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Patch "x86/efi: Clarify that reset attack mitigation needs appropriate userspace" has been added to the 4.15-stable tree

PATCH [email protected] 1 participant 1 message Feb 2, 2018

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This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

x86/efi: Clarify that reset attack mitigation needs appropriate userspace

to the 4.15-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
x86-efi-clarify-that-reset-attack-mitigation-needs-appropriate-userspace.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.15 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree, please let <[email protected]> know about it.

Quoted 1 line

From a5c03c31af2291f13689d11760c0b59fb70c9a5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2018 09:10:02 +0000
Subject: x86/efi: Clarify that reset attack mitigation needs appropriate userspace

From: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

commit a5c03c31af2291f13689d11760c0b59fb70c9a5a upstream.

Some distributions have turned on the reset attack mitigation feature, which is designed to force the platform to clear the contents of RAM if the machine is shut down uncleanly. However, in order for the platform to be able to determine whether the shutdown was clean or not, userspace has to be configured to clear the MemoryOverwriteRequest flag on shutdown - otherwise the firmware will end up clearing RAM on every reboot, which is unnecessarily time consuming. Add some additional clarity to the kconfig text to reduce the risk of systems being configured this way.

---
 drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig +4 -1
@@ -159,7 +159,10 @@ config RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION
 	  using the TCG Platform Reset Attack Mitigation specification. This
 	  protects against an attacker forcibly rebooting the system while it
 	  still contains secrets in RAM, booting another OS and extracting the
-	  secrets.
+	  secrets. This should only be enabled when userland is configured to
+	  clear the MemoryOverwriteRequest flag on clean shutdown after secrets
+	  have been evicted, since otherwise it will trigger even on clean
+	  reboots.
 
 endmenu
 

Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from [email protected] are

queue-4.15/x86-efi-clarify-that-reset-attack-mitigation-needs-appropriate-userspace.patch