Drop packets instead of assert out if packet id rolls over (CVE-2017-7479)

PATCH In review Steffan Karger 2 participants 6 messages May 9, 2017 – May 11, 2017

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Steffan Karger

author

2017-05-09 19:30 UTC #0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 Drop packets instead of assert out if packet id rolls over (CVE-2017-7479)

Previously, if a mode was selected where packet ids are not allowed to roll over, but renegotiation does not succeed for some reason (e.g. no password entered in time, certificate expired or a malicious peer that refuses the renegotiaion on purpose) we would continue to use the old keys. Until the packet ID would roll over and we would ASSERT() out.

Given that this can be triggered on purpose by an authenticated peer, this is a fix for an authenticated remote DoS vulnerability. An attack is rather inefficient though; a peer would need to get us to send 2^32 packets (min-size packet is IP+UDP+OPCODE+PID+TAG (no payload), results in (20+8+1+4+16)×2^32 bytes, or approx. 196 GB).

This is a fix for finding 5.2 from the OSTIF / Quarkslab audit.

Signed-off-by Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>

---
 Changes.rst                               | 10 ++++++++++
 src/openvpn/crypto.c                      | 18 +++++++++++++-----
 src/openvpn/packet_id.c                   | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
 src/openvpn/packet_id.h                   |  1 +
 tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_packet_id.c | 11 +++++++++--
 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

Changes.rst +10 -0

index 1c0154c..183e9fa 100644
@@ -104,6 +104,16 @@ Behavioral changes
 
 - Do not randomize resolving of IP addresses in getaddr()
 
+Version 2.3.15
+==============
+
+Security fixes
+--------------
+- Fix an authenticated remote DoS vulnerability that could be triggered by
+  causing a packet id roll over.  An attack is rather inefficient; a peer
+  would need to get us to send at least about 196 GB of data.
+  (OSTIF/Quarkslab audit finding 5.2, CVE-2017-7479)
+
 Version 2.3.14
 ==============

src/openvpn/crypto.c +13 -5

index f153367..a2e213f 100644
@@ -112,9 +112,11 @@ openvpn_encrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
 		prng_bytes (iv_buf, iv_size);
 
 	      /* Put packet ID in plaintext buffer or IV, depending on cipher mode */
-	      if (opt->packet_id)
+	      if (opt->packet_id
+		  && !packet_id_write (&opt->packet_id->send, buf, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM), true))
 		{
-		  ASSERT (packet_id_write (&opt->packet_id->send, buf, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM), true));
+		  msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over");
+		  goto err;
 		}
 	    }
 	  else if (cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb(cipher_kt))

@@ -126,7 +128,11 @@ openvpn_encrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
 
 	      memset (iv_buf, 0, iv_size);
 	      buf_set_write (&b, iv_buf, iv_size);
-	      ASSERT (packet_id_write (&opt->packet_id->send, &b, true, false));
+	      if (!packet_id_write (&opt->packet_id->send, &b, true, false))
+		{
+		  msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over");
+		  goto err;
+		}
 	    }
 	  else /* We only support CBC, CFB, or OFB modes right now */
 	    {

@@ -185,9 +191,11 @@ openvpn_encrypt (struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
 	}
       else				/* No Encryption */
 	{
-	  if (opt->packet_id)
+	  if (opt->packet_id
+	      && !packet_id_write (&opt->packet_id->send, buf, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM), true))
 	    {
-	      ASSERT (packet_id_write (&opt->packet_id->send, buf, BOOL_CAST (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM), true));
+	      msg (D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over");
+	      goto err;
 	    }
 	  work = *buf;
 	}

src/openvpn/packet_id.c +16 -6

index c637be6..9af74a1 100644
@@ -294,27 +294,37 @@ packet_id_read (struct packet_id_net *pin, struct buffer *buf, bool long_form)
   return true;
 }
 
-static void
+static bool
 packet_id_send_update(struct packet_id_send *p, bool long_form)
 {
   if (!p->time)
     {
       p->time = now;
     }
-  p->id++;
-  if (!p->id)
+  if (p->id == PACKET_ID_MAX)
     {
-      ASSERT(long_form);
+      /* Packet ID only allowed to roll over if using long form and time has
+       * moved forward since last roll over.
+       */
+      if (!long_form || now <= p->time)
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
       p->time = now;
-      p->id = 1;
+      p->id = 0;
     }
+    p->id++;
+    return true;
 }
 
 bool
 packet_id_write (struct packet_id_send *p, struct buffer *buf, bool long_form,
         bool prepend)
 {
-  packet_id_send_update(p, long_form);
+  if (!packet_id_send_update(p, long_form))
+    {
+      return false;
+    }
 
   const packet_id_type net_id = htonpid(p->id);
   const net_time_t net_time = htontime(p->time);

src/openvpn/packet_id.h +1 -0

index f6fa9bd..bfdfb77 100644
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
  * to for network transmission.
  */
 typedef uint32_t packet_id_type;
+#define PACKET_ID_MAX UINT32_MAX
 typedef uint32_t net_time_t;
 
 /*

tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_packet_id.c +9 -2

index 3662e17..1ab3fd8 100644
@@ -130,8 +130,7 @@ test_packet_id_write_short_wrap(void **state)
     struct test_packet_id_write_data *data = *state;
 
     data->pis.id = ~0;
-    expect_assert_failure(
-            packet_id_write(&data->pis, &data->test_buf, false, false));
+    assert_false(packet_id_write(&data->pis, &data->test_buf, false, false));
 }
 
 static void

@@ -140,8 +139,16 @@ test_packet_id_write_long_wrap(void **state)
     struct test_packet_id_write_data *data = *state;
 
     data->pis.id = ~0;
+    data->pis.time = 5006;
+
+    /* Write fails if time did not change */
+    now = 5006;
+    assert_false(packet_id_write(&data->pis, &data->test_buf, true, false));
+
+    /* Write succeeds if time moved forward */
     now = 5010;
     assert_true(packet_id_write(&data->pis, &data->test_buf, true, false));
+
     assert(data->pis.id == 1);
     assert(data->pis.time == now);
     assert_true(data->test_buf_data.buf_id == htonl(1));

Signature · 1 line

2.7.4

Steffan Karger

author

2017-05-09 19:30 UTC #1 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 Don't assert out on receiving too-large control packets (CVE-2017-7478)

Commit 3c1b19e0 changed the maximum size of accepted control channel packets. This was needed for crypto negotiation (which is needed for a nice transition to a new default cipher), but exposed a DoS vulnerability. The vulnerability was found during the OpenVPN 2.4 code audit by Quarkslab (commisioned by OSTIF).

To fix the issue, we should not ASSERT() on external input (in this case the received packet size), but instead gracefully error out and drop the invalid packet.

Signed-off-by Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>

---
 Changes.rst       | 8 ++++++++
 src/openvpn/ssl.c | 7 ++++++-
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Changes.rst +8 -0

index 3dba7e0..734ef73 100644
@@ -327,3 +327,11 @@ Bugfixes
 --------
 - Fix memory leak introduced in 2.4.1: if --remote-cert-tls is used, we leaked
   some memory on each TLS (re)negotiation.
+
+Security
+--------
+- Fix a pre-authentication denial-of-service attack on both clients and servers.
+  By sending a too-large control packet, OpenVPN 2.4.0 or 2.4.1 can be forced
+  to hit an ASSERT() and stop the process.  If ``--tls-auth`` or ``--tls-crypt``
+  is used, only attackers that have the ``--tls-auth`` or ``--tls-crypt`` key
+  can mount an attack. (OSTIF/Quarkslab audit finding 5.1, CVE-2017-7478)

src/openvpn/ssl.c +6 -1

index b1f0f6b..4fca283 100644
@@ -3716,7 +3716,12 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,
                                 /* Save incoming ciphertext packet to reliable buffer */
                                 struct buffer *in = reliable_get_buf(ks->rec_reliable);
                                 ASSERT(in);
-                                ASSERT(buf_copy(in, buf));
+                                if(!buf_copy(in, buf))
+                                {
+                                    msg(D_MULTI_DROPPED,
+                                        "Incoming control channel packet too big, dropping.");
+                                    goto error;
+                                }
                                 reliable_mark_active_incoming(ks->rec_reliable, in, id, op);
                             }

Signature · 1 line

2.7.4

David Sommerseth

2017-05-11 16:36 UTC #2 lore raw

Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Don't assert out on receiving too-large control packets (CVE-2017-7478)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

This resolves the issue in my tests, code looks sane ... so ACK!

Your patch has been applied to the following branches

commit 5774cf4c25e1d8bf4e544702db8f157f111c9d93 (master) commit 66b99a0753352c5cc43e11e39835b6423112df98 (release/2.4)

Author: Steffan Karger
Date:   Tue May 9 21:30:08 2017 +0200

     Don't assert out on receiving too-large control packets (CVE-2017-7478)

     CVE: 2017-7478
     Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>
     Acked-by: David Sommerseth <[email protected]...>
     Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
     URL: http://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&[email protected]...
     Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <[email protected]...>

- --
kind regards,

David Sommerseth

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Steffan Karger

author

2017-05-09 19:30 UTC #3 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 Drop packets instead of assert out if packet id rolls over (CVE-2017-7479)

In reply to Steffan Karger

This is a fix for finding 5.2 from the OSTIF / Quarkslab audit.

Signed-off-by Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>

---
 Changes.rst                               |  4 ++++
 src/openvpn/crypto.c                      | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
 src/openvpn/packet_id.c                   | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
 src/openvpn/packet_id.h                   |  1 +
 src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c                   |  6 +++++-
 tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_packet_id.c | 11 +++++++++--
 6 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

Changes.rst +4 -0

index 734ef73..5a02ad0 100644
@@ -335,3 +335,7 @@ Security
   to hit an ASSERT() and stop the process.  If ``--tls-auth`` or ``--tls-crypt``
   is used, only attackers that have the ``--tls-auth`` or ``--tls-crypt`` key
   can mount an attack. (OSTIF/Quarkslab audit finding 5.1, CVE-2017-7478)
+- Fix an authenticated remote DoS vulnerability that could be triggered by
+  causing a packet id roll over.  An attack is rather inefficient; a peer
+  would need to get us to send at least about 196 GB of data.
+  (OSTIF/Quarkslab audit finding 5.2, CVE-2017-7479)

src/openvpn/crypto.c +16 -9

index f5250ac..50e6a73 100644
@@ -93,7 +93,11 @@ openvpn_encrypt_aead(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
         buf_set_write(&iv_buffer, iv, iv_len);
 
         /* IV starts with packet id to make the IV unique for packet */
-        ASSERT(packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, &iv_buffer, false, false));
+        if (!packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, &iv_buffer, false, false))
+        {
+            msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over");
+            goto err;
+        }
 
         /* Remainder of IV consists of implicit part (unique per session) */
         ASSERT(buf_write(&iv_buffer, ctx->implicit_iv, ctx->implicit_iv_len));

@@ -191,11 +195,13 @@ openvpn_encrypt_v1(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
                 prng_bytes(iv_buf, iv_size);
 
                 /* Put packet ID in plaintext buffer */
-                if (packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id))
+                if (packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id)
+                    && !packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, buf,
+                                        opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM,
+                                        true))
                 {
-                    ASSERT(packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, buf,
-                                           opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM,
-                                           true));
+                    msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over");
+                    goto err;
                 }
             }
             else if (cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb(cipher_kt))

@@ -251,11 +257,12 @@ openvpn_encrypt_v1(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
         }
         else                            /* No Encryption */
         {
-            if (packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id))
+            if (packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id)
+                && !packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, buf,
+                                    opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM, true))
             {
-                ASSERT(packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, buf,
-                        BOOL_CAST(opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM),
-                        true));
+                msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over");
+                goto err;
             }
             if (ctx->hmac)
             {

src/openvpn/packet_id.c +16 -6

index 5175fb0..10fe402 100644
@@ -325,27 +325,37 @@ packet_id_read(struct packet_id_net *pin, struct buffer *buf, bool long_form)
     return true;
 }
 
-static void
+static bool
 packet_id_send_update(struct packet_id_send *p, bool long_form)
 {
     if (!p->time)
     {
         p->time = now;
     }
-    p->id++;
-    if (!p->id)
+    if (p->id == PACKET_ID_MAX)
     {
-        ASSERT(long_form);
+        /* Packet ID only allowed to roll over if using long form and time has
+         * moved forward since last roll over.
+         */
+        if (!long_form || now <= p->time)
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
         p->time = now;
-        p->id = 1;
+        p->id = 0;
     }
+    p->id++;
+    return true;
 }
 
 bool
 packet_id_write(struct packet_id_send *p, struct buffer *buf, bool long_form,
         bool prepend)
 {
-    packet_id_send_update(p, long_form);
+    if (!packet_id_send_update(p, long_form))
+    {
+        return false;
+    }
 
     const packet_id_type net_id = htonpid(p->id);
     const net_time_t net_time = htontime(p->time);

src/openvpn/packet_id.h +1 -0

index 109e56a..aceacf8 100644
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
  * to for network transmission.
  */
 typedef uint32_t packet_id_type;
+#define PACKET_ID_MAX UINT32_MAX
 typedef uint32_t net_time_t;
 
 /*

src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c +5 -1

index e47d25c..7f59b1d 100644
@@ -98,7 +98,11 @@ tls_crypt_wrap(const struct buffer *src, struct buffer *dst,
          format_hex(BPTR(src), BLEN(src), 80, &gc));
 
     /* Get packet ID */
-    ASSERT(packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, dst, true, false));
+    if (!packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, dst, true, false))
+    {
+        msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "TLS-CRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over.");
+        goto err;
+    }
 
     dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "TLS-CRYPT WRAP AD: %s",
          format_hex(BPTR(dst), BLEN(dst), 0, &gc));

tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_packet_id.c +9 -2

index 5627a5b..0a785ad 100644
@@ -129,8 +129,7 @@ test_packet_id_write_short_wrap(void **state)
     struct test_packet_id_write_data *data = *state;
 
     data->pis.id = ~0;
-    expect_assert_failure(
-            packet_id_write(&data->pis, &data->test_buf, false, false));
+    assert_false(packet_id_write(&data->pis, &data->test_buf, false, false));
 }
 
 static void

@@ -139,8 +138,16 @@ test_packet_id_write_long_wrap(void **state)
     struct test_packet_id_write_data *data = *state;
 
     data->pis.id = ~0;
+    data->pis.time = 5006;
+
+    /* Write fails if time did not change */
+    now = 5006;
+    assert_false(packet_id_write(&data->pis, &data->test_buf, true, false));
+
+    /* Write succeeds if time moved forward */
     now = 5010;
     assert_true(packet_id_write(&data->pis, &data->test_buf, true, false));
+
     assert(data->pis.id == 1);
     assert(data->pis.time == now);
     assert_true(data->test_buf_data.buf_id == htonl(1));

Signature · 1 line

2.7.4

David Sommerseth

2017-05-11 16:43 UTC #4 lore raw

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

ACK.

Your patch has been applied to the following branches

commit e498cb0ea8d3a451b39eaf6f9b6a7488f18250b8 (master) commit 591a4e574c43cb9e820950f15dcaabda261def78 (release/2.4)

Author: Steffan Karger
Date:   Tue May 9 21:30:09 2017 +0200

     Drop packets instead of assert out if packet id rolls over (CVE-2017-7479)

     CVE: 2017-7479
     Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>
     Acked-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>
     Acked-by: David Sommerseth <[email protected]...>
     Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
     URL: http://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&[email protected]...
     Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <[email protected]...>

- --
kind regards,

David Sommerseth

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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

David Sommerseth

2017-05-11 16:44 UTC #5 lore raw

In reply to Steffan Karger

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

ACK.

Your patch has been applied to the release/2.3 branch

commit b727643cdf4e078f132a90e1c474a879a5760578

Author: Steffan Karger
Date:   Tue May 9 21:30:07 2017 +0200

     Drop packets instead of assert out if packet id rolls over (CVE-2017-7479)

     CVE: 2017-7479
     Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>
     Acked-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>
     Acked-by: David Sommerseth <[email protected]...>
     Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
     URL: http://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&[email protected]...
     Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <[email protected]...>

- --
kind regards,

David Sommerseth

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