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Patch "x86/kasan: Write protect kasan zero shadow" has been added to the 4.4-stable tree

PATCH [email protected] 1 participant 1 message Jan 5, 2018

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This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

x86/kasan: Write protect kasan zero shadow

to the 4.4-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
x86-kasan-write-protect-kasan-zero-shadow.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.4 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <[email protected]> know about it.

Quoted 1 line

From 063fb3e56f6dd29b2633b678b837e1d904200e6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 15:51:19 +0300
Subject: x86/kasan: Write protect kasan zero shadow

From: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>

commit 063fb3e56f6dd29b2633b678b837e1d904200e6f upstream.

After kasan_init() executed, no one is allowed to write to kasan_zero_page, so write protect it.

Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Luis R. Rodriguez <[email protected]>
Cc Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Toshi Kani <[email protected]>
Cc Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c |   10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c +8 -2
@@ -126,10 +126,16 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
 
 	/*
 	 * kasan_zero_page has been used as early shadow memory, thus it may
-	 * contain some garbage. Now we can clear it, since after the TLB flush
-	 * no one should write to it.
+	 * contain some garbage. Now we can clear and write protect it, since
+	 * after the TLB flush no one should write to it.
 	 */
 	memset(kasan_zero_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) {
+		pte_t pte = __pte(__pa(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+		set_pte(&kasan_zero_pte[i], pte);
+	}
+	/* Flush TLBs again to be sure that write protection applied. */
+	__flush_tlb_all();
 
 	init_task.kasan_depth = 0;
 	pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");

Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email protected] are

queue-4.4/x86-kasan-write-protect-kasan-zero-shadow.patch