define new fs integrity_read method
Subsystems (17)
v5 cover define new fs integrity_read method
With the introduction of IMA-appraisal and the need to write file hashes as security xattrs, IMA needed to take the global i_mutex lock. process_measurement() took the iint->mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve this potential deadlock, the iint->mutex was removed.
Some filesystems have recently replaced their filesystem dependent lock with the global i_rwsem (formerly the i_mutex) to read a file. As a result, when IMA attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take the i_rwsem again.
To resolve this locking problem, this patch set introduces a new ->integrity_read file operation method. Until all filesystems define the new ->integrity_read method, files that were previously measured might not be currently measured and files that were previously appraised might fail to be appraised properly.
Version 2 of this patch set, introduced measurement entries and IMA-audit messages containing file hash values of 0's, instead of the actual file hash, to indicate that the file hash could not be calculated. Like for any other file signature verification error, file access/execute permission is denied.
To override the IMA policy, allowing unverified code to be accessed/executed on filesystems not supported by IMA, version 2 of this patch set defined a new policy "action" named "dont_failsafe" and a new builtin policy named "fs_unsafe", which can be specified on the boot command line.
Direct Access:
Although the new integrity_read method works for files opened with the "O_DIRECT" flag on block devices that support DAX, for consistency instead of failing just the buffered read, this patch set fails both buffered read and DAX. (Refer to commit f9b2a735bddd "ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag" for an explanation of the buffered read locking issues.)
Change log v5:
- fail files opened O_DIRECT, but include access attempt in measurement list.
- removed ocf2 and gfs2 integrity_read support.
Change log v4:
- define ext2/4 specific ->integrity_read functions based Jan Kara's review.
- properly fail file open with O_DIRECT on filesystems not mounted with "-o dax".
- remove the "permit_directio" IMA policy option.
Change log v3:
- define simple_read_iter_from_buffer
- replace the existing efivarfs ->read method with ->read_iter method.
- squashed other fs definitions of ->integrity_read with this patch.
- include dont_failsafe rule when displaying policy.
- fail attempt to add dont_failsafe rule when appending to the policy.
- moved '---' divider before change log, as requested in review.
Mimi
Christoph Hellwig (1):
ima: use fs method to read integrity data
Mimi Zohar (3):
ima: always measure and audit files in policy
ima: define "dont_failsafe" policy action rule
ima: define "fs_unsafe" builtin policy
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 +- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++- fs/btrfs/file.c | 1 + fs/efivarfs/file.c | 12 ++--- fs/ext2/file.c | 17 +++++++ fs/ext4/file.c | 20 +++++++++ fs/f2fs/file.c | 1 + fs/jffs2/file.c | 1 + fs/jfs/file.c | 1 + fs/libfs.c | 32 +++++++++++++ fs/nilfs2/file.c | 1 + fs/ramfs/file-mmu.c | 1 + fs/ramfs/file-nommu.c | 1 + fs/ubifs/file.c | 1 + fs/xfs/xfs_file.c | 21 +++++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 3 ++ mm/shmem.c | 1 + security/integrity/iint.c | 20 ++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 60 ++++++++++++++----------- security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 10 +++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 19 +++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++- 23 files changed, 231 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
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PATCH v5 1/4 ima: always measure and audit files in policy
All files matching a "measure" rule must be included in the IMA measurement list, even when the file hash cannot be calculated. Similarly, all files matching an "audit" rule must be audited, even when the file hash can not be calculated.
The file data hash field contained in the IMA measurement list template data will contain 0's instead of the actual file hash digest.
---
Changelog v5:
- Fail files opened O_DIRECT, but include attempt in measurement list.
Changelog v4:
- Based on both -EBADF and -EINVAL
- clean up ima_collect_measurement()
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 10 +++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 ++--- 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +35 -25
@@ -199,42 +199,52 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;int result =0 ; +int length; +void *tmpbuf; +u64 i_version;struct {struct ima_digest_data hdr;char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; } hash; -if (!(iint->flags &IMA_COLLECTED )) { -u64 i_version =file_inode (file)->i_version; +if (iint->flags &IMA_COLLECTED ) + goto out; -if (file->f_flags &O_DIRECT ) { - audit_cause ="failed(directio)" ; - result = -EACCES ; - goto out; - } + i_version =file_inode (file)->i_version; + hash.hdr.algo = algo; - hash.hdr.algo = algo; - - result = (!buf) ?ima_calc_file_hash (file, &hash.hdr) : -ima_calc_buffer_hash (buf, size, &hash.hdr); -if (!result) { -int length =sizeof (hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length; -void *tmpbuf =krealloc (iint->ima_hash, length, -GFP_NOFS ); -if (tmpbuf) { - iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf; -memcpy (iint->ima_hash, &hash, length); - iint->version = i_version; - iint->flags |=IMA_COLLECTED ; - }else - result = -ENOMEM ; - } +/* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */ +memset (&hash.digest,0 ,sizeof (hash.digest)); + + result = (!buf) ?ima_calc_file_hash (file, &hash.hdr) : +ima_calc_buffer_hash (buf, size, &hash.hdr); + +if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL ) + goto out; + + length =sizeof (hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length; + tmpbuf =krealloc (iint->ima_hash, length,GFP_NOFS ); +if (!tmpbuf) { + result = -ENOMEM ; + goto out; } + + iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf; +memcpy (iint->ima_hash, &hash, length); + iint->version = i_version; + +/* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. DAX, O_DIRECT) */ +if (result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL ) + iint->flags |=IMA_COLLECTED ; out: -if (result) +if (result) { +if (file->f_flags &O_DIRECT ) + audit_cause ="failed(directio)" ; +integrity_audit_msg (AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA , inode, filename,"collect_data" , audit_cause, result,0 ); + }return result; }
@@ -278,7 +288,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, } result =ima_store_template (entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr); -if (!result || result == -EEXIST ) { +if ((!result || result == -EEXIST ) && !(file->f_flags &O_DIRECT )) { iint->flags |=IMA_MEASURED ; iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +10 -0
@@ -441,6 +441,16 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)loff_t i_size;int rc; +/* +* O_DIRECT not supported for buffered read. For consistency, +* don't support O_DIRECT on DAX either. +*/ +if (file->f_flags &O_DIRECT ) { + hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; + hash->algo = ima_hash_algo; +return -EINVAL ; + } + i_size =i_size_read (file_inode (file));if (ima_ahash_minsize && i_size >= ima_ahash_minsize) {
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +2 -5
@@ -235,11 +235,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, hash_algo =ima_get_hash_algo (xattr_value, xattr_len); rc =ima_collect_measurement (iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo); -if (rc !=0 ) { -if (file->f_flags &O_DIRECT ) - rc = (iint->flags &IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO ) ?0 : -EACCES ; +if (rc !=0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL ) goto out_digsig; - }if (!pathbuf)/* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */ pathname =ima_d_path (&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
@@ -247,7 +244,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,if (action &IMA_MEASURE )ima_store_measurement (iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr); -if (action &IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK ) +if ((rc ==0 ) && (action &IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK )) rc =ima_appraise_measurement (func, iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);if (action &IMA_AUDIT )
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Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] ima: always measure and audit files in policy
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, · line 213
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1
-0+ i_version =file_inode (file)->i_version;
This probably wants a comment that i_version might be unreliable unless the file system supports the change attribute.
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, · line 220
Quoted 2 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +2
-0+ result = (!buf) ?ima_calc_file_hash (file, &hash.hdr) : +ima_calc_buffer_hash (buf, size, &hash.hdr);
Please write this like proper C code:
if (buf) result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr); else result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash) · line 447
Quoted 9 lines
+++
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.csecurity/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +4
-0@@ -441,6 +441,16 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)loff_t i_size;int rc; +/* +* O_DIRECT not supported for buffered read. For consistency, +* don't support O_DIRECT on DAX either. +*/
I can't parse this - O_DIRECT is the opposite of a buffered I/O, including reads.
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, · line 247
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-0+if ((rc ==0 ) && (action &IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK ))
no need for the first set of inner braces.
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Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] ima: always measure and audit files in policy
Quoted 10 lines · Christoph Hellwig
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, · line 213
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1
-0+ i_version =file_inode (file)->i_version;This probably wants a comment that
i_versionmight be unreliable unless the file system supports the change attribute.security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, · line 220
Quoted 2 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +2
-0+ result = (!buf) ?ima_calc_file_hash (file, &hash.hdr) : +ima_calc_buffer_hash (buf, size, &hash.hdr);Please write this like proper C code:
Quoted 4 lines
if (buf) result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr); else result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
Sure
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
+++
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.csecurity/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +0
-0@@ -441,6 +441,16 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)loff_t i_size;int rc;
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash) · line 447
Quoted 4 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +4
-0+/* +* O_DIRECT not supported for buffered read. For consistency, +* don't support O_DIRECT on DAX either. +*/ I can't parse this -
O_DIRECTis the opposite of a buffered I/O, including reads.
Right. I'm trying to differentiate between a file opened with the O_DIRECT flag on a filesystem mounted with/without DAX. ?For consistency, it was recommended to fail both.
Quoted 4 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, · line 247
Quoted 2 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-0+if ((rc ==0 ) && (action &IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK ))no need for the first set of inner braces.
thanks,
Mimi
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PATCH v5 2/4 ima: use fs method to read integrity data
In reply to Mimi ZoharFrom: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Add a new ->integrity_read file operation to read data for integrity hash collection. This is defined to be equivalent to ->read_iter, except that it will be called with the i_rwsem held exclusively.
---
Changelog v5:
- removed ocf2 and gfs2 integrity_read support.
- removed ext4 special case to fail O_DIRECT open for buffered read.
Changelog v4:
- define ext2/4 specific ->integrity_read functions.
- properly fail file open with O_DIRECT on filesystem not mounted with "-o dax".
Changelog v3:
- define simple_read_iter_from_buffer
- replace the existing efivarfs ->read method with ->read_iter method.
- squashed other fs definitions of ->integrity_read with this patch.
Changelog v2:
- change iovec to kvec
Changelog v1:
- update the patch description, removing the concept that the presence of ->integrity_read indicates that the file system can support IMA. (Mimi)
fs/btrfs/file.c | 1 + fs/efivarfs/file.c | 12 +++++++----- fs/ext2/file.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ fs/ext4/file.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ fs/f2fs/file.c | 1 + fs/jffs2/file.c | 1 + fs/jfs/file.c | 1 + fs/libfs.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/nilfs2/file.c | 1 + fs/ramfs/file-mmu.c | 1 + fs/ramfs/file-nommu.c | 1 + fs/ubifs/file.c | 1 + fs/xfs/xfs_file.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 3 +++ mm/shmem.c | 1 + security/integrity/iint.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 16 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/file.c +1 -0
@@ -3125,6 +3125,7 @@ const struct file_operations btrfs_file_operations = {#endif .clone_file_range = btrfs_clone_file_range, .dedupe_file_range = btrfs_dedupe_file_range, + .integrity_read = generic_file_read_iter, };void btrfs_auto_defrag_exit (void )
fs/efivarfs/file.c +7 -5
@@ -64,9 +64,10 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file,return bytes; } -static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read (struct file *file,char __user *userbuf, -size_t count,loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read_iter (struct kiocb *iocb, +struct iov_iter *iter) { +struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;struct efivar_entry *var = file->private_data;unsigned long datasize =0 ;u32 attributes;
@@ -96,8 +97,8 @@ static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf, goto out_free;memcpy (data, &attributes,sizeof (attributes)); - size =simple_read_from_buffer (userbuf, count, ppos, - data, datasize +sizeof (attributes)); + size =simple_read_iter_from_buffer (iocb, iter, data, + datasize +sizeof (attributes)); out_free:kfree (data);
@@ -174,8 +175,9 @@ efivarfs_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long p)const struct file_operations efivarfs_file_operations = { .open = simple_open, - .read = efivarfs_file_read, + .read_iter = efivarfs_file_read_iter, .write = efivarfs_file_write, .llseek = no_llseek, .unlocked_ioctl = efivarfs_file_ioctl, + .integrity_read = efivarfs_file_read_iter, };
fs/ext2/file.c +17 -0
@@ -192,6 +192,22 @@ static ssize_t ext2_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to)return generic_file_read_iter (iocb, to); } +static ssize_t ext2_file_integrity_read_iter (struct kiocb *iocb, +struct iov_iter *to) +{ +struct inode *inode =file_inode (iocb->ki_filp); + +lockdep_assert_held (&inode->i_rwsem); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX +if (!iov_iter_count (to)) +return 0 ;/* skip atime */ + +if (IS_DAX (iocb->ki_filp->f_mapping->host)) +return dax_iomap_rw (iocb, to, &ext2_iomap_ops); +#endif +return generic_file_read_iter (iocb, to); +} +static ssize_t ext2_file_write_iter (struct kiocb *iocb,struct iov_iter *from) {#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX
@@ -216,6 +232,7 @@ const struct file_operations ext2_file_operations = { .get_unmapped_area = thp_get_unmapped_area, .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read, .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write, + .integrity_read = ext2_file_integrity_read_iter, };const struct inode_operations ext2_file_inode_operations = {
fs/ext4/file.c +20 -0
@@ -74,6 +74,25 @@ static ssize_t ext4_file_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to)return generic_file_read_iter (iocb, to); } +static ssize_t ext4_file_integrity_read_iter (struct kiocb *iocb, +struct iov_iter *to) +{ +struct inode *inode =file_inode (iocb->ki_filp); + +lockdep_assert_held (&inode->i_rwsem); +if (unlikely (ext4_forced_shutdown (EXT4_SB (inode->i_sb)))) +return -EIO ; + +if (!iov_iter_count (to)) +return 0 ;/* skip atime */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX +if (IS_DAX (inode)) +return dax_iomap_rw (iocb, to, &ext4_iomap_ops); +#endif +return generic_file_read_iter (iocb, to); +} +/* * Called when an inode is released. Note that this is different * from ext4_file_open: open gets called at every open, but release
@@ -747,6 +766,7 @@ const struct file_operations ext4_file_operations = { .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read, .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write, .fallocate = ext4_fallocate, + .integrity_read = ext4_file_integrity_read_iter, };const struct inode_operations ext4_file_inode_operations = {
fs/f2fs/file.c +1 -0
@@ -2514,4 +2514,5 @@ const struct file_operations f2fs_file_operations = {#endif .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read, .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write, + .integrity_read = generic_file_read_iter, };
fs/jffs2/file.c +1 -0
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ const struct file_operations jffs2_file_operations = .mmap = generic_file_readonly_mmap, .fsync = jffs2_fsync, .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read, + .integrity_read = generic_file_read_iter, };/* jffs2_file_inode_operations */
fs/jfs/file.c +1 -0
@@ -162,4 +162,5 @@ const struct file_operations jfs_file_operations = {#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT .compat_ioctl = jfs_compat_ioctl, #endif + .integrity_read = generic_file_read_iter, };
fs/libfs.c +32 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@#include <linux/exportfs.h> #include <linux/writeback.h> #include <linux/buffer_head.h> /* sync_mapping_buffers */ +#include <linux/uio.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -676,6 +677,37 @@ ssize_t simple_write_to_buffer(void *to, size_t available, loff_t *ppos,EXPORT_SYMBOL (simple_write_to_buffer);/** +* simple_read_iter_from_buffer - copy data from the buffer to user space +* @iocb: struct containing the file, the current position and other info +* @to: the user space buffer to read to +* @from: the buffer to read from +* @available: the size of the buffer +* +* The simple_read_iter_from_buffer() function reads up to @available bytes +* from the current buffer into the user space buffer. +* +* On success, the current buffer offset is advanced by the number of bytes +* read, or a negative value is returned on error. +**/ +ssize_t simple_read_iter_from_buffer (struct kiocb *iocb,struct iov_iter *to, +const void *from,size_t available) +{ +loff_t pos = iocb->ki_pos; +size_t ret; + +if (pos <0 ) +return -EINVAL ; +if (pos >= available) +return 0 ; + ret =copy_to_iter (from + pos, available - pos, to); +if (!ret &&iov_iter_count (to)) +return -EFAULT ; + iocb->ki_pos = pos + ret; +return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (simple_read_iter_from_buffer); + +/** * memory_read_from_buffer - copy data from the buffer * @to: the kernel space buffer to read to * @count: the maximum number of bytes to read
fs/nilfs2/file.c +1 -0
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ const struct file_operations nilfs_file_operations = {/* .release = nilfs_release_file, */ .fsync = nilfs_sync_file, .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read, + .integrity_read = generic_file_read_iter, };const struct inode_operations nilfs_file_inode_operations = {
fs/ramfs/file-mmu.c +1 -0
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ const struct file_operations ramfs_file_operations = { .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, .get_unmapped_area = ramfs_mmu_get_unmapped_area, + .integrity_read = generic_file_read_iter, };const struct inode_operations ramfs_file_inode_operations = {
fs/ramfs/file-nommu.c +1 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ const struct file_operations ramfs_file_operations = { .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read, .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, + .integrity_read = generic_file_read_iter, };const struct inode_operations ramfs_file_inode_operations = {
fs/ubifs/file.c +1 -0
@@ -1747,4 +1747,5 @@ const struct file_operations ubifs_file_operations = {#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT .compat_ioctl = ubifs_compat_ioctl, #endif + .integrity_read = generic_file_read_iter, };
fs/xfs/xfs_file.c +21 -0
@@ -292,6 +292,26 @@ xfs_file_read_iter(return ret; } +static ssize_t +xfs_integrity_read ( +struct kiocb *iocb, +struct iov_iter *to) +{ +struct inode *inode =file_inode (iocb->ki_filp); +struct xfs_mount *mp =XFS_I (inode)->i_mount; + +lockdep_assert_held (&inode->i_rwsem); + +XFS_STATS_INC (mp, xs_read_calls); + +if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN (mp)) +return -EIO ; + +if (IS_DAX (inode)) +return dax_iomap_rw (iocb, to, &xfs_iomap_ops); +return generic_file_read_iter (iocb, to); +} +/* * Zero any on disk space between the current EOF and the new, larger EOF. *
@@ -1175,6 +1195,7 @@ const struct file_operations xfs_file_operations = { .fallocate = xfs_file_fallocate, .clone_file_range = xfs_file_clone_range, .dedupe_file_range = xfs_file_dedupe_range, + .integrity_read = xfs_integrity_read, };const struct file_operations xfs_dir_file_operations = {
include/linux/fs.h +3 -0
@@ -1699,6 +1699,7 @@ struct file_operations { u64);ssize_t (*dedupe_file_range)(struct file *,u64 ,u64 ,struct file *,u64 ); +ssize_t (*integrity_read)(struct kiocb *,struct iov_iter *); } __randomize_layout;struct inode_operations {
@@ -3097,6 +3098,8 @@ extern void simple_release_fs(struct vfsmount **mount, int *count);extern ssize_t simple_read_from_buffer (void __user *to,size_t count,loff_t *ppos,const void *from,size_t available); +extern ssize_t simple_read_iter_from_buffer (struct kiocb *iocb, +struct iov_iter *to,const void *from,size_t available);extern ssize_t simple_write_to_buffer (void *to,size_t available,loff_t *ppos,const void __user *from,size_t count);
mm/shmem.c +1 -0
@@ -3849,6 +3849,7 @@ static const struct file_operations shmem_file_operations = { .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read, .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write, .fallocate = shmem_fallocate, + .integrity_read = shmem_file_read_iter,#endif };
security/integrity/iint.c +14 -6
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@#include <linux/rbtree.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/uio.h> #include "integrity.h" static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree =RB_ROOT ;
@@ -184,18 +185,25 @@ security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init);int integrity_kernel_read (struct file *file,loff_t offset,void *addr,unsigned long count) { -mm_segment_t old_fs; -char __user *buf = (char __user *)addr; +struct inode *inode =file_inode (file); +struct kvec iov = { .iov_base = addr, .iov_len = count }; +struct kiocb kiocb; +struct iov_iter iter;ssize_t ret; +lockdep_assert_held (&inode->i_rwsem); +if (!(file->f_mode &FMODE_READ ))return -EBADF ; +if (!file->f_op->integrity_read) +return -EBADF ; - old_fs =get_fs (); -set_fs (get_ds ()); - ret =__vfs_read (file, buf, count, &offset); -set_fs (old_fs); +init_sync_kiocb (&kiocb, file); + kiocb.ki_pos = offset; +iov_iter_kvec (&iter,READ |ITER_KVEC , &iov,1 , count); + ret = file->f_op->integrity_read (&kiocb, &iter); +BUG_ON (ret == -EIOCBQUEUED );return ret; }
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Re: [PATCH v5 2/4] ima: use fs method to read integrity data
Quoted 7 lines · Mimi Zohar
From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Add a new ->integrity_read file operation to read data for integrity hash collection. This is defined to be equivalent to ->read_iter, except that it will be called with the
i_rwsemheld exclusively.Signed-off-by Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Btw, most of this is yours now, feel free to take over the authorship with a little credit to me for the initial patch if you want.
Quoted 1 line
Cc Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
I don't think that will reach Matthew anymore :)
fs/efivarfs/file.c static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file, · line 68
Quoted 4 lines
fs/efivarfs/file.c +2
-2-static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read (struct file *file,char __user *userbuf, -size_t count,loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read_iter (struct kiocb *iocb, +struct iov_iter *iter)
The efivars switch to read_iter should be a separate patch before this one.
Quoted 13 lines
/**
+ *simple_read_iter_from_buffer- copy data from the buffer to user space
+ * @iocb: struct containing the file, the current position and other info
+ * @to: the user space buffer to read to
+ * @from: the buffer to read from
+ * @available: the size of the buffer
+ *
+ * Thesimple_read_iter_from_buffer()function reads up to @available bytes
+ * from the current buffer into the user space buffer.
+ *
+ * On success, the current buffer offset is advanced by the number of bytes
+ * read, or a negative value is returned on error.
+ **/
fs/libfs.c ssize_t simple_write_to_buffer(void *to, size_t available, loff_t *ppos, · line 693
Quoted 2 lines
fs/libfs.c +2
-0+ssize_t simple_read_iter_from_buffer (struct kiocb *iocb,struct iov_iter *to, +const void *from,size_t available)
The addition of simple_read_iter_from_buffer should be another separate patch, before efivars starts using it.
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Re: [PATCH v5 2/4] ima: use fs method to read integrity data
Quoted 11 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 7 lines · Mimi Zohar
From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Add a new ->integrity_read file operation to read data for integrity hash collection. This is defined to be equivalent to ->read_iter, except that it will be called with the
i_rwsemheld exclusively.Signed-off-by Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>Btw, most of this is yours now, feel free to take over the authorship with a little credit to me for the initial patch if you want.
Thank you so much for the initial design and patch!
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Cc Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>I don't think that will reach Matthew anymore :)
Trying his other address as listed in MAINTAINERS.
Quoted 8 lines
fs/efivarfs/file.c static ssize_t efivarfs_file_write(struct file *file, · line 68
Quoted 5 lines
fs/efivarfs/file.c +2
-2-static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read (struct file *file,char __user *userbuf, -size_t count,loff_t *ppos) +static ssize_t efivarfs_file_read_iter (struct kiocb *iocb, +struct iov_iter *iter)The efivars switch to
read_itershould be a separate patch before this one.
Agreed
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
/**
+ *simple_read_iter_from_buffer- copy data from the buffer to user space
+ * @iocb: struct containing the file, the current position and other info
+ * @to: the user space buffer to read to
+ * @from: the buffer to read from
+ * @available: the size of the buffer
+ *
+ * Thesimple_read_iter_from_buffer()function reads up to @available bytes
+ * from the current buffer into the user space buffer.
+ *
Quoted 8 lines
fs/libfs.c ssize_t simple_write_to_buffer(void *to, size_t available, loff_t *ppos, · line 693
Quoted 5 lines
+ * On success, the current buffer offset is advanced by the number of bytes
+ * read, or a negative value is returned on error.
+ **/fs/libfs.c +2
-0+ssize_t simple_read_iter_from_buffer (struct kiocb *iocb,struct iov_iter *to, +const void *from,size_t available)The addition of
simple_read_iter_from_buffershould be another separate patch, before efivars starts using it.
Agreed
Mimi
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Re: [PATCH v5 2/4] ima: use fs method to read integrity data
Quoted 8 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 7 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 6 lines · Mimi Zohar
From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Add a new ->integrity_read file operation to read data for integrity hash collection. This is defined to be equivalent to ->read_iter, except that it will be called with the
i_rwsemheld exclusively.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>Btw, most of this is yours now, feel free to take over the authorship with a little credit to me for the initial patch if you want.
Thank you so much for the initial design and patch!
After moving the libfs and efivarfs code to separate patches, the patch hasn't changed all that much, just additional file systems. ?If you don't object, I'll leave you as the author.
Mimi
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Re: [PATCH v5 2/4] ima: use fs method to read integrity data
Quoted 3 lines · Mimi Zohar
After moving the libfs and efivarfs code to separate patches, the patch hasn't changed all that much, just additional file systems. ?If you don't object, I'll leave you as the author.
Sure - feel free to handle it whichever way you want.
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PATCH v5 3/4 ima: define "dont_failsafe" policy action rule
In reply to Mimi ZoharPermit normally denied access/execute permission for files in policy on IMA unsupported filesystems. This patch defines the "dont_failsafe" policy action rule.
---
Changelog v3:
- include dont_failsafe rule when displaying policy
- fail attempt to add dont_failsafe rule when appending to the policy
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 12 +++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +2 -1
@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ Description: rule format: action [condition ...] - action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit + action: measure | dont_meaure | appraise | dont_appraise | + audit | dont_failsafe condition:= base | lsm [option] base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=] [euid=] [fowner=]]
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -0
@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos);void *ima_policy_next (struct seq_file *m,void *v,loff_t *pos);void ima_policy_stop (struct seq_file *m,void *v);int ima_policy_show (struct seq_file *m,void *v); +void set_failsafe (bool flag);/* Appraise integrity measurements */ #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +11 -1
@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ int ima_appraise;int ima_hash_algo =HASH_ALGO_SHA1 ;static int hash_setup_done; +static bool ima_failsafe =1 ; +void set_failsafe (bool flag) +{ + ima_failsafe = flag; +} +static int __init hash_setup (char *str) {struct ima_template_desc *template_desc =ima_template_desc_current ();
@@ -260,8 +266,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,__putname (pathbuf); out:inode_unlock (inode); -if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise &IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE )) +if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise &IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE )) { +if (!ima_failsafe && rc == -EBADF ) +return 0 ; +return -EACCES ; + }return 0 ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +28 -1
@@ -40,12 +40,14 @@#define APPRAISE 0x0004/* same as IMA_APPRAISE */ #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008#define AUDIT 0x0040 +#define DONT_FAILSAFE 0x0400#define INVALID_PCR (a) (((a) < 0) || \ (a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))int ima_policy_flag;static int temp_ima_appraise; +static bool temp_failsafe =1 ;#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6enum lsm_rule_types {LSM_OBJ_USER ,LSM_OBJ_ROLE ,LSM_OBJ_TYPE ,
@@ -513,6 +515,9 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)if (ima_rules != policy) { ima_policy_flag =0 ; ima_rules = policy; + +/* Only update on initial policy replacement, not append */ +set_failsafe (temp_failsafe); }ima_update_policy_flag (); }
@@ -529,7 +534,7 @@ enum { Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt, Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio, - Opt_pcr + Opt_pcr, Opt_dont_failsafe }; static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -560,6 +565,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"}, {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"}, {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, + {Opt_dont_failsafe, "dont_failsafe"}, {Opt_err, NULL} };
@@ -630,6 +636,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)if ((*p =='\0' ) || (*p ==' ' ) || (*p =='\t' ))continue ; token =match_token (p, policy_tokens, args); +if (entry->action ==DONT_FAILSAFE ) { +/* no args permitted, force invalid rule */ + token = Opt_dont_failsafe; + } +switch (token) {case Opt_measure:ima_log_string (ab,"action" ,"measure" );
@@ -671,6 +682,19 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->action =AUDIT ;break ; +case Opt_dont_failsafe: +ima_log_string (ab,"action" ,"dont_failsafe" ); + +if (entry->action !=UNKNOWN ) + result = -EINVAL ; + +/* Permit on initial policy replacement only */ +if (ima_rules != &ima_policy_rules) + temp_failsafe =0 ; +else + result = -EINVAL ; + entry->action =DONT_FAILSAFE ; +break ;case Opt_func:ima_log_string (ab,"func" , args[0 ].from);
@@ -949,6 +973,7 @@ void ima_delete_rules(void)int i; temp_ima_appraise =0 ; + temp_failsafe =1 ;list_for_each_entry_safe (entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++)kfree (entry->lsm[i].args_p);
@@ -1040,6 +1065,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)seq_puts (m,pt (Opt_dont_appraise));if (entry->action &AUDIT )seq_puts (m,pt (Opt_audit)); +if (entry->action &DONT_FAILSAFE ) +seq_puts (m,pt (Opt_dont_failsafe));seq_puts (m," " );
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PATCH v5 4/4 ima: define "fs_unsafe" builtin policy
In reply to Mimi ZoharPermit normally denied access/execute permission for files in policy on IMA unsupported filesystems. This patch defines "fs_unsafe", a builtin policy.
---
Changelog v3:
- include dont_failsafe rule when displaying policy
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +7 -1
@@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ ima_policy= [IMA] The builtin policies to load during IMA setup. - Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb | secure_boot" + Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb | secure_boot | fs_unsafe" The "tcb" policy measures all programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files opened with the read
@@ -1517,6 +1517,12 @@ of files (eg. kexec kernel image, kernel modules, firmware, policy, etc) based on file signatures. + The "fs_unsafe" policy permits normally denied + access/execute permission for files in policy on IMA + unsupported filesystems. Note this option, as the + name implies, is not safe and not recommended for + any environments other than testing. + ima_tcb [IMA] Deprecated. Use ima_policy= instead. Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted Computing Base. This means IMA will measure all
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +12 -0
@@ -169,6 +169,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; +static struct ima_rule_entry dont_failsafe_rules[]__ro_after_init = { + {.action =DONT_FAILSAFE } +}; +static LIST_HEAD (ima_default_rules);static LIST_HEAD (ima_policy_rules);static LIST_HEAD (ima_temp_rules);
@@ -188,6 +192,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb__initdata ;static bool ima_use_secure_boot__initdata ; +static bool ima_use_dont_failsafe__initdata ;static int __init policy_setup (char *str) {char *p;
@@ -201,6 +206,10 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) ima_use_appraise_tcb =1 ; else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) ima_use_secure_boot =1 ; + else if (strcmp(p, "fs_unsafe") == 0) { + ima_use_dont_failsafe = 1; + set_failsafe(0); + } }return 1 ;
@@ -470,6 +479,9 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) temp_ima_appraise |=IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY ; } +if (ima_use_dont_failsafe) +list_add_tail (&dont_failsafe_rules[0 ].list, &ima_default_rules); + ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;ima_update_policy_flag (); }
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