:
This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for cgroupfs. For instance,
this allows to label the "release_agent" file within each cgroup mount and limit writes to it.Signed-off-by Antonio Murdaca <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)Quoted 5 lines
Now that the merge window is behind us, let's get this merged, but could you update it to use the
selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabelpolicy
capability? See2651225b5ebcdde("selinux: wrap cgroup seclabel support with its own policy capability") for more information.Quoted 4 lines
I don't think that is necessary. This change unlike the other one should not yield any difference in behavior with existing policy; it just allows one to specify fine-grained labeling for cgroup nodes in future policy. It doesn't affect any userspace interface.
Quoted 5 lines
Yes, I thought about that, and if the policy capability was already present in a released kernel then I wouldn't worry about it much, but since the policy capability still only lives in the v4.11-rcX kernels I'd prefer to see this code wrapped with the policy capability ... even if all it really does is give me that warm fuzzy feeling.
FWIW, I just decided I didn't care that much about the policy capability restriction for this patch and went ahead and merged it into selinux/next.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
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Thanks
Quoted 42 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 1 line · Paul Moore
On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 3:17 PM, Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Quoted 25 lines · wrote:
Quoted 20 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 13 lines
On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 10:58 AM, Antonio Murdaca <[email protected]
Quoted 11 lines
wrote:
This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for cgroupfs. For instance,
this allows to label the "release_agent" file within each cgroup mount and limit writes to it.Signed-off-by Antonio Murdaca <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)Quoted 5 lines
Now that the merge window is behind us, let's get this merged, but could you update it to use the
selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabelpolicy
capability? See2651225b5ebcdde("selinux: wrap cgroup seclabel support with its own policy capability") for more information.Quoted 4 lines
I don't think that is necessary. This change unlike the other one should not yield any difference in behavior with existing policy; it just allows one to specify fine-grained labeling for cgroup nodes in future policy. It doesn't affect any userspace interface.
Quoted 5 lines
Yes, I thought about that, and if the policy capability was already present in a released kernel then I wouldn't worry about it much, but since the policy capability still only lives in the v4.11-rcX kernels I'd prefer to see this code wrapped with the policy capability ... even if all it really does is give me that warm fuzzy feeling.
FWIW, I just decided I didn't care that much about the policy capability restriction for this patch and went ahead and merged it into selinux/next.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com