Avoid illegal memory access when malformed data is read from the pipe
PATCH 1/1 Avoid illegal memory access when malformed data is read from the pipe
From: Selva Nair <[email protected]...>
- If only 1 byte is read from the interactive service client pipe, that evaluates to zero wide characters and subsequent check for NUL termination in the data buffer segfaults.
Fix: reject clients that send less than a complete wide character.
--- src/openvpnserv/interactive.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
src/openvpnserv/interactive.c +7 -0
@@ -466,6 +466,13 @@ GetStartupData(HANDLE pipe, STARTUP_DATA *sud) } size = bytes /sizeof (*data); +if (size ==0 ) + { +MsgToEventLog (M_SYSERR ,TEXT ("malformed startup data: 1 byte received" )); +ReturnError (pipe,ERROR_STARTUP_DATA ,L"GetStartupData" ,1 , &exit_event); + goto out; + } + data =malloc (bytes);if (data ==NULL ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.6.2
Hi,
Quoted 6 lines · On Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 01:25:56PM -0400, [email protected]... wrote:
From: Selva Nair <[email protected]...>
- If only 1 byte is read from the interactive service client pipe, that evaluates to zero wide characters and subsequent check for NUL termination in the data buffer segfaults.
Fix: reject clients that send less than a complete wide character.
ACK.
(Not merging right now due to time constraints, but the patch does what it says on the lid - thanks)
gert
Signature · 4 lines
USENET is *not* the non-clickable part of WWW!
//www.muc.de/~gert/
Gert Doering - Munich, Germany [email protected]...
fax: +49-89-35655025 [email protected]...ACK, and now with time to merge :-)
Your patch has been applied to the master and release/2.4 branch.
commit 6f20808c8f37301c43d822f6a22d30b3587abc57 (master) commit 17884fa4ab2b3113559542404704402e5fce7643 (release/2.4)
Author: Selva Nair Date: Fri Oct 20 13:25:56 2017 -0400
Avoid illegal memory access when malformed data is read from the pipe
Signed-off-by: Selva Nair <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg15657.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering