Apply BP hardening for IRQs, PC alignment and Debug faults
cover Apply BP hardening for IRQs, PC alignment and Debug faults
Hi Marc,
Please can you include these two in your BP hardening series? Dan pointed out that there are a few exception types that could come in before the instruction abort, so we need to make sure we catch them too.
Cheers,
Will
--->8
Will Deacon (2):
arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous
exceptions
arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 10 +++++++++- arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.1.4
PATCH 1/2 arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous exceptions
Software-step and PC alignment fault exceptions have higher priority than instruction abort exceptions, so apply the BP hardening hooks there too if the user PC appears to reside in kernel space.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 5 ++++- arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +4 -1
@@ -766,7 +766,10 @@ el0_sp_pc: * Stack or PC alignment exception handling */ mrs x26, far_el1 - enable_daif + enable_da_f +#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS + bl trace_hardirqs_off +#endif ct_user_exit mov x0, x26 mov x1, x25
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +9 -0
@@ -732,6 +732,12 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_sp_pc_abort(unsigned long addr,struct siginfo info;struct task_struct *tsk = current; +if (user_mode (regs)) { +if (instruction_pointer (regs) >TASK_SIZE ) +arm64_apply_bp_hardening (); +local_irq_enable (); + } +if (show_unhandled_signals &&unhandled_signal (tsk,SIGBUS )) pr_info_ratelimited("%s[%d]: %s exception: pc=%p sp=%p\n", tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
@@ -791,6 +797,9 @@ asmlinkage int __exception do_debug_exception(unsigned long addr,if (interrupts_enabled (regs))trace_hardirqs_off (); +if (user_mode (regs) &&instruction_pointer (regs) >TASK_SIZE ) +arm64_apply_bp_hardening (); +if (!inf->fn (addr, esr, regs)) { rv =1 ; }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.1.4
PATCH 1/2 arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous exceptions
Quoted 6 lines · Will Deacon
Software-step and PC alignment fault exceptions have higher priority than instruction abort exceptions, so apply the BP hardening hooks there too if the user PC appears to reside in kernel space.
Reported-by Dan Hettena <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>
M.
Signature · 1 line
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...
PATCH 2/2 arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0
In reply to Will DeaconIt is possible to take an IRQ from EL0 following a branch to a kernel address in such a way that the IRQ is prioritised over the instruction abort. Whilst an attacker would need to get the starts to align here, it might be sufficient with enough calibration so perform BP hardening in the rare case that we see a kernel address in the ELR when handling an IRQ from EL0.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +5 -0
@@ -827,6 +827,11 @@ el0_irq_naked: #endif ct_user_exit +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + tbz x22, #55, 1f + bl do_el0_irq_bp_hardening +1: +#endif irq_handler #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +6 -0
@@ -708,6 +708,12 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,arm64_notify_die ("" , regs, &info, esr); } +asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_irq_bp_hardening(void) +{ +/* PC has already been checked in entry.S */ +arm64_apply_bp_hardening (); +} + asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_ia_bp_hardening(unsigned long addr,unsigned int esr,struct pt_regs *regs)
Signature · 1 line
2.1.4
PATCH 2/2 arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0
Quoted 9 lines · Will Deacon
It is possible to take an IRQ from EL0 following a branch to a kernel address in such a way that the IRQ is prioritised over the instruction abort. Whilst an attacker would need to get the starts to align here, it might be sufficient with enough calibration so perform BP hardening in the rare case that we see a kernel address in the ELR when handling an IRQ from EL0.
Reported-by Dan Hettena <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>
M.
Signature · 1 line
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...
PATCH 2/2 arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0
In reply to Will DeaconQuoted 3 lines · Will Deacon
It is possible to take an IRQ from EL0 following a branch to a kernel address in such a way that the IRQ is prioritised over the instruction abort. Whilst an attacker would need to get the starts to align here,
Nit: I'm guessing that should probably be "stars", but given the context of a theoretical race between a BP training sequence and an IRQ-generating sequence, there's a little doubt left ;)
Robin.
Quoted 45 lines
it might be sufficient with enough calibration so perform BP hardening in the rare case that we see a kernel address in the ELR when handling an IRQ from EL0.
Reported-by Dan Hettena <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 5 +++++ arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +5
-0@@ -827,6 +827,11 @@ el0_irq_naked: #endif ct_user_exit +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR + tbz x22, #55, 1f + bl do_el0_irq_bp_hardening +1: +#endif irq_handler #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGSarch/arm64/mm/fault.c +6
-0@@ -708,6 +708,12 @@ asmlinkage void __exception do_mem_abort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,arm64_notify_die ("" , regs, &info, esr); } +asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_irq_bp_hardening(void) +{ +/* PC has already been checked in entry.S */ +arm64_apply_bp_hardening (); +} + asmlinkage void __exception do_el0_ia_bp_hardening(unsigned long addr,unsigned int esr,struct pt_regs *regs)